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Abstract 
 This study investigated the processes of identity formation among those who identified as 
Rwandan and lived in the Greater Toronto Area. The study was conducted using in-depth 
qualitative interviews and ethnographic participant observation. It argues that those who 
identified as Rwandan in the GTA were subject to powerful discourses of simultaneous 
belonging and non-belonging in both the Canadian and the Rwandan state. The extreme violence 
of the Rwandan genocide ruptured the bonds of belonging that had tied those who identified as 
Rwandan to each other and to the Rwandan state. Since 1994, the new Rwandan state had 
developed a powerful mythico-history that proposed that all those who are identified as Hutu are 
perpetual perpetrators and all those who are identified as Tutsi are perpetual victims, even as it 
had denied that the identities of Hutu and Tutsi continued to exist. The re-telling and re-enacting 
of this mythico-history became the condition of belonging to the newly created diaspora and the 
Rwandan state. Simultaneously, ambivalent welcome and racialization that those who identified 
as Rwandan faced in Canada, and, specifically, the GTA, generated an anxiety and an awareness 
that they could only partially belong in the new homeland. Thus, the exclusion of the Canadian 
state generated a desire for the imagined homeland and enabled the Rwandan state to create a 
diaspora. Yet, those who were defined as part of the Rwandan diaspora negotiated and navigated 
the terms of their belonging/non-belonging in both Canada and in Rwanda. Even as they were 
they were racialized by the Canadian state and framed as both desirable and threatening by the 
Rwandan state, those who identified as Rwandan in the GTA built a sense of home and 
belonging in Canada. They simultaneously became a diaspora and rooted themselves in the new 
homeland of Canada. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Interviewer: How do you define yourself? 
Janvier: That’s a question I struggle with all the time. I’ve been here since ’86, so, my adult life 
 really tends to make me a Canadian. And my children, who are born here, they are 
 Canadian in all their thoughts and everything else. So it’s not easy, much as I love 
 Rwanda, to uproot myself from here, I know my kids would not go back, I had wanted to 
 go there in [...] we were there, I didn’t get enough, or I didn’t get support from my 
 family. I realize, I can go back no problem, but I again, I say that, most of who I am, is 
 here. 
Interviewer: Well, you’ve already hinted at this, but to what extent do you feel that you belong to 
 Rwanda or belong in Rwanda? 
Janvier: Great extent, great extent. I’m a Rwandese. And the fact that, it may be psychological, 
 having been stateless for that long in other African countries, the fact that now I can hold 
 a Rwandan passport makes me feel deeply psychologically involved with that country 
 because it’s like something we never had. I used to carry stateless travel documents. If 
 you carry that, that document, I can tell you, say you reach Heathrow airport—the way 
 you are treated, it’s like you are a criminal. You cannot be allowed to wander in the 
 airport, you don’t know, again this goes to Canada, you don’t know how proud I was, 
 holding a Canadian passport, going to Rwanda, through Heathrow airport, those 
 immigration officers wishing me to have a nice day sir, a nice day sir. The same joe who 
 in a couple of years had a stateless travel documents and was treated as a criminal, now 
 having a Canadian passport, ohhh, it was so sweet. Very sweet, very sweet. So being a 
 Rwandese again, having a passport is a wonderful thing, so nice.  
Interviewer: How do you define yourself? 
Christophe: Because this also, because at some point we will go and, I don’t know how long we 
 will take, but it will come to reality where actually we will find that we are the same. So 
 those Rwanda, DRC, those conflicts to me, they are no sense, ‘cause those they are 
 definitions. Those are definitions, but if we go back in history, we might find that we are 
 all brothers and we are all one, and actually we should have one target. So that’s how I, 
 you know, to myself, I define myself as a human being. Yeah, ‘cause sometimes I take 
 like Rwanda, Africa, you know those are, all, geographical criteria. Unless you send me 
 geographically, how do you define me? But to me, as a, I, I, define myself as a human 
 being. Who wouldn’t give an opportunity to a Rwandan, maybe, let’s say I’m CEO of a 
 company and I would say, you know,  let’s meet you and you qualify for a position that’s 
 available in my company, I wouldn’t say you know this is the number one is Rwandan, 
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 number two is African, number three is a Canadian. I would, you know, look at the 
 performance of everybody, so that is why I say I define myself as a human who would 
 not go by nationality, or ethnic lines, or whatever. I know those things are everywhere.  
Interviewer: To what extant do you feel that you belong in Rwanda, when you visit, or when you 
 think about it? 
Seraphine: Ummm, 20%? I feel Canadian, like I’m I’m a Canadian, I feel like this is my home. 
 Umm, the transit, like, like in the first few years when I just got here, I was still back in 
 Rwanda, ‘cause I was not sure what’s here, how, how do I integrate here, how do I come 
 around and feel at home, but after those years, after now, I don’t, I just, when I go to 
 Rwanda I feel like I’m a visitor. A visitor who is excited to see how the country is 
 progressing, to see how, what has happened, but I don’t feel like I’m there, I’m part of 
 them. I don’t feel like I’m Rwandese. [laughs a bit nervously] I am Rwandese, but at the 
 same time, I would love to visit and then come back.  
Interviewer: So when you migrated you were comfortable identifying as Rwandese? 
Theodore: Yes I was, when I migrated in 1992 I wish I could go to Rwanda directly, before I 
 came to Canada, but at that time I couldn’t do that, so that’s why I went back. At my age 
 now, what I have and what I can contribute, that’s what I have to do now because the 
 country’s in my heart now, so what I can do for a little boy or a small girl in the country, 
 so what I can do.  Yeah, let’s me do my part, my contribution and I will do it, I will teach 
 my son, or my daughter, anybody around me to help. Not only Rwanda, yeah, Africa too, 
 that’s why I’m doing things not only for Rwanda, it’s for Africa too. 
Interviewer: How do you identify yourself? 
Theodosia: I am Rwandese, period. And I have my IDs as Rwandese and I have my passport as 
 Rwandese, so I keep that because Canada accepts dual citizenship, so that’s where I 
 belong. I’m here, I’m Canadian, I have my passport. I cross the border, I go to Kigali, I’m 
 Rwandese, I show my Rwandese passport.  
Why did the people quoted above perceive themselves as belonging to a group? They shared 
little in common; one was born in Uganda, one in Rwanda, and one in Burundi; one migrated to 
Canada 27 years ago, one 13 years ago, and one 3 years ago; one was educated in Egypt, one in 
Rwanda, and one in Canada. They shared skin colour, yet they also resembled African-
Americans, Caribbeans, Sub-Saharan Africans. They shared a language spoken by about 15 
million people worldwide—Kinyarwanda, but not all members of this supposed group spoke 
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Kinyarwanda. Indeed, most of the youth of this group barely understood the language and did 
not speak it.  Yet, despite the incongruences of their experiences and subjectivities, all of the 
above individuals identified as members of a Rwandan diaspora residing in the Greater Toronto 
Area (GTA) and in some cases Hamilton, Canada.  
This dissertation studied the processes of identity formation among the Rwandan 
diaspora in the GTA. It argues that those who identified as Rwandan in the GTA actively 
participated in the process of making a collective identity, even as the Rwandan state called into 
being a diaspora and, in doing so, actively excluded those whom the state deemed as threatening. 
Simultaneously, the ambivalent welcome that they experienced in the new homeland, Canada, 
meant that neither Rwanda nor Canada could be an easy home; yet, even as they became a 
diaspora, they built a sense of belonging and rootedness in the GTA. The extreme violence of the 
Rwandan genocide ruptured the bonds of belonging that had tied those who identified as 
Rwandan to each other and to the Rwandan state. Since 1994, the new Rwandan state had 
developed a powerful “mythico-history” (Malkki 1995) that proposed that all those who are 
identified as Hutu are perpetual perpetrators and all those who are identified as Tutsi are 
perpetual victims, even as it had denied that the identities of Hutu and Tutsi continued to exist. 
The re-telling and re-enacting of this mythico-history became the condition of belonging to the 
newly created diaspora and the Rwandan state. Simultaneously, the ambivalent welcome and 
racialization that those who identified as Rwandan faced in Canada, and, specifically, the GTA, 
generated an anxiety and an awareness that they could only partially belong in the new 
homeland. Thus, the exclusion of the Canadian state generated a desire for the imagined 
homeland and enabled the Rwandan state to create a diaspora.  
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Successive waves of ethnic repression in Rwanda following the so-called “Hutu 
Revolution” in 1959 have led to a substantial diaspora in the global North, resident 
predominantly in Canada, the United States, France, and Belgium. The 1994 genocide also 
sparked a wave of migrations which swelled the numbers of this diaspora. A substantial number 
of these migrants have settled in Toronto and formed ties with one another, making Toronto a 
good site for this study. According to the 2006 national census, 5,670 people who identify 
Rwanda as their country of origin live in Canada and of those, 2,075 live in Ontario (Statistics 
Canada 2006). These numbers do not account for all those who live in Canada but identify 
Rwanda as their place of origin. Many who have recently migrated have done so as “economic” 
refugees and as such, may or may not be documented. Those who are undocumented will not 
appear in census figures. Further, many, though they may think of themselves as Rwandan, may 
identify themselves as having a different country of origin on official documents so would 
appear in the census figures as Congolese, Kenyan, Burundian, and Tanzanian, among others. 
Finally, there are also those who no longer wish to be identified as Rwandan and would thus 
check Black or African, rather than Rwandan on a census form. Given all these factors, the 
census numbers of 5,670 for Canada and 2,075 for Ontario are very conservative. While the self-
described community does not keep internal statistical records, those I have spoken to estimate 
that in the Greater Toronto Area alone there are up to 5,000 Rwandans who identify as such and 
participate in the life of the community to a greater or lesser degree. Indeed, when the 
community hosted the Rwandan President for Rwanda Day in Toronto, on September 28, 2013, 
about 3000 Rwandans attended the event. This community is closely linked to similar 
communities in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City. Also, as of 2001, there has been a westward 
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migration as those who had settled in Quebec or Ontario have chosen to pursue employment 
opportunities in Alberta and British Columbia.  
 
Table 1: Individuals Identifying as Rwandan on Canadian Censuses 
Province /Territory  Numbers of 
those who 
identify as 
Rwandan, 
1996 census 
Numbers of 
those who 
identify as 
Rwandan, 
2001 census 
Numbers of 
those who 
identify as 
Rwandan, 2006 
census 
Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
10 0 0 
Quebec 815 1720 2670 
Ontario 40 1060 2075 
Manitoba 15 30 135 
Saskatchewan 35 50 30 
Alberta 45 140 400 
British Columbia 110 45 240 
Northwest Territories 0 0 20 
   
 
I focused on the GTA community because it is a young community, and the earliest 
migrants settled here in the mid-1980s, as compared to the communities in Quebec which date 
back to the late 1960s. Therefore, the GTA community was currently to this study evolving a 
nascent collective sense of identity, while the older communities had more clearly articulated 
boundaries. Among this group I traced how nation and ethnicity were constituted and formed, 
and how these structures were superimposed onto individuals. Academic discourses, popular 
discourses, and state discourses played out on the bodies of those who were deemed members of 
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this group; yet these discourses did not go unchallenged, as those who were being defined and 
narrated by said discourses contested and actively engaged in their own shaping. I sought to find 
the moments where these negotiations played out.  
Further, I am interested in how the homeland and hostland, the institutions of Rwanda 
and Canada, are instrumental to constructing the category of Rwandan diaspora. In fact, the 
Rwandan state explicitly called into being a diaspora, calling it a diaspora, through concerted 
policy measures. The centralised Rwandan state acted upon the diaspora by generating and 
articulating discourses about ethnicity and belonging in the nation as well as through 
transnational political engagements with the diaspora. The less centralised Canadian state 
likewise created common sense meanings through its multiple discourses of multiculturalism. In 
Rwanda, the post-genocide government had generated a new discourse about ethnicity that on 
the surface stood in stark contrast to previous articulations; namely, the current government 
adamantly argued for a Rwandan identity and denied the existence of the ethnic Hutu, Tutsi, and 
Twa identities. Indeed, among the diaspora, the term ethnicity had come to be associated with the 
deeply riven categories that were the fertile ground for genocide. Those I spoke to were adamant 
that there were no longer ethnicities, even when they spoke of the division and conflict between 
those who identified as Hutu and those who identified as Tutsi, reflecting the dynamics in 
Rwanda. Indeed, contrary to official rhetoric, Tutsi identity was socially, politically, and 
economically privileged in the new Rwanda at the expense of all others (Mamdani 2001; 
Reyntjens 2004; Prunier 2009). These new ideas about the meaning of ethnicity were actively 
communicated to the diaspora by a Rwandan state that was increasingly reaching out to those 
who identified as Rwandan outside the borders of Rwanda.  As the Rwandan state actively and 
increasingly courted the diaspora, transnational engagements between the diaspora and the state 
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were expanding. This study investigated changing home state formations and changing forms of 
transnational engagements with the diaspora which co-constructed the diaspora. The ethnic 
labels of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, which had been officially erased from Rwanda (though they 
continued to shape political discourse), had not disappeared among the diaspora to be replaced 
by the new construct of Rwandan, despite the commonly echoed refrain that “we are all 
Rwandan”.  Yet, state-generated narratives, or mythico-histories, affected the self-identification 
of individuals and groups, and produced new meanings attached to signifiers like ethnicity, 
nation, and place of origin.  Canada had co-shaped and co-produced the communal identities of 
this group through technologies of governance, and in particular, through the ambivalent 
construct of multiculturalism. Rwandans found themselves doubly othered in Canada, both as 
migrants and as black Africans, yet they were making their homes here and creating 
communities interwoven into the fabric of Toronto (Tettey and Puplampu 2005; Creese 2011).  
Given these dynamics, I focused the study on internal and external contestations of what 
it meant to be a Rwandan in the diaspora and how the individuals in this particular population 
came to see themselves as sharing a collective identity. My research questions included the 
following: By what processes, discourses, collective and individual practices, did these disparate 
people come to understand themselves as part of a nation and, in this case, as part of a diaspora? 
How were nation, race and ethnicity constructed, and how did these constructions affect the lives 
of individuals? What was the role of violence in this construction, and how was the event of the 
Rwandan genocide been mobilized in the construction of the categories of nation, ethnicity and 
race? What role have institutions like the Rwandan and Canadian states played in the 
construction of these dominant narratives? How did experiences of racialization, gender, and 
class affect and alter the common sense understandings of those who identified as Rwandan, and 
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offered counter-narratives to dominant discourses? The study asked whether these challenges 
occurred in the public sphere, or were instead examples of “infrapolitics”, that is subtle, covert 
resistance (Scott 1990, 19)? Further, how did transnational politics and connections to the 
homeland shape these narratives? How did people who shared a perceived common origin come 
to understand themselves as members of a community?  
This chapter will first offer a brief historical sketch to explain the recent dispersal of 
those who identify as Rwandan and what propelled them to settle in Canada. Following this 
section, it will discuss the methods that were used in the study, followed by the framework of 
analysis, the central arguments and conclude with the organization of the study.  
 
 
Brief Historical Context 
 Though Rwandese history extends at least 500 years, I will focus on the politics of the 
20
th
 century which generated a diaspora outside of Rwanda, since that is the topic of this study. 
Of necessity, this short sketch of Rwandan history will be incomplete and simplified, in keeping 
with a need to provide background to the politics that resulted in an exodus of mostly those who 
identified as Tutsis from Rwanda starting in 1959, and then largely those who identified as Hutus 
after 1994.
1
 Thus, the story will begin with European colonialism, though the political roots of 
the construction of the ethnic divide reside in contests for power within the pre-colonial kingdom 
(Vansina 2004). 
                                                          
1
Though this study investigates how ethnicity, nation, and race are constructed, it is too awkward to continuously 
refer to “those who identify as…”, thus, this phrase will appear periodically to signal that identities are not things in 
the world, but, as Rogers Brubaker (2006) argues, ways of seeing the world. However, the short and succinct 
terms—diaspora, Hutu, Tutsi, and Rwandan will be used the remainder of the time to enhance readability.  
10 
 
Rwanda was officially claimed as a colony by Germany at the Berlin Conference in 1885, 
but only in 1897 did the German state make its presence known in what, at the time, was 
Ruanda-Urundi—later to become Rwanda and Burundi. Germans governed the area through 
indirect rule and relied on the Rwandese monarchy (in the portion that became Rwanda) to 
govern directly. This allowed the Rwandese, largely Tutsi, monarchy to continue “the pre-
colonial transformation towards more centralisation, annexation of the Hutu principalities and 
increase in Tutsi chiefly power” (Prunier [1995] 2010, 25). In 1916 Belgian forces occupied 
Ruanda-Urundi and effectively claimed the colony from Germany. With the defeat of Germany 
in World War I, the League of Nations granted the colony as a Mandate to Belgium. From 1916 
to 1962 Rwanda was a Belgian colony (Prunier [1995] 2010). While the Belgian colonial 
administration continued the policy of indirect rule, its presence in Rwanda was much more 
notable as, along with imposing significant legislative changes, the Belgian administration 
imposed individual corvée, or forced labour. Under the new regime, “the Rwandan monarchy’s 
oppression of the rural population increased with a disproportionate burden borne by Hutu 
peasants, while Tutsi peasants were spared some of the most exploitative corvée labor 
requirements” (Burnet 2012, 15). Thus, the administrative system fostered a growing resentment 
between Hutus and Tutsis, even though not all Tutsis belonged to the ruling class (indeed, the 
majority were peasants), and not all Hutus were equally oppressed.  
What the colonial moment most effectively created was a racist ideology called the 
“Hamitic hypothesis” of the presumed moral superiority of the Tutsis over the Hutus. This 
ideology, rooted in white, Christian fantasies of a morally ordered universe where (northern) 
Egyptian or Hamitic “invaders” conquered a primitive Southern people, created the mythical 
foundation of the nationalism that emerged with the onset of Rwandan independence (Prunier 
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[1995] 2010; Mamdani 2001). This ideological imposition culminated in a census in 1933-34 
which identified each individual as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa, and formalized this division with 
identity cards. These distinctions were drawn through oral testimony of clergy, physical 
measurements (the francophone Catholic clergy had long held that Tutsis were significantly 
taller and had more elongated features) and ownership of large herds of cattle (Mamdani 2001, 
99). Identity cards with one’s supposed “race” would continue to be used up to 1994 and enabled 
the génocidaires to identify Tutsis in order to kill them.
2
  
 By the 1950s, the small group of Hutu elites who had gained a clerical education began a 
social reform movement aimed at transforming the oppressive political and economic system in 
Rwanda before formal independence. In 1959, this reform movement published a “Bahutu 
Manifesto” which claimed that “‘the conflict between Hutu and Hamites—i.e. foreign-Tutsi’ was 
the heart of the Rwandan problem and called for a double liberation of the Hutu: ‘from both the 
‘Hamites’ and ‘Bazungu’ (white) colonization” (Mamdani 2001, 103-104). The outcome of this 
document was two-fold: the hastening of Belgian efforts at decolonization and the framing of 
democracy as majority rule by Hutus.  
 In anticipation of independence and “democracy”, political parties were established in the 
late 1950s. APROSOMA, created in 1957 by Hutu businessman Joseph Gitera, claimed to be a 
class-based party, but attracted only Hutu membership. Likewise, Grégoire Kayibanda created 
Mouvment Sociale Muhutu-MSM, which also was a primarily ethnically based Hutu party. This 
party shortly became PARMEHUTU. The conservative Tutsi faction reciprocated by creating 
Union Nationale Rwandaise-UNAR, a Tutsi monarchist party that was hostile to the Belgians, 
but wanted the largely Tutsi monarchy to retain political power. The regional and ethnic 
                                                          
2 For more extensive discussions of colonial Rwanda, see Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: 
Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960, 1988, and René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 1970. 
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antagonisms resulted in a PARMEHUTU activist being beaten by UNAR youth on November 1, 
1959. False reports of his death resulted in violence as PARMEHUTU activists attacked any 
Tutsis, UNAR activists retaliated and APROSOMA activists joined the fray. By November 14, 
order had been largely restored, and colonial authorities supported the Hutu political parties 
(Prunier [1995] 2010, 47-51). But the spark that had lit the fire continued to burn, and between 
the end of 1959 and the end of 1964, violence aimed at Tutsi continued, causing the mass exodus 
of 336 000 Tutsi to Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire (Prunier [1995] 2010, 61-62).  
 By the time Rwanda had achieved full independence from Belgium in 1964, 
PARMEHUTU leader Grégoire Kayibanda had been elected president, and APROSOMA and 
PARMEHUTU candidates took most of the legislative seats. Thus, the post-independence 
Rwandan government reflected the “ethnic” divide.  Between 1963 and 1972, “ethnic” tensions 
subsided as they “faded into the background of daily social interactions between average 
Rwandans until 1972 when President Kayibanda’s regime redirected growing regional 
opposition from northern Hutu into ethnic conflict” (Burnet 2012, 15). Tutsi students were 
forced to leave schools, Tutsis were fired from their jobs and rural Tutsi homes were burned. A 
few hundred Tutsis were massacred, causing another wave of migrations of Tutsi out of Rwanda. 
The conflict continued until Juvénal Habyarimana, a general in the army, took power in a coup 
d’état in 1972 (Burnet 2012, 16). He banned political parties and created his own Mouvement 
Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), which formed the government 
(Prunier [1995]2010, 76). The MRND created a system designed to create ethnic “equilibrium” 
by effectively excluding Tutsi from lucrative government posts, and turned Rwanda into a 
“donor darling” due to its “well-organized state apparatus and relative lack of corruption” 
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(Burnet 2012, 16). Below this façade lurked the murderous potential of the ethnic/racial myths 
upon which the nation was founded.  
 Estimates of the number of Rwandans in exile by the late 1980s range between 400 000 
and 600 000, and, of those, a large group resided in Uganda, where, by 1987, those who desired 
return to Rwanda had formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). As Prunier explains, 30 years 
of exile had turned Rwanda into a “land of milk and honey”, particularly among the Ugandan 
group of exiles ([1995]2010, 66-7). When news reached the RPF that Rwanda was again on the 
brink of political crisis as the state repression and violence necessary to sustain an authoritarian 
regime had inspired multiple points of internal conflict, the RPF chose to launch its plans to 
invade. On October 1, 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda (Prunier [1995] 2010, 93). The 
Habyarimana regime was embroiled in internal conflict as, a few months earlier, on the urging of 
French President Mitterand, Habyarimana had agreed to a multi-party system once again, and 
factions within the MRND were actively opposed to the liberalization of the regime (Prunier 
[1995] 2010, 89). At this opening, PARMEHUTU recreated itself as MDR (Mouvement 
Démocratique Rwandaise), which was also an ethnically based party, but one focused on the 
grievances of those who had been denied power (Prunier [1995] 2010, 122).Those who opposed 
the virulent anti-Tutsi image of both the MDR and the MRND created an alternative Parti Social 
Démocrate (PSD), which positioned itself as a centre-left party. Alternatively, the Parti Libérale 
(PL) was a centre-right political alternative (Prunier [1995] 2010, 123-4). Responding to the 
growing opposition and alternate discourses around ethnicity, the hard-line MRND activists and 
politicians, later to be known as the Hutu extremists, or “Hutu Power” wing, used the RPF 
invasion to spur inter-ethnic hatred and ratchet up anti-Tutsi rhetoric (Burnet 2012, 16).    
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 Fighting a nearly 3-year rebellion, attempting to reassert order in his own ranks, and 
facing re-emerging opposition parties, Habyarimana agreed to peace negotiations in Arusha, 
Tanzania in 1992. Out of these negotiations emerged a power-sharing agreement with the 
opposition parties within Rwanda and the RPF, granting the latter an equal number of cabinet 
seats to those held by the MRND (Mamdani 2001; Prunier [1995], 2010). A key principle of the 
Arusha Accords was minority protection for Tutsis and access to power and resources. The 
Arusha Accords and the ceasefire satisfied the international community, and a small UN 
peacekeeping force was deployed to ensure that the Accords were enacted. However, within 
Rwanda, the Accords only further exacerbated the internal tensions as the MDR opposition party 
used them as evidence that what it called the moderate faction of the MRND was selling out to 
the invaders. Opposition and MRND hardliners framed the now “moderates”, who included the 
PL and PSD, as internal enemies, on par with the RPF. The hard-liners, or the Hutu Power 
ideologues, left the MRND and formed their own party, while retaining political and ideological 
control over the MRND’s youth wing—the Interahamwe. Within days of the Accords being 
signed, the now infamous Radio Milles Collines began broadcasting its open racial hatred and 
spurring average Rwandans to violence, at the behest of the Hutu Power wing (Mamdani 2001, 
209). 
 On April 6, 1994, around 8:30 pm, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down over 
Kigali airport and the FAR (Force Armées Rwandaises, the national army from which 
Habyarimana had hailed) and the Interahamwe began killing first members of the coalition 
government and Hutu “moderates”, then the Tutsi elites at about 10:30pm. Over the course of the 
next 100 days, about 800 000 Tutsis and Hutus were brutally murdered (Prunier [1995] 2010; 
Human Rights Watch 1999; Mamdani 2001; Burnet 2012). The genocide ended when the RPF 
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conquered Kigali and forced the remnants of FAR and the Interahamwe into Zaire, in late July of 
1994. In fear for their lives, another 2 million Rwandese, largely Hutu this time, followed the 
génocidaires into Zaire (Prunier [1995] 2010, 312).  
From 1994 to 2003 the RPF created a transitional government, initially following the 
Arusha Accords and creating a coalition of all the major parties, with the notable exclusion of the 
extremist wing of the MNDR (Powley 2005, 154). However, the coalition government quickly 
fell apart as the RPF imposed its vision of a new state and new nation. Since 2003, Rwanda has 
held regular elections, and Paul Kagame, a former general in the RPF, has handily won each 
election. The RPF government, which functions as a single-party system, “orchestrates elections, 
suppresses the independent media, and retains control over most civil society organizations” 
(Burnet 2012, 193). Extrajudicial killing or imprisonment of opposition party members and 
others under the claim that they were promoting what the regime calls “genocide denial” has led 
to a further tightening of political space (Mamdani 2001; Reytjens 2004; Burnet 2008; Beswick 
2010; Human Rights Watch 2010; Burnet 2012). Furthermore, the regime has not offered 
Rwandans the political space to come to terms with their legacy of extreme violence, despite the 
regime’s avowed promotion of reconciliation. Rwandan men and women are still suffering the 
inheritance of violence, and the regime’s re-politicization of ethnicity has led to the overt 
silencing of those who identify as Hutu, as they are universally framed as perpetrators. 
Conversely, those who are the survivors of RPF massacres and other human rights violations, be 
they Tutsi or Hutu, are written out of the nation’s narratives of self. Their stories cannot be told, 
for fear of severe reprisals (Burnet 2012). These discursive violences and silences frame the lives 
of both men and women in the new Rwanda and, as I explored in this study, in what many 
Rwandans in Toronto have come to understand as the diaspora.  
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Methods 
To understand this process of diaspora-making, Rwandans in the Greater Toronto Area 
were studied through in-depth qualitative semi-structured interviews, participant observation of 
community events, and analysis of textual and visual sources. I conducted in-depth interviews 
with 31 individuals who identified as Rwandan and lived in the GTA and in some cases the 
nearby city of Hamilton, though the majority live in Toronto, Scarborough, Mississauga, 
Etobicoke, and North York. The interviews and were done between May 2012 and June 2014, 
while my participant observation was done from July 2012 to April 2015. I recruited my 
participants primarily through the snowball technique, including through recommendations from 
leaders of the organizations that spoke on behalf of the supposed community. I did advertise for 
participants online, through listservs and through word of mouth, but given the private nature of 
many in the community, people were unwilling to approach me. I sought to find a representative 
sample, but primarily those who identified as Tutsi were willing to be interviewed. While there 
were many who identified as Hutu in the GTA, they were difficult to locate and, of those whom I 
located, few were willing to be interviewed. I suspect that this reluctance stemmed from the 
socially subordinate position of those who identified as Hutus, and I have attempted to keep this 
dynamic in mind as I listened to individuals who primarily identified as Tutsis. 
However, from those who chose to speak to me, I sought to find as balanced a sample as I 
could, seeking out equal numbers of men and women, and speaking to young, middle aged and 
older individuals. The sample was made up of 16 men and 15 women. Of the men, 4 were 19-30 
years old, 2 were 31-40 years old, 8 were 41-50 years old and 2 were 51-60 years old. Of the 
women, 4 were 19-20 years old, 3 were 21-30 years old, 6 were 41-50 years old and 2 were 51-
60 years old. I aimed to speak to equal numbers of men and women and to individuals across a 
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range of age cohorts. As I had not sought out ethical approval to speak to children, I conducted 
no interviews with anyone under the age of 18 (the youngest participant was 19 years old), 
although the adults I interviewed sometimes mentioned the experiences of children or recollected 
their own experiences from childhood. I wanted to interview adults older in the age ranges of 61-
70 and 71-80 years, but none of those I approached in those age groups were willing to speak to 
me, which I suspect had to do with language barriers. Thus, I could only address their 
experiences through the lens of their adult children and what these children said of the parents’ 
perceptions. In short, while the interview sample size was small, key groups—especially 
Hutus—were underrepresented, and thus the conclusions I could draw were limited. Nonetheless, 
I sought to have as representative a sample as I could, given the conditions in which I did the 
research. Moreover, I sought to reflect in my analysis insights drawn from considering why some 
categories of people would not agree to interviews.  
 The proposal for this study was submitted to review to the Office of Research Ethics at 
York University, subject to the SSHRC/NSERC/CIHR Tri-Council Policy Statement Ethical 
Conduct for Research Involving Humans. Under the conditions of the review, I had permission 
to conduct interviews with individuals aged 18-80 and attend and observe community social 
functions. While I also had permission to conduct focus groups, no participants were willing to 
meet and speak in a group setting, so I was not able to carry out the focus groups. I identified that 
re-traumatization was a potential risk involved in the research. Thus, I proposed that I would not 
ask about the violence, and where the participant chose to remain silent about it I would follow 
her lead. I also came to every meeting with contact information for the Canadian Centre for 
Survivors of Torture, located in Toronto, which offers victims of trauma free counselling, in the 
hopes of offering support in the case of re-traumatization. I also affirmed that I would maintain 
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strict confidentiality. Consent forms reviewed by the Ethics Committee were signed by all 
participants. I have included a sample consent form at Appendix B. There were two levels of 
consent: the lower level authorized me to use the information provided by the participant, but no 
details that would identify the participant. The second level of consent, signed by only 17 of 31 
participants as indicated in the table at Appendix D, allowed me to include in the dissertation 
some personal information such as age, gender, profession, or time of migration, but never 
participant names or the names of any of their family members. Finally, I received ethics 
approval to ask for participant consent to have photographs taken. However, I opted to take no 
photos of the participants out of respect for their privacy, so no participants were asked to grant 
consent for this. Consent procedures allowed me to make audio-recordings during interviews 
(although two participants withheld this consent, so I took notes during our conversations 
instead). Participants were able to withdraw consent to participate in the research at any point. 
The ethics procedure results obligated me to destroy the audio files of the interview after I had 
made transcriptions of them. I have pledged as part of the ethics procedure to keep the transcripts 
in a secure location and, upon completion of the research, to offer them to a local archive for 
preservation after having removed the required identifying information as applicable. If no 
archives are interested in the data, then I will destroy the transcripts.  
  As a young white woman of Polish ethnicity, but now carrying an Anglo name, I was 
cognizant of my white privilege and anticipated that I might have a hard time gaining the trust of 
the community. However, I learned that my gender, my youthful appearance, and my migrant 
status worked in my favour to make me appear sympathetic and non-threatening. Of course, the 
former two factors were also obstacles in particular moments, as people often perceived me to be 
much younger than I am and therefore less deserving of notice and respect. Uncomfortably for 
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me, I often had to mention my marital status in order to establish my adulthood and, ironically, 
my professionalism. Indeed, the gendered politics of the community meant that I often faced 
questions about my performance of femininity. For example, I was commonly asked if I had 
children, and when the answer was no, I was equally often chastised to have them soon.  In order 
to retain the trust of the community, I had to accept these admonishments with good humour. 
Yet, they rankled, particularly since I understood that the only reason that my fertility was being 
discussed was because of my gender. Thus I had a small taste of the gendered expectations that 
Rwandan women were exposed to.  
Community meetings also had the effect of raising questions about my own ethnic and 
racial identity. I had not anticipated that I would be thus affected, but, for the first time in my 
life, I was hypervisible as one of very few white people in a space dominated by people who 
were racialized as black. Yet, I realized, that unlike those whom I was getting to know, my 
visibility did not occasion hostility; rather, I was noticed, but welcomed. Those who identified as 
Rwandan usually made an effort to smile at me and extend a welcome to me. Nonetheless, I was 
aware that my facial expressions and gestures would be noticed and remarked, because I was 
visibly different. The other non-black people at the events, there in a variety of roles—
journalists, partners, friends—perhaps unconsciously, sought me out in the crowd and made eye 
contact. We never spoke to one another, as we were all there with our Rwandan friends and 
contacts, yet that eye contact was involuntary (and it is no mere thing to make eye contact with a 
woman who is barely 5’1, as I am, when one is taller, as most of the world is). It seemed that we 
needed that symbolic connection to counter the discomfort of becoming visible in a world that 
had, wrongly and unjustly, belonged to us by virtue of our whiteness. In those moments, I was 
given a glimpse of simultaneous belonging and non-belonging, the central dynamic of this study.      
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By beginning my interview process with community leaders I was able to slowly gain the 
trust of these individuals, who then spoke of me to others, thus gaining me entry into the group.  
Even so, I encountered many who, while they were very warm and welcoming, were unwilling to 
be interviewed for the study. When I asked for further recommendations, many were very 
reluctant to help me get access to someone else, and, though I was told so and so would likely be 
interested in speaking to me, I often had to track said person down over a matter of weeks or, in 
some cases, months. Interestingly, individuals who held official positions within the community 
leadership were very difficult to locate and often initially reluctant to speak to me, at least on 
record. I am very grateful to those I formally interviewed and to those who spoke to me 
informally, as they were remarkably welcoming and warm to the stranger in their midst, and 
many went out of their way to help me with my study. At social events I was always drawn into 
conversation and people I did not know made a point of approaching me and welcoming me. 
There was, however, a hesitation, a sense of caution, about participating in the project. Often it 
took many meetings before an individual was willing to be recorded. Even after they had 
consented, many needed to be reassured about what would be done with the research, who would 
have access, and how confidentiality would be maintained. To that end, as noted earlier, no 
personal details or names appear in the study. All names are pseudonyms, and only where 
additional consent has been granted will details like profession, age, and city of residence, be 
identified. When there is a risk of identification by linking a pseudonym with, for example, a 
profession, the individual will be referred to as participant, not by her pseudonym. In some cases, 
I have intentionally withheld information, as, for instance, about the non-governmental 
organizations within the community, to protect identities. Though most of those with whom I 
spoke had not participated in research before, there was a general sense of mistrust and caution 
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about academic research and, probably, about a white researcher in particular. This wary attitude 
is not surprising given the history of genocide and the role that pseudo-academic theories played 
in its justification (Malkki 1995; Prunier 1995; Mamdani 2001). Indeed, the fact that my 
participants were willing to trust me at all is surprising and deserves recognition.  
The interviews averaged 1.5 hours in length, with some as long as 6 hours in total. I have 
indicated the total length of time that I interviewed each individual on the table at Appendix C. 
This data includes only the formal interviews, which were recorded and transcribed. Though 
there were open-ended questions on particular topics—on memories of and connections to 
Rwanda, life in Canada, the community here, and self-identification—often the discussion would 
range into topics that the participants wished to discuss. I have included at Appendix C a list of 
the specific questions that I asked in formal interviews. I would begin by posing the question as 
it appears in the appended document, but would ask follow up questions about topics that 
participants introduced in their answer. Each interview covered the same set of questions, but 
some participants chose to speak on a range of further topics that I did not specifically pose as 
questions. A few individuals were particularly eloquent and inclined to offer more detail and 
nuance than others, and these individuals have been quoted more extensively than others, 
although their understandings and representations of their identities and the world very often 
echoed those of other participants. After the initial interview, I would ask if I could contact the 
participant with follow-up questions and, in the cases where the answer was yes, I did so, 
resulting in 2, and in one case 3 separate formal interviews. I did 2 or more formal interviews 
with a total of 6 of the participants. I also often had occasion to speak to the same individuals on 
later occasions at social events, where, if they said something pertinent, I would verbally ask if I 
could relate that in the research. These discussions were among the 11 informal interviews that I 
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did during the course of the research. These informal interviews were not recorded, but I did take 
notes and, where the individual in question had formally granted informed consent, I was able to 
use the content in the research. Where no consent had been granted, I did not use the specific 
information in the study that I learned through the informal interviews except as part of my 
general impression of the event where the conversation took place. I was a participant observer at 
approximately 13 events over the study period, such as genocide commemorations, NGO 
fundraisers, church gatherings, and Rwanda Day, among others.  
In analyzing the transcripts of the interviews, I utilized a form of discourse analysis. 
Thus, in analysis the transcripts of interviews, I was attuned to how participants understood their 
collective and individual identities. I focused on the language that they used to represent 
themselves and their understanding of Canada/Canadianess, Rwanda/Rwandaness, the event of 
the genocide and the creation of a community in the GTA. I paid particular attention to repeated 
phrases and concepts, such as the Rwandan states’ rhetoric of “we are all Rwandese”, which 
many among the participants echoed. These repeated phrases or ideas I took to be indicative of 
widely held shared understandings of self and other, and self and dominant institutions like the 
Canadian and Rwandan states, as well as understandings of events like the genocide, and more 
broadly, notions of what constituted shared culture. I was also attuned to divergent formulations 
and read these as indicative of a counter-representation that disrupted the dominant narratives 
and pointed to the diversity of experiences of this population of people.  
In order to mitigate, as best as I can, the unavoidable tendency in academic discourse for 
the author to speak for someone, especially as a white women studying a racialized community, I 
have made an effort to “speak with, or beside, rather than for” those who shared their stories with 
me (Creese 2011, 15). This means that, while I was attuned to themes that were specific to the 
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dynamics that I was interested in, I also listened to what my participants emphasized and 
highlighted. For example, in listening to stories of their racialization, I had to also hear the 
emphasis that so many placed upon their sense of belonging in Canada and upon not 
experiencing racialization. Thus, in making arguments about racialization, I will attempt to 
express the nuances around how people perceived and understood these forces.  
The Rwandan genocide has drawn the attention of numerous Western academics who 
have investigated the causes, the conflict, and the after-effects with great detail, offering their 
audience, often Rwandan, a narrative of the violence that differs dramatically from the narrative 
that the Rwandan state has developed. This discrepancy in narratives inspires deep emotional 
turmoil in the community. On a number of occasions, my participants insisted on telling me the 
“correct” history of the genocide, in an attempt to counter the academic narratives. I do not 
perceive that it is my role to offer a “correct” reading of the recent history; rather I am interested 
in the multiplicity of readings and their consequences. In order to avoid instigating further 
turmoil, or individual re-traumatization, I chose not to pose questions about the genocide, or any 
of the violence that occurred before or after. In selecting my questions, I intentionally left room 
for a participant to speak of the violence if she chose, but the questions did not touch on it. I 
respected the choices that many made to remain silent about the violence and thus attempted to 
practice empathy (Burnet 2012, 34). I also hoped that by allowing my participants agency over 
what they wished to share, I would displace some of the power dynamics.  
The interviews often took place in coffee shops or restaurants, though, as I gained trust, I 
was invited into people’s homes—but only by some. I have included the location of interviews 
on the table in Appendix D. I then transcribed the interviews and analyzed them for key themes 
from which I drew my conclusions. I also attended a number of Rwandan community 
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social/cultural events, church services, genocide commemorations, and diaspora meetings with 
state representatives. At these events I was invited to be a participant, so I could not record or 
transcribe the events; however, I did record my impressions and conclusions after, and these 
have been included in the analysis. I often quote directly from the interviews or refer to my 
observations of events, which are based on the notes I took. When I am quoting I intentionally do 
not correct any grammatical errors that may occur in the speech patterns of my participants in 
order to retain their tone as much as possible. Further, I chose not to draw attention to any errors 
by using sic, because this simple gesture, so often used in academic texts, draws attention to the 
authority of the researcher/writer and detracts from the authority of the participant. Language is 
dynamic and forcing the linguistic patterns of my participants into a standard mold denies that 
very dynamism and their agency in using English, which, for most, is not a first language.  
 As a researcher, I understand that I inevitably affect and alter the very relations that I 
seek to observe and transcribe, especially given my positional differences from my research 
participants. As such, I chose to embrace this active role and where I could, I offered my services 
to the community in gratitude for their willingness to share their stories and worlds with me. This 
meant, for example, that I volunteered my services to contact institutions like the Toronto 
District School Board on behalf of the community to enquire about a language program, and that 
I looked up information about pursing studies in a post-secondary institution for an individual, or 
that I helped the community find documentary film makers to record some of their stories. What 
follows is my attempt, based on what I have learned, to understand what it means be a Rwandan 
in what is understood as a diaspora making a home and life in the GTA and Hamilton in Canada.  
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Framework of Analysis 
 This study offers a constructivist reading of how nation, ethnicity, race, and diaspora are 
created and sustained.  It seeks to move beyond the now widely agreed upon truism that nation, 
ethnicity, race, and diaspora are constructed by tracing the institutional logics and politics, the 
individual understandings and perceptions and the conditions that have created the Rwandan 
diaspora. It relies on, and as will be discussed later on, builds on Rogers Brubaker’s account of 
nation, ethnicity, and race as “ways of seeing” rather than “things in the world” by focusing on 
how these identity markers are “practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive 
schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and 
contingent events” (2006, 11). Particularly, Brubaker’s idea of a contingent event as constitutive 
of nation is a central theoretical assumption, however, this study proposes that contingent events 
become ethnically or nationally meaningful by how they are remembered and what meanings are 
attributed to them. It further utilizes the concept of a national cosmology, that is, how a moral 
order is granted to the known world (Tambiah 1985), and “mythico-history”, which is a moral 
re-telling of historical events (Malkki 1995, 55). Foundational to the new cosmology and 
mythico-history that the new Rwandan state had created was the contingent event of the extreme 
violence of the Rwandan genocide. Here, Brubaker’s understanding of the state as the 
institutionalized form of the nation is used to explain the role of the state in the making of a 
diaspora (2006). In order to understand how violence becomes constitutive of the idea of 
Rwandaness, I relied on Brian Axel’s argument that remembering and re-telling violence 
becomes the thread that connects disparate individuals into what then appears as a diaspora 
(2001). I build on Axel’s argument by proposing that recollection of violence alone does not 
generate a diaspora. At least in this case, the new Rwandan state had to first call the diaspora into 
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being, then the recollection of violence, and specifically, the new nation’s mythico-history, 
became the thread that connected those who identified as Rwandan. Further, to analyze how 
violence is constitutive of the new nation that emerged in Rwanda, I utilize Jeffrey Alexander’s 
theory of cultural trauma—an event that is recalled as so traumatic that it breaks the bonds of 
belonging between individuals and communities (2004). 
 To comprehend how the Canadian state generates a simultaneous sense of belonging and 
non-belonging for those who identify as Rwandan in the GTA, I utilize insights from critical race 
theory, in particular the concept of everyday racialization/racism (Essed 1991; Henry et al. 
1995), which proposes that “racism is a system of structural inequalities and a historical process, 
both created and recreated through routine practices” (Essed 1991, 39) enacted by the state and 
by individuals.  Those who are thus racialized by the Canadian state and categorized as either 
perpetrators or victims by the Rwandan state do not submit to these classifications uncritically 
and to investigate the ways in which they respond and negotiate these terms, I borrow from 
psychoanalytical insights to understand how individual emotions effect the everyday categories.  
James C. Scott’s notion of infrapolitics , that is the “wide variety of low-profile forms of 
resistance that dare not speak in their own name” (1990,19), is also useful in understanding the 
ways in which individuals challenge powerful state discourses. A fuller discussion of the 
framework of analysis appears in chapter 2.  
 
  
Central Arguments of Study and Key Contributions  
This study contributes to three strands of literature: the extensive literature on nationalism 
and the theorization of the nation; the literature on diasporas and diaspora formation; and the 
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literature on racialization in multicultural states. Nation, ethnicity, race, and diasporas are the 
products of states and institutions generating collective identities in order to justify political 
actions and mobilize people to support leaders and policies. The violence of the genocide broke 
the bonds that had bound individuals to the former Rwandan nation and to each other. Yet, the 
remembering and retelling of the genocide became the foundation of the new nation. Among 
those who identified as Rwandan in the GTA, the mythico-history of the new Rwandan state, 
centred on the genocide, determined who was included in the categories Rwandan, Tutsi, and 
Hutu, an on what terms. Simultaneously, the ambivalent welcome and the active racialization 
that these individuals faced in Canada generated an anxiety which drew these individuals to the 
Rwandan state and its narrative of belonging. Yet, a diaspora only emerged when the Rwandan 
state called it into being in 2007 by creating institutional structures, such as the Rwanda Diaspora 
Global Network, and informing those who identified as Rwandan that they were now a diaspora. 
Thus, Hutu and Tutsi, Rwandan and the Rwandan diaspora were all actively constructed through 
institutional practices, everyday categories, and cognitive schemas. They are “ways of seeing” 
(Brubaker 2006). Following Rogers Brubaker, I identified  the ways in which “everyday 
ethnicity”, in this case, Rwandan ethnicity in the GTA, was constructed as it was “embodied and 
expressed not only in political projects and nationalist rhetoric but in everyday encounters, 
practical categories, commonsense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, interactional 
cues, discursive frames, organizational routines, social networks, and institutional forms” (2006, 
2). Ethnicity, nation and race, as closely connected classification schemes, are “ways of seeing” 
rather than substantial entities or “things in the world” (Brubaker 2006, 17), and the primary 
force in shaping these political identities in the modern era has been the state or state-like 
institutions. In this case study, the Rwandan and Canadian states have generated these identities. 
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Thus, following Mamdani (2001) I argued that Hutu and Tutsi are politically constructed 
identities. The new Rwandan state has generated a powerful discourse of a new ethnicity—
Rwandan—to supplant the supposed faded ethnicities of Hutu and Tutsi. Yet, even as this new 
identity is rhetorically and forcefully enforced both in Rwanda and in its significant engagement 
with the diaspora community in the GTA, the state perpetuates the existence of the old 
ethnicities, Hutu and Tutsi, by promoting Tutsi individual and collective interests over those of 
the other groups in the homeland, and by appropriating the memory of the genocide as only 
belonging to the Tutsi. A central theoretical claim of this study, building on Jennie Burnet’s 
argument about the new state in Rwanda (2012), is that the new nation has been built upon the 
mythico-history that all Tutsis are perpetual victims and all Hutus are real or potential 
perpetrators. I argue that this nation-building ideology is very evident among the diaspora 
community in the GTA as the Rwandan state enforces a singular reading of recent history which 
erases the memories and trauma of one segment of the community and grants moral and social 
privilege to the other. Indeed, the largely Tutsi community leaders closely echoed and policed 
the new mythico-history of the state as they perceived that the collective trauma of the genocide 
had rendered then vulnerable and they needed the protection and favour of the home state to 
prevent a re-enactment of the violence of the genocide.  
However, those who were thus constructed did not necessarily accept these terms of 
identification uncritically. While many scholars of Rwandan politics argue that Rwandan society 
is inherently hierarchical and authoritarian (Vansina 2004; Newbury 1988), I proposed that, 
among the diaspora, top-down impositions of identity by elites were challenged by bottom-up 
contestations and the everyday life experiences of those who identified as members of the group. 
Individuals who identified as Rwandan in the GTA daily “appropriate, internalize, subvert, 
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evade, or transform the categories that are imposed upon them” (Brubaker 2006, 13). Thus, 
individual accounts offered potent critiques of the new mythico-history by proposing alternative 
ways of seeing oneself and those to whom one was connected. In seeking to articulate the 
constructed nature of these ethnic identities, I argued that there is no collective Rwandan, or even 
Tutsi or Hutu, identity; rather, there is the feminist Rwandan experience, the Christian Rwandan 
experience, the university bound youth Rwandan experience, the upwardly mobile middle-class 
Rwandan experience, the working-class Rwandan experience, among many others. Each of these 
experiences and performances of identity, while an amalgam of many, cannot ever be reduced to 
its component parts. This alternative account of identity allows space for individuals to live away 
from the demand for allegiance from powerful institutions, such as the Rwandan and Canadian 
states. Understanding those who identify as Rwandans as embodying a multiversal identity aims 
to extinguish the violent power of nation, ethnicity and race.  
In a similar vein, I argued that there is no a priori Rwandan diaspora. The memory of 
violence has constituted and generated the construct of the diaspora. This form of identification 
was not created through movement (even presuming that all who leave feel their place of origin 
to be their homeland), but through violence and the accompanying discourses and regulatory 
practices of the Rwandan state and the Canadian state. However, contrary to Axel’s findings 
among the Sikh diaspora in post-war Britain (2001), among the Rwandan diaspora, the violence 
of the genocide ruptured the former nation, but it did not generate connections between those 
who lived away from the homeland. These individuals were often connected to one another, even 
sharing memories of the violence, but they did not become a diaspora until the new Rwandan 
state, itself formed out of the horror of the genocide, called the diaspora into being through its 
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institutionalized practices, accounting schemes, classificatory categories, policy directives and 
discourses and offered the genocide as the foundational myth of the new nation and the diaspora. 
The closely related key theoretical claim of this study is that the state violence that 
individuals in the Rwandan diaspora remembered, retold, and reimagined, became a condition of 
the diaspora’s existence as it is the thread that connected disparate peoples. The cognitive 
experience of overwhelming violence signaled a break in one’s notion of connection to a 
community and identity, and created new forms of identification. The genocide became a 
collective trauma for those who had experienced it first-hand and for those who were connected 
to it, even if they had no part in it. The spiritual, psychological, and physical breaking of bonds 
of belonging generated a need for new forms of identification with others who developed a 
common understanding and memory of the violence, thus creating a community.  Brubaker 
proposes that “violence becomes ‘ethnic’ (or ‘racial or ‘nationalist’) through the meanings 
attributed to it by perpetrators, victims, politicians, officials, journalists, researchers, relief 
workers and others” (2006, 16). I build on this idea by suggesting that violence becomes 
ethnically or nationally significant and meaningful by how it is remembered and then by what 
meanings are attributed to it. Thus, a significant conceptual contribution of this dissertation is 
that contingent events (Brubaker 2006), need to be understood as constructed through discourses 
of memory.  
As noted earlier, a key empirical finding of this study proposes that even as individuals 
connected to one another, they did not come to see themselves as a diaspora until the Rwandan 
state called the diaspora into being in 2007. Prior to this, there was a loosely connected 
community of individuals who identified as Rwandans in the GTA, but their connections to one 
another were based on inter-personal ties, not on a collective identity generated by the shared 
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experience of movement away from the homeland as some of the diaspora literature suggests 
(Bhabha 1990, Gilroy 1993, Bannerji 1997, Scheffer 2003, Agnew 2007, Ricoeur 2010). 
Through the intersections of lived experience and the discourses that envelop it, individuals came 
to identify as members of the new ethnicity of Rwandan and a diaspora.  
One of the conditions that created the ground for the creation of a diaspora was the sense 
of ambivalent welcome that Rwandans found in their new homes in the GTA. The other key 
empirical finding of this study was that even as individuals who identified as Rwandan worked 
to find belonging in the GTA and Canada, they were racialized as black and subject to exclusion 
and, at times, overt discrimination. Multiculturalism, the policy and ideology in which they 
placed their hopes for belonging, posited them as outside the imagination of the Canadian nation 
as, to paraphrase Rinaldo Walcott, to be black in Canada is to be aware of one’s belonging and 
non-belonging (2003, 50). The simultaneous inclusion and exclusion in the new homeland, 
Canada, generated among this group a desire for the homeland. This community paradoxically 
simultaneously forged a place of belonging in Canada, and became a diaspora. 
Even as individuals in this community came to see themselves as Rwandans and as part 
of a diaspora, they found a sense of belonging in their new homes in the GTA. This simultaneous 
expression of belonging in the new homeland while seeking connection to the old homeland is 
one of the central dynamics of this study. I propose that the condition of being Rwandan in the 
GTA signifies that one lives both here/there, even as one lives simultaneously in the present/time 
of violence. This dialectical relationship to time and place is the condition of being part of a 
diaspora. Thus, while state institutions expel on one end and absorb on the other, the individual’s 
ability to exist in two places and two times is a necessary pre-condition for the creation of a 
diaspora.   
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Organization of Study 
The study is organized into chapters dealing with the multiple places, spaces, and 
discourses that those who identify as members of this community shape, contend with, and are 
subject to. The second chapter sets out the theoretical assumptions and approaches of this study 
and explains the central ideas of group, nation, ethnicity, and race it uses. The third chapter 
examines the role of violence and its impact on identity formation and nation-building among the 
diaspora. The fourth chapter explores the contestations of what it means be Rwandan within the 
community and how discourses of nation, and ethnicity are internally drawn and contested 
through experiences of gender and class. The fifth chapter investigates what life in Canada 
means and explores how the Canadian state discourse of multiculturalism contributes to the 
racialization of those who identify as Rwandan. The sixth chapter maps out the connections 
between the state of Rwanda and the diaspora and how these transnational ties structure day to 
day lives. The seventh chapter focuses on the concept of home and how the community members 
have built lives, homes, and found a sense of belonging in the Greater Toronto Area. The 
conclusion summarizes the key arguments and suggests the contributions that this study makes to 
the field. While by no means an exhaustive account of the experiences of those in this 
community, the analysis attempts to formulate a theory of nation, ethnicity, race and diaspora 
and explain how these macro imaginings of states and nations are constructed through micro 
practices of day to day negotiations, maneuvers, and ways of seeing.  
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Chapter Two 
The Making of Diaspora: An Analytical Framework 
 In order to analyse the processes whereby my respondents came to understand themselves 
as part of a Rwandan diaspora but also at home in Canada, and to make sense of the data I have 
collected for this study, I have relied on a series of theoretical assumptions and approaches as 
well as analytical concepts. These theories and concepts have shaped how I have interpreted the 
data and the conclusions I have drawn. The chief ontological assumption in this study has been 
the understanding that nation, ethnicity and race are not things in the world, but, using 
Brubaker’s formula, ways of seeing the world. This insight has led to deconstruction of the 
discourses and processes that create the appearance of nation, ethnicity, race, and diaspora as 
bounded, concrete objects. In deconstructing these discourses, I have relied on a few theoretical 
insights such as the role of violence in shaping the Rwandan diaspora, the roles of the Canadian 
and Rwandan states as institutions which through policies of multiculturalism and 
transnationalism constitute the diaspora, and the concept of home which illuminates how those 
who are defined as belonging to this group themselves understand their identity and their place in 
the world.  
Though it has become something of a cliché to propose to offer a constructivist account 
of social phenomena, this is precisely what I seek to do in this dissertation. However, following 
Brubaker and his admonishments that even in constructivist studies we tend to take the ideas of 
nation, ethnicity and race as things in the world, I seek to observe the formation of identity as a 
social practice and an analytical category. In attempting a constructivist reading of what it means 
to be part of the Rwandan diaspora in the GTA, I map out the “practical categories, situated 
actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, 
institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events” (Brubaker 2006, 11) such as the 
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categories of Hutu and Tutsi which correspond to perpetrator and victim, or the cognitive schema 
of a morally organized universe where victims actions are always just and justifiable. This study 
places particular emphasis on cognitive schemas and discursive frames, which I refer to as 
cosmologies. I borrow from anthropology the notion of cosmologies and the ways in which they 
are utilized to grant order to the known universe (Tambiah 1985), using this concept to trace the 
national cosmology that the new Rwandan state has erected. Malkki’s discussion of mythico-
histories among Hutus from Burundi (1995) becomes a useful resource in articulating the new 
national cosmology of the Rwandan state. Further, the distinct political projects that emerge at 
particular historical junctures in both the putative homeland, Rwanda, and among those who 
identify as Rwandans in the GTA, are central to an understanding of the construction of 
categories and their effects on individuals. I focus on the Rwandan genocide as a contingent 
event that broke the bonds of the nation and generated a cultural trauma (Alexander 2004), which 
makes death constitutive of the very category of Rwandan and thus part of the everyday. The 
violence and how it is remembered and recalled has become the bridge that connects those who 
imagine themselves as belonging to the Rwandan diaspora in the GTA, as Axel (2001) has 
argued about the Sikh diaspora, though I place emphasis on how memories of that violence are 
constructed and circulated. In contending with how race is constructed, especially in the post-
colonial context, I utilize insights from critical race theory to track how conceptions of race have 
altered and how new ideas are scripted onto vulnerable bodies by state institutions. Finally, I 
utilize psychoanalytical insights to understand how individuals’ emotions affect the everyday 
categories and situated actions of those who are part of the diaspora. This interdisciplinary 
approach to analyzing the construction of nation, ethnicity and race aims to delve below the 
surface of identities and expose how they are sustained, supported, challenged and navigated by 
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those individuals whom they ostensibly describe and define. The following expands on these 
ideas, laying out the theoretical assumptions, the key literature behind the study and the 
preliminary conclusions that I draw.  
 
 
Theorizing Diaspora   
Diasporas have been studied in order to come to grips with the seemingly contemporary 
phenomena of globalization, the weakening of the nation-state, and increasingly transnational 
forms of identification. These studies have generated perspectives and theoretical frameworks 
that have enabled a deeper understanding of these processes. Some scholars, like Homi Bhabha 
(1990) and Paul Gilroy (1993), envision diasporas as the space where the limitations and 
fragmentations of national culture can be exposed and contested, as the diasporic subject has the 
potential to hail a new transnational culture that celebrates ambiguity, fluidity, and hybridity. 
Other scholars (Bannerji 1997; Ahmed 1999; Scheffer 2003; Agnew 2007; Ricoeur 2010) have 
focused on the marginal nature of diasporas and their position on the borders of nation and 
belonging, as the “other” to and within the body politic, subject to displacement, racialization, 
criminalization, discrimination, and stigmatization. These theoretical perspectives offer different 
readings of the place and signification of diaspora, but both rely on the presumption of the 
existence of their object of study. 
The diaspora is usually assumed to have an a priori existence with a clear origin—
ancient, medieval or contemporary, and dating from a pivotal moment that led to a mass exodus 
of peoples from their state or region of origin (Scheffer 2003). Diasporas, in their loosest sense, 
are defined as communities that engage in “endless cultural, social, economic, and especially 
political struggles of those dispersed ethnic groups, permanently residing in host countries away 
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from their homelands, to maintain their distinctive identities and connections with their 
homelands and other dispersed groups from the same nations” (Scheffer 2003, 7). Clifford 
further adds that diasporas have a “history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, and 
alienation in the host (bad host?) country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support of the 
homeland, and a collective identity importantly defined by this relationship” (1995, 305). The 
diaspora is presumed to be the product of state or state-like institutions that expel on one end and 
marginalize on the other—in both cases, it is presumed to be created by states and performed by 
the members. Yet, as Brian Axel argues, this framework presupposes that “the common 
denominator exemplifying a diaspora is its vital relation to a place or origin that is elsewhere 
[…and] the place of origin or homeland—embodied in formulations of language, religion, 
tradition, race, ethnicity, indications of territoriality, etc.—constitutes the diaspora” (2001, 8).  
Thus a diaspora is created by movement away from a perceived homeland.  Consequently, in this 
framework, the hostland is assumed to perceive the diaspora as a permanent threat to its cohesion 
and its fantasy of its own closure. Thus, regardless of birthplace, those presumed to be part of the 
diaspora are defined in relation to the imaginary homeland and are subject to the host states’ 
control either through immigration policies, or through multicultural policies.  
Following Axel, I am interested in challenging this place of origin thesis by investigating 
the processes that constitute a diaspora, rather than assuming that movement away from a 
homeland imagined or otherwise necessarily creates this form of group. While there are social 
formations that are usefully defined as diasporas, these are not self-evident groupings with 
transhistorical characteristics. Rather, the particular historical formations that constitute specific 
diasporas need to be investigated and the processes whereby the ethnic/national subject is formed 
and then becomes a representative of a diaspora must be unravelled in order to understand and 
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foreground the agency of those defined as members of a diaspora. I agree with the reading of 
diasporas as marginal and existing on the borders of the nation. However, when members of 
diasporas are viewed as victims of expulsion, racialization, and marginalization, their role in 
shaping their own world and the world around them is rarely recognized. I wish to investigate the 
manner in which members of diasporas practice their agency and are actors in their own 
identification, while often being simultaneously constrained by the technologies of power 
imposed upon them by their hostland and homeland.  
Before I proceed, I need to attend to the terms hostland and homeland. In any discussion 
of the movement of peoples across state borders, we rely on shorthand concepts—like presuming 
that states and borders exist in the first place, in order to be able to discuss the implications of 
these imaginings. The difficulty with this approach is that all too often, even as we are aware of 
the imagined nature of these presumed entities, we lapse into treating them as if they existed and 
were bounded wholes. Likewise, I will use the terms hostland and homeland, or Canada and 
Rwanda, as place holders for an ideological, geographical, and temporal space, and cannot 
promise that I will not reify them—but I will always try to retain a consciousness of their 
construction. I also remain conscious of the difficulty of thinking of Canada as a perpetual 
hostland to those who identify as Rwandan as it presupposes that they are always outsiders to the 
Canadian state’s foundational myths and that Canada can never become a homeland to them. I 
will further develop this problematic in later chapters when I investigate how the individuals 
from this group
3
 themselves conceive of their place in Canada. The term homeland is also laden 
with difficulty, as it carries assumptions of belonging and security, and that those who have left 
                                                          
3
 The use of the term group is also problematic as it assumes the existence of a shared sense of identity and 
positionality, which may not be the case. I use this term, or, alternatively, the term community, for lack of a better 
one, knowing full well that the Rwandan diaspora is not a bounded discrete set of individuals who share a locus of 
understanding at all times. Rather, it serves to designate the notion that those whom I interviewed understood 
themselves to have something in common.  
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desire it—either as a place of return, or as an imaginary place that offers comfort and familiarity. 
In many cases, the presumed homeland is neither a desired spaced, nor, necessarily, where the 
diaspora wishes to return. Those who are part of a diaspora “experience[..] a dynamic tension 
every day between living ‘here’ and remembering ‘there’, between memories of places of origin 
and entanglements with places of residence, and between the metaphorical and the physical 
home” (Agnew 2005, 4). In the case of the Rwandan diaspora, the perceived homeland has in the 
past been hostile and memories of it are too often traumatic. Thus, while I use the terms, I remain 
aware of emptiness of the signifiers and attempt to extricate the multiple meanings and readings 
of the two. 
 
 
Theorizing Nation, Ethnicity, and Race 
To make sense of how these individuals came to identify as part of a Rwandan diaspora, 
we need to theorize not only diaspora, but notions of nation, ethnicity, and race. How do we 
come to see and understand as members of a group, disparate people who ultimately may share 
little in common, and by what alchemy do we then see them as acting together and thus attribute 
action, cognition, and emotion to this group? Social scientists have been offering answers to 
these questions since the turn to identity studies in the 1960s, and chief among them have been 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1977),  Pierre Bourdieu (1980), Benedict Anderson (1983; 2006), Amartya 
Sen (1985), Fernand Braudel (1988), Judith Bulter (1990), Zygmunt Bauman (1992), Paul Gilroy 
(1993), Charles Tilly (1996),  and Stuart Hall (1996). I have chosen to acknowledge the debt 
owed to these scholars, but to use Brubaker’s interventions to focus my analysis. Rogers 
Brubaker has spent considerable time challenging the practice in the social sciences of taking 
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“discrete, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social 
conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis” (Brubaker 2006, 9). He argues that this 
reification of a category of social life leads academics to reinforce the narratives of ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs who seek to call into being an ethnicity. We unintentionally help these 
entrepreneurs summon and generate that which we seek to describe and understand. Instead, we 
ought to view ethnicity, race, and nation: 
not as substances or things or entities or organisms, or collective individuals—as the 
imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring ‘groups’ encourages us to 
do—but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms. This 
means thinking of ethnicity, race, and nations not in terms of substantial groups or 
entities but in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive 
schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, 
and contingent events. It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and 
nationalization as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes (Brubaker 2006, 
11)  
 
Further, but equally importantly, Brubaker explains that: 
Ethnicity, race, and nationhood are fundamentally ways of perceiving, interpreting, and 
representing the social world. They are not things in the world, but perspectives on the 
world. They include ethnicized ways of seeing (and ignoring), of construing (and 
misconstruing), of inferring (and misinferring), of remembering (and forgetting). They 
include ethnically oriented frames, schemas, and narratives, and the situational cues—not 
least those provided by the media—that activate them. They include systems of 
classification, categorization, and identification, formal and informal. And they include 
the tacit, taken-for-granted background knowledge, embodied in persons and embedded 
in institutional routines and practices, through which people recognize and experience 
objects, places, persons, actions or situations ethnically, racially, or nationally marked or 
meaningful (2006, 11). 
 
Following the above analytical frames and Brubaker’s advice, I do not see Rwandan identity as a 
unified stable set of ways of seeing the world; rather, I focus on the multiple ways that those I 
interviewed categorized and identified themselves. This tightening, and yet loosening, of the 
notion of identity sheds greater light on how the individuals whom I interviewed could see 
themselves and their worlds so distinctly, and yet could still, unproblematically, perceive 
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themselves as part of the group that calls itself Rwandan. How one identifies oneself and others 
is fundamentally situational and contextual, yet that does not strip the idea of ethnicity of its 
emotional and often deadly political power. Moving away from a focus on things in the world to 
how these things are created better explains the porous boundaries of national, racial, and ethnic 
categories. These three distinct domains of knowledge production need to be investigated 
individually in order to fully grasp how nation, ethnicity and race come to be seen as things in 
the world and treated as if they exist. Looking at categories allows us to avoid imaging a group 
into being, yet still to appreciate that nation, ethnicity, and race are meaningful for those who see 
through them. Individuals, as actors in the world, daily use categories to “make sense of the 
world, linked to stereotypical beliefs and expectations about category members, invested with 
emotional associations and evaluative judgements, deployed as resources in specific interactional 
contexts, and activated by situational triggers” (Brubaker 2006, 13). Thus, I looked to parse the 
distinct understandings associated with “Rwandan” as a continuously created and re-created 
identity by listening to how individuals framed their experiences, their expectations, and their 
emotions, including in terms of categories and discourses of nation, ethnicity, and race.   
I also investigated the institutions and organizations that were central to the generation of 
this identity as they offered a “standardized scheme of social accounting, a interpretive frame for 
public discussion, a dense organizational grid, a set of boundary-markers, a legitimate form for 
public and private identities” (Brubaker 1994, 7). These ranged from the associations formed 
among those who identified as Rwandan, to the Rwandan and Canadian states as institutional 
structures (the latter two institutions are discussed in a latter section).  Institutions or 
organizations “cannot be equated with ethnic groups”, rather, given their organizational capacity, 
they are capable of what appears to be coherent action (Brubaker 2006, 15). Thus, as Brubaker 
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has argued, nations are “categories of practice”, and states as institutionalized forms of the 
nation. Indeed, states institutionalize “territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as 
fundamental social categories” by developing classificatory systems, accounting systems, 
registering and issuing identity documents, and reinforcing these categories in bureaucratic 
encounters (Brubaker 1994, 6-7). Through these institutional practices, states create, sustain and 
enact the nation as, fundamentally, a process. Thus, it was in the interplay between individuals 
and organizations that the things that we understand as a group became viable.   
To begin, I understand ethnicity as a discourse that is constructed historically, culturally 
and politically, as Stuart Hall argues. While it is often described in primordial terms, it is not a 
transhistorical form of identity, but recognition that each person speaks from a particular place 
and time, and these lived experiences work to construct subjectivity and identity. Thus, language, 
culture, history, and memory constitute a framework of experience that can come to be 
understood as “ethnicity” (Hall 1996, 161).  
 In this study I use both ethnicity and nation because the two concepts are often 
overlapping and simultaneous. There are moments when nation and ethnicity do not overlap—
for instance, “Canadian” can hardly be defined as an ethnic identity in that those who are thus 
understood rarely share language, culture, history, and the memory that constitute a framework 
of experience. Canadian identity is most usefully understood as a national identity that is actively 
generated through processes often originating with the state, primarily because it is a settler 
nation.  Conversely, “Italian”, “Polish” become fluid identities, which, at times, are understood 
as ethnic and at other times understood as national. Likewise, “Rwandan” is increasingly 
becoming both a national and an ethnic category—especially among the diaspora. There are also 
common sense understandings about racial identities linked to ideas of ethnicity and nation and a 
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presumed congruence between national boundaries and racial identities. For example, to identify 
as Rwandan is understood by both those within the category and outside observers to encapsulate 
blackness as an identity and as a signifier and to exclude other forms of racialized identity such 
as whiteness. Thus, in thinking through how these identities are generated and deployed, it seems 
most useful not to get bogged down in minute distinctions which may not matter to those who 
think and see themselves in both ethnic and national terms without differentiating.  
The key formative component of Rwandaness as a national category was the event of the 
Rwandan genocide, an example of what Brubaker terms a “contingent event” (2006) and the 
subsequent meanings that have been attached to it. Brubaker proposes that “violence becomes 
‘ethnic’ (or ‘racial or ‘nationalist’) through the meanings attributed to it by perpetrators, victims, 
politicians, officials, journalists, researchers, relief workers and others” (2006, 16), including in 
the context of such events. As the next section will detail further, I build on this idea by 
suggesting that violence becomes ethnically or nationally significant and meaningful by how it is 
remembered and by what meanings are attributed to it. In the moment of occurrence, violence is 
not initially productive of ethnic or national meanings. Rather, it is when the violence is recalled 
and then inscribed as ethnic, national or racial, that the event of the violence contributes to 
creating the very idea of the ethnicity, the nation or the race. This process of remembering and 
reconstituting the past to form a collective narrative among the Rwandan diaspora which became 
the foundational myth of the new Rwandan nation is one of the central processes under 
investigation in this study. In seeking to make sense of this nation-building process as an 
essential component of diaspora-making in the case of the Rwandan diaspora, I utilize the 
concept of a “mythico-history” borrowed from Liisa Malkki. She defines a mythico-history as a 
fundamentally moral re-telling of historical events that is neither wholly history nor myth—
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hence mythico-history. This mythico-history contains “a set of moral and cosmological ordering 
stories: stories which classify the world according to certain principles, thereby simultaneously 
creating it” (Malkki 1995, 54). The mythico-history is not necessarily factually false, but what 
distinguishes it from other forms of historical narrative is that it is focused on restoring and 
creating order. This mythico-history then becomes the collective history from which the nation is 
constituted. I pursue this idea further in chapter 3 where violence as a meaningful event is 
explored.  
The boundaries between national, ethnic, and racial categories (the latter to be defined 
shortly) also call out for clarification. In speaking to and of the Rwandan diaspora, I am speaking 
of people who alternatively identify as Rwandan (nationally/ethnically), Tutsi or Hutu 
(ethnically), and black (racially). Yet, what do they mean by these categories and how do the 
categories coexist? If nation is a set of categories that construct an “imagined community” in 
Anderson’s terms (2006), or, in Brubaker’s terms, a “way of seeing the world” (2006, 82), then 
so too are ethnicity and race, though they are experienced and interpreted differently. When 
people understand themselves as Rwandans they are classifying their social world according to 
ideas of belonging and identifying themselves against the other—in this case, the Belgian 
colonial other, the Burundian fraternal other, the Congolese external other. To classify oneself as 
Rwandan in Canada is to locate new others against whom one might identify—the black 
Caribbean other, the black African American other, the black Continental African other, and the 
perceived Canadian other (which usually means someone who is born in Canada and thinks in 
collective frames and categories which are distinctly North American, if not Canadian).  
The nation and the national identities that accompany it appear to be stable referents, yet 
the conceptual slippage of the terms demonstrates just how transitory and partial the referents 
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always must be. As Bhabha argues in Nation and Narration, “the mark of the ambivalence of the 
nation as a narrative strategy–and an apparatus of power—is that it produces a continual slippage 
into analogous, even metonymic categories like the people, minorities, or ‘cultural difference’ 
that continually overlap in the act of writing the nation. What is displayed in this displacement 
and repetition of terms is the nation as the measure of the liminality of cultural modernity” 
(1990, 292). While Bhabha understands the nation to be a product and measure of liminality of 
modernity, I am more interested in seeing how it generates common sense understandings of the 
social world. 
To see the world through nation is also to understand oneself as being the inheritor of an 
ordered national cosmology. To borrow from anthropology, cosmology is defined as the ordering 
of the known universe. Tambiah defines this as: 
classifications of the most encompassing scope. They are frameworks of concepts and 
relations which treat the universe or cosmos as an ordered system, describing it in terms 
of space, time, matter, motion, and peopling it with gods, humans, animals, spirits, 
demons, and the like. Cosmologies consist usually of accounts of the creation and 
generation of the existing order of phenomena, explaining their character and their place 
and function in the scheme (1985, 3). 
 
What one sees when one sees through nation is not arbitrary, but the product of a series of 
understandings and orderings of the social and physical world. The borders between people (who 
is a friend and who is an enemy), the borders between things (where one’s home lies and where 
it does not), and the borders between ideas (which belief system is “true” and which is not), are 
all influenced by national cosmologies. These orderings are fundamentally orderings of the 
moral universe. Just as religion once ordered the moral universe, now the nation offers a 
cosmology through which we can understand who we are and our place in the world. A 
cosmology is not a stable, solid block of self and other understandings which is transposed unto 
each new generation. Rather, though it appears defined and clear, it is a system of understandings 
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which is constantly under strain as it is picked and prodded and shaped and unshaped by those 
who are its practitioners and producers. Accordingly, nationality or ethnicity is not “a continuous 
but an intermittent phenomenon” and “happens at particular moments and in particular contexts” 
when individuals understand themselves to be motivated by this identity and understand their 
world through the cosmology that it imposes (Brubaker et al. 2007, 207). 
The place and time from which one identifies changes the content of that identification. It 
is a very different thing to say I am Rwandan because I am not white and Belgian, or black and 
Burundian, than to say I am Rwandan because I am not white and Canadian, nor black and 
African American. Likewise, to identify as a Tutsi means that I am not a Hutu. There are 
presumed social norms and mores and presumed distinct histories which ostensibly divide the 
two ethnic groups, yet the greatest marker of Tutsiness is its presumed difference from Hutuness. 
As Liisa Malkki has argued in her study of Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, the identity of 
her study participants as Hutus or as refugees was not a stable identity, but a continual process of 
“making and unmaking categorical identities and moral communities” (1995, 17). Depending on 
their location in a refugee camp or in town, Hutu refugees saw themselves and their relationship 
to Tutsis in Burundi dramatically differently. In her study, Malkki found that of those who were 
expelled from Burundi by massacres and genocide committed by the minority Tutsi against the 
majority Hutu in 1972, the refugees who lived in town framed their sense of self and identity in 
oppositional terms to those who lived in a refugee camp. For the camp Hutus, exile had taught 
them finally “‘what a Hutu is’ and prepared people for the return to the place where the Hutu 
‘belong’” (Malkki 1995, 209). One of the central themes of their didactic story telling was to 
constitute “the Tutsi” as “a categorical opposite and enemy, but also as the embodiment of such 
abstract moral qualities as evil, laziness, beauty, danger, and ‘malignity’. ‘The Hutu’ tended to 
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emerge out of this, reflexively, as that which ‘the Tutsi’ were not” (Malkki 1995, 54). 
Conversely, the town refugees rejected such categorical framings of their identity and instead 
“seemed to feel most at home in the borderland that was Kigoma [town], a zone of sheltering 
vagueness where national or categorical ‘species’ allegiance was not continually being extracted 
from them” (Malkki 1995, 193). The camp refugees saw the Tutsi as the allegorical enemy, 
while the town refugees developed a much less categorical understanding of their own identity, 
as well as the Tutsi identity. In essence, to be “Hutu” meant a very different “way of seeing” in 
the town than it did in the camp; ethnic identification held few stable referents and was a box that 
was constantly being filled by the actors thus identified and, importantly in Malkki’s study, by 
state and institutional structures, a subject I return to later. 
Race seems to least fit this frame as it carries such a history of division and putative 
difference. It seems to speak to an ontological reality of physical similarities among a particular 
group of people. Rwandans, in particular, could be said to be black nearly universally, thus 
suggesting that all Rwandans share a racial identity and therefore that this is no longer just a 
“way of seeing”, but a deeper, more rooted, way of being. Yet, race is as much a “way of seeing” 
as is nation and ethnicity. Many scholars have spent much time demonstrating that there is no 
biological basis for the idea of race (Obach 1999; Andreasen 2000; Anderson and Nickerson 
2005; Bonham et al. 2005; Smedley and Smedley 2005), and I will not spend time here 
rehearsing their arguments, but will instead focus on how race is a way of seeing. As Kwame 
Anthony Appiah argues, 19
th
 and 20
th
 century black (at the time “negro”) thinkers and 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, spent considerable time and energy on creating a sense of racial 
solidarity through the constructs of Pan-Africanism and negritude, in an effort to persuade their 
incredibly diverse audiences that they shared a common bond (1992). The very fact that their 
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audiences, made up of African Americans and Africans under colonial rule, had to be persuaded 
that they shared qualities and had “natural” affinities, speaks to the lack of an ontological reality 
to race. Thus, seeing through race allowed Crummell, Du Bois, Senghor, Cesaire, and others to 
envision that all peoples who “belonged” in Africa shared a sense of victimhood and oppression. 
Yet, as Appiah points out, even colonialism was perceived very differently in different parts of 
the African continent. Where it had existed for less than 50 years, it had left little impact on the 
culture of the indigenous people, and thus they did not conceptualize colonialism in the same 
way as those who were theorizing it (Appiah 1992, 7).The very notion of liberatory blackness or 
Africaness had to be constructed in opposition to racial hierarchies created by colonial 
machineries and filled in with new meanings designed to foster anti-colonial sentiments and anti-
racism, though, often by generating new forms of racism, as Appiah argues.
4
  
As the earlier formations of “race” were distinct “ways of seeing”, so too are more recent 
revisions of these concepts. Contemporary ideas about what constitutes blackness in North 
America are evident in the ways in which those I study, and many others, understand their social 
world. Consequently, “when we characterize police practices as involving ‘racial profiling’” , we 
are interpreting the world as if race existed and played out in day to day interactions of power 
(Brubaker 2006,70). Thus, when my informants explained that they were subjected to excessive 
traffic stops because of their blackness, they were expressing the way in which they and the 
police officer stopping them were “seeing” through race.  Race does not exist, “yet it is an 
integral part of the classificatory system through which a racialized social order is produced and 
maintained” (Torres, Miron and Inda 1999, 5). Though there may not be a biological reality to 
                                                          
4
 Appiah’s argument is that these new identities, though they were intended as a remedy for the debilitating 
racisms of the past, ended up taking race for granted and thus accepting its existence in the first place. Indeed, 
“the received concept is a hierarchy, a vertical structure, and DuBois wishes to rotate the axis, to give race a 
‘horizontal’ reading, but still retains the very concept of race, thus retaining the roots of racism” (1992, 46).  
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race, it certainly is a way that people are identified and identify themselves, thus becoming one 
of a set of self and other identifications which are mobilized to make sense of and to classify the 
everyday world. It becomes an ontological reality when individuals are racialized and othered 
based on this classification. Racialization is the “process that produces and constructs the 
meaning of race and the structures that accompany such a process” (Agnew 2007, 9). 
Racialization draws attention to how groups are defined as of a certain race and points to the 
processes that lead to the creation of such categories and to the imposition of these categories 
unto individuals and groups (Henry and Tator 2002). To say that race is also a way of seeing is 
not to ignore or devalue the trauma of being racialized and thus dehumanized. It is to understand 
how people are perceived and perceive themselves and what the consequences of these 
perceptions are. This way of seeing through race allows us to avoid reifying it and thus 
contributing to practices of racialization, while not denying its purchase on social realities. Here 
again, moving away from ontology, and thus a focus on what is, to epistemology and a focus on 
how realities are constructed, gives us an avenue to think through the ways in which potent 
classifications shape and enforce realities unto peoples’ bodies. 
Yet, even with such a potent form of classification as race, “ordinary actors usually have 
considerable room for maneuver in the ways in which they use even highly institutionalized and 
powerfully sanctioned categories” (Brubaker 2006, 68). Correspondingly, race, nation, and 
ethnicity, as alternate and sometimes corresponding “ways of seeing” are mobilized and utilized 
every day in multiple ways, in multiple spaces and contexts. Among Rwandans, when elites 
organize and articulate a performance of nation and subterraneanly, ethnicity, as powerful as the 
annual genocide commemorations, young people attend not because of the sense of duty that is 
the oft publicly expressed motivation of their elders, but because of a desire to make sense of 
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their inheritance of loss and memory. Consequently, by bringing their own needs and desires to 
the event, they inadvertently become instrumental in generating both a sense of nationhood and 
ethnicity and the appearance of consensus around the meaning of those terms.  
 
 
Violence and the Making of Rwandan Diaspora  
As the analysis has already noted, violence is central in the making of collective 
identities, and I have argued that violence becomes ethnically or nationally significant and 
meaningful by how it is remembered and recollected, building on Brubaker’s understanding of 
violence and of contingent events. As such, the Rwandan diaspora is unthinkable without 
thinking about the genocidal violence that is the condition of its existence, particularly about 
how it is represented in memory. In this way, the hyper-real violence of the Rwandan genocide 
has become the originary event for contemporary Rwandan identity both in Rwanda, and in the 
diaspora. It is the contingent event that is recalled and remembered as a “phase[…] of 
extraordinary cohesion and moment[…] of intensely felt solidarity” (Brubaker 2004, 12) among 
those who identify as Tutsi, and this event has become the foundational myth of the new nation.  
Every nation and ethnicity, without exception, is rendered through violence, but those 
violences are not always remembered. As Ernest Renan famously argued at the Sorbonne in 
1882, forgetting the violence of conquest, of racial and other differences is crucial in the creation 
of a nation (1990). Thus, most contemporary nations and ethnicities have effectively forgotten 
their bloody origins. But for those who classify themselves as Rwandan, their blood marks their 
beginning and its remembrance. The genocide of 1994 stands as the border—breaking time, 
space, self, and other. The genocidal violence occurred in Rwanda starting on April 6
th
 1994 and 
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there played out on the bodies of between 500,000 and 1.3 million people, not including those 
who died in subsequent years due to revenge killings, murders, state-sanctioned massacres, and 
the brutal Congolese war. The brutal termination of these nearly uncountable lives has drawn in 
horror and blood the stage upon which the subsequent nation and ethnicity would be constructed. 
Their deaths and physical remains have been mobilized as monuments, building blocks in the 
new edifice of contemporary Rwandan diasporic identity. The violence is initially real as there 
are too many bodies and absences to point to, but becomes hyperreal as the bodies and absences 
are recounted, reconstituted, and retold in the fused projects of remembering, forgetting and 
nation-building. The violence transcends the 100 days of killing in 1994 and continues forward 
in time, even as it is left behind temporally. It creates its own time and space, and this time can 
be and is called upon indefinitely. As is the case with other nation-states that are created in the 
aftermath of a deeply traumatizing violence, like the Israeli state, the time of the violence never 
ceases. It is not permitted to fade into memory as it becomes crucial to the state’s narratives of 
self. In the case of Rwanda, like Israel, the contemporary government is a government which 
garners much of its legitimacy from the very violence for which it presents itself as an antidote. 
This Heideggerian double movement of remembering and forgetting (Hodge 1995, 104) 
necessitates the constant presence of the time of violence. Indeed, as the later chapter on violence 
will develop more fully, the ways in which the Rwandan state mobilizes the time of violence are 
reminiscent of the ways in which the Israeli state mobilizes the time of violence. In both 
instances, the time of violence and consequently the violence itself, become common place, 
while thought of and understood as extreme exceptions.  
Axel has argued that for the Sikh diaspora the political violence of the torture of Sikh 
men by the Indian state has become the “central element in processes of a diasporic imaginary, 
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designating a fundamental and historically specific, aspect of not just Sikh subjectification but 
the formation of diaspora itself” (2001, 122). Specifically, the online circulation of the images of 
tortured bodies by Sikhs around the world has formed a “specific modality of identification and 
pedagogy” which is central to the formation of the Sikh diaspora (ibid., 139). Axel’s argument 
that “violence is the thread by which the diaspora is constituted as a community” (ibid., 156) is 
central to my understanding of how remembrances and representations of violence connect 
individuals into a community. However, contrary to Axel’s findings concerning the Sikh 
diaspora, among the Rwandan diaspora, the violence of the genocide ruptured the former nation, 
but it did not generate connections between those who lived away from the homeland—namely, 
neither the violence nor recollections of it created a diaspora, at least not on their own. As the 
analysis makes clear, these individuals were often connected to one another, even sharing 
memories of the violence, but they did not become a diaspora until the new Rwandan state, itself 
formed out of the horror of the genocide, called the diaspora into being through its 
institutionalized practices, accounting schemes, classificatory categories, policy directives and 
discourses and offered the genocide as the foundational myth of the new nation and the diaspora. 
 
 
States and the Making of Diasporas  
 States are the institutional forms of nations from which emanate rituals, laws, norms, and 
classificatory systems (Brubaker 1994) which instantiate the nation. As the earlier section 
indicated, states are also pivotal in the deployment of violence and in the re-telling and 
remembering of violence as constitutive of the nation. Indeed, in the case of the new Rwandan 
nation, it was the state’s very explicitly outlined mythico-history of the genocide which was the 
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foundation upon which those who identified as Rwandese in the diaspora came to connect as 
Rwandans. In thinking of states thus, I am not suggesting that states are monolithic agents with 
unified agendas; rather, the policies that are the product of individual initiatives within large 
bureaucracies make states appear as unitary actors. In the post-Westphalian era we cannot 
conceive of nation, ethnicity, and race without understanding states, and state-like institutions 
(such as the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Uganda), as the central to their construction. Thus, as 
Brubaker proposes, we can distinguish between state-framed and counter-state nationalism. 
State-framed nationalism is “congruent with the state, and […] institutionally and territorially 
framed by it”, while counter-state nationalism, as the name suggests, are formed in opposition to 
an existing state (Brubaker 2004, 144). Whether the nation is congruent or oppositional to a state, 
the very idea of a nation depends upon the existence (or potential existence) of a state to shape it, 
or to be challenged by it. Likewise, a diaspora, as the deterritorialized form of a nation, relies on 
the state or potential of a state to claim it or reject it. This state could be the real or imagined 
home state, or the host state. Yet, to propose that states are the central institution is insufficient to 
explain how they contribute to generating common-sense understandings, cognitive schemas, 
discursive frames, organizational routines, political projects, and contingent events that help 
constitute  nation, ethnicity, and race as categories or ways of seeing. Indeed, the modern state is 
one the most significant “agents of identification and categorization” as it seeks to monopolize 
“legitimate symbolic force […and] this includes the power to name, to identify, to categorize, to 
state what is what and who is who” (Brubaker 2006, 42). To understand these processes, we need 
to delve into specific policy discourses and observe how they function. In this study, two sets of 
policy discourses are of particular interest: the Canadian state’s multiculturalism and the 
Rwandan state’s transnationalism.   
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The Canadian state has been a central institution in the shaping of ideas about race and 
generating new ways of seeing. Policies emanating from the Canadian state create discourses 
which generate “commonsense cultural knowledge about the social world and one’s place in it” 
such as “one’s own and others’ ethno-cultural nationality, and the ability to assign unknown 
others to ethnonational categories on the basis of cues such as language, accent, name, and 
sometimes appearance” (Brubaker 2006, 25). Specifically, the key policy discourse that has 
worked to construct ideas about race has been multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is one of the 
key state-sanctioned and -generated discourses which identifies who belongs to the Canadian 
nation and on what terms. It is premised upon the assumption that ethnic/racial minorities, 
historically actively excluded from the nation, are now included through a series of laws and 
policies  that seek to offer support for the expression and practice of non-Anglo-phone or 
Franco-phone cultures in Canada. Yet, despite the promise implicit in such a policy, the specific 
form of multiculturalism in Canada has served to frame and control a potentially dangerous, and 
even radical other. Multiculturalism is founded on the assumption that “cultures” are things in 
the world and that they will inevitably come into conflict if they are not managed within a set of 
legal and policy constraints. Thus, in creating a policy to manage “cultures,” the Canadian state 
has created and reified the idea of cultures as distinct and incompatible with one another. The 
othered cultures have thus been interpreted as transhistorical and immutable, and fundamentally 
anti-modern. They have become inflexible, stolid objects that have always been enacted the same 
way. Multiculturalism also serves to obscure other vectors of difference within the presumed 
“culture”, because “in stressing ethnicity, it tended to work on and foster the assumption that 
ethnic groups were internally homogenous and, thus, that gender, class, or other differences were 
not relevant” (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002, 108-9).  
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 Using Brubaker, the study sees Canadian state systems of classification and naming as 
having a great impact on generating a Rwandan diaspora, for those who migrate to Canada find 
themselves named and classified as the perpetual racialized other, and thus are often driven to 
seek out other means of belonging. Indeed, the Canadian state’s discourses of racialization were 
a necessary, though insufficient, spur to the creation of the diaspora. Under the policy/discourse 
of multiculturalism, those who identify as Rwandans in the GTA find the ostensible language of 
inclusion, yet are in practice racialized and othered. They are racialized as black and rendered 
hyper visible, even in the context of a region like the GTA where 47% of residents self-report 
being members of a visible minority (City of Toronto 2013), Rwandans in the region faced day-
to-day struggles to stake a claim in the political and social world that they also helped constitute. 
Most said that they rarely experienced explicit manifestations of racism—the story of one boy 
being called a “nigger” by a classmate was rare enough to be an exceptional story that I was told 
by more than one informant. Yet, they nonetheless experienced what Henry et al. (1995) have 
termed “everyday racism”:  
Everyday racism expresses itself in glances, gestures, forms of speech, and physical 
movements. Sometimes it is not even consciously experienced by its perpetrators, but it is 
immediately and painfully felt by its victims—the empty seat next to a person of colour, 
which is the last to be occupied in a crowded bus; the slight movement away from a 
person of colour in an elevator; the overattention to the black customer in the shop; the 
inability to make direct eye contact with a person of colour; the racist joke told at a 
meeting; and the ubiquitous question ‘Where did you come from?’(Agnew 2007, 29)  
 
As one informant taught me, the more contemporary version of that question is “what’s your 
background?”—a question that I, though I am a migrant, have not been asked because I am white 
and have an Anglo name. Yet, nearly all respondents had encountered this question. Many 
understood it to be motivated by curiosity, which they were content to satisfy, while many others 
had grown weary of the question and understood it to be a comment on their perceived 
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difference. Other ways that they had been reminded of their place outside the nation’s 
imagination of itself included non-recognition of their credentials and work experience, 
underemployment, accent discrimination, excessive and unmerited police stops of men driving 
vehicles in their own neighbourhoods, and excessive attention in stores, including outright 
accusations of theft. These experiences of racialization and the concomitant discrimination 
echoed those of other African migrants in Canada (Creese 2011, 148). Thus, the state policy of 
ostensible inclusion but actual containment led individuals who identified as Rwandese to desire 
a connection to Rwanda, understood as the homeland.  
The longing for the homeland motivated many in the community to develop transnational 
ties to the homeland. Transnationalism fosters the development of “new subjectivities” in the 
global arena which engender the development of new identities no longer fixated on the nation-
state, but which are now polycentric (Ong and Nonini 1996, 11).  The focal points of these new 
identities can be ideas of cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, consumption, an international 
business class, and other forms of supra-national ideology and organization. For most migrants, 
though, the development of dual or even multiple identifications marks the emergence of a new 
conception of self and other. To think of oneself as both home and simultaneously away from 
home destabilizes the notion of home and opens up space to envision home as deterritorialized 
and possibly plural. Yet, it also invokes both affective spaces as formative. Thus, when those 
who identify as Rwandan in the GTA engage in transnational practices, they are subjected to (at 
least) two national cosmologies—those of the Canadian state, including its discourses of 
multiculturalism and simultaneous practices of exclusion as discussed earlier, and those of the 
Rwandan state. Yet, the idea of the self and community that emerges is not the product of a 
dichotomy of here/there. Rather, it is simultaneous here/there, a convergence and divergence of 
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time, space and location. As Westwood and Phizacklea have suggested, migration and the 
subsequent transnationalism often generated are a rupturing of linear narratives, wherein the term 
rupture “also suggests the unfinished and discontinuous nature of both the migratory process and 
the making of national identities and nations” (2000, 7). Hence, those who have come to identify 
as Rwandans in the GTA have been both agents and subjects of the making of national identities 
and nations, yet they have also ruptured those constructs as their presence outside the Rwandan 
nation state calls into question the very category of the nation-state as a territorialized locality 
with its associated territorialized understandings of belonging.  
Transnationalism is a flexible term that has been bent to accommodate various theoretical 
and empirical phenomena related to the simultaneous connectedness of individuals to more than 
one state, community, or locality. Transnationalism belies precise definition, but is most usefully 
deployed to describe networks and movement of individuals, ideas, and capital. It involves, at its 
core, the crossing of borders, national, institutional, ideological, philosophical, and practices that 
are not confined within one state, but, as the term suggests, transcend the nation state. Glick-
Schiller and Fouron define transnational migrants as those who “are fully encapsulated neither in 
the host society nor in their native land but who nonetheless remain active participants in the 
social settings of both locations. They construct their identities in relation to both societies” 
(1990, 330). Transnationalism is thus perceived “as social processes whereby immigrants create 
social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders, and developed multiple 
familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political relations that span nations” 
(Wong 2007/8, 81). In this way, the argument of the present study that the study participants had 
come to understand themselves as part of a Rwandan diaspora even while also coming to 
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understand themselves as at home in Canada, is an argument about the constitution of  
transnational belonging.  
Contemporary transnationalism dates back to the origin of the Westphalian system of 
nation-states and the emergence of borders that were crossed and re-crossed. It is an ongoing 
process that has shaped the modern world. Yet, there are components that are new and thus merit 
recognition as novel developments of the latter 20
th
 century. The question of whether 
transnationalism is, in fact, a new phenomenon, or merely the continuation of centuries-old 
practices echoes similar debates about globalization. The responses to both debates are likewise 
parallel—what is new in both transnationalism and globalization (so intimately connected) are 
the technologies of the latter 20
th
 century which have enabled the speedy transfer of people and 
capital and the instantaneous transfer of ideas all around the globe. Yet, despite these novel 
developments, the state remains central to many of these processes, including the constitution of 
a sense of diaspora and of home, as the present study will show. Moreover, despite predictions of 
the state’s decline, it persists and mutates with the new conditions, becoming increasingly a 
virtual creature. As new research into state uses of online platforms has demonstrated, the very 
institutional structure and functioning of modern states has altered with the advent of first the 
internet, then social media (Everard 2001; Fountain 2001; Gruzd, Wellman and Takhteyev 2011; 
Kittilson and Dalton 2011; Bruns and Highfield 2013; Bernal 2014). As Everard proposed, 
states’ role in identity formation has only been strengthened by the transition to online platforms 
(2001), and the Rwandan state is no exception. To paraphrase Twain, the rumors of the death of 
the state are an exaggeration. It is hale, hearty and surprisingly resilient in the face of extra-state 
forces and developments. These developments include: 
 “advances in the ‘technology of contact’”, such as “cheap telephone calls, taxes, 
email and Internet sites, satellite T.V., ubiquitous print media and inexpensive and 
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frequent modes of travel  have allowed for continuous and real-time 
communication within global migrant networks” 
 “the speed and intensity of communication between home and away has created in 
many contexts a ‘normative transnationalism’ in which migrants abroad are ever 
more closely aware of what is happening in the sending context”  
 “The sheer scale of remittances represents both a qualitative and quantitative 
shift”  
 “advances in telecommunications have facilitated wider, more intensive and 
increasingly institutionalized forms of political engagement with homelands, 
including party politics and electioneering, lobbying, mass demonstrations, post-
conflict reconstruction, support for insurgency and support for terrorism” 
(Vertovec 2009, 15).  
 
These extra- and intra-state changes have facilitated ever greater transnational engagements of 
migrants which include “reciprocity and solidarity within kinship networks, political 
participation not only in the country of emigration but also of immigration, small-scale 
entrepreneurship of migrants across borders and the transfer and re-transfer of cultural customs 
and practices” (Faist 2010, 11). As a set of practices and a theoretical concept, transnationalism 
challenges the presumption that migration causes a severing of ties with the homeland and that 
assimilation to the hostland replaces the affective, ideological, institutional and commercial ties 
to the homeland. It serves to acknowledge that migrants usually retain close ties to the homeland 
and even build new ones as they build lives in the new host/homeland.  
 
 
Home and Diasporas  
 The concept of home, be it in the putative homeland or hostland, is one of the central 
analytical categories that forms the cosmology of the nation among the diaspora. Home is 
literally a building or place and an “idea and an imaginary that is imbued with feelings. These 
may be feelings of belonging, desire and intimacy, (as, for instance, in the phrase ‘feeling at 
home’), but can also be feelings of fear, violence and alienation […] Home is thus a spatial 
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imaginary: a set of intersecting and variable ideas and feelings, which are related to context, and 
which construct places, extend across spaces and scales, and connect places” (Blunt and Dowling 
2006, 2). The idea of home carries with it many affective and theoretical understandings, and to 
appreciate what those who identify as Rwandans in the GTA mean when they express that 
“Canada is now home”, it is helpful to understand what the idea of home denotes for similarly 
racialized communities. Many first generation migrants view the imagined homeland as the 
authentic home, while their current place of residence in the hostland is interpreted as a more or 
less temporary necessity.
5
 Yet for all the hope invested in this idea of home, it often remains as 
“only a fleeting, tempting promise, always just out of reach [...] because it is impossible to 
recreate the lost memories” (Davis 2004, 68). Notisha Massaquoi, a first generation migrant from 
Sierra Leone, describes this state of being thus: “For many of us, our identity is based on a 
constant longing for the imagined home, the one that no longer exists, that many of us were too 
young to remember, that we have infrequently visited, and the one which became frozen in time 
and romanticized at the moment of arrival” (2004, 140). There can never be a return to this 
desired home because, as Massaquoi points out, the memory has replaced the reality and the 
memory is of a frozen time which takes on mythological proportions as the hostland fails the 
diasporic subject. Massaquoi explains this disjuncture of the memory of home being juxtaposed 
against the reality when she narrates how her upbringing in Canada was more traditional and less 
progressive than the upbringing of her cohort in Sierra Leone as her parents relied upon their 
memories to replicate what they understood to be traditional values—but the traditions had 
changed in Sierra Leone and suddenly they were anachronistic, even at home. Thus, the idea of 
                                                          
5
 I use the term homeland to refer to the imagined place of origin: in the case of the Rwandan community that is 
the state of Rwanda, even if the person in question was not born or raised in Rwanda. The term hostland refers to 
Canada, but, as I have indicated in previously, a hostland can become a homeland. Indeed, very many in the study 
claimed it as home. Thus, I will use the awkward but more accurate hostland/homeland to indicate the variety of 
subject positions.  
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home was an unattainable, unrealizable idea that sustained the migrant, until confronted with the 
logic of change.   
Sara Ahmed points out that within the literature on diasporas there are two distinct ways 
of viewing the idea of home: as a familiar, comfortable and static space, or as already inscribed 
with strangeness and movement in its very origin. The former reading is “associated with stasis, 
boundaries, identity and fixity. Home is implicitly constructed as a purified space of belonging in 
which the subject is too comfortable to question the limits or borders of his or her existence” 
(Ahmed 1999, 339). This understanding of home allows the interpreter to construct the migrant 
as the privileged subject who is more aware and more knowledgeable than the local subject. 
Inherent in this construction is the idea that migration is exceptional, as Ahmed points out, and 
that it generates new ways of knowing the world. Thus the local subject, who does not move 
spatially or temporally, becomes the limited and constrained subject. The second interpretation 
of home that Ahmed offers complicates the idea of home as it recognizes that this construct can 
serve multiple purposes and functions simultaneously. Home is already strange and movement is 
already inherent; there is no a priori home, as home is constructed through the mediation of those 
who move, those who arrive, and those who stay. Further, there is “dislocation within the very 
forming of homes as complex and contingent spaces of inhabitation” (Ahmed 1999, 340). Here 
both the migrant and those who stay shape the idea of home and imbue it with a variety of 
meanings. Neither position is inherently privileged. Both those who leave and those who stay 
construct home through sentimentalizing it as not only a space of origin, but also a space of 
belonging. Thus affect is central to home—how one feels about a place or time determines 
whether one constructs it as home, or not. However, the place one claims as home can never be 
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exclusively determined by affect—those who are marginalized by the community that they share 
space with are prevented from claiming that space as home.   
As Sara Ahmed points out, “home is where the heart is”, and if the heart cannot rest easy 
where the body is, then home must become an imaginary space that fulfills the unsatisfied 
emotional needs. For the African diaspora which has been placed as the ontological other 
wherever in the world they reside by virtue of their racialization, the heart can never rest easy as 
it always knows its place of residence can be threatened. Thus the knowledge that they will not 
be permitted to feel fully at home in the hostland spurs their desire and connection to the 
ancestral or remembered homeland. Yet, they too often view the hostland as temporary and yearn 
for their homeland as that is the site of their dreams and hopes. Few of them return to this 
homeland because they establish ties and roots in the hostland and find that though they may 
yearn for the homeland, they have little to return to (Gilroy 1993; Tettey and Puplampu 2005; 
Okpewho and Nzegwu 2009). So for most, the homeland remains an abstraction, and a home in 
case the hostland fails them.  
In the present study, these people who shared a perceived shared place of origin and a 
newly emerging identity were forming and developing the institutional supports that more 
established communities had. While many lamented that the emergent community of people who 
imagined themselves as a Rwandan diaspora lacked cohesion and organization, nonetheless, 
there was a sense of shared place, space, experience, and identity—and  a much welcomed sense 
of common safety and belonging in the new homes that they were building, findings that will be 
detailed in chapter 7. Yet, that sense of belonging could not mitigate the lasting memory of 
violence. Those who identified as Rwandan in the GTA, subjected to state discourses about 
ethnicity, nation, race, and diaspora, were connected to one another through the memory of 
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violence which was the originary event of this group. Thus, the discussion of the empirical 
findings of this study begins, by necessity, with an analysis of the role of violence and memories 
of violence.  
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Chapter Three 
Collective Violence and the Making of a Diaspora 
Violence, even deadly violence, has to be understood as a component of everyday life. In 
many instances that means the literal fact of people facing the death of friends and kin. Every 
day, in every state, there is murderous violence—lives are terminated brutally and the ghost of 
those lives haunts those who are left. Death, especially violent death, is traumatic for those who 
witness and remember as it shatters their sense of safety, well-being, and wholeness. Death is 
always individually meaningful, but what makes some deaths collectively meaningful? Why are 
some bodies called upon to bear symbolic meaning within collective understandings, while 
others are forgotten (or selectively omitted) in collective understandings almost as soon as they 
are lost? The difference in the treatment and meaning of one death compared to another is not 
located in the person who died or even in the manner of her death, but in the meanings that are 
subsequently attributed to it and to the ways in which her death is mobilized. As Brubaker 
proposes, “how conflict and violence are seen, interpreted, and represented depends significantly 
on interpretative frames. Today, ethnic and national frames are readily accessible, powerfully 
resonant, and widely understood as legitimate” (2004, 17). Thus, large scale violence in the latter 
20
th
 century has commonly come to be understood as something called “ethnic conflict”. Yet, if, 
as Brubaker argues, the very idea of ethnicity is a way of seeing, rather than a way of being, then 
“ethnic conflict” is not a self-evident phenomenon. Rather, conflict becomes ethnic “through the 
meanings attributed to it” by the various actors involved directly or indirectly in the violence 
(Brubaker 2004, 16). I propose that violence becomes collectively significant not in the moment 
it occurs, or even directly after, but when it is recalled and inscribed as meaningful. The practice 
of remembering the violence as ethnic/national, and commemorating it as such constitutes the 
meaning of the event as ethnic/national.  
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 The Rwandan genocide, like the other horrific genocides of the 20
th
 century, has come to 
be seen as a cultural trauma for and by Rwandans. According to Alexander, “cultural trauma 
occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that 
leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and 
changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (Alexander 2004, 1) This 
means that in thinking themselves Rwandan, members of this group daily contend with death as 
it is constitutive of the very category of Rwandan, and thus becomes part of the everyday. As 
Axel points out “violence today is the common thread constantly creating and transforming the 
relations” that make up the Sikh diaspora. Likewise, violence has become the thread that makes 
up the Rwandan diaspora (Axel 2001, 121). In seeing through Rwandaness, Tutsiness, or 
Hutuness, Rwandans in the diaspora invoke the temporal space of the genocide in order to make 
sense of the present. There is no Rwandan, Tutsi, or Hutu identity without the violence. Thus the 
time of violence and the present can be said to exist simultaneously.  
 
 
Rwandan Genocide as Cultural Trauma  
Cultural trauma differs from individual trauma in the scope of its impact and in the 
manner in which it violates individuals and, most significantly, groups. Erikson differentiates the 
two types of trauma thus: 
By individual trauma I mean a blow to the psyche that breaks through one’s defenses so 
suddenly and with such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively…By collective 
trauma, on the other hand, I mean a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages 
the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality. 
The collective trauma works its way slowly and even insidiously into the awareness of 
those who suffer from it, so it does not have the quality of suddenness normally 
associated with “trauma”. But it is a form of shell shock all the same, a gradual realization 
that the community no longer exists as an effective source of support and that an 
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important part of the self has disappeared… “We” no longer exist as a connected pair or 
as linked cells in a larger communal body (Erikson quoted in Alexander 2004, 4). 
 
As becomes clear in the subsequent discussion of interviews with members of the community, 
the genocide was an individual trauma because it shattered people’s sense of self and their place 
in the world. At the time of writing in mid-2015, 21 years after the genocide, many of those who 
survived the genocide and were participants in this study are still so deeply traumatized by the 
violence that they cannot speak of it and live cautious, closed-off, fearful lives. Those who have 
found their way to speaking of the trauma expressed that they cope better with it than others, but 
they too displayed and cited the continuing impact of the trauma upon their lives. Many spoke of 
lapsing into a deep depression during the month of April, and others said that they avoided 
commemorations for fear of resurrecting the pain. Their individual worlds were riven by the 
trauma and it may take generations for this memory to cease having this destructive power.   
 
 
Individual Traumas 
 Marie, a genocide survivor who was forced to watch her husband be killed, and then was 
raped by the murderers and infected with HIV, physically lives the memory of the violence every 
moment of every day. Every time she took the life sustaining antiretrovirals, every time she 
faced another infection due to her failing immune system, every time she faced another doctor’s 
visit, Marie was physiologically and psychologically reminded of the violence that she bore in 
her DNA. Marie could not forget, for to forget would be to risk literal death, so remembering the 
violence had become the condition of her life. Even as she daily faced the remembrances, the 
month of April was debilitating. She explained that every April, for 21 years, she felt that:  
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And me, if I’m okay in Canada, I have everything, but that shock, the shock was in my 
heart, the way I live in that time can never go, and if I tell you it is gone, I lie to you, 
because the shock it is still inside of me and that’s sometime I feel like I’m not happy, 
especially in April, every April, I’m not happy, I lose happiness. And I feel like a, I have 
dream, sometime I have the dream I think I’m in my country, so I wake up, so my mind is 
go far away and I say, where I am? Oh, so at that time, I think, ohh, I’m in Canada, okay 
I’m saved. 
 
The recurring night terrors, when she wakes up drenched in sweat, and the flashbacks, reminded 
her that the past time of violence continued into the present. Though she was able to remind 
herself that she was now in Canada, and “saved”, she could not sever the power that the memory 
held over her. Though she was physically distant from the place of the violence, the violence was 
never left behind. Though her symptoms matched the Western medicalized idea of post-
traumatic stress disorder, to Marie, these were not a disorder, but the understandable 
consequences of the violence that she both remembered and lived day to day.  
 According to research by Hagengimana and Hinton, genocide survivors living in Rwanda 
likewise experience depression, anxiety, hypervigilance, difficulty concentrating, flashbacks, 
loss of affect—namely, the symptoms of PTSD. Yet, they do not perceive this to be 
“consequence of genocide”; rather, they understand that the genocide lives on in their bodies. 
Thus, hypertension, heart disease, diabetes, and many other illnesses ostensibly medically 
unrelated to the violence, are understood to be the physiological consequences of surviving 
genocide and the continuing stress of living in the memories (Burnet 2012, 90). Marie, now a 
subject of Western medical discourse and diagnosed with a treatable, though fatal, infection, also 
understood both her physiological and psychological symptoms to be the continuation of 
genocide within her. 
Many others whom I interviewed reported that, especially during the month of April, they 
were unable to function and fell into a deep depression. While I was conducting my interviews, 
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no one would meet with me during the month of memories, as they felt they would be unable to 
speak of those memories and still hold themselves intact. Olivia, another survivor, told me 
plainly that no one would be willing to speak to me then, as the risks were too great. When we 
met in June, she explained that people have found ways to function, and the most common one is 
avoidance of the memories. They cannot prevent the memories from interfering with their lives, 
but they can prevent the added interruption of actively recalling the violence, and so they do. In 
her case, when she lived in Rwanda after the genocide, the violence was so present and real that 
“I had to save myself because I was going to the point where I wasn’t doing really well with the 
post-traumatic disorder, and then you’re being revictimized and you’re facing these people who 
were trying to kill you, you have these nightmares every day… It was very difficult, so I did not 
have much choice to stay.” Having removed herself from the site of the memories by migrating 
to Canada, she had since built a life and home. Yet, the month of April was still too fraught for 
her to be able to confront the memories.  
However, at the annual genocide commemorations hosted by the Rwandese-Canadian 
Association in Toronto, I was surprised by how little emotion was shown. In fact, to an outsider 
like myself, the atmosphere was almost festive as people were dressed in bright colours, chatted 
amongst themselves and seemed quite relaxed. Jean, the leader of a Rwandan religious 
organization in Toronto, explained that the signs of trauma are not visible to the naked eye, even 
at moments of official remembrance, but they are nonetheless there. As he explained “You see 
them, physically you won’t know, you won’t know. But inside they’re hurting. They have been, 
they have no facilities like here. Like here, there are so many facilities, they can go for 
counselling, they can talk, for us we are not taught to talk what we have been through, you know 
people keep it inside so they are not open.” In his position as a community leader, he attempted 
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to foster healing by inviting people to speak of their experiences and to share them with others 
who had been through the same trauma. However, many remained vigilant, cautious and stayed 
quiet. Perhaps they were afraid of opening the floodgates and allowing the memories to take 
hold, or they had achieved a quiet stalemate whereby they could survive day to day and keep the 
memories at bay, or, as subsequent chapters will discuss, the political and social consequences of 
speech were too heavy to bear. 
In contemporary Rwanda, silence, especially about the violences, serves both to protect 
the survivors, and is understood to be appropriate behaviour. As Burnet explains: 
silence was a culturally appropriate coping mechanism for managing their violent 
memories. Rwandan children are taught that crying (or even complaining) to strangers is 
futile because only the family members can understand and be truly sympathetic to a 
child’s suffering (Mironko and Cook 1996). Thus, sharing their painful memories, 
especially memories that could provoke them to cry, with a relative newcomer in their 
lives was not a culturally appropriate form of expression (Burnet 2012, 116). 
 
To share memories of the violence with others, especially others who are not close family 
members, is perceived as gauche and poorly received. The survivor who needs to express these 
memories in order to quell their pressure, is punished for this need, further silencing her. This 
ostensibly putative strategy has been a necessary coping mechanism, especially in the years 
directly after the genocide when too many had too much to say, yet an increasingly authoritarian 
state system was enforcing its own exclusionary version of the genocide. Burnet, who conducted 
continuing fieldwork in Rwanda from 1997 and 2011, found that “few survivors were willing (or 
able) to recount their stories as detailed narratives” (Burnet 2012, 79). Though, as Burnet 
explains and I also observed, the trauma is expressed in many non-verbal ways. Nonetheless, 
silence remains a necessary strategy to cope with individual trauma and a closed political space.  
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Coping with Trauma   
 Among the diaspora, however, new coping strategies had emerged. While the Rwandan 
state condoned Rwandan Diaspora Global Network also enforced silence, smaller segments of 
the community have begun to foster spaces where the silence was broken. Jean’s organization 
initially sought to offer a religious home to Kinyarwanda speakers living in the GTA, but as he 
and other organizers quickly learned, the more pressing task was to figure out culturally 
appropriate mechanisms for collective healing; otherwise, few were even willing to come out to 
the religious meetings. So, utilizing the expertise in their community, especially the Canadian 
social work training that two organizing members brought, this community began to reach out to 
survivors. They encouraged those who attended regularly to bring others with them, and then a 
community leader would visit the survivor in her home and would offer her the space to speak. 
This approach was initially met with resistance as “people used to fear each other, maybe when 
they are sick because of the rape, you know, they fear, they fear their community, they want to 
be lonely, you know? They end up becoming worse, the situation getting worse” (Jean). Yet, 
with patience and persistence, some survivors began to share their stories, and they began “not to 
fear,” as Jean put it. Western discourses of mental health are also evident in Olivia’s use of the 
ideas of post-traumatic disorder and revictimization. However, these coping strategies had only 
been successful in reaching some survivors. By and large, ongoing traumatization was still 
persistent in the community, and silences about violence were still the norm.  
 Patrice, a young man who had migrated to Canada within 5 years of the study, was also a 
survivor of the genocide. He had lived most of his life in Rwanda and had made a home in 
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Canada. He explained the subtle and persistent ways that trauma shaped a survivors’ social 
paradigm, even in the diaspora.  
If you go to a party, you heard that someone is from there and there, you don’t want to 
see that person. Cause there might be more background and maybe someone from their 
family did something …You see that person, and things messed up, because again you 
link and you don’t enjoy the party, you may even leave early because you don’t want to 
have to talk to them, or share anything with them, you know? ... Of course, because who 
they are, that person never did anything, a family member, someone in his family, but 
he’s not, he’s linked to that and you have a bad perception of that … You never tell 
nobody, I saw that person in the room and I had to leave.  And that’s when that person is 
organizing another party—“who’s coming?” “Who’s going to be there? Okay, I’ll let you 
know after”.  
Patrice’s point here is that there was no escape from the time of violence. Among the 
community, because it was so small, there were inevitably going to be people who were 
connected to others who may have contributed to a survivor’s trauma, thus the survivor learned 
to cope by being increasingly cautious about social interactions and screening who would be 
present at social events. To fail to do so was to risk sleepless nights followed by stressful, 
anxious days, without respite, for:  
Tomorrow I have to work, tomorrow I have friends to see—you can’t explain to them, 
you can’t tell them when they’ll never understand. And if you go to someone from your 
country, they can give even more than what you want, when all you want is just to get 
away from it. It can’t hurt you, but if you make it bigger, you get to those friends, you 
don’t want to think about it. 
Even as the survivor seeks to build or sustain a community, the threat of traumatization lingers 
and determines the array of available choices. The cultural norm of silence, learned in Rwanda 
long before the genocide, still conditioned many people’s ability to come to terms with their 
trauma. Patrice was very forthright with me, but explained that he would be unable to talk to 
another community member about coping with trauma because in Rwandese culture “we do not 
really talk about personal things”. Interestingly, the very fact that I am an outsider allowed him 
to discuss his anxiety and depression with me, yet he found himself unable to do the same within 
71 
 
the community. Thus the silence was a loud silence, broken by moments of revelation. Those 
who chose to break the silence and speak to me about their memories and the ways in which the 
time of violence continued to mark their days, did so with difficulty. They clearly wanted to 
express and verbalize what living with this kind of trauma meant, day to day, yet, they were 
visibly stressed while doing so. The physical manifestations of breaking that silence were 
shaking hands, tears just held back, a cracked or lowered voice, and long pauses. Despite the 
visible distress, Patrice, and many others who spoke of the silences, expressed a desire for the 
community to break through these boundaries and learn to speak of the trauma, because the 
silence was too costly. Too many survivors were struggling alone, and, because of the risks 
associated with interacting with the community, they were unable to reach out. So they boarded 
themselves up and locked their doors.  
 Yet, listening to the accounts of violence and deep traumatization carried a significant 
risk, even for those who were not themselves survivors. As the studies of psychotherapists 
working with victims of trauma have shown, listening to and empathising with the story and pain 
of a survivor has a tangible impact on the therapist. This idea has been termed “vicarious 
traumatization” and it denotes “changes to the therapist’s enduring ways of experiencing self, 
others, and the world. The effects of vicarious traumatization permeate the therapist’s inner 
world and relationships” (Pearlman and Mac Ian 1995, 558). Those who routinely deal with 
survivors of trauma report symptoms analogous with post-traumatic stress disorder, even though 
they themselves have not directly experienced the trauma (Pearlman and Mac Ian 1995, 559). 
The initial violence reverberates well beyond the moment of the violence and the victim who 
survived. Psychotherapists are developing new tools to cope with vicarious traumatization, to 
offer both the space that the survivor requires and protection for the therapist’s psychological and 
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emotional integrity. Yet, these coping mechanisms and resources are not available to the 
diaspora community. If individuals in the community were willing to listen to those who needed 
to speak, they opened themselves up to the risk of experiencing the symptoms of trauma. Thus 
both the survivors and those who did not survive the violence of the genocide were subject to the 
tyranny of trauma.  
Migration to Canada had allowed many the physical distance from the site of the 
memories to be able to build new lives. Yet, even that measure of respite had not ended the time 
of violence. Seraphine, another survivor who was a teenager during the genocide, explained that 
living in Rwanda became impossible because “knowing that you’ve lost people in the same area, 
you remember that every day, you are just reminded. Everybody was of course crying, because 
of losing people, but uhh, my, the only concern for me was just to get out of the country.” She 
fled the site of memory as soon as she was offered the chance to do so, but she too stated that the 
memories were not gone, they were just less urgent. Angelina, who was not in Rwanda during 
the genocide, but who also lost family during the violence, explained the continuing sense of 
anxiety linked to Rwanda, when she expressed that “it can never be a home because you are not 
feeling secure enough to go back.” 
Individual trauma is an inescapable psychological consequence of witnessing extreme 
violence and experiencing the fundamentally altering fear of imminent death. Individual traumas 
like those described above affect the individual who was harmed and her close family and 
friends, but they do not form a collective narrative. A state or state-like institution is necessary to 
connect individual traumas and to turn them into a cultural trauma that has the power to break 
the nation.  
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Creating Cultural Trauma  
The violence and death individually traumatized those who witnessed and survived and, 
in many cases, heard of it second-hand. However, the genocide took on the status of a cultural 
trauma not at the moments of violence, but in the meanings that had been subsequently attributed 
to it and in the ways that it had been remembered and re-constructed as a mythico-history. As 
Alexander argues, “it is the meanings that provide the sense of shock and fear, not the events in 
themselves” (Alexander 2004, 10). The process of imagining, remembering, and returning to the 
violence collectively, generated shared understandings of the trauma, which then had the effect 
of breaking the social order. The process which turns a violent event into a collective trauma has, 
according to Alexander, a series of necessary markers. The trauma becomes cultural through “a 
claim to some fundamental injury, an exclamation of the terrifying profanation of some sacred 
value, a narrative about a horrible destructive social process, and a demand for emotional, 
institutional and symbolic reparation and reconstitution” (Alexander 2004, 11). Kansteiner, 
writing about collective memory in post-war Germany, cautions against an overly 
psychoanalytical reading of the concept of trauma as it relates to groups because this leads to 
accounts of traumatic injuries leaking into the collective unconscious—a theoretically untenable 
position as a group cannot have an unconscious in the same way that an individual does (2006). 
Groups do, however, have a shared store of unspoken and unspeakable objects which can, in 
some ways, resemble the idea of the unconscious. Nonetheless, however, I will abide by 
Kansteiner’s critique and do not propose that a cultural trauma is the outcome of unconscious 
processes; rather, in this case, ethno-national elites generated a narrative of the genocide and 
framed it as a cultural trauma to serve their political interests of building a new nation. While 
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Alexander, writing in 2004, explicitly states that the Rwandan genocide did not constitute a 
cultural trauma (26), I argue that it has become one among the GTA diaspora, perhaps even in 
the few years since the publication of his book. Since 1994, the genocide has come to be 
understood as a cultural trauma, which has had the effect of dissolving the imagined community 
that existed and generating a new imagined community.  
Why, then, was the genocide so different from previous violences? What was it about that 
event that differentiated it from previous murderous violences that had occurred in Rwanda? In 
1963 and 1964 there were massacres of Tutsis throughout Rwanda. By 1964 the Hutu Power 
ideology had provided the political grounds and justification for extreme oppression and 
massacres of Tutsis and argued that “the Rwandan nation was Hutu and, therefore, power in an 
independent Rwandan must also be Hutu […] Tutsi may live in Rwanda, but only as a resident 
alien minority, at sufferance of the Hutu nation” (Mamdani 2001, 126).Tutsis, as a group, had 
been subjected to expulsion, oppression, and murder. Depending on estimates, between 5,000-
20,000 Tutsis were murdered during this time (Mamdani 2001, 130). Yet, these massacres have 
not been interpreted by the diaspora leaders in the GTA and by their counterparts in Rwanda as a 
cultural trauma. They were and remain traumatic for those who fled Rwanda or lost relatives, but 
they did not have the power to break the social bonds in the same way as the genocide did. What 
is the difference here? Is it the scale of violence? I propose that the scale of violence has little to 
do with how the violence has come to be remembered and represented. Both instances of 
violence were horrific and destabilizing, but only the genocide broke the nation. This, I argue, is 
because the genocide ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) finally defeated the 
Interahamwe in late July 1994 and proceeded to create a new government, led by RPF elites. 
Thus, these RPF elites were in a position to generate an understanding of the events and 
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crystallize the individual traumas into a collective trauma. Conversely, after the previous 
massacres, the Hutu regime remained in place, albeit with some changes in the locus of power as 
new contenders outmaneuvered old ones; the Hutu regime had no interest in generating a 
narrative of trauma. Indeed, under these regimes, the massacres were seen as consolidating 
power, not as a fundamental, crucial, injury to the body. Individual Tutsi communities in exile 
remembered the violence as trauma, but their remembrances were too atomized to constitute a 
whole. Thus, only when there are centralized elites who have the capacity to generate narratives 
and achieve a measure of consensus around them, can an event such as genocide become a 
cultural trauma.  
The notion of belonging in a community or society relies on the existence of bonds of 
shared experience and shared understandings of the world. The national cosmologies that I have 
referred to before encompass the idea that those who share a sense of an identity—be it ethnic or 
national—understand the social world in very specific ways. Beyond a sense of shared language 
and history, this idea of a national cosmology indicates a shared understanding of what certain 
terms mean, beyond the annotative meaning. It also conveys a shared understanding, often 
incomprehensible to outsiders, of the social ties that bind one individual to another and to a 
greater whole—the imagined community. Rwanda in 1994 suffered a fundamental rupturing of 
the very idea of “Rwanda” as a social, emotional and cognitive space. The social ties that had 
bound individuals were broken, and they experienced the social world as ruptured and devoid of 
connection. 
The breaking of the social order of Rwanda is most evident among the diaspora’s 
recollections of the days, months, and years following the genocide. Of those who chose to speak 
of the genocide and the time of violence, nearly all expressed that after the genocide there was 
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“nothing”. The idea of nothingness, so often echoed in the narratives, represents both a literal 
absence of family, friends, and neighbours who had perished or fled, institutions which had 
crumbled as the state disintegrated in the midst of violent conflict, and a symbolic absence of the 
ties that had bound people to people, to place and to institutions. Seraphine, a genocide survivor, 
explained that after the extreme violence of the genocide, “you just have nothing, there’s 
nothing, basically like you’re surviving”. As she told of this emptiness, she had difficulty 
speaking. Olivia, another survivor, said that when she and her family returned home after the 
violence had died down, “there was nothing left there”. Janvier, who lost family in the genocide, 
but was already long settled in Toronto at the time, also echoed the idea that after the events 
“there was hardly anything left in Rwanda”. Those who had survived the genocide and those 
who were emotionally caught up in it, but where spatially far away, as was the case with Janvier, 
near universally expressed the same idea. Angelina developed this theme when she explained 
that, upon visiting Rwanda: 
We took a ride across there from the city for events and how that looks like now, so it 
was emotional. I had to see that it’s no longer my home or association, so I felt like oh 
my goodness, so that’s gone. Now I have to create another meaning to Rwanda, another 
relationship to Rwanda and what does that mean now? Do I call this home? This is a new 
living experience.  
 
This framing of “Rwanda” as a space that is devoid of the old meanings and associations and 
now a space of nothingness, expresses that the social world ceased to be recognizable. These 
members of the diaspora were expressing that there was a clear break from what they had 
understood Rwanda to be, and what it became for them. That the language of this break is so 
similar in many individual accounts, suggests that there is now a collective understanding of the 
individual experiences of violence and social dissolution.  
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Among the informants whose families were forced into exile and who often lost close 
family members, it was not the massacres and the subsequent exile that they mark as the most 
significant historical event, even though for many that meant that they were born outside of 
Rwanda. Rather, their exile and loss became significant next to the sense of belonging that they 
now perceived in the contemporary Rwandan state. Thus the larger meaning of the massacres 
and the exile derived not from the events, but from subsequent events—namely, the creation of a 
new Rwandan state and regime, as the product of the genocide. This interpreting of the past 
through more recent events demonstrates well what Anderson, who has been echoed throughout 
the above, but not yet referenced, argues about remembering and forgetting. In Imagined 
Communities, Anderson argues that the forgetting that Renan describes is an active process, but 
so is the remembering. So, the dead who are remembered for their sacrifices, “even when these 
sacrifices were not understood as such by the victims”, become the symbols of the new 
nationalism (Anderson 2006, 198). Deaths, which rarely have much, if any, collective meaning, 
are mobilized and re-narrated as meaningful. In this case, the deaths of the genocide are 
mobilized as the sacrifice that allowed the new identity to emerge. The “nation’s biography 
snatches, against the going mortality rate, exemplary suicides, poignant martyrdoms, 
assassinations, executions, wars, and holocausts. But, to serve the narrative purpose, those 
violent deaths must be remembered/forgotten as ‘our own’” (Anderson 2006, 206). Among the 
Rwandan diaspora, the current remembering, or bringing the past to the present, resurrects the 
deaths of those who died in 1994, between April and July, as uniquely meaningful, among the 
dark array of potential violent deaths of the last half century. These deaths become significant as 
Tutsi deaths, and as Rwandan deaths, and are thus remembered as “our own”. Consequently the 
violence of that moment is both remembered as a cultural trauma that broke the bonds of the 
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social world, tentative as they may have been, and it became productive of a new Rwandan 
identity.  
Between 1997 and 2008, a new nationalism had emerged and a new cosmology had taken 
root. The new cosmology appropriated the history of the pre-genocide state by narrating a 
historical continuity between the post-independence Kayibanda regime, from 1961 to 1973 and 
the subsequent Habyarimana regime, from 1973 to 1994, and the new regime, initially led by a 
coalition government, but, upon the institution of elections in 2003, hence led by Paul Kagame 
(Prunier 2010). The Kayibanda regime and the Habyarimana regimes are comprehensible as the 
development of one national ideology and nationalism, but the Kagame regime, which has 
consolidated power since 1994, has generated new understandings of the very idea of Rwanda, 
its past and present. A new nationalism, founded on the mythico-history of the genocide, had 
been actively constructed by the regime.  
Alexander identifies four discursive pillars in creating a new master narrative: firstly, the 
“nature of the pain” must be established—i.e., what actually happened; secondly, the “nature of 
the victim” must be identified and clearly articulated; thirdly, the relation of the victim of trauma 
to the wider audience must be established; finally, responsibility must be attributed (Alexander 
2004, 12-15). The post-genocide Rwandan state mechanism has effectively generated a master 
narrative that encompasses all these dimensions, and thus it has re-framed the violence of the 
genocide as a collective trauma which severed the social world that came before and had since 
generated a new nationalism and cosmology. In the aftermath of the genocide, on July 19, 1994, 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) established a new government and began the long task of 
building a new nation. The central ideological principle of this new nation was to generate a 
centralized and uniform narrative of the genocide in order to clearly articulate who was the 
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perpetrator and who was the survivor/victor/liberator. In the face of circulating reports of RPF 
atrocities and mass killings
 
(Mamdani 2001), it was perceived to be politically necessary to 
affirm the “truth” in order to gain a measure of legitimacy. 
Officially, the contemporary Rwandan government avoided the use of ethnic labels, 
claiming that all were “Rwandans” (Mamdani 2001, 226), but practice countered rhetoric. The 
RPF leadership, dominated by Kagame, narrated a story of the genocide which paints it as an 
ethnic genocide intended to wipe out the Tutsi minority, rather than a political one aimed at the 
opposition of the Hutu extremists. This “Tutsification” of the genocide had enabled the RPF to 
maintain strict control of political space under the auspices of promoting reconciliation.  
According to the current RPF-dominated Rwandan government, “The Genocide of the Tutsi in 
1994 was a carefully planned and executed exercise to annihilate Rwanda’s Tutsi population and 
Hutus who did not agree with the prevailing extremist politics of the Habyarimana regime” 
(Republic of Rwanda 2010). The official government line acknowledges that there were many 
Hutu victims; indeed, it states that “over one million Rwandans were killed,” rather than stating 
the numbers in Hutu and/or Tutsi killed, yet the genocide is always referred to as “the Genocide 
of the Tutsi” (Republic of Rwanda 2010). Commemorations of the genocide focus on the Tutsi 
victims and the fact that they were targeted for their ethnic identity. At a memorial site where 
250,000 victims are buried, the guide tells visitors that the site commemorates only the Tutsi 
victims of the genocide, yet the audio guide states that the site is dedicated to both Hutu and 
Tutsi victims (York 2010). While both Hutu and Tutsi were “victims” of the genocide, only Tutsi 
are “survivors” because, according to official rhetoric, the genocide was aimed only at the Tutsi. 
The parallel assumption is that all “moderate” Hutus were killed during the genocide and any 
who survived were either active participants in the genocide or, at best, passive onlookers. In this 
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narrative the Hutu majority bears the moral culpability for the genocide and all Hutu are 
presumed to be perpetrators (Mamdani 2001, 267). 
This framing of one ethnic group as universally morally culpable for genocide echoes 
similar narratives that have emerged in the wake of the Holocaust, the Cambodian genocide, and 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Hughes and Pupavac 2006; Clark 2008). In each of these 
cases, one ethno-national group has been framed as universally guilty of the atrocities that were 
committed, often in the name of the ethno-national groups’ nation-building. However, as Clark 
argues, “the concept of collective guilt is an impediment to peace-building”, as it others the 
ostensible group that is framed as guilty and exonerates us of understanding why the crimes 
occurred (2008, 673). A similar argument is made in Ian Buruma’s investigation of German and 
Japanese memory and the wages of guilt in the post-conflict societies (1995). Collective guilt 
also justifies retaliatory violence against the purportedly guilty ethno-national group, by 
proposing that retaliation is a form of justice (Clark 2008). Indeed, this is precisely the discourse 
that has emerged on the rare occasions when the RPF massacres of Hutus have been raised.  
To label the Rwandan genocide “genocide of the Tutsi” is to ignore a large portion of the 
victims of the genocidal regime and neglect all the victims of the RPF (whom I will discuss 
later). In 2000, the Rwandan government conducted a census and determined that 1,074,017 
individuals perished in the genocide and of those at least 94% were Tutsi (Reyntjens 2004, 178). 
These numbers are inflated and accredit far more Tutsi victims than there could have been, as 
Human Rights Watch estimates that a total of 800,000 perished, of whom 293,000 (36%) were 
Hutu (Human Rights Watch 1999). According to the 1991 Rwandan census the total population 
of Rwanda was 7,600,000, of whom 8.5%, according to their identity cards, were Tutsi— which 
places the number of Tutsis in Rwanda at the time at around 646,000. After the genocide there 
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were between 130,000 to 200,000 Tutsi survivors in Rwanda, which means that between 446,000 
and 516,000 Tutsis died in the genocide (Human Rights Watch 1999). If we accept the Human 
Rights Watch estimate of 800,000 dead, then between 284 000 (35%) and 354 000 (44%) of 
victims were Hutus. Surveys conducted by the Ministry of Education in 1995/6 found there to be 
721,000 victims. Among these 515,000 (71%) were Hutu. A 1996 survey conducted by the 
Ministry of Youth, Culture, and Sport estimated numbers of 834,000 of whom 628,000 (75%) 
were Hutu (Davenport and Stam 2009). The most accepted estimates assume that about one third 
to half of the victims were Hutu. Most outside observers agree that the largest group of victims 
were Tutsi, but that Hutus also suffered heavy losses under the génocidaires. To leap from 
multiple studies that found a range of 36-75% of victims to be Hutu, to a census that finds 94% 
of victims to be Tutsi appears at best poor methodology and borders on propaganda intended to 
minimalize the perception of suffering of Hutu vis a vis the suffering of Tutsi and reinforces the 
perception that all Hutu are perpetrators, in this instance in order to legitimate the Tutsi 
dominated RPF stronghold on power.  
The re-writing of history in order to consolidate power also takes a much more overtly 
political form in contemporary Rwanda. In the aftermath of the genocide, the RPF, in keeping 
with the spirit of the Arusha Accords, created a “genuine government of national unity.” The 
new President, Pasteur Bizimungu, was an RPF supporting Hutu; the Prime Minister, Faustin 
Twagiramungu was a Hutu from the MDR (the main opposition party under the former regime) 
(Reyntjens 2004, 178); and fifteen new ministers were Hutu, while six were Tutsi. The ministers 
represented the political spectrum in Rwanda, with the notable and legitimate exclusion of the 
Hutu extremist wing, as the MDR put forth four ministers, three came from the Parti Social 
Démocrate, three from the Liberals, two from the ranks of independents, one from the Christian 
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Democratic Party, and eight from the RPF (Prunier 2009, 7). The newly minted government of 
national unity did not last long, as in August 1995 Prime Minister Twagiramungu, Minister of 
the Interior Seth Sendashonga (an RPF Hutu assassinated in Nairobi in 1998), and Justice 
Minister Alphonse Nkubito, resigned. From exile (only Alphonse Nkubito stayed in Rwanda and 
was murdered by 1997), Sendashonga alleged concentration and abuse of power, assassinations, 
massacres by the RPA (the RPF military wing which became the Rwandan national army), and 
“massive violations of human rights, insecurity and intimidation, discrimination against the Hutu 
and even against Tutsi genocide survivors” (Reyntjens 2004, 180). Faustin Twagiramungu, from 
exile, criticised the new state’s policy of unity and reconciliation by stating that “ reconciliation 
is not an administrative matter, and should be the business of the Rwandese…a truth commission 
is an ideal way to allow people to give views about genocide and bad politics…the problem is 
killers trying to punish killers” (Brunet 2012, 160).  
The resignations continued in early 2000 as Speaker of the National Assembly Joseph 
Sebarenzi, a genocide survivor, resigned amid growing tensions between the Tutsi who had 
survived the genocide in Rwanda, and the returnees from Uganda (from whose ranks the RPF 
leadership hails) who were closely tied to the RPF (Reyntjens 2004, 181). Accusations emerged 
that the RPF regime was less interested in protecting and supporting the genocide survivors and 
more interested in promoting the interests of their so-called “old case load” refugees (referring to 
those who had fled to Uganda in the 1960s)(Prunier 2009, 7). Subsequently, Prime Minister 
Pierre Célestin Rwigema resigned, followed by President Pasteur Bizimungu, who was then 
arrested and jailed in 2002 (Reyntjens 2004, 180, 193). The “Tutsification” of political and 
economic elites continued after 2002 as the “majority of MPs, four of the six Supreme Court 
presiding judges, over 80% of mayors, most permanent secretaries and university teachers and 
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students, almost the entire army command structure and the intelligence services were Tutsi [....] 
Many of the returned old diaspora (‘old caseload refugees’) have indeed settled in towns and 
cities where they became the majority, ‘squatting’ homes, shops and businesses” (Reyntjens 
2004, 188). The Hutu majority, making up 85% of the population, have consequently become 
marginalized socially and economically and denied access to a significant political voice.   
As political pressure was applied within the government, repression was waged against 
civil society. The whole editorial staff of Imboni, a Rwandan newspaper formerly close to the 
RPF, fled into exile in early 2000 after being threatened for publishing stories critical of the 
government. All media outlets in Rwanda knew to toe the official line or face threats to their 
lives. Civic organizations were being “cleansed of all but a nominal Hutu presence” (Mamdani 
2001, 271). Leading up to the August 2010 elections, the state actively suppressed all 
independent voices in the media by suspending Umuseso and Umuvuzigi, two independent 
newspapers, and calling for their permanent closure on the grounds of being a threat to national 
security (Human Rights Watch 2010).  The political repression had silenced all opposition and 
the state had effectively become the “arbiter of historical truth”(Morrill 2006, 17) as it practiced 
ethnic politics by eliminating or silencing predominantly Hutu opposition and replacing them 
with loyal Tutsis, while publicly performing a narrative of “national reconciliation” after the 
“genocide of the Tutsis”.  
In April 2010, Rwandan authorities arrested Hutu Victoire Ingabire, the leader of the 
United Democratic Forces, an opposition political party formed in exile, for reportedly denying 
the genocide and aiding Hutu rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (York 2010).
 
Ingabire, 
contrary to the accusations, “repeatedly acknowledged and condemned the 1994 genocide. She 
draws a distinction between the slaughter of the Tutsis--which she calls a genocide-and the 
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killings of many Hutus, which she describes as a ‘crime against humanity’” (York 2010). She 
migrated to the Netherlands before the genocide occurred and returned recently to attempt to 
form a viable opposition that would take into account the deep and abiding concerns of the Hutu 
majority. Her message is clear--“not all Hutus are killers, and not all Tutsis are victims” (York 
2010). However, the message is so threatening to the mythico-history that the government 
promotes, that she was arrested and prevented from running for office in the August 2010 
elections. Subsequently, she was tried and found guilty and is serving a sentence of 8 years for 
treason and genocide denial (Leeuwen and Huttuin 2012). Likewise, opposition leader Bernard 
Ntaganda was arrested in 2010 and detained for questioning regarding inciting ethnic 
divisionism, among other charges. Members of both PS Imberakuri and the United Democratic 
Forces have also been detained (Human Rights Watch 2010). 
The master narrative, or mythico-history that the state practices is particularly troubling 
in light of the fact that the RPF stands accused of massacring between 25 000 and 45 000 people 
or as many as 100,000, including Tutsis, during the genocide (Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2004, 
194), killing another 200 000 Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 
1996-1997, and co-instigating a war in the DRC between 1998-2003 which claimed the lives of 3 
million people, mostly civilians (Prunier 2010). Between January and August 1997 the RPA 
massacred around 6 000 mostly unarmed civilians, while between October 1997 to January 1998 
it massacred another 10 000 civilians. Since 2000, the scale of political violence within Rwanda 
has decreased, but violations of human rights continued en masse as forced villigization (forced 
population transfers to designated villages) was practiced in order to make the population more 
manageable (Reyntjens 2004). The narrow binaries that form official discourse have allowed the 
RPF to lead a repressive dictatorship which had effectively silenced all opposition either through 
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direct political violence or through the threat of labelling it “friends of the génocidaires” or as 
“promoting genocidal ideology,” (Prunier 2010) which carries a prison term in Rwanda.  
The notion of “genocide of the Tutsi” at the expense of the Hutu victims is also evident in 
changes to the 2001 Gacaca laws which govern the prosecution of all genocide crimes with the 
exception of planning and leading genocide. Initially, the 2001 Organic Law (the name of the 
legislation  that governed jurisdiction of crimes committed during and after the genocide) used 
both the term “itsembabwoko” and “n’itsembatsemba” whereby the first meant to exterminate an 
ethnic group, race or tribe, and the second referred to massacres (Morrill 2006,17). Thus the 
initial form of the law covered both the killing of Tutsis and the killing of Hutus, which were not 
motivated by ethnicity, but by political orientation or ideology. However, in 2004, the law was 
altered and the two terms were replaced by “jenoside,” a term borrowed from international legal 
language. In the new formulation of the Organic Law there is no reference to massacres, only to 
ethnically motivated killings. Constance Morrill interviewed a number of prisoners awaiting trial 
and found that most perceived the linguistic change to marginalize the Hutu victims of both the 
génocidaires and the RPF, and to focus attention on the Tutsi victims. As one prisoner said: “For 
me genocide means itsembabwoko. Itsembatsemba—this concerns everyone. Yes, I think there 
was a genocide against the Tutsi, but they shouldn’t exclude the Hutu in this genocide because 
they were killed at the same time as the Tutsi” (Morrill 2006, 18). Likewise, the former Senior 
Advisor for the African Continent at Human Rights Watch, Alison Des Forges, indicated that 
this change in the law “is an attempt to limit the focus [...] to killings only of Tutsi” (cited in 
Morrill 2006, 18). Thus the violence of 1994 has been re-written as the “genocide against the 
Tutsi”, which has effectively erased the deaths and suffering of thousands. Those who remember 
and grieve for the erased cannot do so within the confines of the new Rwanda. The genocide, 
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framed as a collective trauma, has been called upon to bear the weight of the new Rwanda and to 
mark the boundaries of who belongs and who does not. 
In conducting my research among the diaspora I did not set out to determine the truth of 
the genocide. Nonetheless, I was informed by a number of participants what the “truth” of the 
genocide was. Individuals who chose to speak of the genocide as a collective experience, rather 
than expressing their own personal narrative, often called upon the Rwandan state’s narrative. 
Christophe, who survived the genocide, lectured on the topic to various interested audiences. He 
told both his personal story and the “history” of the genocide as part of his lectures. He explained 
to me the explicit and intentional targeting of Tutsis during the “genocide against the Tutsi.” 
When I asked what estimates of deceased Hutu and Tutsi he used in his lectures, he emphasized 
that “of course that doesn’t exclude that they are Hutus who are dead in the genocide, but they 
were not the target of the genocide” and did not offer a numerical estimate of dead (Christophe). 
He further explained to me that I was referring to a “Double genocide, for they say there are 
people who were killed who are Tutsi, but there are also others who say the RPF, the ruling 
party, they killed, they killed Hutus, as they were invading the country. So I think that is what 
you are talking about” (Christophe). The “double genocide” refers to revisionist narratives which 
paint both the RPF and the Interahamwe as having committed genocide and thus effectively 
denies that Tutsis were intentionally targeted for their ethnic identity. This narrative is a version 
of genocide denial and is very ethically dangerous. To avoid being cast as a genocide denier, I 
rapidly reassured Christophe that I did not subscribe to this narrative. Effectively, I could not 
pose questions that were seen to challenge the dominant narrative without being implicitly called 
a genocide denier. 
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I had a similar experience with another participant who asked to see what I had written as 
part of my Master’s research on the Gacaca Courts. I was uncomfortable with this request as I 
knew that my critical reading of the Rwandan state was in direct contrast to this individual’s 
personal politics, but I could not deny the request and retain his trust. Therefore, I explained that 
I had since changed my intellectual approach and many of my conclusions and that was why I 
had not sought to publish the paper. He accepted my explanation, but proceeded to lecture me 
about using the works of Catharine Newbury, one of the leading scholars on the Rwandan state 
and politics for the last 40 years, because she is not “a friend of Rwanda” (Richard). Thus, he 
intentionally echoed the narrow reading that the Rwandan state had adopted and reinforced the 
academic silencing that this reading had necessitated, as many scholars who had been writing on 
the subject for a long time had come to be called either “genocide deniers” if they insist on RPF 
crimes, and, as Mahmood Mamdani does, if they discuss the RPF’s repoliticization of ethnicity, 
or as “not friends of Rwanda” if they fail to support the current regime. This message was made 
explicit at the “19th National Commemoration of the Genocide against Tutsi” which was 
organized and hosted by the Rwanda Diaspora Global Network in Canada (the umbrella 
organization for Rwandans in Canada) and the High Commission of Rwanda in Canada. While 
commemorations and other such community events will be discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters, it is worth noting that the keynote speaker at this event was Dr. Gerald 
Caplan and his talk was titled “Fighting Denial while Keeping Resilient.” The talk consisted of a 
litany of those who were engaging in genocide denial, ranging from the “Hutu Power” elites who 
still reside in France, the FDLR (Forces démocratiques de liberation du Rwanda—an armed 
militia made up of génocidaires) in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the allies of the 
Habyarimana government in the Catholic Church, the French establishment, and, increasingly, 
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the Congolese people, even those living in Toronto, as well as the “left-wing anti-American 
intellectuals, lawyers, and academics.” He then proceeded to list off a dozen names of mostly 
academics writing on the topic, including Noam Chomsky, who are, according to this talk, 
genocide deniers. Mahmood Mamdani was then listed as not a friend to the regime, though not a 
full denier. Ultimately, while this distinction is made, the consequence of either is that whether 
one is called a denier or merely not a friend, one has been labeled as expressing either a 
criminally wrong view (as genocide denial is a criminal offence in Rwanda) or merely just an 
ethically wrong view. Thus, the organizers chose to use the commemoration to reinforce whose 
version of the genocide is the correct one and to very explicitly warn members of the community 
and other participants away from those who were deemed deniers. 
 
 
State Appropriation of Survivor Narratives  
 A public alignment with the Rwandan state and its mythico-history was echoed in many 
venues and at many moments. The individuals who thus spoke publicly also echoed the same 
narrative privately, including a sustained and universally positive reading of the contemporary 
Rwandan state, which I will address in subsequent chapters. However, survivors of the genocide 
were less likely to offer a unilaterally positive account of the current regime. While few of the 
participants in the study openly criticized the regime, many survivors spoke of the regime’s 
neglect of survivors in Rwanda. They often expressed the same sense of neglect and silencing in 
the diaspora community as well, as has been discussed earlier.  
In Rwanda the population is divided by state rhetoric into 5 categories: returnees, 
refugees, victims, survivors, and perpetrators.  
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The returnees are, first and foremost, the mainly Tutsi (and some Hutu) exiles who 
returned to Rwanda with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The refugees are divided into 
two: the ‘old caseload’ refers to mainly Tutsi pregenocide refugees, whereas the ‘new 
caseload’ refers to the wholly Hutu postgenocide refugees. […]The victims are said to be 
both Tutsi and Hutu—the latter victims of the massacres of the internal political 
opposition [who are not perceived to be victims of genocide]. But when it comes to 
identifying living victims, this identification is limited to the ‘Tutsi genocide survivors’ 
and ‘old caseload refugees’; ‘new caseload’ are not considered victims and as such are 
often not entitled to assistance for the construction of homes. Finally, survivor is a term 
applied only to Tutsi (Mamdani 2001, 266-7). 
 
In the 2000s, accusations emerged that the RPF regime was less interested in protecting and 
supporting the genocide survivors and more interested in promoting the interests of their so-
called “old case load” (referring to those who had fled to Uganda in the 1960s) refugees. “Many 
of the returned old diaspora (‘old caseload refugees’) have indeed settled in towns and cities 
where they became the majority, ‘squatting’ homes, shops and businesses” (Reyntjens, 2004, 
188).  The state, while outwardly expressing the need and desire for healing and reconciliation, 
had devoted too little energy and resources to the complex needs of survivors, while focusing on 
the returnees as its political base and its clients. While in Rwanda these divisions translated into 
material gains and political access, or lack thereof, in the GTA diaspora the divisions between 
“old caseload” refugees and survivors had translated into subterranean conflict and contestation.  
During another community event, Rwanda Day, when the floor was opened up to 
questions from the audience, a Rwandan woman took the microphone and proceeded to speak for 
about 5 minutes in Kinyarwanda. My neighbour translated her comments for me; she was telling 
of the loss of her whole family in the genocide. As she spoke, I observed a noticeable discomfort 
among the other participants in the event—people were shuffling and whispering to one another. 
I asked my informant what was going on and he explained that everyone was uncomfortable 
because “this is not the place for it” and if the President were already there (he was expected 
within the hour) he would have told her that her comments were not on topic (Felicién). After 
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she had finished speaking, the MC took the microphone away and did not address her directly, 
nor did any of the public speakers on stage respond to her story. The momentary silence in the 
midst of a celebratory event was jarring. Thus, though this survivor forced her story into the 
discourse of nation building, she broke the social norm of generalized silence about the violences 
and was subjected to covert disciplining for it. 
As the subjects and objects of extreme, unthinkable violence, survivors had experienced, 
on their very bodies, the devastating power of nationalism taken to its extreme conclusion. Yet, it 
was this very enactment of power and destruction that led survivors to be hesitant and reluctant 
to fully submit to a new nationalism. In the moment of its greatest violence, the limits of the 
nation were exposed. Survivors thus became the embodiments of the nation’s rupture. For the 
new nation that emerged after the genocide, they served as a potent illustration of the rationale 
for the exhaustion of the former nation, but, simultaneously, having survived what was for so 
many unsurvivable, they became dangerous because their continued lives and, indeed, resilience, 
demonstrated the limits of all nationalisms, including, potentially, the new nation’s. In their 
selective engagement with the new nation, survivors demonstrated pragmatism—where it 
worked in their interests, they would see through nation and echo its cosmologies, but, in the 
moments when it became dangerous to their person or well-being, they sought alternative ways 
of seeing the world.      
These divides between survivors and those who were outside Rwanda during the 
genocide, but still suffered the loss of family and friends, is reminiscent of the struggles of the 
Jewish diaspora after the Holocaust. While retaining and acknowledging the historically specific 
nature of both these genocides, it is useful to compare how the memories of the genocides and 
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the bearers of those memories were deployed by the Israeli state and the new Rwandan state and 
the ethnic entrepreneurs within. Idith Zertal argues that: 
although the Holocaust was to become the most powerful and effective argument in the 
Zionist quest for a Jewish State and ‘the central myth of Israel’s present civil religion’; 
and although the new state saw itself as the spiritual and political-material heir of the 
Holocaust victims, the historic event itself and the direct bearers of its memory—the 
survivors—were almost totally repressed and erased from public discourse and the 
official sphere in the first decade of the ‘statist’ period. It was heroes’, not victims’ time 
(Zertal 1998, 283). 
  
The diaspora Jews who lived outside of Europe and those who would shortly thereafter create the 
state of Israel needed the memories and the bodies of the dead, but could not bear to live with 
them. Though many survivors found their way to Israel in the decade after the genocide, they did 
not find the welcoming home that they had hoped for. Their presence was accepted as a 
necessity, but they were not welcome to speak or make the terror of their memory known. Zertal 
uses Freud’s theory of the uncanny to explain the relationship between survivors and nation-
builders. Freud argued that deep anxiety is provoked: 
through an encounter with something which, paradoxically, is experienced as at once 
foreign and familiar, distant and close, totally estranged, unknown and at the same time 
strangely recognizable and known […] what is evoking profound, inexplicable anxiety is 
not something new and completely foreign that appears all of a sudden, but, on the 
contrary, something that in the past belonged and was close, and which then, under 
certain circumstances, was repressed and concealed, and is now again resurfacing (Zertal 
1998, 291-292). 
 
Zertal demonstrates that this very kind of deep anxiety was produced by the encounter of the 
Zionist-Israeli community and the Holocaust survivors. The survivors in the diaspora are the 
unconscious of Zionism. The horror of the Holocaust was the condition of the existence of the 
Israeli state and its founding myth, yet it was too terrible to be confronted. So the survivors 
become the “bearers” of the burden of memory of the attempt to exterminate Jews. “Total horror 
was thus converted into a kind of untouchable sanctity. The ‘otherness’ of the horror, severed 
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from the very logic of life and defying any attempt of being directly looked at, of being 
understood, represented and memorized, is thus transformed into the awe-inspiring sacred and its 
terrible numinous force” (Zertal 1998, 292). To have confronted the broken souls and bodies of 
survivors in the years of state formation and nation-building would have been devastating to the 
newly emerging nation. Those who used the memories of the survivors could not see the people 
that held those memories—they needed to be dehumanized in order to be palpable. Interestingly, 
in the decades after the initial nation-building project was complete, the now elderly surivors 
were called upon to tell their stories in order to make the horror real for new generations that had 
no other connection to the Holocaust.  
The Rwandan genocide differs in magnitude, duration, and forms of victimization, but 
the necessity of remembering the genocide while forgetting the survivors is similar in both cases. 
Among the diaspora, the survivors are necessary to constitute the historical veracity of the 
genocide and, thus, the new nation. However, to fully confront their suffering would negate the 
optimism necessary for a nation-building project. To fully confront the memories of a survivor of 
genocide is to gaze too long into a nihilistic abyss, where human bonds and, indeed, humanity 
itself, ceases to be. Much like the Final Solution sought to consecrate the German state by 
twinning the people and the nation, so too the Rwandan state in 1994 sought to realize a myth of 
itself as a Hutu nation. 
In both instances the survivors became the bearers of the memory of the immense 
violence of nation making. This memory must be relegated to the subconscious because to 
empathize with a survivor is to understand that life, personhood, and identity are empty and can 
be so easily erased and that the bodies that we live in can be disposed of and forgotten. It is to 
see far too clearly that all our lives and loves are meaningless. Indeed, the survivors themselves 
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often do not wish to open up to this gaze as it is both too penetrating and too debilitating. They 
need to rely on the hope and resilience of others in order to relearn humanity, yet that relearning 
is so very difficult and painful and fraught and asks so much of the fraternal other. Thus, until the 
horror of the genocide recedes, it may be too much to ask the community to confront the 
survivors. Perhaps sidelong glances and glimpses into their private worlds are all that we can 
hope for, and all that they can bear. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Individual and Institutional Practices of Identity Formation 
 
To be part of the Rwandan diaspora in the GTA is to be engaged in ongoing processes of 
translation, re-imagination, and reconstruction of the category of “Rwandan”. It is to be an 
inheritor of a national cosmology, yet to be simultaneously re-writing this cosmology and 
altering its constitutive categories to fit new day to day experiences and multiple forms of 
individual identity. Those who belong to this group are subject to didactic messages from the 
Rwandan state which are potent in shaping who belongs and who does not, and the terms of 
belonging. The collective trauma of the genocide has generated an overdetermined national 
narrative, powerfully enforced by the Rwandan state. While all diaspora communities are subject 
to national discourses from their home state (if there is one), the Rwandan diaspora is especially 
exposed to the powerful homogenizing narrative because the collective trauma has generated a 
collective identity that imagines the diaspora as vulnerable, and those who become leaders in the 
Rwandan GTA community thus perceive that they need the protection and favour of the home 
state, for fear that they could, once again, face genocide.  Nonetheless, individual identities are 
never shaped from above alone; among this group, as among any other, individual members 
contest, challenge, and engage the narratives that they inherit and receive. Thus, the Rwandan 
diaspora in the GTA is a site of construction of the notion of “Rwandese”. For instance, as the 
Rwandan state used women to promote itself internationally as a state that is committed to 
gender equity, individuals in the diaspora offered counter-narratives of the normalization of 
gender-based violence in Rwanda. Likewise, as the state narrated a new ethnicity of “Rwandan” 
to supplant Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa), individual stories and experiences demonstrated the 
degree to which these ethnic identities persisted and how state practices actually served to 
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reinforce these distinct identities. Thus, even as a unified nation was performed, contestations of 
this overdetermined idea emerged.  
Anytime there is a grouping of “Rwandans” as Rwandans, the very category of 
“Rwandan” comes under scrutiny and debate, on the surface, or subterraneanly. Each of these 
moments contains negotiations of “thresholds of meaning that must be crossed, erased, and 
translated in the process of cultural production” (Bhabha 1990, 4). The instability of the notions 
of nation, ethnicity and race are exposed at these moments, and the multiple ways of seeing 
through nation, ethnicity and race generate overlapping and contentious understandings.  
As Brubaker argues, ethnicity, race and nation are not groups or entities, but “practical 
categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational 
routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events” (Brubaker 2006, 11). In 
moments when Rwandans meet as Rwandans, all these interrelated categories, actions, schemas, 
frames, routines, forms, projects, and events work to instantiate Rwandan ethno-nationalism, and 
generate the perception that it is a thing in the world. Yet, simultaneously, as Brubaker proposes, 
this imagined reality is challenged by those who are thus classified. They, consciously or 
otherwise, offer understandings of themselves and the world that do not neatly fit the narratives 
of the nation. This contention between can be called the “‘micropolitics’ of categories, the ways 
in which the categorized appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade, or transform the categories that 
are imposed upon them” (Brubaker 2006, 13). Among the Rwandan diaspora in the GTA this 
dialectical process is most evident during community events when those who identify as 
Rwandans meet as Rwandans. In these moments, institutions, be they a cultural or ethnic 
association or the Rwandan state, impose normative understandings of what constitutes 
Rwandaness. Yet these understandings are contested and challenged by those who are defined or 
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classified as Rwandan. The following chapter will first outline the moments of apparent unity 
and cohesiveness, and then examine the fractures, challenges, impositions—in short, the 
micropolitics of naming the Rwandan diaspora in the GTA.       
These contentious and overlapping meanings were most evident to an outside observer in 
gatherings of associations which presumed to speak on behalf of those who identified as 
Rwandan and which assumed that they represented these diverse peoples’ interests. One of the 
first signs of a newly emerging identity is the formation of associations dedicated to the 
promotion of said identity. As Brubaker argues, only organizations which have “certain material 
and organizational resources, […] are capable of organized action, and thereby of acting as more 
or less coherent protagonists” (2006, 15). To trace the history of the idea of a Rwandan 
community in the GTA is, by necessity, to trace the history of associational life, as without 
associations or clubs, there are no coherent protagonists who can be said to act on behalf of a 
community. There may well be individuals who meet socially and understand themselves to 
share an identity, but they are not visible until they form a common front which is then taken to 
be the actualization of this identity. As migration to the GTA by those who call themselves 
Rwandan is a relatively new phenomenon, the history of Rwandan associations and clubs only 
dates back to the late 1980s. While no one has kept written records of this history, those 
interviewed who participated in the early associational life were able to share what they recalled.   
 
 
History of Diaspora Organizational Life in the GTA 
The first migrants to the GTA, as has been mentioned earlier, were young, well educated, 
men who had refugee status from the UNHCR and were granted asylum in Canada in the mid to 
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late 1980s. They largely originated in the diasporic Rwandan communities in Uganda, Kenya 
and Tanzania, yet shared a sense of historical connection to the imagined homeland of Rwanda 
and spoke the Kinyarwanda language (though a few admit that their Kinyarwanda is weaker than 
they would like it to be). These young men, initially about a dozen or so, also shared a family 
history of exile from Rwanda (most were born outside of Rwanda), and a lack of a new 
homeland as the African states that had received the refugees had refused to grant them 
citizenship and a new nationality (Mamdani, 2001). They found each other through contacts, or, 
in at least one case, by hearing someone speak Kinyarwanda on a Toronto street, and they 
bonded over their isolation and visibility in a dominant white society and their sense of 
connection to their imagined homeland. The family histories of exile and a lack of belonging had 
also fostered a desire for return to the imagined homeland. In particular, those who had never 
lived in Rwanda expressed a “longing to go back” (Mathieu). Thus, when the RPF in 1987 
formed and began military incursions into Rwanda, these young men eagerly watched. In 
particular, those who came from the Ugandan exile group expressed a sense of solidarity with the 
RPF, as it was formed in Uganda (Mamdani 2001). They wanted to help with what they called 
the struggle, but understood that to declare themselves members of the RPF would open them up 
to legal scrutiny by the Canadian state as the RPF was defined as a terrorist organization at the 
time. Instead, they formed the Rwandese Canadian Culture Association (RCCA).  
The RCCA was both a social club and an information-sharing space where the latest 
news from friends and family in the struggle was related. Ironically, the first Rwandan 
association in the GTA was a counter-state organization which fostered a sense of shared identity 
by virtue of its opposition to the regime in Rwanda. Those who participated in the early years of 
this organizing fondly recall the sense of closeness within the organization as “the community 
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was small but very tight” and “really had a sense of community.” Initially, without a shared 
space, the group met on the campus of York University, in empty classrooms or in the 
University’s parkland. A few members of this group were attending the University and lived 
nearby, so “we took York like our own community” and used its semi-public space to socialize, 
play music, dance, and talk (Simon). The social world that they created came to be a place of 
shared understanding and belonging. As a group made up of young men, it was little different 
from any other social group as the members laughed, joked and danced together, but, in the 
midst of this social bonding, there were larger purposes at play as the politics of the RPF 
instigated war, referred by RCCA’s members as the struggle, further knitted the members 
together. News from siblings fighting “in the bush” were relayed, remittances were sent to 
support the struggle, and some members of the groups even traveled to Uganda and joined the 
ranks of the RPF. One participant recalled that “there was a tall Rwandan, I forgot his name, he 
was very tall and he was very quiet, when I came, 3 months later, he left and for me I look at 
him, this person had everything. He’s in such a beautiful country, and he left to live in the bush. 
He left and he never came back, but he didn’t die” (Simon).  Simon’s surprise that someone 
would leave behind “everything” to go fight in the “bush” suggests that though the organization 
was ostensibly in support of the RPF, the degree of the support among its members varied. 
Indeed, those whom I was able to speak to may have supported the conflict, but did not feel so 
personally engaged that they chose to return during the conflict, or after. Nonetheless, some of 
the early migrants returned to join the war and died in battle. Thus the young association was 
directly linked to the war and the members’ sense of connection to one another and to their 
burgeoning collective identity was further tightened by their link to violence.  
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The RCCA also took on the role of a settlement agency for Rwandans who, beginning in 
the early 1990s, began arriving in increasing numbers. After the genocide, in late 1994, the tide 
of new Rwandan migrants rose sharply. In the early 1990s the RCCA took over the lease of a 
house near York University which became known as Rwanda House and this venue served as 
both the meeting place and as a shelter for new migrants. Through telephone communication 
with family and friends in Africa, community members knew whenever a new migrant was 
arriving and “regardless that he is coming from Rwanda, from Congo, from somewhere else, 
they know someone is coming, they were going to take him out of like shelter, and bring him to 
Rwanda house, till he finds a home” (Simon). Thus, any new migrant who arrived in the GTA 
was automatically enfolded into what was becoming a significant community of those who 
identified as Rwandan. Rwanda House also served as a shelter for the now older community 
members if they found themselves without a residence. The joint imperatives of supporting a 
nationalist struggle and of welcoming new migrants turned what had been a largely social club 
into a formal organization with political alliances and interests.  
When the genocide ended and the RPF formed the transitional government in Rwanda, 
those who felt closely connected to the now governing regime could join the RPF. A number did 
so, and a rift appeared in what had been presumed to be a shared identity. The RCCA had been 
made up of anyone who chose to be a member because it was a “cultural group” and any 
Rwandan could be a member. However, to be a member of the RPF, one had to ask permission 
of the RPF leadership in Kigali, which suggests that those who desired membership wanted a 
closer affiliation with the regime, and, simultaneously, the regime was beginning to look for 
allies abroad. Beginning in 1995, those who were close to the new regime began returning to 
Rwanda, among them the general secretary of the RCCA (now the head of the Post Office in 
100 
 
Kigali). Concurrently, the Rwandan High Commission in Ottawa reached out to the organization 
and suggested that there was no need to have the RPF and RCCA as distinct entities. The 
leadership of both factions agreed and merged into a new organization: the Rwandan Canadian 
Association of Greater Toronto (RCA). Because the leadership of the now defunct RCCA had 
left the country and returned to Rwanda without passing on the information about membership, 
bank accounts, etc., the new leadership of the RCA had trouble maintaining continuity. The 
financial records and membership rolls were lost. Thus, the new RCA began its life with the 
assumption that every Rwandan was a member. But this assumption “was not good for the 
organization because you don’t know who to count on because everyone is a member, and 
everybody is not a member” (Simon). So, during the latter 1990s the organization lost steam, and 
became a shadow of its earlier versions. Where it had once been able to elicit the presence of 
nearly all those who identified as Rwandese and lived in the area, now it might count on having 
at most 100 people coming to a big event, though the leadership estimated that there were about 
1000 Rwandans in the GTA at the time. As one participant commented, “Before, there was a 
struggle, it was bringing people together, now that there is no real cause to fight for, everyone 
was just going there for fun, and if the fun as not there, it was about politics, you would not see 
anyone going.”     
In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, even as the numbers of new migrants from Rwanda 
or the African Great lakes region that identified as Rwandan grew, there was no clear sense of a 
shared identity as a unified community. Individuals and families were still connecting, often on 
the basis of a shared understanding of self, but there was a lack of a unified, collective sense of 
an ethno-national community. During the early 1990’s “we were very close”, but by the end of 
the decade, “people were separated” (Mathieu).  Instead, people were connecting based on other 
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loci of identification. Women created their own group, Umurage, which met in individual homes 
and served the particular needs of women, as well as their own conception of the community. 
Here they “start knowing each other’s strengths—what are the strengths that we have within the 
community. So women identify themselves as having … let’s say value to keep the culture … 
and value to teach the kids, the Rwandan culture. So then we develop some kind of cultural club 
for the kids where they can learn the language” (Angelina). While the RCA sought to generate a 
sense of shared identity through cultural activities, Umurage focused on specific needs, such as 
language instruction for children, social support for families struggling with the upheaval of 
migration, and the day to day struggles of racialized women. This group, which had a fluid 
membership, was also an information-sharing space where women shared survival strategies, 
economic opportunities, and taught each other how to navigate gender regimes. Other individuals 
who identified as Rwandans formed branches of opposition political parties in support of what 
appeared to be democratization in Rwanda. Others yet moved away from those who identified as 
Rwandan and created their own social worlds, unconnected to any sense of ethno-national 
affinity. Many others chose to return to Rwanda in hopes of starting over. During these years, 
Rwandaness, as a national/ethnic event or category, failed to crystallize in the GTA, despite the 
efforts of what Brubaker has called “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” and the ongoing elite-level 
ethnopolitical conflict in the remembered homeland (Brubaker 2004, 12).   
 
 
Emergence of a “Diaspora” 
In early 2007 the Cabinet of President Kagame declared that a Diaspora Office ought to 
be created to connect Rwandans in the “diaspora”. Thus, in 2008, the Diaspora General 
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Directorate was created under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new 
Directorate had a mandate to “mobilize Rwandan Diaspora for unity/ cohesion among 
themselves targeted for the promotion of security and socio-economic development of their 
homeland” (Republic of Rwanda website 2014). This new Directorate established branches of a 
new umbrella organization called the Rwandan Global Diaspora Network in all the states where 
a significant group of those who identify as Rwandans resides. Hence, there are branches in 
Senegal, Kenya, Burundi, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, United Kingdom, Germany, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, France, Poland, Austria, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Canada, 
United States, India, China, South Korea and Australia (Rwanda Diaspora Global Network 
2014).  Under this new initiative, in 2008, the Rwandan High Commission to Canada launched a 
new organization in Canada with branches in all the urban centres where there were a significant 
number of those who identified as Rwandan. Thus, the Rwandan Diaspora in Toronto, also 
known by its formal acronym RDGN (Rwandan Diaspora Global Network), presented itself as 
the organizational body of the community in the GTA and was the conduit for the Rwandan 
state, via its High Commission to Canada, to connect to individuals who identified as Rwandese 
and lived in the GTA. Its primary function was to organize the annual genocide commemoration 
and other, less formalized, community events. These events are part of an active effort by 
institutions, the state among them, to call into being the “diaspora” as a community. Without a 
central organization to call into being the identity of “Rwandan” and to mobilize individuals to 
frame themselves as Rwandan, it would be difficult to argue that there is such a thing as a 
Rwandese community in the GTA. There would be those who identified as Rwandans, but their 
connection to one another may have been tenuous. Thus, to a certain degree, the existence of an 
organization like the RDGN, or its precursors, is a necessary condition for a diaspora to exist, for 
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though ethnic leaders do not create ethno-national groups, they can strengthen ethnic solidarity 
and thus heighten ethnic consciousness (Zucchi 1988, 142), generating a sense of shared space 
and identity, which manifests itself in the idea of a diaspora.  
As the central body of Rwandans in the GTA, during the year 2013, the RDGN worked 
towards the following goals:  
 Working effectively and efficiently with the Rwandan High Commission in Canada for 
 the mutual benefit of Rwandans here and in Rwanda. Being a voice in the wider society 
 of Canada. Social activities such as BBQs. Promotion and facilitation of Rwanda day in 
 Chicago and Boston. Promotion of investments in Rwanda.  Agaciro fund. The very 
 successful and well attended 19th Commemoration of Genocide against Tutsi. And of 
 course the best Rwanda day ever held. It was befitting that the first Rwanda day in 
 Canada be held in Toronto given its rich history of activism and always a vanguard. 
 (email correspondence from President of RDGN sent out to internal listserv) 
 
Its executive was made up of an annually elected President, Secretary General, Finance 
Secretary, Youth and Sport Representative, Gender Representative, Communication Secretary, 
and Knowledge Transfer Representative. Positions and elections were open to all members of the 
community, though only a small cadre of individuals nominated itself. Aside from its formal 
capacity, the RDGN also offered settlement support to new migrants. Before leaving Rwanda, 
many migrants already had a phone number for a leader in the RDGN as their first contact to the 
Rwandese community in Toronto. If they lacked a contact for the Toronto chapter, they had a 
contact for the Ottawa or Montreal chapter, through which they would be put in touch with the 
RDGN. The leadership of the RDGN would then delegate further and connect the newcomer to 
others who may be useful in finding employment, housing, schooling and all the necessities of a 
new life. This kind of service was assumed to be part of the normal functioning of the 
organization, but not its primary mandate. Indeed, there was no official representative assigned 
to newcomer support. Partly this was a consequence of the fact that, by 2013, there were fewer 
newcomers from Rwanda than there had been in the previous two decades, as it had become 
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increasingly difficult to be accepted on humanitarian grounds as a refugee from Rwanda, as the 
UNHCR revoked refugee status for refugees from Rwanda in June of 2013 (Toeka Kakala 2013). 
Thus, to migrate to Canada, Rwandans needed to apply under the categories of skilled workers, 
family sponsorship, business or student visas, or live-in caregivers (Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada). This policy change had limited the numbers of Rwandese newcomers to Canada, 
though census figures to support this were not yet available. Meanwhile, for those who were able 
to migrate and chose to seek out the Rwandese community, the RDGN was their first point of 
contact.  
Yet, despite the Rwandan state sanctioned organization, many people in the community 
did not feel an immediate affiliation with the RDGN. Rather, the sense of connection was with 
other individuals whom they had known for years and trusted. Thus, when the RDGN organized 
an event and sent out email invitations, it could not be assured of attendees. So, to ensure 
attendance and success of the event, the RDGN relied on the inter-personal relationships of its 
members and affiliated individuals. There were a few people who were very well connected and 
kept in touch with many of the disparate groups and they were then called upon to communicate 
with their contacts and issue the invitation themselves. So, despite the organizational edifice and 
the assumption of collective action that it created, the community emerged as a community 
because people were individually tied and connected to one another, not because they shared a 
sense of obligation as “Rwandese” in the GTA. The ostensibly ethnic/national ties were in fact 
ties of interpersonal trust. Indeed, many of these central actors who connected others often 
choose not to take up leadership positions in the community because “you take it and now you 
lose your freedom. Now you have to say what is politically correct, instead of what you think” 
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(Simon). So, the organization appeared to be the face of the ethnic/national community, but it 
was only an edifice that relied on other types of community and interpersonal ties.  
 
 
Remembrance and Performances of Unity  
The ethnopolitical entrepreneurs of the community perceived themselves to be the 
boundary makers of the definition of “Rwandese”; thus, at formally organized events hosted by 
community leaders, there was usually an active narration of the nation, often closely linked to the 
Rwandan state’s narratives of self. These community events can be seen as what Brubaker calls 
“contingent events” whereby groupness, or the appearance of cohesion, happens, but is not a 
constant. Thus there can be moments of “extraordinary cohesion and moments of intensely felt 
collective solidarity”, but, these are moments, not given or fixed things in the world (Brubaker 
2006, 12). Groupness was evident at the RDGN’s annual commemoration of the genocide hosted 
in early April. This event served as the central rallying point for the community, and as an active 
moment of nation-building as the genocide and the subsequent nation was narrated. The 
commemorations were performances of unity in a community that was internally divided by 
ethnicity, gender, and age. These were moments when markers of difference were harnessed and 
repositioned as markers of shared values and shared ways of seeing. The 19
th
 commemoration, 
held in 2013, and subtitled as “Let’s Commemorate the Genocide Against the Tutsi as we Strive 
for Self-Reliance” (no one could explain to me precisely what self-reliance meant), and hosted 
by the Rwandan Diaspora in Canada and the Rwandan High Commission of Canada, took place 
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over the course of two events.
67
 The first event was a flag-raising ceremony held at Toronto City 
Hall, and the second event was a day-long program of speakers at an auditorium at Ryerson 
University. Both events were enacted to commemorate the genocide, but, as with all such public 
performances, the underlying motivation of this nationalized practice of mourning was a 
performance of nation.  
No one who feels a connection to Rwanda either by birth or by ancestry is liable to forget 
the genocide. Especially survivors, as I discussed earlier, recalled the genocide during April, 
often despite themselves, as the physical and psychological symptoms of trauma invaded and 
overturned their lives. The genocide will not be forgotten by those who lived it, nor by their 
children, who live their lives under the shadow of the trauma, much like the children of 
Holocaust survivors lived with “the ‘elephant in the room’—a subject barely spoken but 
nonetheless unavoidably present” (Stein 2007, 87). Before the inauguration of the RDGN in 
2007, small groups organized their own ceremonies of remembrance. People met on the occasion 
of the anniversary and together remembered the events and those that they had lost. Harnessing 
people’s memories into a centralized performance of remembrance is not about remembering, as 
that was already an active process. It was primarily an opportunity to create a sense of a group 
and to generate ethno-national narratives. Official commemorations of traumatic events are 
rarely intended for remembrance; rather, these are moments of nation-building as the deaths that 
have been compelled and granted meaning are mobilized to serve the ends of identity formation. 
States utilize a fictionalized account of a traumatic event to generate political legitimacy and 
                                                          
6
 I attended the 19
th
 and 20
th
 commemorations of the genocide during the field work for this study. I focus the 
analysis here on the 19
th
 commemoration as it was more extensive and had a longer program, but I will reference 
the 20
th
 commemoration in chapter 6, when I discuss Rwandan transnationalism.  
7
 All the public events hosted by the RDGN were held in both Kinyarwanda and English, with the intention that 
outsiders, like myself, would be able to participate. Also, many among the youth did not speak Kinyarwanda, so 
English became the lingua franca.  
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mobilize its constituents. The commemorations of 9/11 in the United States serve to illustrate the 
degree to which that traumatic event has been harnessed as a nation-building narrative as 
Americans are re-narrated into collective victims of a deeply wounding assault. In this case, the 
Rwandan state, acting through the High Commission in Ottawa, actively worked to re-write the 
history of the genocide in order to re-inscribe a version which posited the RPF as the saviours of 
the nation, and which actively denied any of the atrocities committed by the RPF. The formally 
ascribed motivation for the genocide commemoration is remembrance and resolution of trauma, 
yet neither is the outcome. In Rwanda, commemorations are moments of nationalized mourning, 
which: 
 minimized and denied the multiplicity of truths about the genocide. Nationalized 
 mourning poses difficulties for genocide survivors who find that the dominant discourses 
 do not fit with their own experiences. Other Rwandans find that the politicization of 
 survivorship resulting from nationalized mourning denies their deeply personal memories 
 of violence, loss and trauma. While attempting to forge a new, unified national identity 
 around a single understanding of the genocide and a single version of Rwandan history, 
 national mourning homogenizes the diverse experiences of victims of the genocide, the 
 civil war, and afterward. (Burnet 2012, 92) 
 
Likewise, in the diaspora, the commemoration was a site of reinforcing the mythico-history and 
the correct telling of the genocide. Fidèle explained that the official commemoration was “a 
government thing, but it’s not about to remember people. And even if you go there, there’s a few 
survivors. You see people from Uganda, from here…” The point he was making was that those 
who were in Uganda or in Canada during the genocide were not survivors, yet they were the ones 
who attended the commemorations. There was an understanding, at least among some of those to 
whom I spoke, that the official commemorations were no longer about remembrance, but about 
nation-building. As I have recounted earlier, this even extended to identifying those who were 
now deemed “genocide deniers”. In this re-telling of the genocide, the voices of those whose 
experiences did not fit the national narrative were silenced and their grief, terror, and loss 
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negated, again. It also served the purpose of narrating a fictionalized unity of the community 
both to members of the community and to outsiders.  
 The first portion of the commemorative program, which I attended, took place at Toronto 
City Hall on a Saturday prior to the fuller program. The purpose of the ceremony was to raise the 
Rwandan flag above city hall and inaugurate a week of reflection. The flag, flown above Toronto 
City Hall symbolized the community’s desire to carve a space out where its grief would be 
recognized, valued and they would be granted the dignity of the bereaved, not just the pity and 
revulsion of a society that perceived their past to be barbaric. The organizers of the event were 
very pleased that they had been able to book city hall as a venue. One explained that it was the 
first time they had been able to book such a prominent venue and expressed pride that the city 
had allowed the event to take place. There was also an invitation sent out to the mayor of the 
city, and the organizers had hoped that he would attend, but were disappointed. Nonetheless, the 
symbolism of holding the commemoration at city hall was very powerful, and the 50 or so 
attendees at the flag-raising ceremony were audibly proud of this evidence of their belonging in 
the civic space. A few people I spoke to were chagrined that the mayor had neither attended nor 
officially declined the invitation. A key organizer spoke up and chastised the group by reminding 
it to be grateful that for the first time in Canadian history the Rwandan flag would be flown over 
a Canadian city hall.  
Upon our arrival to the nearly empty city centre, we were ushered into a committee room. 
As the room slowly filled with mostly members of the community, there was a subdued tone of 
collegiality. The crowd was made up of mostly middle-aged adults with very few adolescents 
and children present, though many of the people there were parents, suggesting that they had 
intentionally kept their children home. We were invited onto a terrace of city hall and there, upon 
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the flag pole, was the Rwandan flag. As soon as we were all gathered, the Canadian national 
anthem was played on a sound system, and then the new Rwandan national anthem was played. 
While everyone had lowered their heads respectfully for the Canadian anthem, none had sung 
along, yet many in my vicinity sang along to the Rwandan anthem. During the anthem, the 
Rwandan flag was lowered to half-mast. We were then invited back to the committee room to 
hear short speeches. A community leader spoke for a few minutes, first chastising the crowd for 
being so small. He reminded the crowd that it was their responsibility to remember and to bring 
others to remember. I noted that there were few survivors there and that the speaker who was 
admonishing others to remember was not himself a survivor.  This observation echoed what 
survivors had expressed in interviews—that the community did not pay enough attention to the 
needs of survivors. It also illustrated the ways in which the experiences of those who survived 
the violence were called upon in nation-building moments, but the people themselves were 
erased.  
The speaker then thanked the city for the facilities and remarked how historic it was that 
the city had issued a proclamation of making April 7
th
 a day of remembrance, though there were 
no city representatives on hand to deliver this message, begging the question—who was doing 
the remembering?  The symbolism of holding the event at city hall and the Rwandan flag 
prominently displayed above the building spoke to the notion that this space could contain 
multiple identities and national narratives, yet the noticeable absence of representatives from the 
municipality suggested that the while multiplicity of meanings could be contained in one space, 
the memory and trauma of this community was insufficiently significant for the civil servants of 
their city to formally acknowledge.  
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The ceremony, though sparse and short, was nonetheless significant for the multiple 
meanings and messages that it conveyed. The most visible message was the message of the 
rightful place of this community in the civic space of the largest city in Canada, though the 
message was not reinforced by representatives of the city. Another significant narrative that 
emerged was that of who ought to remember the genocide and how. The nationalist symbolism 
of the flag-raising and the anthem playing very prominently coupled the practice of remembering 
the genocide with Rwandan nationalism and equated the two. In so far as modern states rely on 
overt performances of their own existence and significance through flag-raising and waving, the 
Rwandan state was performed as a modern nation. While many of the attendees had expressed a 
sense of belonging in Canada during interviews, no one sang the Canadian anthem, while many 
in my vicinity sang the (new) Rwandese anthem. This small group of attendees demonstratively 
performed their ownership of Rwandan identity in that moment. But, the group was small, and 
the very notable (and noted) absence of many others suggested that the need to demonstrate 
ownership of an identity did not supersede the frustration of having to attend two separate events. 
Very many parents had expressed sentiments like those of Theodosia who said that “most of time 
either I didn’t get the communication when they are meeting, second when they are meeting I 
don’t have time to go” to community events, and this event was no exception, having been 
promoted only through the community listserv.  
Furthermore, the community leader’s admonishment of attendees for being so few in 
number suggested that the event was not about expressing solidarity with the victims and 
survivors, but about performing a civic duty of Rwandan nationalism in a Canadian civic space. 
The pairing of these two national narratives expressed the notion that those who identified as 
Rwandese in Canada were proud of both their native nationality and their hyphenated nationality. 
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It was both a performance of belonging in the Rwandan nation and belonging in the Canadian 
nation.  As with all overt performances of nation, there was no room for any expression of 
dissent from this official narrative, thus creating the impression of full consent and unity of 
identity and purpose.  
The second portion of the commemoration was a day-long event of a series of talks 
followed by an evening vigil held at Ryerson University in downtown Toronto, which was much 
better attended. By the middle of the program, there were about 150-200 people in attendance, 
and, by all accounts, this was a very good showing. While this number is triple those who 
attended the previous ceremony, it is still a fraction of the local community, which is estimated 
to be up to 5000 strong. In this instance, absenteeism at a genocide commemoration organized by 
the RDGN and the Rwandan state representatives in Canada is one measure of quietly resisting 
the appropriation of the recent history and the new nationalism that had emerged. Absenteeism 
can be interpreted as an example of what James C. Scott calls “infrapolitics”, which is “the 
struggle waged daily, by subordinate groups,” yet is “beyond the visible end of the spectrum” 
(1990, 183). In moments where the subordinate group cannot openly declare its opposition 
because the cost would be too great, it speaks in a “hidden transcript” which can include speech 
acts or “activities such as poaching, pilfering, clandestine tax evasion, and intentionally shabby 
work” (14), and is “designed to minimize appropriation” (Scott 1990, 188). As one informant 
explained “I’ve not been in three years, because for me, I don’t see it as a commemoration 
anymore, it’s a government show-up.” As the title of the event suggests, there is no room at this 
moment of myth-making for the remembrance of any dead except Tutsi dead at the hands of the 
génocidaires. Thus, for those who carry the burden of remembering Hutu dead, or Tutsi dead at 
the hands of the RPF, this commemoration obliterated their memories.  
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Georges, a Hutu who was living in Europe during the genocide, expressed that during 
genocide commemorations “I’m not supposed to mourn my own people”. His people were his 
father, two sisters and a brother who were kidnapped and killed by the RPF well after the 
genocide had ended. His losses were as extensive as the losses of many Tutsi families, yet his 
memories were negated, as there was no space in the official narratives to even mention those 
who were murdered by the RPF in the months and years following the end of the genocide. Even 
in private recollections, his dead are erased. If he raises their ghosts, he faced the threat of being 
labelled a genocide denier. When I asked how is it possible to not mourn one’s dead, he 
responded “You can’t! I left Rwanda when I was young, it was tough, it’s a tough situation to 
lose people, especially to lose 3 people together same day… [Interviewer]: Incredibly traumatic, 
and then to be told you can’t mourn them. [Georges]: You can’t say it, you are genocide denial. I 
don’t deny the genocide happened.” To be labeled a genocide denier is dangerous as it carries the 
risk of social ostracization from the community in the GTA, but, perhaps more significantly, it 
carries the risk of criminal prosecution in Rwanda. Others fear that return to Rwanda would have 
lethal consequences; Fidèle asserts that “I can’t go there, I can get killed” because he actively 
opposes the governing regime. So, rather than openly protest and risk being detained for 
“genocidal ideologies” according to the governing regime, or even potentially killed upon 
visiting Rwanda, many in the GTA diaspora chose to subvert the performance of unity by their 
absence at state sanctioned commemorations.  
Those who attended the commemoration were not passive objects of the myth-making. 
Rather, they listened carefully and showed their approval vocally, even during talks. While 
assent was vocal, dissent from the narrative presented was less obvious, but no less real. I, as an 
outside interlocutor, had difficulty seeing the moments of dissent during the commemoration, 
113 
 
but, during private conversations after the fact, I slowly began to see moments of unravelling and 
divergence, beyond just absenteeism.   
The talks focused around three themes: narrating the genocide and attributing 
responsibility, connecting the genocide to the Holocaust and the Armenian genocides, and 
national representation/nation building on the edifice of remembering the genocide. Of the 16 
talks by a variety of individuals from a variety of organizations, none opened up the narrow 
frame of the “genocide against the Tutsi”. To tell the story of the genocide, genocide survivor 
and Professor of French Literature at McMaster University, Dr. Eugène Nshimiyimana, spoke 
first. Though his research focuses on memory and identity construction, his talk was so dense 
with academic jargon that I had trouble following his argument. The audience also seemed to be 
subdued, I suspected, because they too did not follow what he was saying. Thus, he may well 
have offered an account that troubled dominant narratives, but because he masked it so well 
behind the language of an inaccessible academy, his points were lost on his audience. The next 
speaker was Dr. Amanda Grzyb, of the University of Western Ontario, who offered a very 
compelling account of how the Globe and Mail coverage of the genocide exhibited casual 
racism. The audience responded vocally, openly and loudly scoffing at the claim made in 
newspaper that the conflict dated back 500 years. The next speaker was PhD candidate Berthe 
Kayitesi (University of Ottawa), who argued that the children of perpetrators are not guilty of 
their parents’ crimes and should not bear the burden of responsibility, yet she simultaneously 
spoke of these children “inheriting genocidal ideology”. Again, the audience responded with 
audible agreement. The final component of the first part of the program was given by Dr. Egide 
Karuranga, who told his harrowing story of survival and escape. His narrative broke the mold of 
the academic talks of the first session as he spoke of his first-hand experience, yet his narrative 
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fit the dominant narrative as he was a Tutsi and he explained the violence that he witnessed and 
fled was a continuation of the violence from earlier decades. He expressed that “in 1973 they 
took our teachers, killed them and threw them in the river” and that, when he had to flee, 20 
years later, he had to escape through the same forest where the teachers were killed. His focus on 
the Tutsi as a victim group that had been persecuted in the modern history of Rwanda is amply 
supported by evidence. Yet, the continual framing of the Tutsi as victims, long after a Tutsi-led 
regime had been in power in Rwanda, speaks to an appropriation of the narratives of the 
Rwandan state which relies on the framing of Tutsis as perpetual victims and therefore never as 
perpetrators, and of Hutus as perpetual perpetrators and therefore never as victims. 
Likewise, the talk by the PhD candidate also offered the same narrative, as the children of 
Hutus were presented as inheritors of “genocidal ideology”, thus, even though they had nothing 
to do with the genocide, they carry the burden of their parents’ crimes and the subsequent 
classification of (potential) perpetrators henceforth. This representation of one ethnic group as 
perpetual perpetrators is reminiscent of how the Kagame regime frames the genocide and its 
aftermath. As one person explained, in 2013, just outside of Kigali, during a speech to hundreds 
of young people, 18 to 19 year olds, Kagame asked the Hutu youth to stand up and to apologize 
to the Tutsi youth for the crimes of their parents (Fidèle). This is troubling as the young people in 
question were born after the end of the genocide, thus neither the Hutu youth nor the Tutsi youth 
lived through the trauma. Likely, the experience of living with the absence of murdered or 
incarcerated family members meant that this new generation shared more than was recognized 
yet, instead of understanding and building on their commonalities, Kagame and those who 
accepted his logic, reinforced the differences and power imbalances.  
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Opening Thoughts about Sexual Violence 
Even as the speakers represented the violence in ways that erased Hutu dead and Tutsi 
dead at the hands of the RPF, there were challenges to Rwandan state practices that illustrated 
that the members who made up the leadership of the RDGN, although closely tied to the regime, 
expressed some nuanced counter-narratives to universalizing state narratives. For example, one 
speaker opened up space to discuss sexual violence. While the Rwandan state has been lauded 
internationally for its commitment to gender equity, (indeed, it has the highest percentage of 
female members of Parliament in the world), sexual violence committed during the genocide, or 
since, remains a deeply taboo subject. In speaking explicitly to the issue of rape, the speaker was 
countering the Rwandan state’s national discourse of fostering gender equity.  
Dr. Karuranga, the final speaker on the panel, expressly narrated accounts of women 
being raped in the midst of the slaughter. The degree and extent of sexual violence during the 
genocide has been recorded by outside researchers. According to the UN special rapporteur, at 
least 250 000 women were systematically and brutally raped during and after the genocide (UN 
Commission on Human Rights 1996).  Yet, despite the enormous human toll of this violence, as 
Dr. Kararunga stated, “this story will never be told because in our culture we don’t speak of rape. 
A woman is raped and she is ashamed as if she did something wrong.” He then issued an 
invitation to begin a conversation about sexual violence, thus subtly challenging social and state 
practices in Rwanda. 
Sexual violence is silenced in most ethno-national communities, especially post conflict, 
yet among those who identify as Rwandese and live in the GTA, there were those who were 
actively speaking about gender-based violence. Grace, a genocide survivor who was raped and 
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intentionally infected with HIV during the genocide, had settled in Toronto, yet the memories of 
the social stigmatization and ostracization that she suffered in post-genocide Rwanda haunted 
her. As a Tutsi woman, she suffered the fate that so many others did; she was forced to watch as 
her husband was murdered before her eyes and then she was repeatedly raped, beaten and left to 
live with these memories. In 1996 she learned that she was HIV positive and feared that the 
daughter she had borne after the rape was likewise positive (thankfully, her daughter was 
negative). Unemployed, doubly stigmatized as a rape victim and as an HIV positive women, 
Grace and her four children suffered hunger and extreme poverty. She recalled that: 
Just like that you lose everything, you lose hope, you lose respect, you lose your dignity, 
you lose everything because many people knows about your rape, and many people know 
about your infection, HIV, so they stigmatize and discriminate. And the family too, from 
the family, my family from my husband’s side, they stigmatize me, every people you 
know, and they make me to be poor, not have a peace, not have a hope, not have a wish. 
 
In the years following the genocide, not only did she suffer the physical trauma of HIV, but she 
also suffered social isolation and ostracization as a rape victim. Her story could not be told in 
Rwanda, because, as Dr. Kararunga stated, gender-based violence is a taboo subject.  
Violence against women is still prevalent in Rwanda. Despite the passage of a law 
against gender-based violence in 2009 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 2009), 
traditional norms and values sustaining masculinity and femininity that sanction gender-based 
violence prevail, especially in rural areas (Slegh and Richters 2012, 133). In a study conducted 
by Slegh and Richters, 59.4% of men and 70.6% of women agreed with the statement that 
“Violence against women is needed to control a wife, and women sometimes deserve to be 
beaten” (2012, 140). Of those in the study, 98% regularly attend religious services and, during 
the focus groups, often used Biblical verse to reinforce the ideal of a “good man” and a “good 
woman” (2012, 142), thus lending institutionalized religious justification for gender-based 
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violence. Many participants in Slegh and Richters’ study found the law against gender-based 
violence to be too punitive to men as it mandates heavy sentences for sexual assault. They also 
expressed that the law grants women too much power. Women are perceived to provoke 
violence, and those who have reached for greater economic autonomy have suffered for it as the 
data support that “violence against women tends to intensify when women’s income increases” 
(Slegh and Richters 2012, 139).  
This social phenomenon was one area of dissent from official state practices, as many in 
the Rwandese GTA community stated that they were troubled by the treatment of women in 
Rwanda. Simon’s life and work was in Toronto, yet he took his vacations to run anti-gender 
based violence workshops for youth in Rwanda. As Simon told me, young, well-educated 
women who went in search of jobs, encountered the following from the older men who would 
hire them: “say, how old are you now? Say, maybe 23, 24? You are mature enough to see that if 
you see that I am helpful, you can be helpful in another way. Go, you are mature enough you 
think about it, you come back.” The implied message was that the cost of employment is extreme 
sexual harassment, and even sexual assault. As Simon explained, some young women leave and 
look elsewhere, but others feel that this is the only way to get a job and so submit to the violence.  
These young women are then unable to speak of the violence inflicted upon them, and are doubly 
victimized, first by the perpetrator, then by not being able to publicly speak of the harm.  
Simon used the example of a young girl, 14 or 15 years old, who was pregnant by her foster 
father’s brother. She was afraid to speak of the rape because “if she complains, she will not have 
a home. And what was happening was that they were blaming [her], instead of blaming the 
aggressor, they were blaming those girls—you are such a stupid, how can you do this?” Simon 
wondered why she did not charge the man with rape, which the new law covered, but she was 
118 
 
afraid of both the social fallout and the possibility of the charges being dropped as the onus is on 
her to prove that a rape occurred. Her community was more likely to support the perpetrator’s 
version of events than the victim’s, so, despite the new legislation, she was still subject to an 
oppressive gender regime which exposed her to extreme sexual violence and threatened 
ostracization and homelessness if she tried to challenge it. The new legislation had established a 
legal framework for protecting women, but it had not significantly altered everyday realities and 
discourses about gendered expectations and social roles. Thus, inviting the attendees at the 19
th
 
genocide commemoration in the GTA to engage in a public discussion of sexual violence 
challenged current practices in Rwanda (and elsewhere). Though the Rwandan state had passed 
extensive legislation ostensibly protecting women, it had not opened up public debate on the 
topic. As Dr. Kararunga pointed out, “we don’t speak of rape.” Yet, the trauma inflicted by 
gender-based violence marked the lives of many women who identified as Rwandan.  
Dr. Kararunga’s call to open up discourse about sexual violence was an interjection into 
an otherwise narrow inscription of Rwandan state narratives. The subsequent speakers included 
individuals from the Jewish community and the Armenian community who, as outside actors, 
intentionally or otherwise reinforced the dominant narrative about the genocide, and de facto, the 
state’s origin myth.  The Jewish activists spoke of resilience and the importance of documenting 
and publishing survivor’s accounts.  The activists from the local Armenian community 
positioned the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide in a continuum of 
genocidal violence.  Unsurprisingly, neither group raised any contentious issues about the 
violences that they represented (such as Israeli state appropriation of Holocaust survivors’ 
stories), nor invited their audience to understand these violences as complex events with far-
reaching consequences. Understandably, in narrating genocide, a simple and straightforward 
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narrative with clear protagonists and clear antagonists is the most practical approach as it 
demarcates clear moral terrain. Yet, rarely are moments of hyper-real violence simple or 
uncomplicated, as the earlier discussion of Israeli state-building practices demonstrated. Nor are 
the practices of remembering and re-telling these violences void of political interests and 
motivations.  
The politicization of the Rwandan genocide was exemplified in the concluding 
component of the talks. Dr. Gerald Caplan, a Canadian academic and journalist who had spent 15 
years studying and discussing the genocide and who had been called by President Kagame a 
“friend of Rwanda” (by his own admission), was called upon to conclude the discussion. 
Caplan’s discussion of “Fighting Denial while Keeping Resilient” which primarily focused on 
identifying and outing those he claimed were engaging in “genocide denial” actively and 
forcefully reinforced the Rwandan state’s singular narrative of the events. Some of the 
individuals whom Caplan identified were engaging in what can be accurately described as 
genocide denial as they claim that the numbers of dead are exaggerated. Yet, many of those he 
identified were investigating the very complexity of this violence and offering more or less 
plausible analyses. Such a debate about the violence is necessary to maintaining open spaces 
where the voices of those who are silenced by the Rwandan state’s narrative can be heard. 
Someone like Georges, suffering the loss of too many family members, is silenced and his grief 
and his dead erased if all dissenting voices are silenced. Silence about violence serves to 
reinforce narrow state narratives which further harm those who have already suffered too much.  
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Celebrations and Performances of Unity  
Unity is also performed during celebratory moments, such as the launch of a new 
Rwandan youth group, CARY. The Canadian Association of Rwandan Youth (CARY) was a 
new organization that had emerged as part of the Rwandan state’s efforts to constitute a diaspora. 
There were three regional chapters as of June 2013: one in Montreal, one in Ottawa and one in 
Toronto. CARY was intended to be an organization that connected young people who identified 
as Rwandan and offered them a psychological and emotional space whereby they could be 
“Rwandan”. As Mathieu explained, the inspiration for CARY began at a series of summer camps 
hosted in Ottawa by the Rwandan High Commission with the express intent to connect young 
people to their ostensible culture and to each other.    
Yeah, I remember it was specifically focused for young Rwandans in the diaspora, and it 
was one of the things that put my foot in the door, to you know, connect more. So, umm, 
meeting a lot of young Rwandans from Toronto, Hamilton, Kitchener, GTA, Edmonton, 
Montreal, Quebec City, Ottawa, London, Ontario, and realising that, how many more, 
young Rwandan adults are there, with similar upbringings to me. I mean some were born 
here, and some moved here, but we all kinda did share a lot of the same experiences. So 
that was something that opened the door, kind of. (Mathieu)  
 
The High Commission, as a branch of the Rwandan state in Canada, hosted these camps for 
youth to learn their own identity, which alone suggests the degree to which ethnicity is not a 
thing in the world, but a way of seeing. In this instance, the Rwandan state was explicitly 
creating a way of seeing through ethnicity and nation and very intentionally training young 
people in this cosmology. It is telling that these young people whom Mathieu speaks of had not 
connected on their own in any significant way before the state mechanism explicitly formed a 
connection between them. Though they “kinda did share a lot of the same experiences,” as 
Mathieu put it, this connection and sense of affinity is not synonymous with an ethnic 
identification. Indeed, youth from many different migrant communities can be said to have had 
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similar experiences of migration, alienation, and marginalization which could form the basis of 
communal ties. It is only when the state mechanism harnessed the similar experiences of this 
particular group that the youth came to see themselves as Rwandan youth. Mathieu expressed 
this idea when he explained that “I mean we all started as friends, cousins. But at the same time, 
though we were connected, only a few of us had reason to build our friendships—like a lot of us 
who played basketball together, uhh, a lot of us, who went to school downtown, or in Toronto…” 
Here the bases of previous claims of affinity were familial ties, an interest in sports or even just 
geographic proximity.  
Other young people, especially ones who migrated recently, expressed that they 
intentionally sought out ethnic and national diversity in their social group because experiencing 
ethnic diversity was one of the benefits of living in Canada. Patrice explained that: 
Then you start looking around and see some people that you can kind of watch, that’s 
when you meet someone, maybe from Africa, and you become friends, you go from 
Congo, even though Congo used to clash, but you go, oh, why not try something different 
because you are in Canada? So you start a new life in Canada. So that barrier of country, 
language, culture, is no longer there. That new thing, that new experience, and they 
become your friends. That’s when I started hanging out more with people from other 
countries, intentionally, because you are interested in knowing who they are, because 
they are not what you was expecting them to be.  And it’s a reality and you gotta adjust, 
and you changing then, you losing the, the part of Rwanda start fading, it start going 
away. 
 
Thus, individuals like Patrice rarely joined organizations like CARY because, as he explained, he 
did not move to Canada to only associate with other Rwandans. Ironically, the youth who grew 
up or were born in Canada, lamented that those who had recently migrated were unwilling to join 
CARY with them. So, the membership of CARY was largely made up of those who did not have 
a living memory of Rwanda, yet had grown up haunted by the ghosts of the recent past. Their 
knowledge of their Rwandaness came from stories that they had been told, or through a few 
visits (most families were unable to visit regularly as the airfare alone was very expensive, but 
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nearly all had gone back at least once). Their understanding of the place that many imagined to 
be a homeland was mediated through the memories and understandings of their parents. These 
both serve to create a longing and desire for the homeland and concurrently created an emotional 
and intellectual distance from the object of desire. In seeking out other Rwandan youth, they 
were seeking to fulfill a desire for belonging and to make sense of their inheritance of loss. 
Simultaneously, those who lived most of their lives in Rwanda and had recently migrated were 
seeking to expand their social and conceptual boundaries, so, while maintaining ties to others 
who identified as Rwandan, they nonetheless created an intentional distance from them.  
 Jeanne, a young woman who identified as Rwandan but had spent most of her youth in 
the GTA, expressed her desire for connection with a mythical Rwandaness and her 
disappointment that those she encountered did not fit her idea of who a Rwandan ought to be. 
Jeanne: And it’s so sad, because now I’ll meet someone and they’ll say you’re the first Rwandan 
 I’ve met, and Hotel Rwanda comes to mind, and the funny thing is that I’m always  
 looking for Rwandan friends, because all my friends are Canadian, from different ethnic 
 groups, and I’m always looking for Rwandans that are my age. That’s why I was really 
 excited that the new group was starting, but most of the time, they speak English, or 
 they’re even more Canadian than other friends that I have. 
 
Interviewer: And that’s disappointing?  
 
Jeanne: Yeah! Yes it is [giggles]. I want someone that forces me, continues to umm, force me to 
 stay connected to it. But they’re also looking…and every now and then, when you meet 
 someone who is recently from Rwanda, they’re looking to learn English, so you know…  
 
She desired connection with others who identified as Rwandan because she felt that her 
connection to the culture was tenuous, so she wanted others to pull her back. But, upon meeting 
them, she has learnt that “they’re even more Canadian than other friends that I have.” Thus, her 
desire for a mythical culture was transposed onto the geographical space of Rwanda as she 
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expressed that she dearly wanted to visit the state, because she had not been back since her 
family migrated when she was a very young child.  
 Other youth who identified as Rwandan had been socialized by their parents to expect 
certain cultural traits from Rwandans, such as reserve and quiet dignity and were delighted that 
the youth they had met through CARY did not fit this cultural paradigm. Natalia expressed that: 
But the young people are great. So, like, chill, and relaxed. ‘Cause it’s like, of course, 
like what I told you, of how you hear all those stories, people from Rwanda are very to 
themselves, and I’m the opposite of that. So once I meet the young Rwandan youths here, 
especially at this CARY, it’s crazy—they’re just like me, it’s amazing! ‘Cause it’s like 
not only can you share the same culture, and the same, sometimes views, sometimes not, 
and stories together, but also, they’re not these isolated creatures that you were brought 
up to think that they are. (Natalia) 
 
The multiple expectations and assumptions that young people brought to the organization 
generated new meanings and new understandings. Even as some came looking for a 
reinforcement of the identity that they had been taught by their parents, others were intentionally 
looking for young people who embodied a multiple and hybrid identity. The very nature of the 
organization then became one of oscillating between nationalist narratives and more 
cosmopolitan ideas of self. CARY echoed the earlier RCCA in that both were created by young 
people of Rwandan origin or identity who desired a closer affinity with one another. While 
RCCA was created as a counter-state organization devoted to the creation of a new Rwandan 
state form, CARY was a state-created organization, devoted to the maintenance of the current 
Rwandan regime. Yet, interestingly, perhaps because CARY was made up of young people who 
had largely grown up in Canada while RCCA was made up of young people who had grown up 
in exile, CARY’s members were less politically motivated and involved. They gravitated to the 
organization in a search for identity, not necessarily out of a political drive to support (or 
overthrow) a regime.  
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Song and Dance as Expressions of Rwandaness 
The launch of the Toronto chapter of CARY was an opportunity for those who perceived 
themselves to be part of a community to gather in celebration of a younger generation of 
individuals who identified as Rwandan. The senior members of the community were vocally 
supportive of the youth and took every chance they could to express their pride in “our youth”. 
The possessive pronoun in this commonly repeated statement implied both a sense of ownership 
of the activities of the younger group members, as well as a claim to the collective identity of 
Rwandan. This identity making was demonstrated at a gala that was hosted by the newly formed 
CARY Toronto which the community was invited to attend. Unlike commemorations, this was 
an opportunity to gather together as Rwandans without the weight of the memory of violence. 
The evening was joyful, playful and boisterous, as the cultural strictures of reserve and silence 
were loosened and community members enjoyed themselves. It was also an opportunity to 
perform Rwandaness through song and national dance. The young members of CARY took it 
upon themselves to entertain the crowd and did so very well as a number of them performed 
songs and danced. There was an interesting duality to the performances—the songs were 
Western (a Beyoncé song was sung and another performer sang his original R&B tracks), but the 
dance was “Rwandan” national dance. To hear a Beyoncé song and R&B music at an event 
celebrating the launch of a Rwandan cultural association spoke to the cultural hybridity of the 
younger generation who perceived themselves as Rwandese, but also, simultaneously carried and 
performed multiple identities— Canadian, African-Canadian/American, hip-hop, among many 
others. Yet, they also expressed their desire for Rwandaness in explicit ways. One of these ways 
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was through dance. In the mid-2000s, a Rwandan dance troupe was formed by some of the 
women in the community. They taught their daughters Rwandan dances, mainly Ushashaja, the 
dance traditionally performed by Rwandan women, which the young women regularly performed 
at communal events. This dance is made up of a gentle swaying motion originating from the 
hips, followed by an undulation of the upper body, conducted by a line of dancers who move in 
formation. It is very repetitive and rhythmic. Unlike the traditional male dances from Rwanda, it 
does not allude to specific practices such as farming or hunting (Simon). The dance troupe also 
performs at churches and social events outside of the community to demonstrate Rwandan 
culture.  
Dance becomes a literal and figurative antidote to death as the bodies in motion negate 
the stillness of dead bodies. In light of the recent hyper-real violence associated with 
Rwandaness, witnessing (or performing) Rwandan dance becomes an act of symbolic 
reinscription of this identity as alive and breathing. National dances serve to embody the nation 
as an expression of culture because they are a medium that “is especially well suited for displays 
if identity, combining music, dress, body, and movement to convey ideas of a group’s 
distinctiveness” (Reed 2010, 5). When dances are framed as national dances they lose their 
fluidity and become ossified as a particular expression of the nation. Post-colonial states, as part 
of their nation-building exercises, followed the earlier trend that European states had established 
of labelling and framing folk dances as national dances, and then monumentalizing them by 
establishing museums and schools devoted to teaching these ideas of new nations embodied in 
the dancers (Reed 2010, 6). Dance and national culture are perceived to be so intimately paired 
that the two become referents for each other. Rwandaness was understood as dancing in a 
particularly ethnic way. Dance became more a marker of identity than even language, given that 
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many in the dance troupe did not speak Kinyarwanda, yet happily performed Rwandan dances in 
Rwandan costume.  
At the gala, the local dance troupe was joined by a male dancer visiting from Rwanda. 
He, I learned from my tablemates, was well known in Rwanda as a dancer and performer and 
came from a long line of performers, following his father and grandfather in the profession. His 
very body, the medium of his art, represented an idea of the nation superimposed onto the bodies 
of his grandfather, his father, and him, thus telescoping the history of this nation backwards 
through genealogical time. His performance was framed by the local troupe as he moved among 
and between them. But, as the only man on the stage and as the only performer who sang along 
with his performance, he was also an active transferer of cultural texts—a storyteller. 
Conversely, the young local women, dressed identically in white tank tops, flowing skirts and 
headbands, and moving collectively as one group, were de-individualized and did not possess the 
creative power of story-telling. Their young, beautiful bodies expressed the nation, but they 
seemed to have little individual control over this expression, unlike the male performer.
8
 During 
the performance, the women dancers left their formation, dispersed into the audience and bodily 
invited members of the audience to dance with them. This bodily invitation created a moment of 
intimacy as diverse audience members, myself among them, danced for a moment or two with 
the young Rwandan woman. For a moment, she and her partner moved rhythmically (or, in my 
case, awkwardly) together creating a bodily interpretation of the idea of Rwandaness. In that 
moment the dancer invited insiders and outsiders to be momentarily Rwandan, as we emulated 
her sinuous movements. Her body, moving beautifully, became Rwanda. But when the dance 
was stilled, we returned to our fragmented, individual identities, as even the dancers changed 
                                                          
8
 While there are clearly gender differentiated dances suggesting specifically gendered expressions of nation, I 
know too little about them to fully explore this dimension.  
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into their own clothes. As each woman left the main floor and returned, clad in her evening 
outfit, she put away her momentary role as the embodiment of Rwanda and reclaimed her own 
personality and positionality.  
This bodily articulation of nation was roundly welcomed by all gathered at the event. The 
outsiders were impressed by the aesthetic beauty of the movement and quieted by their 
incomprehension of the story told by the male dancer. The insiders, those who identified as 
Rwandese, reveled in a shared understanding and the non-verbal communication of their identity 
as a thing in the world. This moment appeared to be a moment of unity as all gathered seemed to 
be caught up in a simultaneous experience and emotion. Yet, as one participant explained, the 
very idea of a Rwandan dance is a negotiated concept as there are different regional dances, 
some of which have been fused into one dance, but “there’s so many different—they all look 
almost the same, but different meanings and when you go to Rwanda it’s really distinct and you 
can see the difference when they perform it. But our generation here they don’t know about 
Abahamba, they don’t know about Ichibera [specific regional dances]9, they do it sometimes 
without knowing” (Simon). Furthermore, when these traditional dances were performed by local 
youth, they, intentionally or not, fused contemporary hip-hop moves with the traditional dance, 
thus inscribing their own hybridity onto the dances. As one of the dancers, Louise, explained: 
“most of the songs say are traditional songs, then we really have to figure it out by ourselves. 
And if it’s just other dances, sometimes we can learn from Youtube, also sometimes we have to 
really figure it out ourselves […] there’s no expert. We just sit down together and like, okay 
guys, let’s do something, let’s find out something. I think it’s really a good point, everyone 
participates because there’s no boss.” The dance troupe is, in effect, reinventing the dances and 
                                                          
9
 The spelling of these dances is as dictated by the participant. I did not find a record of these dances, so could not 
verify the spelling.  
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reinterpreting them as a uniquely localized expression of their own version of Rwandaness. In a 
small way this newly introduced hybridity is challenging the hegemony of the Rwandan state by 
altering the modes of expressing Rwandaness. Even if the hybridity is unintentional, it 
nonetheless poses a challenge by offering alternative expressions of national identity.  
 
 
Micropolitics and/or Internal Contestations 
Ethnicities 
These moments of groupness, to use Brubakers’ term, suggest that these people, who are 
present at these moments of unity and performance of nation, appear to share ties and 
understandings of self. Yet, simultaneously, even as individuals were actively and even joyfully 
performing unity, there were underlying contestations and challenges playing out about what it 
meant to be a Rwandan in the diaspora community of the GTA. The deeply riven divide between 
those who are identified as Tutsi and those who are identified as Hutu was one of the most potent 
and visible points of contestation among those who belonged to the community. The 
performances of nation at community events were always ostensibly performing Rwandan 
nationalism, but the subtextual performance was of Tutsi identity writ large as Rwandan identity. 
Nearly all the community leaders, speakers at events, and event organizers were Tutsi, though 
they rarely identified themselves as such because they echoed the Rwandan state’s narrative that 
“we are all Rwandan”. Yet, as I got to know the community better (though I could never know 
the group as well as an insider and always my experiences were mediated by cultural translators), 
I noticed the dearth of those who identified as Hutus at events. When I broached this topic during 
interviews (with mostly Tutsis) I was told that Hutus are present, but no one could point any out 
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to me. They always seemed to be just beyond my peripheral vision, and so I came to perceive 
them as peripheral in the community as well. This interpretation was reinforced by the few Hutu 
with whom I had the opportunity to meet and speak.  
I was commonly told by community leaders that though the ethnic identities of Hutu and 
Tutsi were relevant in the past, now “we are all Rwandese”. One such ethnocultural entrepreneur 
explained it thus:  
We are all Rwandese. We are Rwandese. And really, as a social scientist, you can hardly 
take the Hutu and Tutsi, if people speak the same language, inhabited the same 
geographical area, intermarry, and as a practice, how do you tell who is a Hutu and a 
Tutsi? Okay? In the past, the moment a Tutsi would be, if his cows would die, under a 
certain number he would become a Hutu. You see, when you move from one. So there 
are questions of kinds of misreading. Yes, there were Tutsis, you can see them through 
physical structure, yes there are Hutu, but now, we would rather be Rwandese. (Janvier)  
 
Janvier was drawing from the state’s script which frames the division between Hutus and Tutsis 
as a division of class recognized by ownership of a certain number of cows. Another informant 
who had recently migrated from Rwanda, also explained ethnic divisions in Rwanda as classes: 
 
Yeah, so what, what do we have in Rwanda, actually? It’s classes. We have classes. So 
you have like, like, you can have rich people, you can have, you know. Yeah, yeah, So I 
find classes. You cannot tell me how I would go to your house in Rwanda and I would 
feel comfortable. The language, the food, the way you dress, it’s the same. So, that’s, not 
ethnic, that’s not an ethnic group. (Christophe) 
 
This narrative closely echoed the framing of national reconciliation that the Rwandan state had 
been promoting since 2001. As a key tenet of its mandate to foster reconciliation, the Rwandan 
government officially erased ethnicity by declaring that “ethnic identity would no longer be an 
official factor in the bureaucratic life of citizens or the state” (Burnet 2012, 155). On numerous 
occasions, President Kagame had stated that there were no more ethnic identities in the new 
Rwanda. During an interview with Al-Jazeera’s Rhiz Khan, Kagame explained the following: 
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I think there is a bit of confusion here. When we banned the use of the identities that were 
used to divide the people of the country – erroneous though, because people think we 
have tribes, yet we don’t have tribes. We simply have social classes made up of people 
who were farmers, those who used to keep cattle and those who were dealing in 
handicrafts. This is how the society is divided. But we said: “You can call yourself 
whatever you want to call yourself, but you cannot use it against somebody who is 
different from you. Above all, we are all Rwandans. You can say you are Hutu, Tutsi or 
Twa – but you cannot use it politically to the detriment of the other one who is different 
from you.” This is all we have said and this is an open debate and you can’t say better 
than that. (Office of the President 2011) 
 
The parallels between Kagame’s oft repeated formulation and the statement by a GTA 
community leader were striking. Both statements identified the distinction between Hutus and 
Tutsis as “social classes” and that these “classes” had been demolished in favour of a unified 
narrative of “we are all Rwandans”. On the surface, these statements point to a surprisingly 
successful reconciliation program which appeared to have, in the space of merely 20 years, 
extinguished Hutu and Tutsi as ethnic identities and made them social classes. This re-framing 
implies that social classes are less fixed than ethnicity as one can shift one’s position within a 
class hierarchy. Thus, the idea of a uniform “Rwandese” ethnicity can be crystallized as older 
ethnic narratives are reformulated into other social categories, without challenging the hegemony 
of ethnicity.
10
 Rather than understanding ethnicity as a construct and thereby undermining the 
ideological basis of the state, this re-framing allows the state, as embodied in the figure of the 
autocratic president, to claim that those who had previously identified ethnically as Hutu and 
Tutsi were mistaken in their perception of their own identity and that they were actually referring 
to class distinctions, while their ethnic identity was all along Rwandese. There is a seductive 
logic to this reasoning as it offers an explanation of the genocidal violences as caused by colonial 
and post-colonial elites who manipulated class distinctions and called them ethnicity to incite 
                                                          
10
 It is at times difficult to distinguish between expressions of ethnicity and expressions of nation. The most 
appropriate term seems to be ethno-national as Rwandan is both an ethnic identity associated with a language, 
culture and imagined shared history, as well as a national identity as it is tied to a bordered geographic space.  
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conflict, while this explanation also offered the common people an underlying shared identity. 
Yet, despite the emotive appeal of this logic, in the Rwandese community in the GTA, tensions 
around ethnic identity remained a significant source of conflict.  
 As one participant explained, many in the community disagreed with the official line that 
“we are all Rwandese” because it concealed the ethnicization of the new regime. Thus, as Tutsi 
make up 10% of the overall population of Rwanda, yet “they work at 90% [of government 
positions], so if you say there’s no ethnic, and even if you see the whole government is Tutsi, 
you can’t say the Tutsi have more power” (Fidèle). Those who pointed out this disparity did not 
do so out of a sense of altruism or even justice, but because they genuinely feared that the current 
governing regime was recreating conditions for another genocide. Yet, despite these simmering 
anxieties, ethnic affiliation had become a taboo subject.  
 There was a public consensus to avoid discussing ethnic identities and, since I did not 
pose any questions directly related to ethnicity, many of the participants in my study did not 
identify their presumed ethnic background or discuss the presumed ethnicity of others. Based on 
this initial observation, it would appear that the ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi had indeed 
receded in importance for day to day life. Yet, despite the oft repeated claim that “we are all 
Rwandans”, as I gained trust within the community, a number of participants in the study 
directed our conversation towards inherited ideas about ethnicity. Many among the community 
in the GTA explained that, because it was relatively small, everyone knew who was a Tutsi and 
who was a Hutu. Indeed, “here in Canada it’s much easier to know who’s a Hutu or Tutsi than in 
Rwanda. Because in Rwanda now, the government is trying to avoid it, it’s not like they are so 
successful about it, but…” (Simon). Community members “know” through a complex set of 
cognitive associations which rely on the cosmology that they inherited from their immersion in 
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Rwandese culture. Those who grew up in Rwanda before the genocide had an extensive social 
map of familial and community associations. So, for instance, Simon explained that he “knew” 
that a young woman was Hutu because he had known her uncle in Rwanda where ethnic identity 
was determined and marked on identity cards, and thus knew the family’s presumed ethnic 
identity. Based on this knowledge he extrapolated her identity and understood her to be Hutu. 
Those who grew up outside of Rwanda would not have had access to this kind of lived memory 
since they did not have a day to day experience in a neighbourhood of Hutus and Tutsis. Rather, 
the diversity that they knew included individuals who identified as belonging to other regional 
ethnic groups, other national groups, other linguistic groups. So, how would they have learned, 
upon first sight, who was Hutu and who was Tutsi? Natalia, a young woman who had grown up 
in Canada, offered insight into how this kind of classification can be learned and inherited 
despite not encountering individuals from the ostensibly other ethnic group.  
Natalia: I can tell who’s Rwandan. We just have these traits that I can identify. The forehead, the 
  eyes, you know, the long face, the skin, the legs. There’s just so many things. So I can 
 tell what someone is. Sometimes it’s hard. You don’t know. When you go to those 
 events, there’s some people you meet and you’re like—You’re a Rwandan?  
 
Interviewer: Does that challenge your presumption of what it means to be Rwandan? 
 
Natalia: It does and no, because at the end of day, it’s like you went to Somalia, or Ethiopia, 
 which are the countries known to have a specific type. There’s a look. You can just tell. 
 So, once we tell.  
 
Interviewer: Really you’re talking about Tutsis? 
 
Natalia: I am, I am, I don’t know…that’s what pisses me off, because I can’t differentiate it. Of 
 course, Hutus, we were brought up to think they were the shorter, darker, scruffier, 
 everything feature wise, they were more wide. 
 
Interviewer: So you were taught that too? 
 
Natalia: Well, no, I wasn’t, I just read it from the research. My mom would not talk about—my 
 mom would not describe it. But my mom would be like, she saw one, she’d be like—he is 
  Hutu.  
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Interviewer: So you had a visual image of what that means.  
 
Natalia: Yeah, but most of the people that I see, I could just…it’s weird, it’s interesting that you 
 say that, I could, I know the differentiation between and Tutsi and a Hutu, but when I see 
 a Rwandan, I just say they’re Rwandan. I don’t think there’s a Hutu or there’s a Tutsi—I 
 think Oh, there’s a Rwandan, and I speak English. At the end of the day, there is 
 something different about both people because of what.  
 
What was interesting about Natalia’s account was the degree to which she had been trained to 
see a physiological type, yet when she met people who were identified as Hutu, she often found 
that they did not match the presumed physiological characteristics. However, rather than lead her 
to question the existence of the type, she was “pissed off” because she “can’t differentiate”. Yet, 
she is simultaneously echoing the narrative of “we are all Rwandans”. This cognitive dissonance 
seemed to be easily glossed over. Even as migrants from Rwanda taught their children the new 
ethno-national identity, they continued to inscribe ethnic differences onto individuals.  
 Delphine, herself a genocide survivor, lamented this continuation of what she saw as the 
roots of the genocidal ideology. As she explained, “I don’t know how to tell the difference 
between Hutu and Tutsi, I just don’t know. It’s like you’re asking me between Chinese and a 
Korean, I just feel like they look the same. I don’t know anything. I don’t know how people tell. 
Other people, maybe, not me. They look the same” (Delpine). As someone who grew up in 
Rwanda and survived the genocide, it would be safe to assume that she would be able to tell the 
two ostensible groups apart better than anyone else, yet she genuinely could not and was troubled 
that others could/thought they could. 
 These ostensible differences dictated silences at social and community gatherings. Jean-
Paul, a young man who survived the genocide as a child and had since migrated to Canada on his 
own, explained that when he socialized with his Rwandan friends, a group of young men who, 
like he, had migrated relatively recently, they shared the “happy memories”. They discussed 
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childhood memories (though not genocide narratives—childhood here means their early youth, 
before 1994), but the moment “someone wants to mix that with some political situation, about 
how things are going now, then we stop”. They would share “information about what happens, 
but not the analysis, the whole thing.” They avoided offering their individual understandings and 
opinions of current politics in Rwanda because the group was mixed. It is made up of Hutus and 
Tutsis and the understanding was that the ethnic identity would lead to conflicting interpretations 
of events, so, to keep ties, they created spheres of silence. Christophe, another young man, also 
described that he would avoid certain topics because “there’s a Hutu, or because there’s a Tutsi.” 
Neither man avoided interacting with individuals from the other ethnicity, but this interaction 
came with a cost of carefully choreographed silences and omissions, as those who identified as 
Tutsis were sometimes aware of the power of the genocide narrative and the subsequent framing 
of all Tutsis as victims and all Hutus as perpetrators. Christophe, as a Tutsi, would not discuss 
anything to do with the genocide, the single greatest marker of Rwandaness in the contemporary 
moment, with his Hutu friends, because “no matter what, that kid is going to know his ethnic 
affiliation” and when the frame is that “Hutus killed Tutsis”, he may say that “I was not even 
born, I don’t even know about these things”. So, to avoid alienating his friends, Christophe chose 
to keep the silences. Yet, though he avoided imposing his power over his friends, he used that 
same power to establish himself as an expert on the genocide whose interpretation of the events 
was inherently legitimate because he was a Tutsi.  
Another informant described how he, as a Tutsi, befriended a young Hutu man. He 
wanted to throw his new friend a party for his birthday, so he invited his friend to extend an 
invitation to his friends. Thus, to his surprise, the Tutsi man found his home filled with young 
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Hutus. He was delighted by this as he aimed to try to connect the two groups within the larger 
group. Yet, the challenges of sharing social space reared their head at the party:  
Participant: Yeah, so I looked—there was no one, everybody was Hutu, and also I can see when 
  they meet, what kind of discussion they have. Because they was so excited to be here, 
 they were so wonderful to me, they came with their wives, their children, it was so nice 
 evening, but one was dating a Canadian girl, and the Canadian girl didn’t know, and so 
 she started talking about politics, “yeah, your dictator, how do they call him—Kagame?” 
  and talking so negative.  
 
Interviewer: Right, she’d learned this from her partner?  
 
Participant: Yeah, and I can see that they was so, so like, so shocked, and they wanted to  stop 
 her. 
 
Interviewer: Was it because they were here, in a Tutsis home, and they didn’t want that 
 conversation which normally happens when they are together?  
 
Participant: Yeah, that conversation. And someone had to say, oh, can we go outside just to have 
 a smoke, and when she came back, she was quiet [laughs]. And so, this is how I see, like 
 the community outside is different than the community in Rwanda. 
 
Despite his desire to befriend those who were identified as Hutus, the host was unwilling to 
listen to criticisms of Kagame, and his guests knew this well, so they ensured that the appropriate 
silences were maintained. Indeed, they were “shocked” by the rupture as their private 
conversation was brought to a quasi-public realm.  As James C. Scott argues, the resistance of 
subordinate groups is waged quietly, often beyond the public view. This is a “tactical choice 
born of a prudent awareness of the balance of power” (Scott 1990, 183). In this community, 
Tutsis were the dominant group both in terms of numbers and in terms of relative social power. 
They were, by and large, perceived by most audiences as the victims and survivors of the 
genocide, which granted them latitude and a significant measure of social authority in the 
community. They also tended to be associated with the current governing regime, thus granting 
them institutional support and legitimacy. There were a number of Hutus who were also allied 
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with the regime, but their affiliation depended upon their full acceptance of the state’s mythico-
history.  They were not permitted to dissent, as the examples of Victorie Ingabire and her 
colleagues in Rwanda demonstrated.
11
 Tutsis likewise were not permitted to dissent, but they did 
not face the same risks as Hutus. As one dissenter explained, “in my position, it’s safe what I do 
because I am a Tutsi and I am a genocide survivor, so I can’t be genocide denier, because I’m 
survivor…A Hutu can’t be in my position—they can say anything to him, but they can’t say 
anything to me” (Fidèle).  
 According to the Rwandan state’s narratives, Hutus were always read as guilty, 
murderers by association, and Tutsis were always read as innocent, victims by association. 
Angelina described how this framing of ethnic identities informed social interactions:  
Angelina: Yeah, so, you wanna be careful about your conversation, your choice of topics, you 
 avoid political stuff if you are not sure. 
 
Interviewer: So conversation about the current regime in Rwanda? 
 
Angelina: Yeah, current regime, politics in Rwanda, even race, those ethnic differences—I can’t 
 say are you a Hutu? Because it might be offensive to this person because the two groups 
 are associated in a different way—Hutus are associated with the genocide, and Tutsi, you 
 might be scared that they might say, ohh, how do you think about me now, since I’m 
 revealing that I’m a Hutu, what do you think of me now, right? Are you thinking I’m the 
 one associated with killing?  
 
Like Christophe, she expressed an awareness of the social and political power of this 
understanding of contemporary ethnicity in Rwanda and its parallel assumption among the 
diaspora in the GTA. But she also expressed empathy for those who were understood to be Hutus 
and the assumption of guilt that this interpretation carried. Yet, despite the alliance of those who 
identified as Hutus and those who identified as Tutsis, and attempts to understand the perspective 
                                                          
11
 The treatment of the political opposition in Rwanda is discussed in chapter 3.  
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of the other, there remained potent emotional obstacles, especially for those who were first 
generation migrants and thus had a recent lived memory of the supposed other. 
 Both those who identified as Tutsi and those who identified as Hutu expressed anxiety 
associated with interacting with the ethnic other. Those who identified as Tutsi, both genocide 
survivors and those who were not in Rwanda during the genocide but nonetheless lost much of 
their family, spoke of fearing Hutus, in the years following the genocide and even 20 years after 
the violence. Patrice was a genocide survivor who was only 7 during the horrific events, but they 
had marked his life since. Having grown up in the new Rwanda, he wanted reconciliation and 
wanted to move past ethnic division. His desire for acceptance conflicted with his psychological 
and physiological responses to the memories of violence.  
Patrice: I know how they look like, I know who they are. But I don’t feel like I need to judge 
 anybody. But the thing is I know what they did, ‘cause I still have memories, I still suffer. 
 
Interviewer: That trauma doesn’t go away.  
 
Patrice: But I think having a chance to move away, leaving that reality and being taken away 
 from Rwanda, seeing a different side, different people, sharing food, sharing different 
 things. And perhaps people change. And for young people it’s easier to change than a 
 much older person.  
 
Interviewer: Do you have friends who are from the other group? 
 
Patrice: Yes. Even in the church, there they are. Someone will say, oh they are this, but they are 
 not taken away or chased from the group, there is a lot of that though. But uh, some 
 person may come, [and say] this person is this. Yeah, I know. And do you know this? I’m 
  like yes.  
 
Interviewer: So, they’ll warn you? 
 
Patrice: Yes. They’ll warn you. 
 
Interviewer: The older people? 
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Patrice: Yeah, they’ll let you know. 
 
Interviewer: Because they are cautious, worried? 
 
Patrice: They’re worried, they may think that they’re protecting you, and they change your 
 perspective on that person. You know what I mean? I saw that person as a person, he was 
 this and this, I accepted him, as a friend. Now you’re telling me this and I’m a little bit 
 afraid. Because then I link him to what happened to this and this and this.  
 
Interviewer: Right, and he’s not involved. He was probably a child as well. 
 
Patrice: Exactly. Either way it creates a little distance. It’s hard, but what are you going to 
 do? 
 
Patrice’s narrative exposed the degree to which some senior members of the community policed 
ethnic boundaries and ensured that younger community members retained these markers. This 
policing of boundaries served to harden and reinforce the putative differences between those who 
were identified as Hutus and those who were identified as Tutsis. Yet, the cost of maintaining 
those ethnic markers was borne by Patrice, as the constant reminder of who was what incited his 
anxiety and generated fear, despite his desire to cross ethnic boundaries. As a young migrant, he 
sought to build a community and a support system, but the community then denied him a feeling 
of safety. Those whom he had perceived to be friends were re-framed as the other, and he was 
left with disquiet. The emotional toll of confronting this trepidation and unease was often too 
great for survivors, so they chose to retreat further. The social policing of ethnic boundaries by 
the senior members of the community served to perpetuate distrust and anxiety, but it also 
prevented survivors like Patrice from feeling safe and thus beginning to heal his psyche.  
 Many of those who identified as Tutsi perceived it to be their duty to police the 
boundaries of ethnicity and when they encountered a Hutu passing as something else, to expose 
them. Olivia, as a Tutsi woman who often encountered newcomers in her professional capacity, 
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took it upon herself to expose what she perceived to be a lie. She explained that when she met 
migrants from the Great Lakes region in Africa who claimed to be Congolese, for example, but 
carried Rwandan names and spoke Kinyarwanda, she confronted them with what she understood 
to be their deception. She acknowledged that some may have been choosing not to identify as 
Rwandan because they did not wish to carry the stigma of others’ crimes, but she still understood 
their deception to be evidence of their guilt, if only by association. Yet, in the same conversation, 
she maintained that in the community the terms Hutu and Tutsi were no longer used as all saw 
themselves as Rwandan.  
Angelina also recounted the deep-rooted tensions that she had observed within the 
community.  In the years after the genocide, the local, largely Tutsi community in the GTA, 
feared to hold social events, because “If we bring this social gathering, who knows, some Hutu 
might just come and say ‘I’m going to put a bomb here and kill all these people’”(Angelina). The 
generalized fear of the other was difficult to overcome, but, 20 years since the violence, it had 
largely died down. Most cited the sense of day to day safety that they experienced in Canada, as 
well as the rule of law which served to deter acts of violence. Nonetheless, individual fears 
remained as Angelina expressed that there are very many Tutsis in the community who “can’t 
stand being with a Hutu, because they’re still resenting that, they can’t let go” and Hutus who 
aren’t “sure whether you’re going to accept them either, or whether you associate with them, 
even if they have nothing to do with the killing that happened in that country…so they 
withdraw…and they form their own group.” This divide was echoed in the geography of the new 
diaspora communities, as the individuals who identified as Hutu often chose to settle in Quebec, 
or Ottawa, where there were larger groups of people identified as Hutus, thus, they no longer 
formed such a minority within a minority. The ones who chose to cross ethnic boundaries were 
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subject to scrutiny and suspicion, even though there were very many individuals in the 
community who wished to see reconciliation.  
Those who identified as Hutus faced the social policing of boundaries and surveillance if 
they chose to remain part of the community. As Angelina explained, many chose to absent 
themselves and form their own social circles and groups where they could feel more at ease. Yet, 
many others sought out the larger community and wished to collectively identify as Rwandese. 
Georges, a Hutu man who was studying in Europe during the time of the genocide (and thus is 
exempt from accusations of being directly involved) and who lost close family members at the 
hands of the RPF, was one of those who desired to remain in the community. Yet he was very 
aware of the dangers that he faced. He knew many others who had chosen not to connect because 
“especially Hutus who took refuge in Congo and then came here, it would be difficult. I know 
there’s some good innocent people, they are here, I meet them…They keep a low profile. The 
accusation can be…” He was referring to the accusation of being a perpetrator in the genocide.  
To be accused of being a perpetrator in the genocide had the power to destroy one’s life. As he 
explained, having witnessed other judicial systems, once such an accusation is made in a North 
American system, “they accuse you, it’s up to you to defend. In Europe the prosecutor has to 
prove guilty. .. Somebody can accuse me and you can’t reverse that.” Even those who had been 
exonerated of all crimes still carried the mark of the accusation hence forth, as, for example, 
those who were found not guilty at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, 
were still treated as if they were guilty, even by the Canadian state. Georges explained that a few 
of them had family in Canada, but were not permitted to even travel to Canada as they were 
denied visas, let alone settle here.   
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 Despite external performances of unity, the inherited and actively propagated division 
between those who identified as Tutsis and those who identified as Hutus remained a deep divide 
within the community. As I have sought to express, very many in the community were actively 
trying to come to terms with this divide and desired to share a sense of identity and peoplehood 
with those whom they perceived as the other. But this desire was very often paired with fear and 
anxiety which remained too difficult to overcome. Others yet, while extolling a unified national 
Rwandan identity, actively worked to demarcate those who were Tutsi, and thus understood to be 
innocent, and those who were Hutu, and thus understood to be at least suspect, if not guilty.  
 
 
Gendered Divisions 
 The performances of unity that were the public façade of the Rwandese community in the 
GTA were also riven by gendered divides about the very meaning of Rwandaness, usually 
referred to as “our culture”.12  Migration and movement away from Rwanda had altered the 
gendered understandings that individuals had learned and inherited. Men and women expressed 
the challenges of new ideas about gender roles and expectations and how these had affected their 
interpersonal lives and relationships. While I will spend more time discussing how migration, 
settlement and racialization affect men and women differently in chapter 5, here I will focus on 
how gender is connected to Rwandaness as an ethnic/national identity.  
 Early on in my research, I began hearing of how migration had “destroyed” families, and 
how this troubled those who spoke of it because “in our culture, we would like to see our people 
stay together” (Connie).  Separation and divorce in families was understood by many participants 
                                                          
12
 At times participants in the study used the language of “culture” to describe sets of ideas or behaviours within 
the presumed community. I understand this to be an expression of ethnicity as it relates to language, culture, 
history and memory, which constitute a framework of experience that can be understood as ethnicity. 
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to be an outcome of migration and the imposition of new ideas about gender roles, but also, 
significantly, as a challenge to cultural integrity. Many worried that the dissolution of marriages 
was a sign of breakdown within the community and thus identified it as a threat to the integrity 
of the Rwandese identity in the GTA diaspora. The increase in incidences of divorce was often 
presented as a disintegration of Rwandese culture and traditions. Even those whose focus was on 
empowering women in the community, lamented the increased rates of divorce. While these 
participants spoke positively about the increased economic and personal liberties that women had 
in Canada, they were concerned about the effects of these new liberties on the cohesion of the 
community.  
 As Angelina explained, migration had exposed men and women to new ideas about 
gender and a new legal and institutional regime which facilitated women’s greater autonomy.  
There is different power dynamics when you are in Rwanda, between men and women. 
The men is really they have bigger power, the respect of women is very compromised 
sometimes there, but, when the women are here, they feel they have power, because there 
is a voice for women, number one, there is protection here, and she knows that 
economically, if worse comes to worse, the government will help you out. But over there 
in Rwanda, when a men and woman disagree or so forth, you have no job, so your 
survival is compromised, so women feel safe to here, because they know there is a better 
opportunity for them. (Angelina) 
 
Rwandese women in Canada were able to take advantage of a legal structure and system of 
social support which enabled them to leave marriages that were abusive or too difficult to keep 
intact, and some chose to do so. This new trend was similar to what the Ghanaian community in 
Toronto also experienced. With respect to the latter, Manuh explains that “a persistent complaint 
among [Ghanaian] men is that the Canadian state is ‘spoiling’ the women by making them 
conscious of their rights and that this consciousness is leading to high divorce rates. Men also 
contend that the state benefits available to unmarried or divorced women with children […] 
undermine the authority and power of husbands to maintain particular kinds of relations with 
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their wives” (1998, 487). Likewise, Creese, studying the new African diaspora in Vancouver, 
observed the same trends as “both men and women agonized over the increasing incidences of 
divorce and the loss of community support. For the most part, however, women identified the 
men’s failure to adapt as the central issue, while men were more likely to blame women for the 
new and unreasonable expectations” (2011, 155). Marital discord and disintegration appeared to 
be common features of African diasporic communities in Canada as members of these 
communities dealt with the immense stress of migration and settlement as well as the new 
gendered expectations.  
While marital discord among African diasporic communities was the product of a clash 
of gender regimes and stress, it was often understood in the Rwandese community as a failing to 
perform Rwandese culture appropriately. Connie explained that while in Rwanda many middle 
class women did not need to work outside the home, or, if they did, they could afford to hire 
domestic help to run the household, in Canada, these same women were in a position where the 
family was struggling for economic survival, so they had work in the labour force, but could not 
afford domestic help. Women faced the struggles of building a new life and a double work day 
and, often, found that their partners were not able to bend to the new circumstances. Instead, the 
men asserted their national/ethnic identity as a “Rwandese man” to attempt to reinstate gender 
norms that they had assumed would continue. They then accused women who contested these 
norms of forgetting the culture. In a caricature of the men’s role in this dynamic, Connie stated “I 
don’t know how to cook, so I won’t cook. I didn’t know how to clean the house, so I won’t do it. 
I am a Rwandese man—why did you forget about our culture?” The accusation of forgetting 
one’s culture is a challenge directly aimed at the woman’s identity and sense of belonging in the 
Rwandese community. This painful accusation echoed the Rwandan state’s narrative of nation as 
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women were to be the bearers of the nation, but only as long as they performed a closely policed 
gender appropriate script of the docile and passive woman. Much like the state used women as 
the façade of its progressive policies while neglecting their safety and well-being, this 
interpersonal and domesticated interpretation of ethnicity and nation relied on women 
performing their roles with appropriate passivity. The accusation of forgetting one’s culture, 
hurled in the midst of heated arguments, stayed in the memories and narratives of women. When 
they recounted their marital troubles, this claim of forgetting their culture was a key injury that 
they expressed, especially since, in this community, it had been the women who had formed their 
own groups in order to teach children and youth the language and dances of their culture, thus, 
the women had carried the burden of transmitting culture to the next generation.  
 Young women were also taught by their mothers how to behave as a “Rwandese 
woman”.  Behavioural codes for women associated with performing this national/ethnic identity 
focused on personal modesty, respectability, reserve and appropriately “moral” behaviours. In 
Rwanda, “women are viewed positively when they are reserved, submissive, modest, silent and 
maternal, when they maintain a ‘respectable’ household, when they raise ‘wise’ children. They 
are viewed negatively when they gossip, are loud and overly emotional, or have a dirty house or 
rude children” (Burnet 2012, 44). In the diaspora, these “negative” behaviours were read as 
contrary to national/ethnic identity, not only as violating gender norms. Thus, young women 
were trained to abide by the following rules, as Natalia recounted:  
Oh my god, going out late at night. My curfew, to this day, is still 8:00, even though I 
come home late. It’s just that as a Rwandese woman, you are not supposed to be home, 
like past 11:00. Or else, my mom says it’s like prostitution, that’s what you’re going to be 
called, especially like in Rwanda. I don’t know if other interviewees told you this, but a 
lot of women like to gossip. So, it was basically shame to the family if the girl would 
be…wouldn’t have something called umucyo. Umucyo, it’s basically having value for 
yourself, and having respect for yourself, as a woman. Not coming home late, keeping 
everything in order and clean, especially in the house, and so on. (Natalia) 
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Violating the norms of Rwandan culture carried the risk of being labelled a “prostitute”—one of 
the universally damming condemnations of a woman. In such a small community, which, despite 
its dispersal throughout the GTA, maintained close ties of communication, a young woman’s 
challenge of these gendered norms would become known, because, as Natalia indicated, gossip, 
or information sharing, was a common practice. This challenge was read as a violation of 
ethnic/national norms and the young (or older) woman in question would be socially 
marginalized within the community.  
 Women who broke the gendered social codes faced a challenge to their identity in the 
diasporic community and in Rwanda. When they traveled to Rwanda they were no longer 
perceived to be “Rwandese”, but as “Westernized”. Women, having lived in Canada and claimed 
some of their rights, no longer accepted their role as subservient to men, and “if you try to speak 
up and be the one—she is Westernized, that one” (Angelina). She was accused of no longer 
respecting men or her husband and the cost of this was social isolation. So, to remain accepted in 
the community both in Rwanda and in Canada, women developed survival tactics. Thus, “even 
though you know better, you tend not to speak up too much, you just find a tactful way to 
balance that kind of bias, so that you are not cut off from the society completely, or you have to 
know who you are speaking to, or find a better choice of words. You have to gain their approval, 
otherwise, people will isolate you” (Angelina). This tactic of guarding what was said and to 
whom was a common strategy to mitigate against conflict and social isolation. Marie, a single 
mother living in the GTA, had mastered the difficult art of navigating between different gender 
regimes while still maintaining a space within her community. Divorce was perceived as a social 
stigma for a woman in Rwanda because she was granted status through her male relatives or 
husband. Thus, the severance of a marriage meant that she lost her social status, though her 
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husband did not suffer the same consequence (Burnet 2012, 46). So, as a divorced woman, Marie 
had chosen to only share her divorce with her immediate family in Rwanda. When she had been 
able to travel to Rwanda, she had maintained the illusion that her husband stayed in Canada and 
could not travel with the family. This white lie ensured that she was welcomed and treated with 
respect as a Rwandese woman. She had learned to navigate the terrain of who a good “Rwandan 
woman” was, while still asserting her own needs. She understood that Rwandaness was a way of 
seeing, and so showed only the narrative that fit the dominant discourse.   
 Nation and ethnicity, as “ways of seeing”, rather than objective realities, nonetheless 
shaped the lives of men and women in the Rwandese diaspora community in the GTA. As the 
many examples here have illustrated, despite inherited ideas about who belongs and who does 
not, and on what terms, individuals negotiated, navigated and re-narrated these identity markers. 
Even at moments of heightened performance of “Rwandaness”, there were multiple 
understandings of that idea at play. These multiple interpretations interacted with the dominant 
discourse about nation and ethnicity and individuals teased out spaces of mediated, at times 
temporary, belonging. Yet, even as individuals created openings in narrow state-derived 
discourses, others within the same community work to counter these openings and reinforce what 
it meant to be a Tutsi, a Hutu, a Rwandese man, a Rwandese woman. These plural power plays 
illustrate the instability of ethnicity and nation.         
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Chapter Five 
 
Ambivalent Welcome: Canadian Multiculturalism and Racialization 
 
As Rinaldo Walcott argues, “to be black and at home in Canada is to both belong and not 
belong” (Walcott 2003, 50). Those who identified as Rwandans in the GTA daily negotiated the 
slippery terrain between belonging in Canada and the routine reminders of non-belonging. They 
faced an ambivalent welcome in their new host/homeland, as they were constructed and read as 
black and inherently and irrevocably different. Yet, even as they were daily reminded of their 
difference and subject to scrutiny, they affirmed their agency by demonstrating their 
deservedness of full citizenship and insisting that they faced discrimination and marginalization 
only in certain moments. They were very well aware of the ambivalent welcome that they 
received, but claimed that, having been habituated to extreme exclusion in Rwanda, Canada had 
offered them a safe haven where they could build new lives. The seeming paradox of 
simultaneous belonging and non-belonging that this chapter explores encapsulates what it means 
be part of a diaspora—namely, to have built new lives and new identities in a new 
host/homeland, yet to be aware of one’s ambivalent place in the new host/homeland and the 
potential for exclusion and even expulsion. Thus, for the Rwandan diaspora in the GTA, a lived 
memory of deadly exclusion cast a rosy glow on the terms of inclusion that they experienced in 
the GTA, but those who identified as members of this group were not oblivious to the 
contradictions of belonging in the new nation.  
When a white, often Anglo-Saxon by ancestry, Canadian encounters another person 
socially, they rarely feel any qualms about asking “what’s your background?” Indeed, many 
would conceive of this question as expressing flattering curiosity about the other. Yet, beneath 
the seemingly polite exterior of this question, lurk a number of assumptions which fundamentally 
148 
 
challenge the claim that all Canadians are indeed equal. This question is only posed to those who 
look or sound different; I, as an immigrant, and thus as someone whose ‘background’ is not 
Canadian (whatever that may mean), am not asked this question because I am white and have a 
Southern Ontario accent. Those wishing to show polite interest in me ask me about my 
profession, my hobbies, or even my weekend plans, but never about my “background” as they 
assume that they know it, and therefore presume that I belong within the imagined notion of 
what constitutes the “Canadian” nation. Yet, nearly all who participated in this study have 
encountered this ubiquitous question before. Some laughed when it came up as it had become 
something of a joke—the polite reminder that one does not belong, one cannot be ‘from here’, 
and must have a foreign ‘background’. These seemingly polite euphemisms reveal how 
normalized day to day racism and the assumption that to be Canadian always means to be white 
and often to have Anglo-Saxon ancestry have become. Nearly all those who participated in this 
study expressed that they were constantly reminded of their visible difference and led to 
understand that they could not be Canadian because they were black, contrary to the claims of 
Canada being a multicultural nation. 
This chapter explores the central dynamic of this study which is the simultaneous 
belonging and non-belonging that is foundational to the creation of a diaspora. As previous 
chapters have proposed, the memory of the extreme violence of the genocide has been mobilized 
by the new state to generate a diaspora. However, this process would not be possible without an 
ambivalent welcome in the new homeland. If those who identified as Rwandans living in the 
GTA had found belonging and acceptance in their new homeland, then they would not long for 
the imagined homeland so acutely. In offering a conditional welcome, the Canadian state 
contributed to the creation of the diaspora. The analysis begins by exploring the micro politics of 
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identity construction in the GTA and the subtle ways in which those who are racialized as black 
are excluded from belonging. It then explicitly addresses the ways in which individuals are 
racialized as black, and concludes with the economic effects of these micro politics.  
 
 
Multiculturalism 
 Contemporary Canada is oft cited as one of the successful examples of multiculturalism 
as an ethic and a practice (Kymlicka 2012). It is held up as an example (albeit an imperfect one), 
for states struggling with their own “ethnic/cultural” conflicts. Racialization, racism and 
exclusion, though they are acknowledged, are assumed to be anomalies, or failures of 
multiculturalism, rather than inherent components of this state discourse. Canadian 
multiculturalism, enacted in 1971 and enshrined in the 1988 Multicultural Act and underwritten 
by the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Puplampu and Tettey 2005; Abu-Laban and 
Gabriel 2002), has become one of the central myths of the contemporary Canadian nation. It is 
officially premised upon the central idea that ethnic minorities, historically excluded from the 
narratives of the nation, are now included. According to the initial formulations of the policy, it 
“gave explicit recognition at the federal level to Canadians whose origin was non-French, non-
British and non-Aboriginal. Thus the policy served to reconfigure expressions of ‘Canadian 
identity’ in a way that was inclusive of ethnocultural and racial minorities” (Abu-Laban and 
Gabriel 2002, 105). In contemporary parlance, the language has shifted somewhat from ‘ethnic 
minorities’ to ‘visible minorities’ which, according to the Employment Equity Act of 1986, 
means the following: “Chinese, South Asians, Blacks, Arabs, West Asians, Filipinos, Southeast 
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Asians, Latin Americans, Japanese, Koreans and other visible minority groups, such as Pacific 
Islanders” (Statistics Canada 2006).  
 The policies of multiculturalism panned out in the creation of, initially, a 
Multiculturalism Directorate within the Department of the Secretary of State, then, a Department 
of Multiculturalism in 1989, which was then subsumed along with other departments, into the 
Department of Canadian Heritage in 1993 (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002). Initially, the policy 
objectives were to: 
 to assist cultural groups to retain and foster their identity; 
 to assist cultural groups to overcome barriers to their full participation in Canadian 
society (thus, the multiculturalism policy advocated the full involvement and equal 
participation of ethnic minorities in mainstream institutions, without denying them the 
right to identify with select elements of their cultural past if they so chose); 
 to promote creative exchanges among all Canadian cultural groups; and 
 to assist immigrants in acquiring at least one of the official languages (Dewing 2013). 
 
Concurrently to this study, as of 2008, multiculturalism has been transferred to the Department 
of Citizenship and Immigration, where its mandate is now to: 
 support for the economic, social, and cultural integration of new Canadians and cultural 
communities; 
 facilitation of programs that promote mentorship, volunteerism, leadership, and civic 
education among at-risk youth of different cultural backgrounds; and 
 promotion of intercultural understanding and Canadian values (democracy, freedom, 
human rights and the rule of law) through community initiatives, with the objective of 
addressing issues of cultural social exclusion (parallel communities) and radicalization. 
In 2010, it was additionally mandated to: 
 to build an integrated, socially cohesive society; 
 to improve the responsiveness of institutions to meet the needs of a diverse population; 
and 
 to actively engage in discussions on multiculturalism and diversity at an international 
level (Dewing 2013). 
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As evidenced by the different articulations of Canadian Multiculturalism, it is a discourse that 
has evolved from a focus on institutional support for folkloric activities and the teaching of 
“heritage” languages (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002), to a focus on social/cultural “cohesion” and 
curbing of the threat of “at-risk youth” and “radicals”. The focus of both the discourse and the 
practices is now on explicitly controlling and managing a dangerous, potentially “radical” other. 
Though these policies appear to have different outcomes, they are ideologically consistent as 
Multiculturalism is founded on the assumption that “cultures” are things in the world and that 
they will inevitably come into conflict if they are not managed within a set of legal constraints. 
Explicitly, it presumes that those “others” listed above are the possessors of dangerous and 
threatening “culture”, while it assumes that the keepers of the nation, the Anglo minority, are 
devoid of dangerous “ethnic” culture, and only possess the civil democratic virtues of “freedom, 
human rights and rule of law”. As Sara Ahmed has argued, multiculturalism “posits difference as 
something ‘others’ bring to the nation, and as something the nation can have through how it 
accepts, welcomes or integrated such others” (2007, 235).  
Will Kymlicka, as a foremost scholar of the contemporary phenomenon of 
multiculturalism, perceives this state form as both a discourse and a legally codified system 
which holds the potential to remedy the flaws of the Westphalian state system. He explains that: 
Ethnic minorities have not fared well under the Westphalian system of sovereign ‘nation-
states’. Various policies of assimilation and exclusion have been directed at minorities in 
the name of constructing homogenous nation-states, and the international community has 
historically turned a blind eye to these injustices. Today, however, there is a growing 
commitment to remedy this situation, and it is increasingly accepted that the treatment of 
minorities is a matter of legitimate international concern, and should be subject to 
international norms and standards. At a minimum, these evolving standards set the limits 
on the means that Westphalian nation-states can use to pursue their visions of national 
homogenization. Bet these norms also, implicitly at least, offer an alternative vision to the 
Westphalian state, one with views diversity as an enduring reality and defining feature of 
the polity, and which views tolerance as a core value (2007, 5).  
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While Kymlicka recognizes the many shortcomings of Canadian multiculturalism, he 
nonetheless optimistically perceives this institutional form as the appropriate container for the 
diversity of the nation. His optimistic account of multicultural states imagines a state system that 
is based on diversity as a central ethic, and thus works to mitigate exclusion and marginalization. 
Yet, despite its recognition of diversity, the inherent assumption that ethnicities/races exist as 
things in the world, rather than as ways of seeing, ascribes perpetual difference to those who do 
not fit the imagined nation. They become the eternal others who must be tolerated, whose day to 
day practices are inherently and troublingly different and whose “culture” is ossified as the 
counter to white/Anglo culture. The practice of multiculturalism holds within it the seeds of 
reactionary politics as those who are perceived to be the keepers of the nation—in Canada’s case 
the Anglo-Saxon minority—are called upon to learn to tolerate the sometimes intolerable 
difference of the ethnic/racial other, yet they also retain the ability to reject the other. They 
possess the “power and control to decide who the newcomers should be” while the “others” 
“have to demonstrate their worth in order to gain entry and earn their place in the receiving 
society” (Li 2003, 10).  In times of economic and political crisis, as the latter 20th century and 
early 21
st
 century have proven to be, the “immigrant”, the “foreigner”, the eternal “other”, can be 
called upon as the lamb to sacrifice on the altar of the nation state. It is no accident that during 
these decades the rallying cry of the increasingly more powerful right wing in Western 
democracies has been to limit or completely reduce immigration. Thus, immigration, used as a 
code, becomes “a euphemistic expression for racist labour and citizenship policies” (Bannerji 
2000, 4). As Peter S. Li has articulated, a folk understanding of “immigrant” associates it with 
“people of colour who come from ‘Third World’ countries, who do not speak fluent English and 
who occupy lower positions in the occupational hierarchy […] skin colour is the basis of social 
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marking […] the term immigrants also implies undesirable newcomers who are too culturally 
and racially removed from mainstream Canadians of European culture” (2003, 44-5). When the 
code word “immigrant” or “foreigner” is raised, the conflict framed by political elites as ethno-
cultural, is in fact conflict about ever dwindling resources and the imagined threat that new 
others pose to future scarce resources.  
Yet, there are other potentials within the idea of multiculturalism; among them is the 
potential to understand the nation as the socio-legal frame for a plurality. Here, I intentionally 
use the term plurality as opposed to diversity to distinguish between the narrative of multiple 
cultures bent on conflict, as opposed to a recognition of many forms of difference at many 
junctures. Indeed, “diversity has become a codified concept to refer to unbridgeable differences 
of people and to injurious consequences that such differences have created” (Li 2003, 125) in 
both popular/folk discourses and state discourses. Thus, in my understanding, plurality 
recognises that nation, ethnicity and race are ways of seeing, not things in the world, and thus 
aims to avoid reifying them by recognizing the inherent fractures, breaks, and overlap between 
them, as well as the moments when they do not define or determine one’s identity. Plurality 
further recognises other pivotal components of identity: class, age, gender, sexuality, ability, 
religion, etc. This interpretation echoes Bannerji’s liberatory notion of multiculturalism as 
speaking to “multiplicities of tradition and power relations between them, marking the internal 
power-inscribed differences within the space of the nation […leaving] behind the Weberian 
paradigm of tradition-modernity and a facile post-colonialism which threatens to become a form 
of culturalism” (2000, 5). Yet, despite the potentials within the ideas of multiculturalism, the 
form it takes in the Canadian nation state is one that “construct[s] and ascribe[s] political 
subjectivities and agencies for those who are seen as legitimate and full citizens and others who 
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are peripheral to this in many senses. There is in this process an element of racialized 
ethnicization, which whitens North Americans of European origins and blackens or darkens their 
‘others’ by the same stroke” (Bannerji 2000, 6). Multiculturalism in Canada, it seems, has not 
offered the promised welcome to the newly included members of the nation.  
  Multiculturalism, as both discourse and policy, has changed its face over its 40 years of 
existence, as the earlier discussion of the changes to the legislation indicated. Even as 
multiculturalism had been declared a failed project in many European states, including Britain, 
France and Germany during the first decade of the 21
st
 century, it persists in Canada, finding 
relatively little opposition (Sucharov 2013). As Elke Winter proposes, multiculturalism in 
Canada in the 1990s “acquired a different meaning, from a seemingly group rights based 
approach to a much stronger and openly acknowledged emphasis on individual choice. This 
reduced multiculturalism’s imputed divisiveness and rendered it socially acceptable, even to 
many of its critics” (2014, 141).  
With the emergence of a new post-9/11 global order, the same order that rendered the 
idea of multiculturalism defunct in Europe, Canadian multiculturalism also changed; however, 
now it shifted further from a neo-liberal focus on individual choice to what Winter terms 
“republicanism”, namely, grounding the idea of multiculturalism on the foundation of “English-
Canadian values and institutions” (2014, 143). The new policy direction that the state has taken 
since 2006 illustrates this new (and old) ideology through the publication of a new guide for 
migrants in 2009 entitled “Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship”. 
The guide begins by affirming the centrality of the British monarchy over the symbols of civic 
nationalism:  “In Canada, we profess our loyalty to a person who represents all Canadians and 
not to a document such as a constitution, a banner such as a flag, or a geopolitical entity such as a 
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country. In our constitutional monarchy, these elements are encompassed by the Sovereign 
(Queen or King)” (Canada 2009, 2). Under this new policy direction, the monarchy has become 
the new symbol of the Canadian nation, as the navy and air force became, once again, “royal”, 
and all embassies and missions were requested to hang a portrait of the queen (Winter 2014, 
143). The citizenship guide also affirms that “serving in the regular Canadian Forces (navy, army 
and air force) is a noble way to contribute to Canada and an excellent career choice”, while also 
perpetuating Islamophobia by emphasizing that “Canada’s openness and generosity do not 
extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, “honour killings,” female genital 
mutilation, forced marriage or other gender-based violence” (Canada 2009, 9). As the second 
decade of 21
st
 century got underway, multiculturalism, which, as Bannerji and other post-
colonial scholars have argued, posited white Anglo-Saxon culture as dominant, is now “officially 
identified with British traditions, values, and institutions such as the monarchy” (Winter 2015, 
651), and has staked out Muslims as the new and threatening other. Yet, even as new forms of 
virulent and violent racialization mark Muslims in particular, the old forms of racialization 
remain intact, and blackness, as embodied by those who identified as Rwandan, largely remains 
outside the imagination of the nation.      
    
 
Loving the Hostland/Homeland  
Those who identified as Rwandan in the GTA, though they were well aware of their 
position outside the imagination of what constituted Canada, nonetheless insisted that though 
they may encounter resistance and an emotional/cognitive distance from the keepers of the 
nation, they felt that they belonged and often explicitly stated that they preferred to live in 
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Canada over any other country. Many went so far as to refuse to criticize the society that had 
granted them ambiguous welcome precisely because it was a kind of welcome. In setting out to 
conduct this study, I expected to encounter many stories of day to day racialization and 
reminders of difference among those who identified as Rwandese. I did hear these stories, but I 
also heard, emphatically, that though there were struggles—economic, social, individual—the 
Canadian state and the society it represents had offered this community a far better home than 
they had encountered elsewhere and that the community has thrived here as it has not been able 
to do elsewhere. Thus, in offering my analysis of what it means to be a Rwandan in the GTA and 
to contend with discourses of multiculturalism while faced with racialization, I must begin with 
how those whom I am speaking alongside perceive their new hostland/homeland.  
 Very many of the participants in this study insisted on the fact that they felt that they 
belonged in Canada and that Canada had become a very good home to them. While often these 
same participants would later in the interview discuss instances of racialization and 
marginalization, they remained insistent that these moments did not challenge their place within 
the nation. Initially, I thought that perhaps this insistence was due to my outsider status and the 
fact that I appear to represent the dominant culture in Canada. However, as I gained trust in the 
community and many came to perceive me as an ally, the narrative did not change. Of course, I 
remained an outsider, and thus my outsider status comes to bear in my interpretation of this 
dynamic. The apparent contradiction is difficult to reconcile within the theoretical frameworks 
that exist as the state is read as either accepting or as exclusionary. Yet, I had to hear what the 
participants were saying, and thus accept the contradiction. Though this insistence does not fit 
the paradigms I was equipped with, it does demonstrate the degree to which ethnicity, race and 
nation are ways of seeing as my participants were capable of seeing themselves in multiple ways. 
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Thus when they expressed a love of “Canada” while describing instances of explicit racism, they 
were expressing the dynamic and contradictory experience of both belonging and not belonging. 
They were articulating the paradox of simultaneously building a home and becoming a diaspora.   
In the participants’ accounts there emerged three central narratives about belonging in 
Canada. The first of these was an unequivocal statement that Canada was great/good/best, the 
second was that Canada was a much better home than other, especially European, states, and 
finally that Canada was preferable to Rwanda because it afforded basic civil liberties.  Janvier 
very emphatically repeated that “Canada, is one of the best countries in the entire world […] It’s 
a place that has really blessed me, blessed my family, [..] and I have kind of integrated so well.” 
Like most of the participants, he mentioned incidences of racialization, which I will discuss in 
greater detail later, but he was insistent that Canada as a state/society had offered him welcome 
and economic opportunities. He was eager to demonstrate his national pride and his ability to 
contribute to the society, as he recounted that one of his children was an army cadet, suggesting 
the child’s potential willingness to serve in the military in the future. This paternal boast 
demonstrates both Janvier’s desire to be seen as a contributing member of his new 
host/homeland, as well as his pride in socializing his children to do the same. Theodore likewise 
avowed his appreciation and sense of belonging: 
[I know] Both sides, French side, English side, so I know this country. It was a really 
good experience because I came to this country because I want to come, you know? Until 
today I don’t regret being in Canada, I love it. It is good, there’s a lot of opportunities, a 
lot of friends, and you know, if you have a dream, you can realize it, do whatever you 
want to do. You have to work hard as everybody they are doing. I had a chance to go to 
school, study what I was dreaming to do, I’m working what I was dreaming to work, you 
know?  
 
Both these men point to two dynamics of their belonging—that ‘Canada’ afforded them 
blessings/opportunities and that they took advantage of those blessings/opportunities. They focus 
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on both the external conditions and institutional structures that enable new migrants to pursue 
education, find employment and establish themselves, as well as the individual agency and 
fortitude required initially to migrate and then to fight for one’s belonging. Pierre also pointed to 
these two factors as he explained that: 
After the war I sent all my kids here to study. Because the barrier was open and it was 
better to send kids here to study, because at that time Rwanda was not good, after the 
war. Many people send their kids outside, me I would prefer Canada. Canada is the best 
country, the best! Before Rwanda was the best, it was paradise, now no more. It’s better 
in Canada, I sent everybody here. And when you are old, its better you live with your 
kids. My wife and me we are now Canadian and have the whole family here. 
 
Pierre’s account also emphasizes the external/state opportunities, as the phrase “the barrier was 
open” indicates that the Canadian state was receiving refugees and migrants from Rwanda; it 
also emphasizes his agency, by pointing out that while others sent their children elsewhere, he 
chose Canada. These articulations of pride and belonging are not empty rhetorical gestures, but, 
rather, recognition of both the opportunities that had been denied elsewhere as well as the agency 
of the speaker in migrating. These are badges of belonging as the speakers are insisting on their 
part in the dialogical relationship between state and citizen. They are asserting their individual 
agency in the face of larger state structures, such as immigration policies, and claiming their 
place of belonging.  
 Other respondents likewise expressed their sense of belonging, but it was mediated by the 
memory of exclusion and marginalization elsewhere. Fidèle, having lived in Europe in the early 
to mid-1990s, expressly contrasted Canadian multiculturalism with continental European mono-
culturalism. He explained: “The racism. It’s very, very high in Europe. I think because Canada is 
a multicultural country, everyone comes from somewhere else too….You don’t have any limits 
in Canada. That’s why I love Canada.” Unlike the earlier accounts of affection and pride, 
Fidèle’s account expresses  “love” for Canada based upon the contrast between his day to day 
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experiences in Europe and those in Canada. The sense of contemporary belonging and “love” is 
rooted in the negative memories of exclusion and outright racism in his previous hostlands, 
rather than in any positive attributes of Canada. While many participants used the language of 
“love” in speaking of their affective response to the idea of Canada and their experiences in it, it 
seemed to embody a broad range of emotional responses encompassing pride, attachment, 
fondness, contentment, appreciation and gratitude. Georges, in his account, expressed a muted 
appreciation as he contrasted his experiences in Germany to his experiences in Canada:  
Then I came here, I applied to come to Canada, I had different options, I chose Canada. I 
think it was a good choice. Far from Africa, compared to others, but… And after 3 
months I found my first job, and I’m still there today.[…] I used to live in Germany, you 
don’t see like a lot of people from different nationalities, and then, you’re at the airport 
[in Toronto], you see like, Indian, Black immigration officers—it’s different. From the 
beginning, from the airport, you can see it’s different. […]Umm, hmmm, I belong to 
Canada, I have no choice now. It’s different when people come here, as an immigrant, 
voluntary, but I came here as a refugee. I had no options. 
 
Georges’ narrative embodies the ambiguity of belonging/non-belonging. As a refugee who 
cannot return to Rwanda, he has “no options”, thus he must, if he is to make a life and establish a 
world for himself and his family, come to terms with the nation that he has made his home. 
Those terms are not glowing, rapturous words of “love” or “greatness”, but rather a quiet 
appreciation for the fact that the institutionally inscribed multiculturalism bears itself out in the 
visibility of non-white people in civil service positions. Yet, his narrative also points out his 
agency in the process as he emphasizes that he rapidly found work and has continued to work for 
the same organization for well over a decade. This points to his ability to make himself valuable 
as a worker/employee. In a neo-liberal society where only those who work in the formal labour 
market are deemed deserving of full citizenship, Georges is thus asserting his worth and merit, 
thus his deservedness of full citizenship.  
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 The third narrative of attachment or belonging that emerged was an explicit appreciation 
for the civil liberties that are constitutionally enshrined in Canada but not afforded in the 
remembered homeland. In these accounts, the affective attachment was rooted in the individual 
possibilities that civil liberties afford. Thus, Bernard explained that he was attached to the idea of 
Canada because: 
first of all the rights of the people, its different than in Rwanda—people have their rights 
to speak—freedom of speech, right? It’s totally different back home, in Africa in general, 
but the right to right to speech…. I’m a Canadian, I’m proud of it. Yeah. Whenever I go 
with a Canadian passport, I feel I’m proud so, yeah, I love it. Even if you pass on the 
airport you feel okay. So many people they don’t have that opportunity to be Canadian, I 
get it. I’m really proud. Actually, I’m proud of being Canadian, being Rwandan-
Canadian, I’m proud of it. 
 
 Here the emphasis is less on the institutional opportunities or advantages, and more explicitly 
stated as a sense of relief. The narrative of pride is based on the fact that the speaker no longer 
has to fear saying the wrong thing or being detained illegally. Jean likewise expressed his 
appreciation of this dynamic thus:  “I haven’t been to other countries where I am so accepted, 
[...] you can do anything, as long as you are, you know, you are doing your own thing, not doing 
bad things like, you know, you are not breaking the law, you know? But here you can work, you 
can study, you can do business, you can start a church like this one, you know, you can do 
anything.” These accounts do not negate that there is racialization, racism and exclusion, but 
they express that these exclusions are mediated by the perceived rule of law and equality before 
the law. Christophe, having spent his whole life in Rwanda, expressed his approval of: 
a good country that respects human rights, so I mean also the freedom of expression 
where you cannot see politicians, I was going to say politicians who are not in tension, 
but there is a tension among politicians everywhere, but here, Canada, is one of the first 
world countries, you know, like to take me back to what I was saying, diversity. Diversity 
in the sense of ideas, where you have people from a different political party, but they still 
sit together in the parliament and discuss the issues that constitute the interests, the 
interests of all Canadians, but I don’t think we have reached that point, of course this is in 
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comparison with where I came from, Africa, generally speaking, where, uhh, the 
opposition is regarded as a threat to the government, not an asset. So this is different here, 
so the opposition actually is, let’s say the opposition leader is someone who is very, a 
VIP, who the government has an obligation to take care of. So that’s where, that’s how I 
see Canada, a country of great opportunity, a country that everybody who would wish to 
come.  
 
This explanation seems laudatory of Canadian political institutions, but in fact reveals the 
speaker’s disappointment that his remembered homeland has not “reached that point”. More 
explicitly so, Olivia frames her emotional response to “Canada” in terms of her experiences in 
Rwanda as:  
I came here as a stranger, I came here a different colour, I came here as completely 
different. I wouldn’t be surprised if someone discriminates me, because I’ve been 
discriminated by my own people anyways. I grew up where I couldn’t access public 
school, I couldn’t access good public jobs, I couldn’t access anything. My parents 
struggled to pay my private schooling, because Tutsis weren’t allowed to go to public 
school. So, it would hurt me less, if a white person, or a person of another colour 
discriminates me because I was discriminated with my own people, so.  
 
Her response is a wary expectation of harm because she had been socialized to extreme 
exclusion. Her account also offers a clue into how the other participants can express love for a 
nation-state that offers them a mediated and often partial sense of belonging. The long 
habituation to a repressive state system and highly exclusionary politics impart a rosy glow onto 
Canada, yet the participants in this study where not unaware of the contradictions inherent in 
their welcome.  
 Beyond asserting their worth to be citizens, in speaking of “love” for Canada, the 
participants in this study were also responding to the newest articulations of the multiculturalism 
discourse, as many expressed an awareness that they are perceived as potentially dangerous 
outsiders, as subsequent sections will demonstrate. As of 1997/8, the federal government 
reframed the focus of multicultural policy to “fostering a society that recognizes, respects, and 
reflects a diversity of cultures such that people from all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging 
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and attachment to Canada” (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002, 113). This re-articulation, with its 
focus on “attachment to Canada” was a response to emerging (unsubstantiated) criticisms that 
multiculturalism was weakening national unity. These critiques have only proliferated in the 
2000s, and new migrants cannot help but be aware of the insistence that their first allegiance be 
to their new homeland, otherwise they are perceived as acting in a divisive manner. Indeed, one 
needs only to read the majority of comments under any news article addressing migrants in 
Canada to understand that migrants are to assimilate and be grateful. Thus, when my participants 
insisted upon their “love” for Canada, they were both expressing a genuine affective response, as 
well as responding to a discourse which posits them as deviant if they fail to make this assertion. 
They risk being perceived as “radical” and their youth as “at risk” if they fail to clearly articulate 
their attachment to the new homeland. As perpetual others, they are well aware of the scrutiny 
that they are under. Despite a changing political culture in the post-9/11 Canada, I do not need to 
assert “love” for Canada, as it is assumed by any interlocutors that I feel affection and 
attachment to my homeland (even if that were not true), but a racialized group like Rwandan 
migrants must abide by the public script, or risk facing outright hostility and having their place in 
the nation questioned and possibly revoked.  
 
 
The Role of Migration Stories in Creating a Shared Narrative  
The decision to leave one’s homeland, even in the midst of violence and the threat of 
imminent death, is never an easy one. One faces unknown languages, cultures, isolation from 
one’s friends and family, the possibility of personal and financial defeat, psychological stress and 
anxiety, marginalization in the new host society…Yet, for the participants in this study, the 
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decision to leave, and the decision to choose Canada as a new home, granted them a sense of 
safety and security. This point was repeated often, as a statement of fact. Diane’s unequivocal 
claim that “When I came, I felt peace and protected” exemplifies the degree to which a sense of 
day to day insecurity was a motivating factor and the concomitant relief that settling in Canada 
provided. The sense of security usually refers to physical integrity, as Olivia explained that:  
I wasn’t given any other choices, it was the first choice which presented to me, so uhh, 
but I think it would be my first choice, but at that time, I did not have many choices, I had 
to save myself because I was going to the point where I wasn’t doing really well with the 
post-traumatic disorder, and then you’re being revictimized and you’re facing these 
people who were trying to kill you, you have these nightmares every day, and they are 
writing you notes saying hey we’re gonna kill you anyways, blah, blah blah. [takes a deep 
breath] It was very difficult, so I did not have much choice to stay. 
 
Others understood the idea of security more broadly when they pointed out that migrating 
and settling in Canada ensured that they no longer had to worry if they would have enough to eat 
the next day. Jean-Paul explained that he was “looking for greener pastures, I guess, I was trying 
to see if I could get a place where my life is assured, I have safety for living, I have cash for 
tomorrow, I know what I will eat the next week or whatever, like, yeah. That kind of thing I was 
looking for, some better kind of life.” Like other migrants who flee violence, those who migrated 
from Rwanda to Canada did so to find a peaceful home. Yet, also like others, they wanted to 
ensure themselves and their families a better future with greater economic opportunities.  
The decision to leave was not an easy one for any of the participants who discussed it at 
length, but the choice to migrate to Canada, provided that they had a choice, seems to have been 
more straightforward. Jean explained that “I chose Canada because, as I said, I was a refugee for 
more than 10 years, and I didn’t have any, you know, acceptance in the country where I was, 
even though I was in Africa, but I was not accepted as one of them. But here, in just three years I 
was able to be a citizen, to study, to work, to contribute to the Canadian society.” Others, 
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especially those who migrated in the 1980s, stated that Canada was the only country willing to 
accept them as refugees. Implicit in this is both an expression of gratitude that there was a place 
for them in Canada, as well as a condemnation of the African states that denied citizenship to 
refugees. Those who expressed their status claims in this manner were calling upon a 
cosmopolitan narrative of universal human rights and the fundamental human need for dignity. 
Yet, even as they used a rights discourse, they still expressed heartfelt gratitude for entry to 
Canada. In the midst of a long discussion of the structural and institutional racism in Canadian 
immigration policy and multiculturalism, Olivia expressed that “I don’t even know how to 
express my gratitude to this nation.” The gratitude expressed here is genuine, and I do not wish 
to challenge its expression, yet the fact that so many participants expressed gratitude for being 
granted basic civil liberties and some basic social rights speaks to the fact that human rights are 
rarely understood as rights. Those who perceive themselves to be in a position to grant these 
rights understand them as a set of liberties that can be as easily revoked. Likewise, those who are 
the beneficiaries of these rights also know very well how tangential and uncertain they can be. 
Though these migrants chose Canada as their destination, they are also perpetually aware of the 
need to not express entitlement to precisely those rights that, as citizens, they ought to be 
entitled.  
The initial shock of arriving in Canada was often expressed in the trope of one’s response 
to the weather in Canada. Very many, though not all, participants explained that they had never 
seen snow before arriving in Canada and they ruefully recounted their shock and awkward 
attempts to cope. “But when it came to September, October, by that time, it was snow, it was my 
first time to see snow, you know? And it meant I could go out and start catching, you know, 
picking it up, the snow, the whole thing, I was falling down, I slip, I didn’t know what to do” 
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(Jean).  André explained that the first winter was “very dramatic” as there were only two other 
Rwandans that he could find, but for a long time he saw no other blacks. That first winter he did 
not know how to cope with weather as he overdressed and nearly passed out from heat 
exhaustion indoors. He fondly recalled the vision of “Two black men walking like they are on 
the moon” in order to not fall on the ice. Others recalled arriving in the summer and being 
stunned by the heat and humidity. One participant was settled in Windsor where he recalled that 
it was “very hot, humid, very humid”, as Windsor tends to be in June. He began job searching 
wearing a “nice tie even when it is so hot.” In recalling this story he laughed at the younger 
version of himself who insisted on wearing a suit and tie in the midst of a Windsor summer, 
“sweating in Canada like crazy!” Simon also recounted a weather tale: 
I remember when the plane was landing, I started panicking, because I never saw snow 
before. And I’m looking down, it was completely, white, I thought it was water. And 
people, I look at them, they are laughing, talking, and for me, I was so nervous—I’m 
wondering what’s happening, are we landing on a lake. I couldn’t take it, I had to talk to 
someone. I said “what’s going on?” “Why?” “We are landing on water!” “It’s not water, 
it’s snow” [laughs].  
 
These stories, fashioned into humorous anecdotes, bore the mark of many re-tellings. They had 
clearly been shared with many a friend and family member and had taken on a quality of myth. 
These (tall?) tales were these individuals’ personal pieces of Canadiana. They too were markers 
of belonging, because, after all, which Canadian does not have a story or two of extreme 
weather?  
Yet, alongside these claims of belonging, were narratives of alienation, isolation and 
individual struggle in the face of a new culture and society. Migration is never easy, but the 
stress and challenges that it poses can be magnified or diminished, depending on the conditions 
that one encounters upon arrival. Many of the participants in this study expressed their loneliness 
in the months and years following migration. Jean, who above expressed his appreciation for the 
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life that he had been able to build, explained that he faced “culture shock” when he migrated. 
New climate, new foods, and new language often amount to what has been ambiguously termed 
“culture shock”. One’s psychological and emotional classificatory systems are inadequate to 
fully apprehend and explain the unusual, uncomfortable, new world. Yet, there is a particularity 
to Jean’s “culture shock” which does not fit a universal account of migration. He moved to 
Alberta and “it was hard because at that time that was when I still needed, I was feeling 
homesick, you know, I wanted to go, because there at that time, no Rwandese community there. 
Very few Africans, I remember I used to pass in the street one in Calgary, there, you know, as an 
African, we would greet each other without knowing each other” (Jean). He traveled to visit 
Toronto and “I found it was quite different, I found people of different culture, people of 
different background, people from Rwanda, Burundi, so I felt here, even when I came from 
Calgary, I told my friends there that I’m coming to Toronto to visit, just to visit then I will go 
back, but when I arrived here, that’s when I saw my people, I said I’m not going back” (Jean). 
Those whom Jean identified as “my people” where those who likewise identified as Rwandan or 
Burundian, those who shared a national cosmology and a language, yet, they were complete 
strangers.  
André likewise recounted initially settling in Edmonton and feeling lost and alone, 
seeking out the few black faces in the crowds, but, when he travelled to Toronto to visit an 
acquaintance, he found that “there were Africans” and chose to settle in Toronto. The 
significance of both these narratives is that both men settled in the late 1980s and early 1990s in 
Western Canada, which, until the latter 1990s, did not have significant groups of African 
migrants. Both men expressed a sense of relief at finding greater numbers of African migrants in 
the GTA. It is most useful to contrast these accounts with the account of Richard, who initially 
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settled in a small town in New Brunswick. There, in a small community of about “eleven 
thousand very warm people,” Richard felt welcomed and included. Even though there were only 
2 black men (himself included) in the town, he expressed that “I wish the economy wasn’t so 
bad—really I would not have moved to Toronto” (Richard). When I asked if moving to New 
Brunswick from Africa was a culture shock, he replied that it “Was not! Surprising, and again, 
because of the travelling you do, I did, rather, anyone who travels will testify to this—you learn 
to adjust, you learn to accommodate, actually take people and learn from where you are at” 
(Richard). All three men settled in cities that had small numbers of those racialized as black, but 
only two of the three felt this as isolating and marginalizing. Richard’s recollection that the 
people of his new town were warm and welcoming stands in stark contrast to the accounts of 
culture shock above. It appears that the shock was less about confronting unfamiliar 
environments, and more about how the people in those new environments classified and 
categorized these newcomers. Indeed, André explicitly stated that the isolation from Canadian 
society knit the Rwandese diaspora closer together.  
Very many in the Rwandese diaspora community in the GTA expressed the common 
theme of facing depression in the first few years after migration. Bernard recalled that “When I 
came, I feel like going back home. The first year was very hard. Very, very hard. Stressful, I got 
depressed, to interact, to integrate, it was so hard, so hard. It takes time, it takes time… but still, I 
had my family, I had my sister, I had my cousins, I had my aunt, a big number of people, but I 
felt it.” Likewise, Janvier expressed that in the first six months “I felt so low and I wanted to 
leave this country”. Olivia explained the causes of the depression among so many new migrants 
thus: 
You go there, there’s many losses, you come from a country where you’re somebody and 
you come here you’re absolutely nobody. It does something, psychologically, and, and 
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besides, you are traumatized from what you went through, so now you have to manage all 
those loses, you lost family, you lost your properties, now you’re losing your country, but 
where you’re going, umm, you, you losing identity altogether […]And I can tell you that 
by the time a newcomer comes here, especially those who come here as refugees, by the 
time you go through your immigration process and this and that, by the time you get a 
job, by the time you do this, five years later you, you’re done. The ambition you came 
with, depression, guilt of being a loser, because you came here with these ambitions—to 
go to school, to do this, to go to work, to make money and to contribute to society, but 
then you meet all the systemic barriers in terms of not being able to go to school because 
you don’t have your immigration papers yet, and not being able to hold a job in your 
career because no one, your, your, your diploma or credentials are not accepted here, but 
there’s less willingness or services to upgrade your credentials, also if you are willing to 
do so. So there’s so many barriers, by the time you spend five years here, low income, no 
job, or, or, or, labour, or trade, or low, whatever it is, whatever the situation is, and 
disconnection from your community, you, you, you’re basically not productive as you 
would, would have done, if your integration has been done in a very nice way (Olivia). 
 
Olivia explicitly pointed out the institutional barriers faced by new migrants as the causes of both 
psychological stress and depression, as well as a loss of actual productivity. In this analysis, the 
very system that is ostensibly designed to integrate newcomers in order to spur economic growth 
has the outcome of marginalizing them and reducing their productivity due to an overall decline 
in health. Olivia’s observations affirm what many scholars have reported about new migrants. As 
Bierman, Ahmad and Mawani report, new migrants “have better than average health on arrival”, 
but, over time, immigrants with non-European origins “were more likely to report a change from 
good, very good or excellent health to fair or poor health” (2009, 112). Precisely as Olivia 
observed, individual factors such as exposure to violence and traumatic events, as well as 
community factors such as discrimination, lack of recognition of credentials, and social 
dependence all play a role in affecting new migrants’ health outcomes for the worse (Bierman et 
al. 2009, 112-120).  
 Another significant factor in the well-being of new migrants is their access, or lack 
thereof, to their own families. Many families have to deal with extensive periods of separation 
due to the increased difficulty in sponsoring family under Canada’s immigration policies. As 
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Peter S. Li has demonstrated, “there is no doubt that the government places a higher premium on 
independent or economic immigrants because they are deemed to bring a greater economic value 
to Canada than those admitted under family class or the refugee class” (2003, 43). As a 
consequence, it has become increasingly difficult to sponsor family members in the family-class, 
leaving many families in limbo for years. Grace’s children were adolescents at the time of her 
migration as a refugee to Canada. Since then, they have grown into adults, but she has been 
unable to witness this as “it is not easy to bring them because to sponsor them, it is not easy” 
(Grace). Her separation from the children was a significant burden for her as she had to choose 
between raising them and supplying herself with anti-retroviral medications. Her choice, which 
was really not much of a choice, meant that she could not see her children as her new homeland, 
which had assured her physical well-being, denied her psychological and emotional well-being 
by not enabling her to sponsor her children.  
 Those who wished to have their family visit them in Canada faced increased scrutiny as 
African visa applicants are very commonly denied, more so than other groups, based on 
anecdotal evidence (Tettey and Puplampu 2005, 35). A 2009 internal Canada Border Services 
report warned that Canada could face increasing numbers of African migrants as the European 
Union had stepped up its policing of African migrants who will “take advantage of generous 
social programs and a ‘sympathetic’ refugee processing system” (O’Neil 2009). This fear has a 
long history in Canada’s immigration policies, which are still “neo-racist”  and thus defined by 
the following features: “constrained access to immigration officers and difficulties with 
application procedures in certain countries; an attempt to link crime with immigration, and by 
extension, an entire ethnic group; labour market segmentation in which the ethnics occupy the 
bottom rungs of wages and benefits, despite their qualifications and skills” (Tettey and Puplampu 
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2005, 33). As of 1998 there were only 8 Immigration Offices on the whole continent of Africa; 
since then the numbers have increased to 20 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada), but potential 
migrants must still face the stereotypical view among Canadian immigration officials that all 
Africans are economic refugees and potential burdens on the social safety net (Tettey and 
Puplampu 2005, 34). This racial profiling leads to high rates of rejection of visitor visas for 
Africans. In 2010 a Halifax-based African aid group was denied travel visas for eight of their 
African colleagues to travel to Canada to attend and teach at a conference. Despite letters from 
MPs, assurances that the Gambians in question have families and jobs in Gambia, then 
Immigration Minister Jason Kenney denied their request on the grounds of fears of illegal 
migrants (Foot 2010). Among the Rwandan diaspora in the GTA this relatively higher risk of 
denial of entry means that attempting to have a family member visit bears a very high emotional, 
psychological and financial cost. Revocata explained that she had witnessed how easily migrants 
from other regions were able to attain visas for their loved ones, and that her difficulty in 
attaining the same reminded her that she did not belong and that her family was viewed as a 
threat, not as welcome tourists.  
 
 
Keeping Families Together  
 The families that had been able to sponsor loved ones, especially elderly parents, 
encountered new obstacles. Elderly community members often ended up very isolated as they 
lacked daily interaction with anyone outside of their nuclear families. Those families, despite 
their best efforts, could not offer sufficient interaction as usually both heads of the family worked 
and any children/grandchildren spent most of their days at school, leaving the elderly 
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parent/grandparent alone for most of the day. This contrasted sharply with the remembered 
experiences of “back home”. Many participants expressed that one of the things that they missed 
most about life in Rwanda was the close community bonds. As Christophe explained, back 
home, neighbours and friends “just drop in, they don’t have to ask you, so... how are you, how 
was your day? You know you have that, that, that connection to people around 24 hours seven” 
(Christophe). While in the GTA, “emotionally, it’s challenging because you live here by yourself 
[…]You go near your home, you do what you have to do, you watch T.V., you  go to bed, so, but 
back home it’s not like that” (Christophe). Olivia agreed with this sentiment and articulated that 
“sometimes I feel like it’s not pleasant to be a senior in this country [laughs self-consciously], as 
much as I support them and I try my best, they live in isolation and back home I know social life 
is more, people are more close, communities more close.” The new social norms of greater 
individual autonomy coupled with the geographic dispersal of those who identified as Rwandan 
in the GTA led to very little social interaction for elderly community members. The diaspora 
community in the GTA had attempted to remedy this situation by hosting social events in an 
effort to “cater to our older parents because they lose that social connection” (Angelina). Despite 
these efforts, the day to day lives of the elderly parents in the community were marked with 
isolation and marginalization due to a lack of services directed at elderly migrants. The anxiety 
about the treatment of senior citizens and the presumed more favorable conditions in Rwanda 
mirror attitudes held by other African migrant groups. Tettey and Puplampu, in their extensive 
study of the new African diaspora in Canada, also found that many African-Canadians contrast:  
the perceived anomie and loneliness of old age in Canada, in general, with the imagined 
emotional succor that elderly people in Africa enjoy through the constant flow of 
interactions with friends and extended family. It is worth acknowledging that the reality 
in Africa is slowly shifting away from this ideal, nostalgic image ingrained in people’s 
minds as modernity creates changes in African social structures, and as families begin to 
experience trends similar to what these African-Canadians are worried about (2005, 154).  
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Thus, even as families struggled to meet the complex needs of elderly parents, the remembered 
homeland was, in this regard, increasingly a fiction, especially since in many of the cases the 
reason that the family sought to sponsor their elderly parents was because there was no longer an 
extended family to care for them in Rwanda.  
 
 
Raising Children in the Host/Homeland  
 Another unanticipated challenge that those who identified as Rwandan faced in Canada 
was the loss of the extended family to share child-rearing responsibility. Gillian Creese, in her 
study of the new African diaspora in Vancouver (2011), found that many of those who identified 
as African also lamented the new challenges in raising their children. As Creese recounts, the 
mythical idealized African family offered childcare, social connection and moral training. In 
Canada, new migrants argued that the lack of the extended family “can make the family very 
dysfunctional” (Interview quoted in Creese 2011, 152), and intensified the child-rearing 
responsibilities of the conjugal family, thus adding new stressors. These new stressors were 
borne largely by women who: 
experienced the brunt of increased parenting duties and other domestic work in 
Vancouver, as well as new forms of isolation in the absence of a more communal 
environment in which to accomplish these tasks. Isolation from neighbours, cooking 
indoors instead of outside, keeping doors locked, and always having to be physically 
present with youngsters were difficult aspects of women’s lives (Creese 2011, 153).  
 
Theodosia, like the African women in Vancouver, explained that child-rearing norms in Canada 
posed new challenges. She clarified that: “I think it’s busy with most of the parents, especially 
here where you don’t have like, umm, a, family looking after your kids. Like back home, that’s 
one thing I actually enjoy. Back home I have family looking after kids, you are able to go out, to 
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have your social life, but here it’s not easy” (Theodosia). Coping with a double work day, as well 
as being the sole caregivers to children, causes significant stress for parents, especially among 
those who belonged to the middle class in Rwanda where they could afford domestic help, along 
with child care from relatives.  
Beyond the loss of class-based privilege, the absence of an extended family means that 
the conjugal family is wholly responsible for language and cultural training as well. As many in 
the study sheepishly admitted, they tried to teach their children Kinyarwanda, but English ended 
up being the language most commonly spoken in the home because it was the children’s first 
language and “When I want things to go faster, I speak in English” (Theodosia). The parents 
often recognized that the children were struggling balancing being simultaneously Canadian and 
Rwandan. Angelina explained this tension in the home thus:  
My children, as opposed to me, they are born here. They are really true true Canadians, 
right? They don’t even have the minor accent, like we have. They feel truly, strongly 
Canadians. They even tell, us as parents, they tell “I’m Canadian—you guys came from 
Rwanda….” It’s like we’re divided. It’s how they’re socialized, I guess. They think of 
themselves as more Canadian than us because we speak a different language in our 
household, and we blend in the two cultures […] When we went with them this summer 
to Rwanda, they seemed lost. Once they don’t speak the language, the culture is even 
weird to them (Angelina). 
Bernard identified the same dynamic when he articulated that: 
I speak Kinyarwanda, but his mom is fluent in English, you know?  She talks in English, 
she studied here, but I try, because when kids go back home, because sometime they will 
want to see where their fathers are from, and they find it very hard to know what people 
are talking about, they are the odd man out—they don’t even understand what’s going on. 
For example, we used to have like a dance here. But if we meet we speak totally 
Kinyarwanda. So the kids, they find themselves out of the community (Bernard).  
The parents in these cases expressed an internal struggle as they wished for their children to have 
the rights of full citizenship and the concomitant sense of belonging in their new home, but they 
also feared that the new home might prove unwelcoming and the children would need to have a 
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back-up plan, so to speak. Angelina explained that “we worry about them, having to face some 
barriers, if things don’t change. You hope for the best, but they could be there, some people are 
not fully, umm, fully, educated around acceptance, around different race….” Theodosia stated 
this point most explicitly when she argued that “If you don’t belong here and you don’t belong 
there, then you belong where? You are nowhere. But once you know that you belong, you have 
your identity as Rwandese, then it’s not gonna break your heart when people tell you those 
stories, you are negro, you are this, you are that, you have accent, whatever.” The children in this 
community, whether they were born in Canada or in Rwanda, face conflicting value systems as 
the ideas they are taught at school and in the playground do not neatly fit with the ideas that their 
parents offer. Rather than embody the easy hybridity that is often assumed of second generation 
migrants, these children must navigate often murky terrain between competing cultural scripts 
and expectations, and between competing national cosmologies that shape their day to day lives. 
The discussion of youth experiences from the previous chapter illustrated this dynamic as those 
who had grown up here felt pulled in opposing directions.  
Another source of anxiety for parents in the GTA diaspora group was the perceived 
excessive freedoms of children. As Puplampu and Tettey have observed, “many African-
Canadian families complain about the fact that they are sanctioned for bringing up their children 
in the African way which, in the uni-dimensional system defined by mainstream society, is 
construed as backward and abusive […which] has led to a clash between Africans and Canadian 
state institutions” (2005, 40). Creese also observed that the pathologization of the African family 
“can lead to more intensive scrutiny of African immigrant families” by police or social services 
(2011, 151). While I did not hear of any families being directly involved with Family and 
Children’s Services, I did hear the fear of this state institution resonating through parents’ 
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narratives of the struggles of raising their children. Bernard narrated a story he had heard from 
another parent about such an encounter:  
That’s mean they give them too much freedom and then you can’t, there’s an extent, you 
can’t even talk to them. So there’s no respect there. You see, they give them their 
freedom, they misuse it. Always when I got to work I visit the shops, and I was talking to 
a father who had two kids, his son, he used to bite him and his sister, the father got tired 
of this so you know what he did? He took his son and bite him so that what happened, the 
mother called the police [chuckles]. So many people they are concerned because they 
say, that’s not your right, because you have to watch your kids and they say what you do 
is wrong. The mother said “my husband is abusing my son” she told the story and the 
police took him. And when they caught, they charged him, for six months he was in jail. 
Imagine! (Bernard) 
Implicit in this narrative is the assumption that the state grants excessive rights and privileges to 
children, while the parents are under surveillance and are not free to parent according to their 
values. This is usually narratively juxtaposed against the imagined freedom that parents have in 
Rwanda to raise their children as they see fit. Jean also voiced this anxiety when he expressed 
that “the culture I grew up there is, you have to, you know, to behave like our father, your 
grandfather […] But here kids are different, you know? They have to, that’s what they are taught 
in school if your daddy does this and that to call 911 or if your parents don’t do this and that 
report to a teacher, so, we have to be careful in the way you approach them, because they have 
their rights” (Jean). While this study was not focused on parenting strategies so I cannot 
extrapolate larger arguments from the evidence above, it is interesting to note that only fathers 
expressed the fear of state surveillance, while mothers’ anxieties focused more on the children’s 
capacity to cope with conflicting cultural scripts. This may be a product of the overall increased 
state surveillance of black male bodies, expressed in this case in a fear for their children’s well-
being.  
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 Both fathers cited above also expressed trepidation about “stranger danger” and the 
inability of children to move around freely that it implied. Bernard explained that when he and 
his children visited Rwanda, the children “have freedom—they find other kids who know the 
city and go with them, so a sort of freedom which is not here”, which stood in stark contrast to 
the streets of Toronto, where “you don’t know what will happen, somebody can come take your 
kid.” When I pursued the point, Bernard explained that the difference lies in the fact that in 
Toronto “there are so many strangers around, it’s harder to befriend people, because it’s a 
multicultural city, people are different, totally different.” The multiculturalism that is so publicly 
lauded as the virtue of Toronto here is re-framed as a source of tension and anxiety. The 
assumption here is that one can trust those who are similar to oneself, but the cultural differences 
of the other are read as dangerous, especially to children. Jean also expressed a similar anxiety 
when he explained that “I talk to someone, you know, they fear here much, yeah like here, my 
kids can go to the neighbours and play with them, back in Rwanda I meant, they can go to 
neighbours and play with them, but here you have to always be with your kids to know where 
they go, to follow them, to bring them back to school, you know.” Both fathers voiced unease 
about state surveillance of their actions and parenting strategies, and, simultaneously, over the 
lack of care/attention that their children merited in public spaces, generating the perception that 
they may be vulnerable to violence. This exemplifies the position of racialized people in 
Canada—on one hand, subject to surveillance and pathologized, on the other, neglected and 
subjected to violence. As Rinaldo Walcott argues, “blackness in Canada is situated on a 
continuum that runs from invisible to hyper-visible” (2003, 44), and these two men find 
themselves, at different moments, on both ends.   
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Families and New Gender Regimes 
The new anxieties and stresses that migration brought were often compounded by new 
gender regimes in the host/homeland. Mostly women spoke of the new tensions in the nuclear 
family and their consequences, one of which had been the dissolution of many marriages. Olivia, 
a single mother of two, articulated that the loss of social and economic capital upon migration is 
harder for men to bear because “men lose a sense of their manhood. As a woman, you have no 
choice—you have to move so your children can survive here. Women are more integrated and 
have more opportunities and they grab at those opportunities.” Because women had been 
socialized to expect less from life, they were less devastated by the losses that migration brought 
and thus willing to take on survival jobs in order to support their families. New domestic 
responsibilities put added stress on the partnerships, as there was no extended family to share 
childrearing duties and domestic help, easily accessible to the middle-class in Rwanda, was no 
longer an option. Thus, women were faced with the double day and, in many instances, could not 
rely on their partners to help with the new pressures. Connie explained this dynamic thus:  
Outside, in Rwandese culture, the women are so, they are still think, they are down the 
men domination. And when it mixed with Canadian culture, we have many problems in 
marriages. That is a big issue. So, you come from work, you go home, you have to cook, 
you have to clean the house, take care of the children, and the husband is there watching 
T.V. and you come from work. And he comes home, instead of helping you, he watch 
T.V., and when you talk about the T.V., when you ask him why he cannot help you—
‘I’m a Rwandese man’. In Rwanda, men come from work, give the money for the stuff at 
home, and then sit home, watch the T.V., and you make the food for him, wash the 
clothes, and that’s it—he’s a king there. But many women are facing that problem, and 
the big problem is that they don’t talk about [it] (Connie).  
 
Connie’s explanation, echoed by many other women, identified two key changes in the 
partnership. Firstly, she pointed out that Rwandese women were subject to men’s domination, 
even after arrival, and this dynamic was understood by Connie, and many other women in the 
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community, as a troubling dynamic. Olivia also expressed patriarchal domination in the 
household as a problem in itself when she explained that in Rwanda men often preferred less 
educated wives, because “when you were very educated in the country [Rwanda], you were 
having a hard time to getting a husband, because there is a degree that you would challenge 
them, you are more elite, and uh, you might not want to settle with some of the treatment that 
you see, so you risk of not getting married, because no one wants to go with you with a Master’s 
degree or with a Doctorate.” Yet, both she and Connie understand the need for women to gain an 
education and to participate fully in both their households and in the community. Secondly, 
Connie explained that the new expectations within the household were borne largely by women 
because the domestic tasks of survival are presumed to be the women’s role. Yet, these same 
women were now carrying the burden of working in the formal economy as well as in the 
domestic economy, and were run ragged.  
Increasingly, women who would have stayed in a bad marriage out of necessity in 
Rwanda had the ability to leave that situation and did not necessarily face homelessness or 
hunger in their new host/homeland. Their survival was not compromised, and they felt safe. As 
Angelina explained, a woman may not have “a lot of money, but at least there is a way--she can 
do some odd jobs, and she can have some housing and she can see her kids in a better support 
here” (Angelina). Women perceived their new host/homeland to offer them greater autonomy 
and dignity, even as the new pressures broke down marriages, and often left them as single 
mothers. As Angelina explicitly stated, “Your dignity is preserved here. Some of them put 
themselves through school, and got better jobs as well, they feel empowered” (Angelina). This 
echoes what Creese found among the African migrants in Vancouver, where “for women, new 
models of spousal partnership provided spaces for greater autonomy within the family that most 
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women strove to attain” (2011, 155-6), even as they lacked the family and community networks 
that they had had access to in the homeland. 
The above narrative of marital discord was a common refrain that I heard from many 
participants, especially women. The perceived difference in gendered expectations was usually 
held up as the casual factor in marital dissolution. Yet, given the prevalence of gender-based 
violence in Rwanda and in Canada, it is hard to believe that there was no gender-based violence 
among the Rwandese diaspora in the GTA. However, none of my participants raised the issue of 
gender-based violence, which suggests that it remained sufficiently taboo that few spoke of it 
within the community. There is also the possibility that those who spoke to me about marital 
dissolution chose to omit gender-based violence from the narrative in order to avoid further 
pathologizing African families. Nonetheless, a study focusing on wife assault in Toronto’s 
African immigrant and refugee community found that: 
African Canadians who are most vulnerable to wife abuse share the following 
characteristics: they are recent immigrants to Canada; come from a ‘home country’ with a 
violent and tumultuous recent history; are relatively young (below 35 years of age); are 
the mothers of one to three children; have been sponsored by their spouses but are still 
individually recognized as landed immigrants or refugees; and have an annual family 
income of less than $30,000, to which the woman contributes less than the husband” 
(Musisi and Mukta’s 1992 study discussed in Cottrell, Tastsoglou and Moncayo 2009, 
74). 
 
Many of the participants fit into all, or nearly all the conditions cited above, suggesting that it is 
highly likely that gender-based violence was a significant factor in the marital discord in the 
community. However, given that my study focused on identity, and not family/marital 
relationships, it is impossible to draw conclusive arguments. Nonetheless, research conducted 
among other migrant groups indicates that migration and the subsequent stressors, including the 
loss of the male breadwinner model, contributes to increased risk of gender-based violence 
(Kulig 1994; Morash et. al 2000; Tang and Oatley 2002; Jiwani 2005).    
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 Men also struggled with the new gender regimes that they encountered in the new 
host/homeland. Olivia argued that men who migrated to Canada “were somebody back home”, 
and the loss of status compounded the loss of family, property, and belonging. Likewise, among 
the African diaspora in Vancouver, “men, on the other hand, were challenged to give up some of 
their authority, fundamentally redefining their concepts of masculinity. Some men readily 
accepted the new partnership model of masculinity, but many more lamented their wives’ 
changing expectations” (Creese 2011, 156). I encountered a number of men within the 
community who had renegotiated domestic duties in order to achieve a more equitable balance of 
labour in the household. Richard spoke of this process implicitly when he narrated his 
professional and personal trajectory over the last 15 years. He explained that he had achieved a 
satisfying career in an industry that he really liked, but when he and his wife chose to have 
children, he chose to move to another company where his position was not as satisfying, but he 
had greater flexibility and was able to be home with his kids much more.  The wife was the 
primary breadwinner in the family and the husband was the primary caretaker of the children. 
Yet, despite his choice to sacrifice his career in order to be more present with his children, he 
seemed to still feel the need to justify his decision and to explain to me, an outside observer, that 
these were his choices and the rewards that he gets from them, suggesting perhaps that his 
decision is not universally understood or appreciated. Though there were a number of men like 
Richard who had chosen to split the domestic labour and child-rearing duties more equitably 
with their partners, there were many who, faced with new expectations and a re-negotiation of 
power in the household, chose to leave the family unit and return to Rwanda.  While I did not 
speak to anyone who had made this decision, I did speak to a few former partners of these men 
who, with some bitterness, felt that the choices made by these men were self-serving, as the 
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women were now single mothers with the full financial, emotional and psychological 
responsibility for their children. I also heard, from others, that these single mothers rarely got any 
child support from a former partner once he had returned to Rwanda. Nonetheless, many of the 
women expressed that “I don’t want to go to Rwanda where I won’t have any voice there, the 
next thing he is just driving me to his own place only, and I can’t even come back, I may not 
even have a ticket to come back here. No, I’m not going there” (Angelina). It appeared that, 
despite the significantly increased labour and social isolation of migration, women in the 
community coped better than men. By and large, Olivia’s claim that women in the community 
were more resilient because they had been socialized to expect less from life seemed to bear out 
in my findings.   
 
 
Confronting Multiculturalism  
 Although Multiculturalism, as a federal state policy, “remains obscure and the program 
content of multiculturalism is periodically modified”, it is perceived as appealing because it 
“symbolizes a tolerant feature of Canadian society that stands as an opposite to what most 
Canadians believe to be a strong pressure to conform and assimilate in American society” (Li 
1999, 149). As an ideology, among Canadians there is general perception that “it is a desirable 
idea,” but no clarity about what it refers to or how it is enacted (Li 1999, 164). This very 
ambiguity, arguably intentionally fostered by state institutions which can fit all manner of 
meaning into the box labeled ‘Multiculturalism’, also leaves a space for individual interpretation. 
In conducting this study, I heard numerous interpretations of Canadian multiculturalism 
expressed by the participants in the study. Even as multiculturalism framed them as the eternal 
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other, those who identify as Rwandan in the GTA filled it with their own hopes and expectations 
for belonging. 
 Patrice juxtaposed Canadian multiculturalism to Rwandan monoculturalism as he 
explained that in Toronto he met “white people, Arab people, you know from other countries 
from Africa, and that’s something also about Toronto, there’s a lot of variety of people that you 
can meet. I meet all type of people, all type of ages. It is good, because I’m thinking I like that, I 
like new people” (Patrice). Patrice framed Canadian multiculturalism explicitly as encompassing 
greater plurality than just ethnic diversity when he identified “all type of people, all type of 
ages.” In his understanding, it is this very plurality which enables him to feel safe as he 
perceived that in Canada difference was not dangerous the way it had been in Rwanda. Indeed, 
he explained that the degree of plurality was protective, unlike in Rwanda where difference was 
cast as either Hutu or Tutsi and only those two ethnic identities were perceived as significant. 
Yet, even as he appreciated plurality, he was aware of the tensions between ostensibly different 
‘cultural’ groups as “I work with different type of people and when we go out, we cannot go 
together, because when we are together, some people feel so isolated, on the side, because they 
don’t like the music I listen to, or, they have different background, different life. When you live 
with them more, you enjoy with them, whenever you go out of work and share a drink, it’s a 
problem” (Patrice). Interestingly, he does not perceive the tensions between people of ostensibly 
different ethnic backgrounds in terms of a clash of cultures, but, rather, in more quotidian terms 
as divergent musical preferences, for example. Yet, these fractures are significant enough that 
they cause tension and “problems”, preventing a deeper interpersonal engagement outside of 
work.   
183 
 
 Like Patrice, Seraphine also identified plurality as a prominent and progressive feature of 
life in the GTA. She also contrasted this plurality to a monocultural society, when she stated that: 
“I love other, like diversity of people, I don’t like to be in one, uhh, because I value other people, 
I value other nations and we have uhh...one of the good things with Canada is that is has 
diversity of people, its multicultural, you meet people from other nations, whether you don’t 
know them, but you get a chance to connect with them, knowing you, ‘cause I love to know 
about other cultures” (Seraphine). The implicit contrast, stated in “I don’t like to be in one” 
(“one” referring to one culture/ethnicity) is to the remembered homeland, which, for Patrice and 
Seraphine, was extremely traumatic as they were both survivors of the genocide. Thus, for both 
of them, the plurality that they encountered was reassuring and comforting. In both their 
accounts, there lies the assumption that as long as they are one of many who are different, they 
will not be targeted as the group that is too different to tolerate, and be re-subjected to genocidal 
violence. Of course, this assumption ignores the genocidal history against Canada’s indigenous 
population, but it is a comforting notion to those who survived genocide elsewhere.   
 Christophe also lauded Canadian multiculturalism as he explained that in his workplace 
he encountered individuals from a variety of presumed ethnicities. Thus, “in my department I’m 
from Rwanda, I have another colleague from Eritrea, I have another colleague from Pakistan, 
another is from India, another one is from Jamaica, I have another one is from Filipino, so that 
kind of stuff. You know we enjoy it, we have the same kind of connection, we respect each 
other. Yeah we live it every day […] Yeah, yeah so that that tells you how diverse Toronto is” 
(Christophe). The absence in this litany of “diversity” was most striking to me—he did not 
mention any people from Europe, and all the ethno-national groups that he identified are 
racialized minorities in Canada. In this account of “diversity” whiteness is the background 
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against which his and his colleagues’ visible difference plays out. They are rendered different by 
virtue of non-belonging to the white majority group. This is actually an account of the manner in 
which racialization marks men and women who are understood as non-white as the visible 
externalized face of multiculturalism. It is also important to note that the workplace in question 
was a call-centre, which is generally a low-wage, low-skill workplace. Thus, Christophe’s 
account also demonstrates the degree to which the low-wage, low-skill service sector industry in 
the GTA is staffed by racialized people—a point I will return to later.  
 The inherent contradiction of multiculturalism as both including all manner of ethnic 
difference and only marking racialized peoples from the so-called Third World was articulated 
by Theodore. He explained that: 
But you know there are some people they are not uhh, I cannot call open-minded, they 
don’t understand that the country of Canada is big, that people from all over the place, so 
that’s why I have to explain myself. But someone who knows that this country belongs to 
everybody, like you came from Poland, I came from Africa, someone from India, 
together we build this country, so it doesn’t matter where we are from, or the, the colour 
of your skin, you know? We build this country together, so you have to explain to them 
and you have to understand them, that’s reality that people are facing” (Theodore).  
 
Interestingly, Theodore perceived that it was up to him, and other migrants like myself, to 
explain to those who are not “open-minded” what Canadian multiculturalism entailed. He did not 
see it as a completed project that granted space and belonging to all new migrants, but as an 
ongoing process necessitating patience and understanding on the part of the migrant. Rather than 
perceiving multiculturalism as having created space and understanding for him and his family, he 
understood it as his burden to expand and educate those who are not “open-minded”, or, in other 
words, the keepers of the nation. While many in the study expressed disappointment with the 
incomplete welcome extended to them, Theodore was unfazed by it, and happily took up the 
challenge of building the nation. This perspective stood in sharp contrast to Olivia’s earlier 
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account of migrants exhausting themselves trying to “to go to school, to do this, to go to work, to 
make money and to contribute to society, but then you meet all the systemic barriers in terms of 
not being able to go to school because you don’t have your immigration papers yet, and not 
being able to hold a job in your career because your diploma or credentials are not accepted 
here”. Partly, this difference in emotional response to the lack of welcome is attributable to the 
age at which one migrates, and therefore how much social capital one is able to acquire in the 
host/homeland. Olivia arrived as an adult with a family to support, while Theodore arrived as an 
adolescent and acquired his secondary and post-secondary education in Canada, making his 
professional goals more easily attainable. Thus, it is less surprising that Theodore had energy for 
nation-building, while Olivia was fatigued, though undaunted.  
 Probably the most interesting account of the complexity of Canadian identity and his 
place within it came from Simon: 
I cannot really define who is a Canadian, and uh, I don’t know how I can define who is a 
Canadian. Sometimes I can hear on the radio, people are discussing themselves about 
being Canadian, and people are so vocal about it, sometimes I see they are the ones who 
are minorities, and they are talking about my flag, the Canadian, but it’s not the majority. 
The majority of people, they are Canadians because they just stay back and do their own 
business, be tolerant. And even being a Canadian, for people who are so passionate about 
it, it scares me. Because I see that they are becoming more like Americans. Yeah, you go 
to USA, you see on each house the flag, everywhere. And with the whole mentality, and 
we are not Yankees. And uh, it’s why I feel like I am, because I belong to the majority of 
people who are more tolerant, who are more accepting of everyone doing their own 
business and who have a sense, of umm, tolerance. [..]in the beginning when someone 
was talking to me about being a Canadian, I would say—‘it’s being polite’. They would 
say ‘how can you say this’? Because you go on a bus, by mistake, you step on someone, 
and the person will say to you-‘oh, sorry, sorry’. You are the one who stepped on him or 
her, and she is the one who is the one telling you ‘sorry, sorry’. I say, they are so polite. 
And uh, [chuckles] more time you spend, you see on the street people just giving the 
finger to everybody, and people yelling, and you are in a workplace, you see people who 
are undermining each other, but you feel so disappointed, because you create a myth 
about what is being a Canadian, and this myth is being destroyed by people, and uh, you 
feel so disappointed. But, at the same, time, when I look at it, I feel like, oh, maybe, now 
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I belong. Because now I see more than I was seeing before, before it was like a fantasy 
(Simon).  
 
Simon’s fascinating analysis revealed that he, having lived in Canada for over twenty years, 
perceived that belonging comes when one is able to see through the myths of nationalism and 
grimly accept the often unpleasant reality of communal life. Yet, he also observed and contrasted 
an exclusionary form of xenophobic nationalism, like that of the “Yankees”, to a more liberal, 
tolerant model of multiculturalism. These two competing Canadian national cosmologies play 
out in day to day lives, as well as in political theatre. Simon, as a racialized man, confronted both 
narratives. The trepidation that he expressed over those who are “so passionate” about the 
mythical nationalism that he saw emerging points to an understanding of nation as contingent, as 
fragmented, and as uneven. Unlike those whom I quoted earlier, Simon did not feel a compulsion 
to exclaim his love for the imagined community of Canada. Yet, those whose nationalism he 
fears, would demand such tribute from him, explicitly because he is a racialized migrant from a 
so-called Third World country, and thus, according to the xenophobic, closed narrative of nation 
that he observes, he must demonstrate his worth in order to attain belonging. He is haunted by 
xenophobic nationalism as it hovers over his day to day life. It manifestations are the moments 
when he is racialized and reminded of his difference.  
 
 
 
Reminders of non-belonging: “What’s your background?”  
 As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, one of the most common means by 
which those who are racialized are reminded of their place outside the nation is through the 
ubiquitous query “what’s your background?” Many participants in this study explained, with 
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grim humour, the perennial sprouting of that pseudo-polite question, and it’s very clear, though 
implicit, meaning:   
Theodore: It’s not like you, because what are they going to ask you when they see your name, 
 but for me, if they sees me, they says, ah, you’re a Canadian, where are you from, 
 where’s your background?  
 
Interviewer: What’s the difference? 
 
Theodore: The difference in term of colour, people think because you are white, to be  
 Canadian is normal. You see that’s reality where we are coming from.  
 
Theodore’s matter of fact explanation of the meaning of this question echoed what many others 
also understood to be the underlying message—you do not belong here because you are black. 
Revocata, facing this question, explained that she was not ashamed to explain where she came 
from, but understood that the question meant that “even though I call myself Canadian, I am not 
treated like a Canadian” (Revocata). To be black in the GTA is to be perpetually framed as 
external to the nation’s imagination of self; it is to be the eternal other that those who belong can 
mark and remind of her non-belonging. Theodosia argued that “Canada has its good own things 
to offer. But still, in Canada we don’t belong. We are still immigrants. We don’t belong” 
(Theodosia). After over fifteen years of living in the GTA, she baldly stated that she and others 
like her, implicitly those who are likewise racialized, “are still immigrants”. I too am an 
immigrant, yet I do not encounter the above question, nor am I led to understand that I am still an 
immigrant (expect once, at the U.S. border, where the border guards, seeing my place of birth, 
Poland, tapped into racialized discourses about Eastern European women and enquired if I was 
being trafficked across the border by my partner). Having attained citizenship, I am treated as a 
citizen because I am white and bear an Anglo name. Yet the same is not true of those in this 
study. Many, if not most, had likewise attained citizenship status (and proudly proclaimed it), 
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yet, they remained framed as perpetual immigrants, because of their blackness. As Rinaldo 
Walcott puts it, “the impossibility of imagining blackness as Canadian is continually evident 
even as nation-state policies like multiculturalism seek to signal otherwise” (2003, 48). 
 
 
What do you know about Rwanda?  
 Another injury oft expressed by the participants in this study was that many Canadians 
knew very little about Rwanda, and exhibited little or no desire to learn more. While none of the 
participants were surprised by the overall ignorance about one African nation, a good number 
were hurt by their co-workers’, neighbors’, and state representatives’ lack of desire to learn about 
the difference that those who identified as Rwandans purportedly carried. Theodore stated that 
“before I come I know where is Canada. I know. Because we went to school they teach us where 
is Canada, where is Europe, Egypt, they teach us all these things—you know, since you are 
young” (Theodore). Yet, contrary to his experience, in Canada “even when they teach them, they 
don’t have that curiosity to find out” (Theodore). This common observation demonstrated the 
limits of multicultural tolerance. We, as a society, are reluctantly willing to allow those who 
come from elsewhere to settle here, but we do not care to understand, appreciate or think about 
what they carry with them, nor do we imagine that their culture/ethnicity could enrich our 
communities. That is the source of the injury that Theodore and others expressed—that what 
they bring is automatically perceived to be valueless and not worth learning about. In this 
manner, all the history, philosophy, art that they understand Rwandaness to embody, is negated 
and erased. They become subjects of external racialization and their value as individuals and as 
citizens is dictated by the (white) keepers of the nation.  
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Racialization in the Host/Homeland  
 The reminder of coming from somewhere else and the lack of interest in that place serve 
to remind those who are othered of their difference. These day to day, subtle practices are part of 
a broader set of practices of classification and identification of who belongs and who does not in 
Canadian society. Those who identify as Rwandan in the GTA are racialized as blacks in a 
dominant white society. Racialization refers “to the process, and the structures that accompany 
such a process, that produce and construct the meaning of race” (Agnew 2009, 8). It classifies 
and marginalizes individual people, but also refers to “specific traits and attributes as, for 
example, accent, diet, name, beliefs and practices, and places of origin” which are interpreted as 
“abnormal and of less worth” than the dominant culture (Agnew 2009, 8). As Philomena Essed 
has argued, racialization (though she uses the term racism) “is routinely created and reinforced 
through everyday practices” (1991, 2). This process plays out in institutionalized practices, like a 
segregated labour market, underrepresentation in political institutions and a lack of recognition 
of the contributions of minority groups in the national history, as well as on an individual level, 
when in day to day interactions individuals remind the person who is racialized that she is 
presumed to be in some way inferior. Essed points out that both of these levels of experience are 
connected as: 
From a macro point of view, racism is a system of structural inequalities and a historical 
process, both created and recreated through routine practices. System means that 
reproduced social relations between individuals and groups organized as regular social 
practices. From a micro point of view, specific practices, whether their consequences are 
intentional or unintentional, can be evaluated in terms of racism only when they are 
consistent with (our knowledge) of existing macro structures of racial inequality in the 
system. In other words, structures of racism do not exist external to agents—they are 
made by agents—but specific practices are by definition racist only when they activate 
existing structural racial inequality (Essed 1991, 39).  
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Thus, when we hear an individual account of someone being called by a racial epithet it is an 
example of racialization/racism because it is part of a larger system of inequitable access to 
social resources and is an example of one group enacting power over another, played out in one 
symbolic interaction. Everyday racialization/racism is “the integration of racism into everyday 
situations through practices (cognitive and behavioural) that activate underlying power relations” 
and through these practices racism becomes “part of the expected, of the unquestionable, and of 
what is seen as normal by the dominant group” (Essed 1991, 50). The other side of racism, often 
obscured, is the privilege that the dominant group exercises precisely because it is able to 
dominate other groups. Thus, in Canada, whiteness has been and continues to be read as 
normative and those who are racialized as white are granted privilege (Nelson and Nelson 2004, 
3), such as some of those I have mentioned experiencing, while those who are racialized as other 
are subject to scrutiny, surveillance, over-attention, avoidance, marginalization, and neglect.  
 Those who identify as Rwandan are racialized as black, which, in the GTA, carries 
specific assumptions of criminality, immorality, vulgarity, loudness, and visibility (Henry 1994). 
They are also racialized as black African, which is associated with primitivism, violence, 
tribalism and a general backwardness (Mudimbe 1988). These cognitive frames preexisted the 
Rwandan community in the GTA, yet those who were part of this community found themselves 
read, measured and, often, found lacking, according to those yardsticks. Men, women, youth and 
children, though subject to the same ideas about who they are based on how they look, 
experienced racialization in specifically gendered and age-specific ways. Both young and older 
men were assumed to be criminals, but the manner in which this assumption played out differed. 
Older men spoke of being the subject of covert, nervous glances, white hands tightening on 
purses, security guards or police following them, unmerited police stops, and the day to day 
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undermining of their authority in workplaces. Young men discussed being perceived to be “black 
youth” and thus subject to police surveillance, and overt and coercive performances of authority 
from figures of authority, like school principals. Unlike their partners, brothers, and sons, women 
were less likely to be assumed to be criminal, but they faced sexualization, surveillance, 
oversight and disregard. Women discussed being ignored in classrooms, being overlooked for 
placement or promotions in workplaces, and having their sexuality surveilled, commented upon 
and judged. Young women seemed to be least affected by racialization, yet they too experienced 
the loss of interest of a potential employer, the lack of attention in a classroom, the increased 
scrutiny in a shopping mall.  
 Regardless of age, gender or social class, those who identified as Rwandan described a 
process of routine racialization. However, many also insisted that these were moments of 
racialization and that, by and large, they felt accepted and welcomed in their new homeland. 
They actively resisted being framed as victims and insisted on their agency in these encounters. 
Indeed, some even spoke disparagingly of friends who resisted racism through activism or public 
declarations, thus creating a moral dichotomy of victim/resister and agent/educator. I will try to 
accommodate this very often expressed sentiment by referring to racialization as sporadic and 
enacted in particular moments; thus, rather than drawing a picture of complete marginalization 
and oppression, I will refer to moments of racialization.  
 
 
Racializing Children 
 While I did not interview any children for this study, parents often spoke of their fears 
and anxieties about their children’s place in the host/homeland based on the stories and 
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experiences that their children brought home. Olivia discussed her son’s experience of 
racialization thus: 
I remember and experience where my son, my middle son, he was what, maybe 5, or 6? 
He went to school, in the class there was no other black kids, and uh, the kids were never 
exposed they come from rural area of [city of residence], they, they were never exposed 
to colour and they would touch him thinking he’s dirty. They would say if you wash 
yourself really well, would the dark come off? [chuckles, a bit bitterly] and he came 
home very, and he says mom, these kids are so ignorant. He was only 5 or 6. But he did 
not take it personally, he says they touch my hair, they touch my skin, and they think I 
don’t shower. And I says, how did you react to that, and he says well, they’re just 
ignorant, they don’t know. I said, you can’t blame them, they’ve never been exposed, so 
they, so they overcame (Olivia). 
 
The children in the classroom (implicitly called parochial) exhibited simultaneous desire and 
repulsion; they were drawn to him, needed to touch him, yet presumed his colour to be dirt and 
imagined that if he bathed, he would look more like them. They were enacting, on the small 
stage of a kindergarten classroom, the drama of the colonizer and colonized, the drama of the 
black body seen, perceived, known and rejected through the eyes and touch of whiteness. Yet, 
Olivia was insistent that neither she nor her son “blame” the children, as the children were 
merely “ignorant”, rather than well-versed in racial mythology which places blackness 
hierarchically below whiteness. Olivia’s insistence is also interesting in light of the fact that 
while rural Ontario remains largely white, it is not a space without blackness, as T.V. and other 
forms of media inform these spaces with larger racist mythologies and narratives. A recent case 
is that of a secondary school in Sutton, Ontario, which made national headlines first because 
students were regularly wearing the Confederate flag and claiming it was a symbol of rural pride, 
then, a year later, because a black (Nigerian) student was viciously beaten while being called the 
“n” word by onlookers. This school, according to interlocutors, was primarily a white school, yet 
as the incidences above demonstrate, it was a space that was suffused with racist mythologies. 
Thus, Olivia’s insistence on the need to educate and “expose” the kindergarten class to her son’s 
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difference must be read as her desire/need to not be read as a victim of racism. Though she was 
well aware of racism and had many other stories to tell, each narration emphasized that the 
source of these incidences was ignorance, not hate. Yet, she was clearly harmed by the events 
and worried over her children’s ability to cope and have full lives in a white-dominated society. 
As she explained, her other children had also faced racism in the classroom as one had been 
called the “n” word after a lesson on the harm that the word carries, and her other child had faced 
daily belittlement of her surname. All three incidences were narrated as moments, as passing 
phases, rather than a pervasive racist mythology built upon the assumption of a white nation. 
Yet, the toll of confronting this mythology was evident as she recognized that “we always have 
to work harder, justify ourselves, confirm ourselves, try to just be accepted, because people judge 
you before they even see” (Olivia).  
 Other parents also expressed the pain of watching their children suffer racialization in 
classrooms or on the playground. Angelina, whose children were born in Canada, explains that: 
So now they’re really Canadians. So now, the worry is, they’re going to look for a job 
and the same question will come to them—Where do you come from? Or they might not 
be equally participants in terms of job opportunities, or run for presidency of this country, 
or being any dreams fulfilled, because there’s that association of their colour. They speak 
perfect English, they have the whole history of Canada, they appreciate the love on 
Canada. You know? It’s who they are. So if they face discrimination, they end up not 
being so considered as true true Canadians, they lose out […]Yeah, there’s that tension. 
So sometimes we ask them, so, do you feel like you are picked differently at school, and 
stuff. “Oh mom, yeah sometimes, yeah, there is racism” I don’t know how they interpret 
that, but they tell me that there is racism. “How come anybody who is doing bad things is 
always black? Or bad neighbourhood is black?”  (Angelina) 
 
The mother’s anxieties over her children’s chances in life were starkly clear, but neither she nor 
her children could point to exactly how racialization was enacted in these instances. Yet, the 
children were aware that their society criminalizes black bodies when they asked why the media 
is fixated on black crime and why predominantly black neighborhoods are portrayed as “bad”. 
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The parents suffered over the fact that the children knew racism and were aware of it, but even 
more so because it was so subtle that there was nothing that they could do to fight it. Unlike 
Olivia, they could not go to the school and demand that…what? How could parents combat 
racialization that is so commonplace, so pervasive and yet so subtle? Diane also pinpointed this 
dynamic when she recalled that her child was commonly asked “where he was from, even though 
he was born here” and that this indicated that “they see him as black” and always “you are from 
somewhere else” (Diane). How can parents protect their children from the bone deep harm of 
subtle, even at times polite, racialization? Diane’s six year old son fell on the playground and 
broke his arm, yet none of the teachers were aware that he had severe bruising because he was 
“so dark”, so his broken arm was untreated till he went home that night. Diane was enraged. The 
principal apologized. Did that change the fact that “the teacher did not care” enough about 
Diane’s son? The experience of Rwandan children being racialized is similar to those of other 
African groups in Canada. As Creese recounts, African parents in Vancouver told stories of 
“children being unable to find playmates, being told negative comments about the colour of their 
skin, or being viewed as ‘dirty’ or ‘too yucky’ to touch” (2011, 178). The parents in Creese’s 
study expressed heartache over these new challenges and adopted new, protective parenting 
strategies to protect their children.  
Parents’ anguish over the harm their children suffered echoed through the stories I heard. 
Richard worried that his children would come to hate the colour of their skin because “they are 
more comfortable with, they’re more in tune with white, which, as a black person, it’s 
dangerous” (Richard). He recalled overhearing a little black boy in his child’s class telling his 
grandmother that he did not want to be in the sun because “he didn’t want to be turned dark” 
(Richard). Richard tried to protect his children by teaching them that “you should be proud of 
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who you are—it will never change, it will never change you being a Canadian, however, you 
should be proud of your complexion, you should proud of your hair”(Richard). His attempt to 
broaden the narrative of who is “Canadian” to include his black children is the only remedy he 
has available to shield them, yet, it is an ineffectual rebuff when in nearly all other social 
interactions his children are reminded that they are different and that their difference, their 
blackness, their nappy hair, are outside the nation’s narration of self and they are framed as 
external to normalized whiteness.  
 
 
Racializing Men 
 Men in the community experienced the most overt forms of racialization of all the groups 
as they were explicitly criminalized. Middle aged men described the various moments when they 
were reminded of their marginality and the externality of their blackness. Those who had lived in 
the GTA since the late 1980s remembered more explicit and overt moments of racialization, 
compared to the more subtle forms it had taken by the time of this study, in the 2010s. During 
the 1980s and early 1990s, many of my informants recalled being called by the “n” word on the 
street, people physically shying away from them on elevators, buses, being denied rental 
accommodations, and being denied jobs. Richard recalled vividly the common experience of 
“you walk in the elevator [..] women—they shrink away from you and clutch their purse”, people 
on the streetcar intentionally bumping into him and referring to him as “one of those”, being 
detained at a shopping mall on accusations of theft, and many other day to day incidences of 
overt racism (Richard). Jean remembered that when he lived in Calgary in the late 1980s, “I 
remember there was a time when you got to a bus and nobody want to sit next to you.  You 
know? And sometimes you would go to outside and the kids would come and touch your skin to 
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see” (Jean). Both men contrasted these explicit moments of racialization with the more subtle, 
yet no less insidious forms that they encountered in the 2010s.  
 One participant joked that he preferred the racism of the 80s and 90s because it was more 
explicit and he knew how to respond to it, while now he worries that his reading of a situation is 
subjective and someone else would not think he was being racialized. This anxiety over the 
interpretation of an event was a common theme; a number of participants, when asked if they 
had experienced discrimination, hedged that they had, but could not directly explain how, and 
seemed to fear that I, as their listener, would not believe them because they could not point to a 
clear event or moment. Bernard explained that “it’s not open. It’s not direct because of laws, it’s 
not like in other countries, but, people are not free of discrimination. You can see by, by action, 
you can see it, by the way they talk, or the action, but it’s not open. Not like in other countries, 
like in Europe, here it’s there, but…” (Bernard). This collective forgetting and denying that 
racialization/racism affect and often shape the lives of people of colour have the secondary effect 
of making them feel that they are imagining the event and that they are exaggerating. Thus, not 
only are they harmed by the instance of racism, but they are also then doubly harmed by being 
led to question if they imagined the event. Indeed, it becomes evident why my participant 
jokingly preferred the good old racism. 
 Yet, they are racialized in subtle but insidious ways, as Richard’s story demonstrates:  
And the way, people, sometimes you approach them, and they nearly tell you’re black, 
English is not your first language, so, far, now, you start talking to them, now they are 
going through the process of doing their judgment—by the time they realize you’re 
talking to them in English, they’ve lost what you’ve said and say---“pardon, what did you 
say? I didn’t hear what you said.” And, most people they don’t realize that’s what’s going 
on in a human being, and to me, I didn’t take it—if I’m in a bad mood, or something else 
has affected me, I’ll get irritated (Richard). 
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The amount of emotional energy expended in negotiating these moments of being seen as a black 
man, and therefore not being seen as a person, can amount to exhaustion. To daily navigate and 
negotiate for a measure of dignity and respect is wearying work that only those who are 
racialized have to engage in. I never have to repeat myself because someone imagined that I was 
threatening and therefore failed to hear what I had to say. When I speak, I am usually heard; 
when a man racialized as black speaks, he is often not heard, or misheard. André also offered 
many stories of how he, as a black man, was denied respect personally and professionally. He 
was a manager in his workplace, yet, routinely, he was presumed to hold a lesser position in the 
organization. On visiting city hall in his professional capacity, he was assumed to be a social 
assistance recipient and directed to the wrong department. On another occasion, he arrived late at 
a conference for managers in his field and the doors were already closed. He asked a janitor to be 
allowed in, but the janitor responded with scorn that the conference was only for managers and 
he would not be permitted. It took some time to persuade the janitor that he was a manager and 
belonged inside; the janitor was contrite, but André was once again reminded that as a black man 
he is never assumed to be in a position of legitimate authority.  
 Excessive and unmerited police stops of racialized men in the GTA have become routine 
for those affected, to the point that they train their sons to be passive and polite in order to 
deescalate the situation. Overall, black men are “more likely to be stopped, questioned, searched, 
and generally harassed by the police” than any other group (Abdi 2005, 57). André has long 
learned that if he is stopped by the cops he is “prepared to be extra nice” because if you “resist 
they will arrest you” (André). Richard, as another long-term resident of the GTA, has also 
developed the same strategy for dealing with this issue. He told the story of trying to persuade a 
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white friend of the reality of unmerited police stops and narrated the friend’s response as 
follows: 
Richard: ‘you guys exaggerate sometimes’, you guys, you mean us black people? He said 
 ‘yeah!’ I said I’m not offended, you’re my friend, I’ll classify that as ignorance 
 because I can be granting certain things and it’s not a judgment call. He said ‘prove it to 
 me’. He was driving that time, his dad had a 7 series BMW. I said ‘really? I’m not a 
 betting men, but I’ll let you drive fast for a few minutes, we’ll go to different areas do 
 all kind of things. In fact, roll through that stop sign, where there’s a cruiser, and I’ll 
 point it out to you, there’s a cruiser, I’ll do the same, eventually when it comes to my 
 time and we’ll see.’ He drove we did a couple things which are obvious and most  
  of the time… 
Interviewer: Should have merited a stop. 
Richard: Yes. He said, ‘yeah, if I was a policeman I wouldn’t even give it to you’. I said, ‘that’s 
 how you think’. So we switched. 3 times within less than the time he was driving, I was 
 stopped [by a police officer]. I was given a warning, he said ‘do you realize you rolled 
 through the stop sign?’ I said, ‘officer, I’m so sorry.’ And again, it’s, you know, one of, 
 you get taught, and this was when I worked with the YMCA, with young people, black 
 people, we say, when a police officer approaches you, give him the best respect you can 
 give him, don’t be controversial, don’t confront him, just respect him. 
Interviewer: Right, so you’re training young black men to deal with that harassment? 
Richard: Imagine.  
Interviewer: So you actively train them. 
Richard: We did, we did. We did workshops where we did those kind of things. I apologized, he 
  said you can cause an accident.  
Interviewer: So when you were so deferential, his power was already reinforced, so he didn’t 
 need to then punish you further? 
Richard: Indeed, indeed. And when we left, he stopped, as I was driving, he [the friend] said, 
 ‘you know, I’m so sorry.’ I said ‘don’t apologize, I can understand where you’re coming 
 from, but where we’re coming from, this goes on every day to a lot of us.’ 
 
The above excerpt demonstrates both the fact that Richard’s coping mechanisms are necessary as 
he is indeed more likely to be stopped because he is black, as well as the degree to which this 
day to day reality is denied by others. The friend, as a white man, does not face this form of 
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institutionalized discrimination himself, but to add insult to injury, he does not believe the black 
man who tells him about it. Thus, not only is Richard’s experience denied, his ability to honestly 
assess his experience is read as exaggeration as “you guys” are presumed to be prone to 
unrealistic assessments. He is thus read as irrational and untrustworthy, which is another element 
of the insidious racialization that he is subjected to. As another participant explained “you get 
angry, then you give up in a sense” because he had learned to expect racism (André).  
 An interesting reading of day to day racialization comes from Simon who described 
working in a “completely white” town where “knowing that I was from Africa, it was like 
everyone wanted a small piece of me—to touch me, to talk to me”(Simon). In this experience, 
which he recalled fondly and told me in order to demonstrate that he had experienced moments 
where he was prized for his difference, Simon was desirable for his blackness. He was valued 
not because he was competent at his job, but because he was a black man doing the job. While 
he recalled this warmly, it too was an example of racialization. And, though Simon did not 
perceive it as harmful, it still served to underscore his difference based only on his physical 
traits. In a way, he internalized this racialization as he explained that:  
The discrimination might be there, but at the same time, the only way for me, the only 
way I see to be successful, is to avoid discriminating yourself. When you start seeing 
others as different, you behave in a way that you black yourself and you don’t reach out, 
you don’t open yourself to others, and I can see, even within the community, there’s 
people who have been here for so many years, but they’re always by themselves (Simon). 
His reading of “black[ing] yourself” puts the onus on the person who is being racialized to not 
only pretend not to see the racialization, but also to not be affected by it. Thus he criticizes those 
who “don’t reach out”, “don’t open yourself to others”, as, in effect, causing their own isolation 
and marginalization. This criticism, which I also heard from others, points to a troubling 
dynamic whereby community members buy into narratives about the decline of racism and 
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racialization and then, if someone points it out its continuance, she is presumed to be 
“black[ing]” herself. This idea of “black[ing]” oneself is interesting as it suggests both the 
understanding that blackness is constructed through day to day practices, as well as the negative 
association with North American blacks. When Simon refers to “black[ing]”, he is referring to 
behaving like North American blacks, which, as he reads it, is detrimental and pathological. This 
flip in agency is damaging as it proposes that those who are systematically denied access are 
themselves to blame for this denial. It also demonizes those who speak out against racialization, 
thus denying them the power to name their experience and offer a potent critique of Canadian 
society.  
 
 
Racializing Young Men 
 Young black men in the community also experienced racialization, but they were more 
inclined to understand it as Simon understood his experiences—namely, that if they avoided 
“black[ing]” themselves, they would not be racialized. The internalization of racism is a fairly 
common response among young black men who face daily discrimination, but it comes with a 
great cost as it negatively affects physical and psychological well-being (Pierre and Mahalik 
2005). In some cases, as the case of Somali youth in Canada, the external racism that they face is 
paired with Islamophobia, doubly othering them (Naji 2012). Rwandan youth are not externally 
perceived as Muslim (though some are) and thus do not face the double burden of racism and 
Islamophobia. Nonetheless, they bear the burden of coping with internalized racism.      
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 Patrice expressed internalized racism in discussing the ubiquitous hoodie which is a piece 
of clothing that is twinned in racist mythology with criminal and deviant black bodies. His 
interpretation of this piece of clothing is very revealing: 
And also, you know how they say a black guy wearing a hoodie is bad? I mean is it 
wearing the hoodie, or the way you behaving yourself wearing that hoodie? […] I wear a 
hoodie every day and I don’t feel rejected. But a brother of mine who’s wearing a hoodie 
behaved differently, being rejected. Maybe he didn’t wanna come in a Starbucks like this 
wearing a hoodie, cause he felt like he would be rejected or labeled, being from a gang 
member, or something like that. [Laughs] I don’t care! I know who I am, I know what I 
do and who I am, so I’m going to wear it because it’s cold. Cause I don’t wanna bring 
like a big jacket, so, I think it’s about self and how you understand it. And that’s when 
you end up being rejected, by taking yourself out of the world because of the way you see 
it (Patrice).  
Patrice clearly had been exposed to the racist mythology as he was well aware that “they say a 
black guy wearing a hoodie is bad”, yet, rather than interrogate who “they” are, and what the 
consequences of this narrative are, he framed the matter as a personal choice as “it’s about self 
and how you understand it. And that’s when you end up being rejected, by taking yourself out of 
the world because of the way you see it”. This individualization of a racist mythology which 
pathologizes black male bodies is a defense mechanism as it allows Patrice to perceive that he 
has agency and he can avoid being racialized. Yet, its final consequence is to submit to the 
racialization by taking on the injury and internalizing it; thus, if Patrice, acting as he does, is then 
rejected or marginalized (which the earlier examples suggest he will be, often), he cannot point 
to a system of structural racism and can only look inwards and blame himself for this imagined 
failure.  
 Another defensive move practiced by young Rwandan black men is to 
assimilate/appropriate the cultural codes of African American youth, in particular hip hop 
culture, and therefore to join a collectivity that has made a space of resistance to normative 
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mythologies (though, admittedly, this space has been appropriated and colonized by dominant 
discourses). As Ibrahim argues, “once in North America, continental African youth enter a social 
imaginary: a discursive or symbolic space in which they are already constructed, imagined, and 
positioned, and thus treated by the hegemonic discourses and dominant groups, respectively, as 
Blacks” (2004, 278). Their appropriation of hip hop culture is an “articulation of the youth desire 
to belong to a location, a politics, a memory, a history, and hence, a representation” (Ibrahim 
2004, 280). In Ibrahim’s research, his young subjects analyzed their own relationship to hip hop 
culture as “a search for identification […] for someone who reflects you, with whom you have 
something in common” (2004, 287).  
This pattern of consciously seeking out hip hop culture as an alternative to dominant 
discourses was also evident among the young Rwandan men I encountered, though not all chose 
to seek belonging by identifying with this sub-culture.  Mathieu recalled that during his 
adolescent years: 
I was heavily influenced by hip hop culture, so I mean that’s also another thing that I was 
really connected with fellow black students. So I know, a lot of times, the way I would 
dress, the way I spoke, when we were together, we went around together, and a lot of 
times there was somewhat of a negative perception by authorities, not so much peers our 
age, or even our parents, more so authorities. I remember getting questioned a few times 
by police, never for really doing anything. I’m not even going to say that each case was 
racial profiling, because that would be unfair, but there is, there was scenarios, that I did, 
you know we were questioned. And I’m not surprised because we were in a large group, 
and you know, whether it be late at night, or whatever, that was kind of a perception, we 
did feel, especially from authority figures (Mathieu).  
 
Mathieu’s recollection is interesting for two reasons: firstly, he is cognizant of his choice to 
join/appropriate this sub-culture and its linguistic/stylistic modes as a means of connecting with 
other black youth; secondly he acknowledges that there was greater scrutiny upon him as a black 
man, but he attributes this to the supposed negative perception of hip hop culture. His self-aware 
choice to participate in this sub-culture demonstrates the degree to which young men consciously 
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negotiate discursive framings of themselves as black men and actively seek to negotiate spaces 
of community and belonging to counter their racialization. Yet, even as Mathieu sought to resist 
these framings, the disciplinary gaze of police and other authority figures reinforced the 
racialization of young black men as criminal to the point that Mathieu, in recalling this phase, 
expressed that “I’m not going to say that each case was racial profiling because that would be 
unfair” and that he was not surprised “because we were in a large group.” This statement is 
interesting because it reveals both a recognition that the moment could be read as racial profiling, 
but he is choosing not to read it so, and suggesting that because they were in a large group, the 
questioning may have been justified. He is slipping between resistance to racialization and 
internalization of racialization, never fully comfortable on either ground. Indeed, his further 
statement that “there was a few instances […] in my primary years, a few times in my secondary 
years, not a lot, but the majority of the times I was quiet, I never had any issues with police, 
never anything like that, or, umm, but like I said, there was a few times the perception from 
authority figures, as well as other students who unfortunately were a bit ignorant [called him the 
“n” word]” (Mathieu), reveals that he avoided further disciplining because he was quiet. Again, 
the agency is flipped and the assumption that if he stays quiet, he will not face trouble, fails to 
recognize the additional burden placed upon him because he is a young black man and must 
therefore strive to avoid the disciplinary gaze as it is always watching. Further, Mathieu excuses 
his classmates for using the most obliterating racial epithet in North American dialect on the 
grounds of ignorance. Yet, by definition, one uses such an epithet correctly because one knows 
whom to call the “n” word—its very usage is an example of knowledge of racist mythologies, 
not ignorance. But Mathieu, like Olivia, like Patrice, needs to sustain the idea that racism is an 
anomaly, an aberration, in order to be able to create a space of belonging.  
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Racializing women 
 Rwandan women also had to contend with day to day racialization as their bodies were 
daily misread as black women’s bodies and thus cruelly adorned with either neglect or dismissal, 
or sexualized and subjected to blunt surveillance. As with men, older or middle-aged women
13
 
were more inclined to observe and reflect upon the moments of racialization than young women. 
Perhaps this was an indication of the long-term exposure and exhaustion of the older women, or 
perhaps, young women, who are socialized to be perceived as adornments, find little strange 
when they are thus treated. A common refrain that emerged from a number of middle-aged 
women was that in day to day interactions they were silenced, neglected and made invisible, 
while simultaneously becoming visible against a backdrop of whiteness. Revocata explained that 
whenever she approached a service counter she encountered suspicion and a heightened 
awareness as the question “Can I help you?” created a shield. It was not posed to enquire if she 
could actually be helped, but as a sharp reminder that she was being watched. Her role, in that 
moment, as a customer (and thus, in a capitalist system, worthy of respect) was subsumed under 
the visibility of her blackness and the parallel assumption of presumed criminality. A similar 
dynamic played out in her professional setting where she held a high position, yet was nearly 
always assumed to be customer/client and thus was denied the professional respect that she 
merited. As an expert in her field, even in her professional capacity, her expertise was 
denied/undercut in favor of white colleagues.  
                                                          
13
 I am referring to older/middle aged women in order to distinguish them from young women who are in their late 
teens and twenties, rather than as a marker of age/attitude. Older/middle aged here means 30-60 years of age, 
roughly.  
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Marie experienced the same dynamic when she attended a post-secondary institution. She 
recalled that she was the only black student in the class, thus making her hyper-visible, yet, as 
she was made visible, her presence was simultaneously erased because she was silenced. She 
recalled an incident when, in a group activity: 
Marie: they asked for ideas to bring and I had an idea from my own book, from group discussion 
  and I brought an idea, an idea forward. And there were like 5 students.  And I strongly  
 believe that my idea was right, but one of the kids, you know, the young kids, didn’t 
 seem to believe me, you know? They believed the other, the guy’s, idea, and I knew it 
 was wrong, which it turned out to be wrong. 
 
Interviewer: Right, because he was a young man... 
 
Marie: [chuckles] male, white....so he has the right answer.  
 
Interviewer: right, and you as a black woman...? 
 
Marie: I have the wrong answer.  
 
Marie further explained that she often felt that professors were less likely to call on her to answer 
a question than on her classmates, especially if the classmate was a white male. Diane 
experienced the same dynamic in her post-secondary education, though in her case she was in a 
female-dominated field, but she still found that white women were called upon more often than 
she, because she was black. Both women explained this dynamic matter-of-factly, because they 
had learned to expect this kind of treatment. They expected that they would, as Diane teaches her 
children, “have to work hard, double what others have to do”, because they are black and 
women, so doubly disadvantaged.  
 The visibility that black women are ascribed differs from the visibility of black men 
because black men are pathologized as criminals, while black women are deemed to be sexually 
immoral. In the GTA the largest group of those racialized as black is of Caribbean descent and 
many participants in the study indicated that they were often presumed to be Caribbean, which 
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they often found troubling as this assumption carried moral weight. Caribbean women are likely 
to be single mothers in a continuation of familial patterns after migration and, in the new 
economic reality, they are often subsequently economically marginalized because of the lack of 
two breadwinners. This familial pattern, the consequence of colonialism, migration and 
economic inequality, is read as “pathological or deviant by professionals who interact with 
Blacks” (Henry 1995, 99). This interpretation shapes the discursive framing of black Caribbean 
women as immoral, especially if they are single mothers. Rwandan women, like many black 
women in the GTA (see Henry 1995), are often assumed to be Caribbean and thus judged as 
morally inferior to the dominant white society, my participants told me. Marie, a single divorced 
mother, found herself interpreted and assessed by her work colleagues as such:  
Marie: Here there is also the stigma of uhh, you know, your race, your income is low, low-
 income, poverty... 
Interviewer: Especially as a woman?  
Marie: Yeah, poverty, and a woman of colour, you know, you like to have children, is the 
 assumption.  
Interviewer: I see, so it is the presumption that you are not as moral as others, because  
  you are black?  
Marie: Exactly! [very emphatic]  
Interviewer: Where do you encounter this? 
Marie: You know, at work, colleagues, you know?  
Interviewer: How do you know that that’s what they are thinking? How do they show you 
 that that’s what they are thinking?  
Marie: They made comments. Oh they’ll say, ‘oh, aren’t you having another child? I 
 thought you guys liked to have many children’ you know?  
Interviewer: That’s pretty clear that that’s what they presume.  
Marie: [laughs] You know? They don’t look at the individual person! 
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“You guys”, used by Marie’s white colleagues, here means Caribbean black women and 
becomes a code word, also used by Richard’s white friend, to refer to black men, signifying a 
foreign, different and marginal presence within the dominant society. It implies that those who 
are thus labeled, behave and think differently—they are not “we” or “us” but “you guys”—
distant cognitively and emotionally, and, by implication, inferior, in this case, in normative 
morality.  
Being daily read as black Caribbean women meant that Rwandan women were assumed 
to carry the cultural (presumed inferior) traits of that community. Thus, Angelina was commonly 
asked by her employers “how come you don’t behave like a Jamaican?” and when she pressed 
and asked her boss why he asked her this question, he replied that she had “a different 
demeanor”. She understood this to mean that not only did she not fit narratives about “louder” 
and “vocally aggressive” black women, but that she was in a stable marriage. Thus, in her 
workplace, rather than be judged on her merit as a worker, she is assessed for her conformity or 
non-conformity to racist scripts about behavior and sexual patterns. She is then lauded and 
appreciated for not acting “Jamaican”, suggesting the depth of racism in the workplace.  
 
 
Labour market integration and segregation 
Racialization contributes to labour market segregation as those who are racialized as 
black and African face considerable obstacles finding satisfying employment. Many in the 
community were able to find employment relatively quickly after arrival—usually within a few 
months if they spoke one of the official languages. But, like nearly every other non-white 
migrant group, few were able to find employment commensurate with their previous education 
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and experience. As Creese has argued, “there are three overlapping barriers that privilege local 
Canadian-born workers over foreign newcomers and collectively constitute a process of 
deskilling skilled migrant workers: 1) the demand for Canadian work experience, 2) the demand 
for Canadian educational credentials, and 3) the demand for a local Canadian accent” (2011, 69). 
These three barriers contribute to a system whereby African migrants often have high levels of 
education, yet are employed in low-wage, low-skill jobs. Overall, both men and women who 
migrate from Africa tend to have a higher level of education than those who migrate from any 
other region, or their Canadian-born counterparts. Indeed, according to Laryea and Hayfron’s 
study, in 1996 56% of African born men possessed a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared to 
45% of Asian men, 26.7% of Caribbean/Latin American men, 29.8% of U.S./European men, and 
26.6% of native-born Canadian men. Likewise, 46% of African born women had a bachelor’s 
degree or higher, compared to 41.3% of Asian women, 24.8% of Caribbean/Latin American 
women, 31.3% of U.S./European women and 31.2% of Canadian born women (2005, 116). Yet, 
despite their overall higher level of education, “there are significant earnings gaps between 
African-born immigrants and their Canadian-born counterparts,” and “African-born immigrants 
are less likely to be employed in a high-skilled occupation” (Laryea and Hayfron 2005, 126). To 
cope with the new reality, African women and men settled in Vancouver pursued three survival 
strategies: to accept any work, including low-wage manual labour; to volunteer in an unpaid 
position in order to gain some Canadian experience; to pursue post-secondary education in 
Canada to attain Canadian credentials (Creese 2011, 82). Those who identified as part of the 
Rwandan diaspora in the GTA faced similar obstacles.  
 While the employment outcomes of those who identify as Rwandan but were raised in 
Canada appear to be equivalent to their Canadian-born counterparts, it is difficult to assess this as 
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of yet, as among this diaspora group the youth are only now beginning to complete their 
education and entering the workforce in full time capacities. However, those who migrated as 
adults certainly faced the same obstacles as other African migrants in Canada. Both men and 
women faced similar obstacles, but the employment opportunities available to them differed as 
women found themselves even more segregated into low-wage service sector positions like 
personal support work or customer service, while men, after much struggle, where often able to 
find employment in white collar work, though rarely equivalent to the jobs they had had in 
Rwanda or elsewhere. Among this migrant group, those who arrived prior to 1994 tended to be 
largely young well-educated men with, at least, an undergraduate degree. Those who migrated 
after 1994 were more economically diverse and thus some had completed post-secondary 
education, some had completed high school education, and some had only completed primary 
education. Nonetheless, there was great emphasis on education and those who arrived without 
post-secondary education often pursued it after migration, gaining Canadian credentials in the 
process. Nearly universally among the study participants, those who arrived with post-secondary 
degrees found that their credentials were not fully recognized. So, a four year Bachelor’s degree 
from an African institution was counted as one year towards a Bachelor’s degree (Richard), a 
Master’s degree was counted as a Bachelor’s degree I was told, and this meant that the social 
capital that they arrived with was erased as they then faced the choice of returning to school and 
accruing debt, or attempting to find employment with the now degraded qualification. Some 
men, like Richard, felt offended by the devaluing of his credentials as “they say, we’ll give you 
only one year, and you have to do three years—and I said –really? British system?” and chose to 
take his chances in the labour market at the time (Richard). Thus, rather than rely on his 
education, as he had assumed he could, he pursued work in a field that only required a secondary 
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degree. Others learned that the only work available to them was at “seven eleven, to be a cashier. 
I said how can they do this to people?  When they told me to this point they want me, a man in a 
suit, a university graduate, […]The reality did not meet the illusions I had. I expected, I expected 
things to be very different, I tried looking for employment, I couldn’t, the employment that was 
there for me was beneath my education” (Janvier). Yet, in Janvier’s case, persistence paid off 
and he attained a job that fit his actual qualifications better, though it was still a lesser position 
than his education merited. 
 Yet, others chose to accrue debt in order to attain a Canadian education and Canadian 
credentials. This strategy, while it mitigated one of the barriers Creese identified, carried the risk 
of a significant delay in one’s capacity to earn an income, which, for those who had dependents, 
was rarely an option. Further, as some found, even Canadian credentials did not guarantee full-
time employment. Thus one participant, who had been a professor in Rwanda, did not have his 
credentials recognized, so to pursue teaching in Canada he had to first complete his Bachelor of 
Education. Upon finishing that credential, he was only able to find work as a substitute teacher 
for many years before finally being offered full-time employment. Thus his earning potential was 
significantly deferred.  
Others chose to find so-called “survival work”. For instance, one man who had owned a 
company and had overseen the installation of major water works in Rwanda, found work as a 
plumber. Many women in the study migrated anticipating that they would be able to work in 
their professions, but found themselves marginalized in the low-wage service sector. When 
Connie migrated, despite the post-secondary education that she had, she could only find work in 
housekeeping. She explained that it was “a hard, hard job. When you come from Africa […] 
things are not as you expected, and you have to deal with those things, and you have to get 
211 
 
money, you have to live, and when you are here alone, with your family back home, […] it’s a 
struggle, but I did my job.” The work exhausted her physically and emotionally but she 
continued to work as it was preferable to being on social assistance. Likewise, another 
participant, despite having a post-secondary degree, was only able to find work as a personal 
support worker. This position was “something I would never do with my status where I was at. 
But my experience wasn’t recognized, my degree wasn’t recognized, so I had to start somewhere 
and I had to support my young children who were still overseas. So yeah, the beginning was 
tough”. Many women spent years in these positions, and, exhausted by the stress and the labour, 
decided to return to post-secondary education to pursue Canadian education. Thus very many of 
the women I interviewed were at the time of the present study enrolled at post-secondary 
institutions, or had very recently completed their new degrees. Yet, even with Canadian 
credentials, many were still either underemployed in short-term contracts or unemployed and 
volunteering in order to attain that all important industry experience. This pattern of 
underemployment of women of colour has been observed by many scholars (Chui and Zietsma 
2003; Aydemir and Skuterud 2005; Frenette and Morissette 2005; Zaman 2006). Indeed, “the 
position of immigrants of colour, and in particular of immigrant women who are already 
marginalized in a gendered labour market, has considerably worsened in the last two decades as 
economic restructuring and ‘flexibility’ have increased low-wage, non-standard (particularly 
part-time and temporary) work” (Creese 2011, 63).  
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Accent Discrimination  
 One of the socially acceptable forms of pointing out someone’s difference in the GTA is 
to comment on their non-standard accent. This too is a form of racialization as it serves to denote 
that that person with the purported accent does not belong and needs to be reminded of this. This 
admonition serves to remind not only of non-belonging, but of the hierarchically lower position 
of the speaker, as she is “perceived to be less competent (or, indeed, incompetent) and have more 
difficulty being heard or having [her] speech taken seriously” (Creese 2011, 34). The ability to 
speak English in the GTA is a form of social capital and “Native speakers in predominantly 
White English-speaking nations remain its privileged purveyors” and possess the power to 
“define legitimate forms of knowledge or expression” (Creese 2011, 35). This power is enacted 
in “practices of misrecognition, trivialization, and the ‘refusal to hear’ non-standard accents,” 
which are “everyday forms of linguistic domination” (Creeese 2011, 36) and systematically deny 
the racialized minority upward mobility.  
 Many in the study spoke fluent French if they had completed secondary school in pre-
1994 Rwanda or had lived in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Burundi. Those who lived in 
Kenya, Tanzania, or Uganda usually spoke English upon arrival. There were also some who 
lacked linguistic capital in either official language, but possessed unrecognized linguistic skills 
as many spoke at least two, if not more, African languages, such as Swahili, and, of course, 
Kinyarwanda. Given the time of migration of most in this study—the late 1980s or early 1990s—
those who spoke French often found work relatively quickly, predominantly in customer service. 
Yet, many others struggled to find employment due to accent discrimination, and even those who 
did find employment were disciplined for their accents. Among the participants in the study, it 
was predominantly women who spoke of being disciplined for having a non-standard accent. 
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That few men mentioned this suggests that their greater social power relative to Rwandan 
women protected them somewhat from this form of othering. Seraphine recalled that “it was 
tough to get a job, very very tough. Like, you, the, the, minute you go for the interview, they hear 
the accent... […] It was a big barrier. A big one. I think I lost like how many jobs […] and they 
are very polite, they tell you, oh thank you, we will call you if something comes up and right 
then I knew there was no job for me.” This systematic denial of access to employment because of 
a non-standard accent contributes to the economic marginalization of new migrants.  
 Theodosia recalled that even though she found work in customer service and thus was 
able to contribute to her family’s economic well-being, she still faced regular discrimination: 
I used to be customer service agent on the phone. When I speak with the Canadian 
people, people who speak Canadian English, they would say, oh you have an accent. I 
said, Yeah, thank you, I know that, how can I help you? You know?  You move on, you 
know? And, sometimes when I speak to them, they say, oh, can I speak to someone who 
speaks better English. And then the question is—is it better English you are looking for, 
or you are looking for someone who can service your needs? Right? So there you get 
hassled. But hey, you get to live with it and you bypass it. I still do have an accent for 
sure, but I don’t need to be told because I know (Theodosia).  
 
The perpetual reminder of her accent was another racial code signifying, effectively, “Ohh, 
you’re black.” It serves no other purpose than to signal to the speaker that the listener is aware of 
the speaker’s presumed difference. Even over the telephone line, Theodosia was reminded of her 
place outside the nation. Diane, who migrated fully fluent in French, assumed that her linguistic 
capital would aid her in economic integration. It allowed her to find work relatively rapidly as 
there was a demand for Francophones at the time of her migration; yet, her non-standard accent 
in French was likewise noted. In one instance a client claimed that he needed to speak with 
“white from Quebec” and refused to speak with her, even though she spoke French. She went to 
her manager who supported her and told her to hang up the phone (Diane). That the client could 
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identify her as non-white merely by virtue of her accent, suggests that accent discrimination is 
likewise a form of racialization, as individuals possess knowledge of accent origins and can 
usually place an accent from Latin America, Eastern Europe, South Asia, Africa, and so on, and 
thus associate accent origin with a presumed racial identity. Olivia likewise had to contend with 
assumptions about her competence because of her accent. When she was “working with the older 
population, and you can’t blame them, they’ve never been exposed, when you have an accent, 
they judge you from that even before they know who you are and what you can do. You have to 
work harder to be accepted, much harder than anybody, any regular co-worker who was raised 
here” (Olivia).  
 Not all remarks concerning one’s accent are discriminatory. Angelina illustrated the 
different connotations of the same statement when she explained: 
Angelina: “Oh, it seems you have an accent, where is that accent coming from”? 
 
Interviewer: Is that code for something else? Does that statement mean ‘you are different  
  than us and I am telling you you’re different’?  
 
Angelina: Yeah, yeah. It’s automatically telling you you don’t belong here—maybe I perceive it 
 that way. […] Others will say “I love your accent” “Yeah It’s a beautiful accent—
 where’s that from?” So those are more welcoming and more umm, they take your, they 
 take your approval in a way, like you feel there is an interest, approval telling you they 
 accept your accent, rather than saying I don’t understand and even asking you, you know. 
 
Those who are thus reminded of their presumed difference are well versed in identifying the 
motivation for the question. Indeed when the latter version of the question is posed, many 
appreciate the interest and happily tell of their remembered homeland. Significantly, in 
Angelina’s account is a recognition that the power to accept or decline someone lies squarely 
with native-born speakers. 
215 
 
 The day to day racialization that Rwandans in the GTA encountered ensured that, despite 
their persistence, ambition and perseverance, they were not perceived to be fully Canadian. The 
Canadian state, as a central institution of national discourses, has actively maintained a 
systematic hierarchy of belonging whereby white Anglos are presumed to be the keepers of the 
nation and they possess the power to name and classify those who belong and to remind those 
who do not belong of their place outside the national cosmology. Thus, Rwandans in the GTA 
faced state constructed, reinforced and maintained racialization. They simultaneously faced 
racialization in their interpersonal and day to day encounters with classmates, co-workers and 
neighbours. Those who identify as Rwandans encounter these systemic barriers in their day to 
day lives as they are systematically racialized as black and as African. By generating discourses 
of multiculturalism and thus holding out the promise of belonging, the Canadian state offers a 
tantalizing promise of a new space of belonging. But, too often, as the above discussion has 
demonstrated, multiculturalism is the window dressing of a hierarchical system whereby those 
who are racialized are institutionally denied their place. This only partial inclusion in the nation 
in which they have made their home creates a need for belonging elsewhere, and, for many, that 
need for belonging is thus inscribed onto the idea of a Rwandan diaspora and a connection to the 
homeland through transnational practices.  
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Chapter Six 
The Contradictory Dynamics of Transnationalism  
 
Previous chapters have spoken at some length about the universalizing national 
cosmology that the Rwandan state has sought to impose upon those who identify as Rwandan but 
make their homes and lives in the GTA. Yet the dissemination of knowledge, especially about 
who belongs in the nation and what constitutes the nation, is not uni-directional. Those who 
identify as Rwandans in the GTA actively engage in transnational ties with the imagined 
homeland of Rwanda and individually and collectively negotiate the parameters of belonging. 
They sustain transnational ties with family and friends in Rwanda, generating a sense of 
closeness and connection, despite the vast geographical distance between them. Thus they 
sustain dual emotional worlds—the one in the GTA of the nuclear family, and the one in Rwanda 
of the larger Rwandan mythical family. Many in the community also have developed charities 
and other forms of non-governmental organizations which allow them to participate in the civic 
life of Rwanda as well as determine their own idea of belonging to the Rwandan nation. Finally, 
most in the community are also subject to state-generated and driven networks and connections 
to Rwanda. Yet, though the Rwandan state seeks to monitor and control who belongs in the 
Rwandan nation, these individuals’ sense of belonging is hotly contested. They consciously 
create connections and imagine new versions of the state, even as a universalizing one is 
imposed upon them. Though they are subject to the narratives of transnationalism that the 
Rwandan regime imposes for its political and economic ends, those who identify as Rwandans in 
the GTA are transnational agents in their own right, who often actively challenge the regime’s 
mythico-history and policing of identity. 
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There are three broad trends of transnational activity that Rwandans in the GTA 
undertake: individual/familial connections, non-governmental engagements, and state-driven 
networks. Individuals retain very close ties to the families that they have in Rwanda through 
phone communication, internet communication and through travel to Rwanda. Though not all of 
the participants in this study had the financial means to travel to Rwanda, nearly all expressed a 
deep desire to do so. Those with the financial means of travel often did so annually, and 
perceived it to be a duty, as well as a pleasure. The internet provides the most readily accessible 
means of retaining ties to friends and family in Rwanda as social media had enabled quick and 
efficient communication and many participants reported daily contact through Facebook and 
other forums. This form of connection, retained despite the uprooting of the migrant, serves to 
create an affective transnational community, whereby national state borders do not have a 
monopoly on classification and identification. This type of transnationalism, largely established 
and maintained beyond the scope of a state (provided that the state does not limit access, to, for 
example, the internet, and thus does not intervene), is an example of so-called “‘little’ 
transnationalism---of household and family” and is probably one of the most durable forms of 
transnational activity (Vertovec 2009, 18).   
Another common form of transnational engagement among the Rwandan community in 
the GTA was the formation of non-governmental organizations devoted to many goals, but, most 
commonly, to development in Rwanda. Among the community in the GTA, I counted at least 5 
different charities/organizations, formed by those who identify as Rwandans in the GTA and 
committed to promoting economic and social development in Rwanda through various activities 
such as: funding education for youth, offering training in Christian ministries, training widows in 
skills such as sewing, and offering housing and support to orphans. This form of transnational 
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activity often also entailed physical movement between Canada and Rwanda, but, more 
commonly, it entailed the diffusion of expertise and capital from Canada to Rwanda. It is an 
example of transnationalism “from below” which denotes “local, grassroots activity” (Vertovec 
2009, 18). As Mahler points out, transnationalism from below “can generate creole identities and 
agencies that challenge multiple levels of structural control: local, regional, national, and global” 
(2009, 68). This type of transnationalism is not instituted by state institutions in that it is 
instigated and enacted by individuals and communities, yet it relies heavily upon the cooperation 
of a state system, both to permit the movement of capital and expertise across state borders, and 
then to enact the grassroots vision of development within the state. It may be “from below”, but 
it is subject to the regulatory power of the state, and, thus, unlike “little” transnationalism, it does 
not weave around existing state institutions, but necessitates the active participation and 
intervention of states.  
The third category of transnational activity is that instigated by the Rwandan state. 
During the period of the present study, this included regularly held Rwanda Days whereby 
President Kagame traveled to major urban centres in Europe and North America and met with 
the local diaspora community in order to encourage investment in and return to Rwanda. This 
was supported by a well-funded information campaign paired with infrastructure development in 
Rwanda to facilitate such investment. It also included programs whereby the state offered 
funding to bring diaspora members to visit Rwanda and “Come and See, Go and Tell” how well 
reconciled and developed the nation state had become. This program supported the Rwandan 
state’s project of ‘reconciliation’ by exposing those living abroad to the developments in 
Rwanda. Those who were thus funded were then tasked with telling their friends and colleagues 
in the diaspora just how developed and reconciled Rwanda had become (Government of Rwanda 
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2014). Interestingly, according to one participant, this program specifically targeted Hutus in the 
diaspora in order to persuade them that the ethnic divides were a thing of the past and return to 
Rwanda was, once again, a possibility.  
 This form of state-led transnationalism begs the question—was this transnationalism, or 
internationalism? It seemed to be an example of state institutions acting on behalf of the state 
mechanism in an international capacity. However, the audience and subjects of these activities 
were not other states, nor an imagined international community, but migrants who had left 
Rwanda and made their homes elsewhere. These are transnational interventions because the 
Rwandan state was transcending the state order/system and speaking to a group that it had 
labeled the diaspora. In creating this label, the Rwandan state had generated a space of extra-
state belonging and existence. Yet this space of belonging to a deterritorialized notion of Rwanda 
is not open to all who would wish to seek it out. The Rwandan state created a narrative of 
belonging for those who had agreed with its national cosmology, and denied belonging, 
potentially even life, to those who had challenged its mythico-history.   
The Rwandan-state led initiatives served the primary purpose of encouraging return and 
investment in Rwanda. Yet, perhaps more significantly, they also served to enforce and 
disseminate the Rwandan state’s myths beyond its borders. As Brubaker suggests, the modern 
state is “one of the most important agents of identification and categorization”, but “even the 
most powerful state does not monopolize the production and diffusion of identifications and 
categories” (2006, 43). The individual/familial and non-governmental forms of transnational 
activity generated narratives that offered alternative notions of what it meant to be a Rwandan 
residing in the GTA. As such, before discussing state-led transnationalism, it seems most useful 
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to begin a discussion of transnational practices by investigating bottom-up, individualized 
practices and those enacted through non-governmental organizations.  
 
 
Little Transnationalisms  
Those who have family in Rwanda had been able to sustain long-term close ties and 
contact with the imagined national community by communicating with those family members 
who still resided in the remembered homeland. The more urbanized and middle class the family 
members, the greater the ease of communication as they now had access to technologies like the 
internet and cell phones. These universally human ties sustained affective connections to 
individual people, such as parents, siblings, children left behind, spouses, cousins and friends, 
thus creating a sense of community and belonging, in the absence of a new community in the 
new host/homeland. Yet as the migrant slowly built up new affective ties in the new 
host/homeland, one would expect that the ties to those in the homeland would slowly peter out 
and become secondary to newly formed connections. However, as Janvier demonstrated, daily 
interaction with those from “home” was an integral part of many migrants’ lives:  
I call Rwanda every morning. I’m glad that my parents are still alive, they’re in their 
eighties. I make sure that I call them every day, and I make sure that I call my brothers 
who are also there. So thank god technology has facilitated all that, we now buy calling 
cards it’s no longer exorbitant the way it was in the ‘80s or the ‘90s. We now have calling 
cards and they also have cell phones, which is another technology which has really made 
the whole [...] even faster. Communication has developed faster than other areas. So I’m 
in touch on a daily basis (Janvier).  
Even though he had lived in the GTA since the 80s (and thus had lived away from the imagined 
homeland for nearly three decades), Javier still called his parents daily—which is more than 
many adult children who live in the same city as their aging parents. But his bond extended 
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beyond his parents as he phoned his brothers nearly as often, as well. This daily connection 
allowed him to sustain the sense of kinship with his biological family, as well as the affective 
imagination of his place in the nation since he was able to daily hear gossip from the street, the 
neighbour’s troubles, the other neighbours daughter’s successes, another neighbour’s drunken 
altercation with the beat cop. These snippets of largely irrelevant day to day life narratives, the 
actual stuff of life, placed Janvier in the homeland affectively in a way that was impossible when 
he lived there. When he had lived in the homeland, he would not have been able to chortle at the 
neighbour’s drunken altercation because he would have been angered at the vomit on his front 
step; he would not have been able to cheer on the other neighbour’s daughter’s success because 
he would have been jealous that his children were not as lucky or successful. He would have had 
to face, day in and day out, those whom he held responsible for the genocide. However, at the 
literal remove of thousands of kilometers, Janvier could indulgently hear these stories and thus 
create an idealized homeland narrative where people are closer to one another (than in Canada), 
and to feel “proud of being Rwandese” because “look at who did what in the genocide and how 
they are living in harmony with their neighbours” (Janvier).  
 Yet not everyone had such a rosy picture of “back home”; many who had migrated and 
made new homes in the GTA engaged in forms of little transnationalism, but were not 
enthusiastic about it; rather, the practice carried emotional and financial responsibilities which 
were not easily borne. Because Patrice migrated by himself, it could be assumed that he would 
have eagerly sustained ties like Janvier had done. However, in reality, sustaining transnational 
ties to his family and friends became more of a burden than a joy: 
Patrice: when you got here, they expect you to bring something for them. So, for them you are 
 living a better life—making more, so everything is better so they expect you to bring 
 something. You cannot just bring $500, or a $1000, no, no, if you take some money first 
 of all for your family, everybody knows after a week that you’re there.  
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Interviewer: You have to bring gifts for everyone.  
 
Patrice: Everyone. It may not be money, but it’s, it does something too. Some people are even 
 like 40, like, older than you, start coming to you like “how are my kids going to go to 
 school?” “What can you do for me?”   
 
Interviewer: Right, they start asking you for favours.  
 
Patrice: And you cannot afford it. And sometimes you live a different reality here, you say no to 
 the person asking, like what’s going on? You’re kind of confused. You can’t say no. You 
 feel uncomfortable. And then someone else will come, what am I going to do? 
 
Interviewer: Right, then word will get around that you are giving away money. 
 
Patrice: And I know people who will go there and plan to stay there for a month, and come back 
 after 2 weeks because they have no money left. They can’t afford to stay.  
 
Interviewer: That’s really prohibitive. 
 
Patrice: It is. It’s, it’s a challenge. But the thing is that’s where, like, if, I decide to go, I think I 
 would have to plan like I’m going on a mission, or something like that. Yeah, cause the 
 first time when you go back, the first thing you have in your mind is oh, I wanna see my 
 family. I wanna see them, you don’t really expect that they will ask for that much. And 
 it’s also going back to see friends. For me when I see friends, I’m going to have fun, have 
 a meal, share something, but then you see people after the meal, saying that, start asking 
 things—you don’t expect that. And then, then, okay, so you came here to help people or 
 you came here to see people? That’s when I’m saying next time when you go back you 
 have to change how you view it. So that, the first thing you think is “I’m going back 
 home”, you expect to go and have fun. It doesn’t happen, it’s different (Patrice).  
 
So the transnational migrant, who was barely able to support himself in the new homeland where 
he had been relegated to a low-wage service sector position, found himself unable to travel to see 
his family and friends without undue financial burdens placed upon him by those very people 
whom he wished to see. Even those outside his direct circle felt that it was appropriate to ask him 
for favours and gifts as they now perceived him to be a “Westerner” and thus, by definitional 
fiat, economically successful. The result of this dynamic was that Patrice, and others who had not 
attained middle-class security in their new homeland, were unable to travel “home” even if they 
were able to travel to Rwanda, because “home” was now the site of demands and subsequent 
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guilt when the migrant was unable to live up to the expectations placed upon him as a 
transnational migrant.  
 Maintaining transnational ties carried emotional burdens alongside significant financial 
burdens as well. Olivia explained that she needed to travel to Rwanda because it was “part of my 
healing process too, like every time I have a chance, I can afford it and I have time to go, I will 
go. Cause I still have a strong attachment with that country”. Yet she also explained that 
travelling back to Rwanda awakened what she termed “survival guilt because I worked with 
women survivors, I worked with orphans, I worked with people in need, who were physically 
and psychologically hurt, so when I had to leave, it felt like there was some unfinished business 
for me”. This survival guilt was paired with guilt that “my personal contribution was not there”, 
that she had been unable to offer service and aid in the development of a new Rwanda. Thus, the 
technologies that enabled the migrant to retain closer ties than ever before also come with an 
emotional cost and placed burdens upon the new migrant attempting to build a life for herself in 
a new homeland.  
 
 
Little Digital Transnationalism  
Engaging in individual/familial forms of transnationalism across time and space creates 
an alternative idea of the nation, which does not rely on territorial claims or state institutions; 
rather, it fosters and feeds an affective nation, whereby the migrant who is no longer within the 
nation-state does not feel any less Rwandan for his distance. Further, as Kadende-Kaiser has 
observed in the case of Burundian digital activism, online interactions can create spaces in which 
victims of political violence may find room for healing (2003). While none of the following 
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examples deal explicitly with trauma and healing, the memory of violence is ever present in the 
references to the mythico-history, and in individual attempts at connection. The migrant thus can 
envision that the Rwandan nation transcends the state and its geo-political limits. Jean-Paul 
describes this affective tie when he explains that: 
I don’t see myself as a Canadian, I see myself as a Rwandan. I don’t have any Canadian 
papers. Sometimes when someone calls me Rwandan-Canadian, or Canadian-Rwandan, 
I’m like, I should be called Rwandan. Just that, you know? It’s so great that you can’t let 
it go in any way, yeah. Even if things change, if things were like whatever, I still feel that 
I’m so connected to my country in a way that I can’t explain. I don’t know how. I mean, I 
find myself laughing at myself sometimes, I mean I spend a great amount of time reading 
about local [Rwandan] stuff, the newspapers have some websites I keep reading them, 
anyone who has written anything, my Google alerts are saved for Rwanda. I’m like, why 
do I have to do this? I’m not there, if they are doing anything it does not affect me at all, 
but something forces me to keep in close touch with Rwanda and I can’t give it up. Like I 
can’t get it out of my head (Jean-Paul). 
 
Jean-Paul was aware of his literal and psychological distance from Rwanda as he recognized that 
“if they are doing anything, it does not affect me at all”, yet he could not help but sustain his 
emotional connection to the nation as inscribed in news feeds and social media. This ability to 
keep informed and, potentially, to intervene in the dialogue on social media, enabled him to 
imagine that he was exclusively “Rwandan”, which he distinguished from “Rwandan-Canadian 
or Canadian-Rwandan”. These hybrid hyphenated markers did not sit well with his sense of self. 
His insistence upon his unitary identity, despite migration to the GTA, is itself a form of 
transnationalism. Though it seems to challenge the implicit hybridity of the transnational 
migrant, the fact that his chosen national identification was to the nation-state that he no longer 
resided in, and had no plans of returning to, suggests that hybridity is not the only form of 
transnational identity. Indeed, his intellectual and affective ties were so strong, that he “can’t get 
it out of [his] head”; his identification with the imagined deterritorialized nation seems 
compulsive, and unconscious. Yet, the maintenance of this tie required active engagement with 
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the imagined homeland and with those who resided there. Jean-Paul had to continue to follow the 
social media and news outlets in order to feel that he was close and connected, despite the 
distance. He, like the Eritreans whom Victoria Bernal observed online, understood himself as 
deeply rooted, involved and “acting on behalf of [his] nation” (Bernal 2014, 4). He was 
participating in the creation of a digital transnational idea of the nation. This idea goes beyond 
the state and its policies, the geographic space designated “Rwanda” and the people who identify 
with this identity. This third space, very much a contemporary component of diasporic Rwandan 
identity, is the virtual notion of ethnicity/nationhood, whereby the individual in question reads, 
comments, posts on forums, news sites, and in social media, and thus imagines that he is an 
active participant in national affairs, as well the domestic affairs of the distant family. Bernal 
proposes that this new relationship between states and diasporas is altering the meanings and the 
practices of citizenship and sovereignty and that “the diaspora used the internet to create Eritrean 
space online in ways that extended the nation and the sovereignty of the state into the diaspora 
and the virtual” (2014, 27), a topic that will be further explored in the section that deals with 
state-led transnationalism. Many scholars have also observed that rather than weaken ties to the 
nation-state, migrants’ ability to connect through virtual connections has led to a strengthening of 
national identities (Dahan and Scheffer, 2001; Parham 2005; Erikson 2007; Bernal 2014).  
 The evolution of digital technologies, especially social media like Facebook, had further 
facilitated interpersonal transnational connections as families regularly communicated through 
these means. Theodosia explained that her children were able to sustain a sense of family with 
family members whom they had not seen in a long time (or, in some cases, ever), through 
Facebook. She was warmly proud that: 
when I speak to my mom, they ask me –ohh, who is that? And I say grandmother, and 
they say, oh, grandmother, can I speak to her? You see now they have this relationship of 
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wanting to speak to their grandmother, of wanting to speak to their nieces and cousins, 
their aunties. Yeah, sometimes when I see them, sometimes when I am on the Facebook, 
when I see their picture, I say ohh come and see so and so. So it’s a connection. And 
that’s the connection I wanted to build with the family back home. So because when they 
go there and they see there and when I talk to them, and when we come back and they see 
the pictures, they can write to each other, they can remember each other. That’s a 
connection, that’s the relationship I wanted to build with the family back home 
(Theodosia).  
 
The children, who were born in Canada, were able to imagine a kinship with people who were 
born and raised in an East African nation-state (not necessarily Rwanda), because they travelled 
to visit these people and then were taught to reinforce and deepen the shallow ties to these people 
who really only shared genetic material and ancestry, as social media platforms enabled the 
perception that one was emotionally and psychologically close to them. This notion of family 
bonds would have been impossible in a pre-internet era as letter writing was arduous and largely 
only undertaken by those who already shared an affinity and tie (Bernal 2014). Thus, children 
born to migrants outside of the homeland would not as easily have been able to imagine a distant 
family as emotionally close because they lacked both a shared history and the capacity to 
regularly interact with said distant family. In this sense, the intergenerational transfer of affective 
ties and connections to specific people, not just to an imagined community, is a product of new 
technologies, especially the world of Facebook.  
 Yet not all transnational migrants were delighted with the ability to sustain digital ties 
easily. Especially Facebook could serve as both a means of togetherness, and generate 
simultaneous distance. Patrice explained that having the ability to glance into other people’s lives 
became a double-edged sword when what he witnessed was his friends’ successes and these 
stood in sharp contrast to his circumscribed efforts to build a new life. As he put it: “right now 
everybody is getting Facebook, so that’s really helping to keep in touch—pictures and stuff like 
that. And something interesting, most of my friends, they are married, some of them might have 
227 
 
even kids, […] Whereas here, you’re still trying to make a life, you know? To settle down” 
(Patrice). He was happy for his friends, but his difficulty in attaining the same worldly goods in 
the host/homeland sharply accentuated his distance from the old homeland. His experience 
stands in contrast to the celebration of the virtual nations and nationhood as it illustrates that 
even in a virtual world, economic marginalization in the hostland can weaken ties with the 
homeland as the migrant feels individualized shame, thus he chooses to distance himself.   
 
 
Children’s Transnational Imaginations  
 As I mentioned above, the children of migrants, especially those who were either born 
outside Rwanda, or so young at the time of migration that all their conscious memories were 
formed after, were still able to develop transnational connections with those in Rwanda and thus 
tap into an affective Rwandan nation. André described how his children, all of whom had been 
born in Canada, carried with them an imagined Africa and were very trepidatious when they first 
visited. Despite being the children of migrants, these children were fully saturated in the 
Canadian/Western cosmology of the West as the centre of civilization, commerce and modernity, 
and the rest, especially Africa, as the site of savagery, tribalism and tradition. As the father 
explained to me, they could not envision Rwanda as a cultural/linguistic/economic entity apart 
from larger Africa. Rather, they conceived that they were travelling to a mythical Africa of 
famine and danger. Much to their father’s grim amusement, they anticipated that Rwanda would 
be primitive and have insufficient food to feed them, and that there would be wild animals 
roaming the streets. As André explained, “kids who are born here live in another world” and 
were unable to imagine the Rwanda of which their parents spoke. Thus, when they encountered 
civility, order and modernity in the form of urban streetscapes with restaurants and shops they 
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were “very impressed”. They were stunned to realize that the wild animals, especially the famous 
gorillas, which they had half feared and half desired, where only present in national parks and 
not roaming the streets of Kigali (though the image is an amusing one calling to mind something 
out of a Kipling narrative), and that there were no lions in Rwanda (contrary to the mythical 
world of Disney’s Lion King, which was one of the few images of Africa that they possessed). 
This culture shock, for it can only be called that, calls to mind the culture shock, discussed in the 
previous chapter, of those who migrated from Rwanda to Canada. Thus the children of the 
migrants experienced a similar sense of dislocation and displacement upon travelling to Rwanda.
 Yet, upon adjusting to this alternate reality, the children, according to the reports of 
parents, came to truly love the parent’s homeland. André’s children got to spend time on their 
grandmother’s farm and encountered the delights, so often foreign to urban children, of eating 
fresh produce and fresh dairy. According to their parents, they were further delighted by the 
extended kinship system of everyone being called “auntie/uncle” or “grandma/grandpa” as they 
were used to a narrower conception of family. Theodosia likewise described that her children 
initially experienced dislocation, but rapidly came to see the pleasures of having a distant 
homeland. The language of Kinyarwanda, which was often the only language spoken by 
grandparents in Rwanda, became an initial obstacle as the children who were raised in Canada 
were unlikely to understand it and felt excluded from all adult interactions. However, after some 
time spent among family, children often began to pick up the language and were able to interact 
with their new family and “they loved it, they enjoyed it, it was a good experience for them” 
(Theodosia). Children seemed to especially take to the idea of having an extended family as their 
experience in Canada had been of the nuclear family only. The addition of so many people into 
one’s circle of “family” created a sense of belonging and acceptance, though, as many parents 
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reluctantly admitted, after a few weeks of this type of immersion, the children yearned to return 
to their Canadian lives and to their PlayStations. Thus the children’s transnationalism differed 
from the parents’ transnationalism as it inverted the experiences and expectations as few children 
would come to see Rwanda as the primary home—for most, home would remain Canada, but 
Rwanda could become a second home, accessed through online interactions and occasional 
visits. This echoes the findings of many studies that focus on the second-generation experience 
of migration and transnationalism, though the particular circumstances and internal politics of 
each diasporic group determines the degree of affiliation that second generation migrants feel for 
the homeland (Christou 2006; McAuliffe 2007).  
 For many children of migrants, the experience of suddenly becoming exotic and desirable 
and not just other, was an intoxicating adventure. Simon’s daughter first travelled to Rwanda 
when she was 8 years old and the experience of “everybody wants to take care of you and so she 
felt so special, seeing everywhere she goes that they treat her with consideration” allowed her to 
see herself as someone of value, not just a tolerated outsider in a dominant white society. She 
gained “a strong personality” and confidence from being perceived and treated thus, and, upon 
returning to school in Toronto, “she was talking to everyone in her school about her family in 
Rwanda” (Simon). Yet, as her father explained, he worked hard to teach her she is neither 
Canadian nor Rwandan, but “I want her to grow up feeling just she is human” (Simon). While he 
was delighted that his daughter had learned to feel connected and even proud of his homeland, he 
stressed a fundamental anti-nationalist humanism as his personal challenge to the terrors that that 
occurred in the name of hyper-nationalism in Rwanda. His ability to envision himself as neither 
Canadian nor Rwandan was a direct consequence of migration. It was the dislocation from the 
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territorial state that opened up affective and ideological possibilities of belonging to new 
imagined communities.  
 
 
Imagined and Real Transnational Interventions in Rwanda 
Those who understood themselves to be transnational migrants framed themselves as 
actively involved and invested in contemporary developments in the imagined homeland. 
Janvier, in extolling Rwanda’s virtues, constantly used the pronoun “we”, as in:  
Rwanda today is the envy of so many African countries. Economically, politically, 
socially, and otherwise. We have leaders in Rwanda who tell us that being in an 
environment of blind people, we shouldn’t take any pride that we are partially blind. 
Okay? Which translates into—we shouldn’t compare ourselves to other impoverished 
countries around, okay? We should aim at being Singapore, we should aim at being 
Canada, so, being better than the way things are in Uganda (Janvier). 
 
The persistence of the personal collective pronoun indicated his affective attachment and his 
perception that he had as much of a stake in the doings of the Rwandan state as those who 
resided within Rwanda. While in some ways this is an imagined attachment as, living and 
working in Canada, the socio-political events occurring in Rwanda only marginally affected him, 
yet, in other ways, those in the diaspora often have a deep stake in domestic events. Especially 
those who contribute through remittances have not only a stake in the outcomes, but also a claim 
to affect those outcomes. Yet, few were eager to mention if they sent remittances or how much 
they sent, though there was a general understanding that most families sent some form of 
remittance back, as Patrice had indicated. In some cases these took the form of buying property 
for elderly parents, or purchasing cattle and other livestock for family farms, or sending school 
fees for a niece or nephew. Others bought themselves land in Rwanda, as they imagined that they 
might one day return to retire in the remembered homeland. Yet, few wanted to discuss the 
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details, and when one participant mentioned that he had bought his parents cattle, for instance, he 
was very quick to explain that this was a form of wealth in Rwanda and that it would ensure the 
elderly parents a stable income. It seemed that because the forms of remittance were not only 
monetary, and thus perceived as Western/modern, the participant felt that I, as an outsider, would 
not understand the value of the gift, or, perhaps, feared that I would read the giver and recipient 
as pre-modern, according to western mythologies of Africa.  
 Many migrants felt an emotional stake in the efforts at reconciliation in post-genocide 
Rwanda and, as Christophe explained, firmly believed that they had a role to play in preventing a 
recurrence of genocide, even though they lived in Canada. He argued that: 
I think that there is a role that everybody can play to make sure that the past we have seen 
that doesn’t come back, that the history doesn’t repeat itself, and it’s not because the 
international community is there, it’s going to do something, it’s not because there are 
people who are outside who are going to do those things, because it’s a process, so it’s 
only Rwandans who can build successfully that process. So, and I feel also that there’s a 
role that I can play to make sure that my kids will not experience the same history that I 
experienced (Christophe).  
 
Even as he was building a life in Canada, he still worked to create a future for his potential future 
children that was free of the violence that had marked his life so profoundly. His intervention is 
an interesting one to understand as an act of transnationalism as his activism was to offer lectures 
in Canada to school groups, church groups, and any other organization willing to listen, on the 
history of the genocide (his version closely resembled the state’s narratives, as I discussed in 
chapter 3). His intervention in homeland politics was to lecture on this topic to Canadian 
audiences. The identity of the audience is significant because it points to the nature of 
transnational activism. As Christophe envisioned, his activism was geared towards reconciliation 
and recovery in the homeland, but he was seeking to attain this end by engaging with those who 
were not connected to Rwanda. While from the outside this appears contradictory, it makes sense 
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if we understand that his idea of Rwanda and Rwandaness extends beyond the national/geo-
political entity to an idea, a possibility of a future free of violence, and this idea, while directed at 
the geo-political space of Rwanda, could be enacted elsewhere.  
 The belief that such a future was possible, perhaps even already occurring, was another 
common feature of narratives of transnational emotional investment. Revocata spoke at length of 
the degree to which “the country was completely destroyed” after the genocide and how a new 
Rwanda had now emerged. Her pride in the new Rwanda was evident as she explained that 
where Rwanda was now was remarkable as Kigali was “now safer than some areas of Toronto” 
and though “some types of leadership may not be the same as in Canada”, “the country is trying 
very hard” (Revocata). While she did not place herself in the narrative the way that Janvier and 
Christophe had, her personal stake and investment in the new Rwanda was evident in the ardour 
with which she defended it against an (imagined) attack.  
 
 
Absence of Affective Transnationalism  
 To propose that the above discussed engagements are indeed transnational, we need to be 
able to point to moments/engagements where the migrant does not develop transnational ties, 
otherwise, transnationalism is simultaneously everything and nothing. Seraphine discussed how 
astounded she was to perceive the changes in the new Rwanda. Yet, at the same time, she no 
longer perceived herself as belonging to that society. She was impressed with “progress” and 
“development”, for instance, that “the president has a system where students do study for free, 
like the whole primary, elementary school—like it was not there before. Uhh, that is something 
that I said, wow this is great, even if you can’t manage to pay for high school, but at least you 
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have that basic education. And umm, even in general, to see how the country is progressing” 
(Seraphine) At the same time, she felt that “but I don’t think I can live there”. She did not 
perceive herself as having a transnational identity whereby she could feel a belonging in more 
than one locality at once; rather, her narrative was one of the decline of identification with 
Rwandaness as her identification with Canadianess emerged. She articulated that  
in the first few years when I just got here, I was still back in Rwanda, ‘cause I was not 
sure what’s here, how, how do I integrate here, how do I come around and feel at home, 
but after those years, after now, I don’t, I just, when I go to Rwanda I feel like I’m a 
visitor. A visitor who is excited to see how the country is progressing, to see how, what 
has happened, but I don’t feel like I’m there, I’m part of them. I don’t feel like I’m 
Rwandese (Seraphine). 
 
 After years in Canada, she came to see herself as “Canadian, like I’m, I’m a Canadian, I feel like 
this is my home”. Interestingly, she framed herself as an outsider, a “visitor” when she traveled 
to Rwanda, unlike others who ardently maintained that they belonged in Rwanda and reinforced 
this affective tie with physical ties such as land ownership. Though she was still connected to 
Rwanda and Rwandaness, as her travel to Rwanda indicated, she did not see herself as 
transnationally identified.  
 Likewise, Angelina was impressed with the economic and social progress that she had 
witnessed in Rwanda when she traveled there, but also understood herself to be an outside 
observer:  
I do not fully feeling like I’m a Rwandan, any longer. One is because I never lived there 
as a child, to have a very strong bond with the country, I can see Rwanda and associate it 
with my extended family, but I really don’t have anything to miss much, uhh, I still feel, 
when I was going there I felt I’m  more Canadian than Rwandan. But I have love for 
Rwanda because I know people who I grew up with,[…] but I feel like I’m a visitor 
(Angelina).  
 
Both Angelina and Seraphine used the term “visitor” to describe their place in the imagined 
homeland, which, evidently, is no longer their homeland. Both women expressed a greater 
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emotional affinity for Canada than for Rwanda, thus challenging the assumption that migration 
necessarily creates transnational identities. Interestingly, both women traveled to Rwanda and 
were invested and interested in developments there, but used third person pronouns to describe 
these developments—“they”, “their”, etc.—rather than the personal possessive pronouns evident 
in Janvier’s discussion of Rwanda. These women’s attachment to Rwanda was qualitatively 
different than the attachment expressed by others mentioned earlier, and it is by taking account 
of the difference in their degree of affective ties that it becomes evident that there is no universal 
experience of migration nor of subsequent transnational identification to Rwanda while living in 
Canada; rather, each individual experience, while subject to the universalizing narratives of both 
states, is shaped by the individual agency and perspective of that person.  
 
 
Transnationalism from Below: Civil Society 
Non-governmental organizations have long been considered a significant part of 
contemporary transnationalism. These organizations are often perceived as a component of the 
assumed assault on the state as they breed an idea of transnational civil society that has the 
ability to affect national interests and introduce new social and political norms into the state. As 
Steffen Mau argues, “the role of civil society actors is crucial, because they can have an 
important function in the articulation of political claims and interests which can no longer be 
sufficiently represented in the framework of the nation-state” (2010, 163). Indeed, in the case of 
post-genocide Rwanda, the state had little capacity to offer any services, and the proliferation of 
external civil society actors did serve to articulate new claims and interests. However, with the 
creation and establishment of the post-genocide regime, the state has increasingly come back as 
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the central political actor. Thus, though it initially appeared that the nation-state’s dominance and 
utility was in question, its return has once again inscribed it as the pivotal institution in the 
formation of Rwandan society and diaspora, as will be argued below. Nonetheless, those in the 
diaspora, seeing the initial needs in the wake of the genocide, rallied individually and in small 
numbers and created non-governmental organizations to offer multiple services. As I mentioned 
earlier, during my research among the diaspora in the GTA, I counted at least 5 distinct NGOs 
that had been created in the 20 years since the genocide.  
The first example of this relatively new form of transnationalism for this community was 
an informal religious network that offered skills training in Burundi, Rwanda, Congo and 
Uganda. A number of religious leaders in the GTA had organized themselves into an informal 
network that offered what they termed “discipleship” training in Rwanda and other states in the 
region. This program was designed initially to help fill the spiritual gap left by genocide in 
Rwanda, but as it slowly took on life, religious communities in states adjacent to Rwanda 
became involved, and it came to serve a much broader regional purpose. While it was organized 
by religious leaders, it was not centralized through any one church or central organization and 
instead relied on the contacts and expertise of the few who participated, making it very much the 
brainchild of the creators. Jean explained the purpose of this organization thus: “I go there to 
train some local pastors because most of the pastors there died during the genocide, so we have 
to train people and also to encourage Canadian missionaries to go there and help, and also, you 
know, not only missionaries, but other people who are trained in different ways, as teachers and 
so forth” (Jean). Not only did this organization offer spiritual support, but it also offered more 
bricks and mortar aid, as it sent funds for particular projects, like the building of a church or 
school, found teachers able to teach in the school, and filled other gaps left by the state. 
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 Interestingly, it was not only those of Rwandan descent who offered their services, as 
“missionaries from Kitchener, Ontario, different areas, from Thunder Bay, we are doing some 
good work there, you know, different ways” (Jean). As Jean and his colleagues sought to offer 
their skills in order to rebuild Rwanda, they also tapped into their new Canadian networks and 
utilized the expertise of other members of their new religious communities, indeed, explicitly, as 
Jean explained, those extending to “white churches”, in order to provide services in Rwanda. Of 
particular relevance to the present study was the fact that this organization brought to the fore 
new ideas about who participated in the civil society of Rwanda. Now, non-Rwandans, people 
who had had no previous connection to Rwanda, offered not only financial support, but, more 
significantly, skills and expertise as they travelled to Rwanda as missionaries with a variety of 
additional practical purposes. Interestingly, this ongoing grassroots intervention upset Western 
discourses of the primitive, undeveloped ‘Rest’ needing the aid of the civilized, developed 
‘West’, even as Western missionaries traveled to Africa, replicating a centuries old narrative 
(Mudimbe 1988). As Jean expressed, the white, non-Rwandan, missionaries were very surprised 
by what they encountered in Rwanda and often expressed a new found love/affinity for the 
region. Indeed, they “like it more than we actually […] expected”, and they returned to their 
Canadian homes with a new idea of a very particular culture (Jean). This transnational 
intervention of non-Rwandan Canadians served to undercut universalizing narratives about 
Rwandan primitivism, while sustaining universalizing Christian narratives, but, perhaps more 
significantly, it served to re-frame how those of Rwandan origin in the GTA were perceived by 
their religious peers. The missionaries who had traveled, presumably expecting to find 
primitivism and poverty, likely the same tropes that André’s sons had expected, encountered 
economic development and growth, cultural plurality, warm hospitality and, effectively, a 
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society fully embroiled in day to day modernity. As a few participants explained, their colleagues 
learned to see them differently, from associated with primitivism and genocidal violence, to 
agents and subjects of complex subjectivities and plural, transnational identities. Thus the 
involvement of non-Rwandans in this transnational activity had the effect of altering how 
Rwandans in the GTA were perceived and read, effectively altering the discursive 
understandings about Rwandaness in the GTA.   
Another transnational engagement which has had the effect of altering discursive 
meanings of Rwandaness (and, consequently, Canadianess), has been a more institutionalized 
NGO called Shelter Them, created and fostered by two Rwandan community members in the 
GTA. This organization described itself thus: 
Shelter Them is a Christian charitable organization dedicated to helping orphans and 
vulnerable children in Rwanda receive the basics of life.   
Shelter Them was birthed in the hearts of Rwandan genocide survivors, Josephine & 
Jocelyne in 2005. In just a few short years Shelter Them has grown from a small feeding 
program into a recognized charitable organization. We are rescuing the homeless orphans 
in Rwanda and giving them a chance to become a part of Rwandas bright future.    
Our passion and purpose is to rescue orphans and needy children from a hopeless 
life on the streets, and provide them with a bright future (Shelter Them 2014, 
emphasis in original). 
 
As the brainchild of two genocide survivors, this type of grassroots intervention served to 
appease the survivor’s guilt by utilizing the energies and resources in the new homeland to help 
build “Rwandas bright future”. The fact that the mission statement of the organization pointed 
out that it was “birthed in the hearts of Rwandan genocide survivors” inextricably connected the 
emotional needs of the survivors with the activities of the organization. Thus, even as the 
organization sought to engage on the ground in Rwanda, it served to meet the emotional needs of 
Rwandans in the GTA by making them feel (rightfully) that they were potent and able to affect 
change in the lives of those who lived in the remembered/imagined homeland. By creating this 
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type of NGO, those in the diaspora community in the GTA were actively working to alter their 
own narratives as survivors of genocide and migrants in a new homeland. Their ability to 
transcend borders and generate a “transnational social field” (Mahler 2009, 75) altered their self-
perception as Rwandans, and specifically, as Rwandans who survived the genocide, while also 
altering how they were received in Canada. The creation of an NGO could be read as positing 
them as global citizens within the domestic order of Canada and demanded that they be seen as 
potent and globally engaged, rather than as victims and passive interlocutors within the national 
imaginary of the Canadian state. Every year the founders of the organization took 12-15 
volunteers to Rwanda where they engaged in various labours, such as building a playground, 
offering workshops, and visiting with the children whom the charity provided for. These 
volunteers, not unlike the missionaries described above, traveled to Rwanda with a set of 
expectations and returned with new ideas about the place and the people in it. Again, this 
discursive shift in the meaning of Rwandaness forced these volunteers to see their 
hosts/organizers in a new way as they become the agents of both sites, fluent in the languages 
and cultures of both Canada and Rwanda.  
Even as this organization served to alter self and other perceptions of those living in the 
GTA, it also affected the meanings associated with Rwandaness within Rwanda. This 
organization had actively partnered with the Rwandan state in order to secure land and resources 
to build a village outside of Kigali to house the beneficiaries of the charity. Its focus was on 
offering services in order to fill the gaps left by state services. As such, even though it was a 
grassroots initiative of two genocide survivors, it necessitated state intervention and cooperation. 
While Shelter Them did not overtly challenge state narratives or power, by virtue of offering 
social services, with the blessing of the Rwandan state, it pointed to the significant absences, and 
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effectively, to the inability of the state to offer its citizens necessary services. Yet, even as this 
type of charitable organization exposed the absences, by partnering with the Rwandan state, it 
reinforced the hegemony and legitimacy of the state and served to expand its ambit.  
 
 
Rwandan State-led Transnationalism  
In light of annual remittances ranging from $10 million in 2003 to $91 million in 2010 
(World Bank), or, according to the Diaspora General Directorate in Rwanda, $42.85 million in 
2005 to $172.4 million in 2009 (Fransen and Seigel 2011, 10), the Rwandan state has a 
significant interest in retaining close ties with those who have migrated and settled elsewhere. 
Therefore the state instituted the Rwandan Diaspora Global Network, as was discussed in chapter 
4. Indeed, the founding documents expressed the sentiment that: “the Government of Rwanda 
(GoR) strongly believes that the Rwandan Diaspora is an important constituent that cannot be 
ignored and which, if it is well harnessed, can contribute to national socio-economic 
development” (no longer available, quoted from Fransen and Seigel 2011, 13). The Constitution 
of the RDGN further expresses the state’s desire to “harness” those who have migrated in 
expressing “the need for the Rwandan Diaspora members to actively participate in the social, 
cultural and economic development of their motherland and the duty the Rwandan Diaspora owe 
to their future generations” (Constitution of the Rwandan Diaspora Global Network). These 
policy documents actively frame the diaspora as not only another “pillar” of the Rwandan nation 
state, but also as owing allegiance and loyalty to said state. In order to enforce this allegiance, 
especially in the form of further economic remittances, the Rwandan state has actively generated 
transnational ties with its diasporas by reaching out to the ethno-political entrepreneurs in 
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diaspora communities who usually already have ties to the Rwandan state apparatus, and, even, 
by hosting events for the diaspora communities in their new homes.  
 
 
Diaspora as Desirable: Rwanda Day 
During the period of the present study, the most visible articulations of the state’s attempt 
to encompass and return to the national fold those who have migrated were so-called Rwanda 
Days. These were one-day events hosted by the Diaspora General Directorate and organized 
through its local branch of the RDGN. As of 2014, there had been six Rwanda Days: Chicago 
(U.S.A.) 2011, Paris (France) 2011, Boston (U.S.A.) 2012, London (U.K.) 2013, and Toronto 
(Canada) 2013, and Atlanta (USA) 2014. Their stated purpose was as follows: 
Rwanda Day brings together Rwandans and friends of Rwanda living around the world to 
reaffirm their core national value of Agaciro celebrate the country’s progress and discuss 
ways of being part of Rwanda’s social-economic transformation. It is an opportunity for 
Rwandans to meet, interact and exchange views on their country and how they can 
contribute to the vision of a modern, unified and prosperous nation. Rwanda’s success 
depends on Rwandans living at home and abroad working together as well as partnering 
with friends of Rwanda to achieve set goals. Past events held in Boston, Chicago, Paris 
and Brussels were a resounding success and attracted many thousands of Rwandans who 
are committed to their country’s development (RDGN 2014).  
 
Agaciro means dignity and self-respect, but also encompasses a variety of meanings spanning 
national self-definition, individual willingness to submit to the larger good, and specific, 
contextual meanings that only become clear within a given context. I was lucky enough to be 
able to attend the Rwanda Day held in Toronto on September 28, 2013 and thus observe both the 
performance of nation and the response of the GTA community to this performance.  
 In the weeks leading up to the event I started hearing rumors that maybe there might be a 
Rwanda Day in Toronto, but it was only 2 weeks before the event that the organizing committee 
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(made up largely of local RDGN members) was informed that it would take place and began the 
truncated process of planning. At this point nearly everyone in the community knew it would be 
happening two weeks hence, but no one knew where it would be held. An invitation was sent out 
through the RDGN listserv and we (those on the listserv) were asked to sign up online. The 
online registration required us to indicate our involvement and our role, neither of which struck 
me as strange, until I had a conversation about the topic with Fidèle a few weeks after the event. 
He explained that he and others like him who openly criticize the Kagame government for its 
human rights abuses and repression domestically were not permitted to attend as “They know 
me, so if I tried to go there, they would not let me in” (Fidèle). Indeed, the most notable part of 
the event was the extensive security apparatus involved. Up till the night before the event, no one 
was informed where it would be held. Again, this odd detail was explained by Fidèle, who had 
been an organizer of protests held outside the Rwanda Day venue against the Rwandan 
involvement in the gross human rights violations in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Apparently, in order to avoid the protesters, Kagame’s team switched both the hotels and the 
venue for the celebration in the days preceding the event. However, because the Toronto Police 
Services were involved in security for the event, those organizing the protests got wind of the 
changes and were informed of them and thus able to alter their plans as well. Fidèle described the 
cat and mouse game thus: 
Fidèle: A week before, the police came to my house. 
Interviewer: Canadian police? 
Fidèle: Canadian police. I was at work, they give a business card to my wife, asking them to 
 contact they need to speak to me. My wife gave me the number, I call him, say, so what 
 do you want to talk about? He said ‘I wanna talk about Rwanda Day’. My thinking 
 maybe the Kagame people who is here they want me to stop what I am doing, so I was 
 not surprised that my name came up. But I didn’t know who gave them my name. So, I 
 told them, anytime you can see me. He asked me, can I see you today? I said, I’m 
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 working but after 6 we can meet. He said, okay, let’s see you tomorrow, then. After that, 
 because we have, I don’t know if you know, [Christopher Black] he’s a lawyer for the 
 ICC in Arusha—he’s helping us. I asked him what do you think, should I see them? He 
 said, don’t worry, I’m gonna come too. So he came with me, and we meet across from 
 my work and I asked them, they asked me, are you agreed to do a peaceful protest. Of 
 course I’m going to do a peaceful protest. I asked them if I’m allowed to do a protest, ‘Of 
 course, 100%, this is Canada, you can do it’. I asked them, how come my name come up? 
 They say, okay, we didn’t supposed to tell you that, but I’m gonna tell you why. So, there 
 was a Kagame security, two people, so everybody somebody come to the country, like 
 some big figure, they have to do research, they have a system, they put Rwanda and 
 whatever names comes up, so they have to see them. They say, your name come up as a 
 first name, that’s why we’re here. But we’re not here to tell you don’t protest, you can 
 protest, but we’re here to do your security too, because anything can happen. 
Interviewer: So, it wasn’t a threatening visit, it was a visit checking in to make sure everything 
 was okay on both sides?  
Fidèle: They even asked me, do you need a body guard? I said no, I don’t need anybody, but if I 
 need, I will let you know. So, that’s why the success of the protest, is because of them 
 too.  
Interviewer: Because they were supportive?  
Fidèle: No, not really that, but I push them in a corner that day because they have to give me 
 their permission. Because the Kagame team they didn’t want to say that, even the people 
 who support him, they didn’t know until the last minute because they didn’t want the 
 protest, so they say at 5 o’clock on Friday, so we could not get a permit. But they don’t 
 know the rules that you don’t have to have a permit. You have to tell them where you are 
 going to be, so they can be there, but I told them, if you ask me to protest peaceful, I need 
 something. To be able to protest peaceful, I need to know where they are going to be, 
 otherwise, imagine if they doing, we go to the Sheraton hotel, and they doing it at 
 Weston, and we find out at the last minute. I’m not responsible for what happens, the 
 movement of people from Sheraton to Weston, they say, oh, really, how many are you 
 going to be? I said, we are going to be more than 500, so I’m not responsible, if these 
 things happen. Just so you know. It’s okay, we’re going to stay peaceful, and protest 
 [Rwandan military incursions into the Congo and its funding of militias there]. They said, 
 okay, stay in touch, I’m going to tell you every move they make. We worked together, 
 and they gave me all the information.  
Fidèle’s account exposes a regime that is unwilling to face any criticism, including from peaceful 
protesters. 
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As a participant in the event to which Fidèle was denied entry, I also observed a regime 
that was excessively anxious and sought to very carefully control the situation and the events of 
the afternoon. Kagame traveled to Canada with a team of roughly 160 people, which seemed like 
a large number for the sole purpose of attending an afternoon event with 3000 members of the 
diaspora community, especially since the logistics of the event had been organized by local 
individuals. The majority of those in his retinue were security personnel who tightly monitored 
the grounds of the hangar building in Downsview Park, where the event was finally held. It took 
me an hour and a half to enter the building (even though I arrived 1 hour before the event was to 
begin), as everyone attending was first confirmed on a list, verified against photo ID, then passed 
through a full pat down, a metal detector, had all belongings x-rayed, and then had their 
belongings searched. The intrusive security procedure culminated with my research notes being 
read by the security personnel. I was allowed entry (apparently my notes were not incriminating), 
but felt somewhat violated by what I perceived as a breach in my privacy (I particularly took 
offense at my notes being read without my consent). This excruciating security apparatus did not 
lie dormant during the event either. We were not permitted to have our phones on during the day 
(though some intrepid participants evaded the steely gaze of security and surreptitiously filmed 
the day, then posted the films on YouTube), and had to shut them down at the security gate. To 
make a phone call I had to leave the building, and then, to re-enter, had to pass through the whole 
gauntlet of security again. I was carrying a water bottle with me at that point and was not 
permitted to bring it back inside (where I had obtained it). The purpose of providing this 
narrative is to illustrate the excessive degree of anxiety of the state, even though only those 
identified as “friends of Rwanda” were permitted to enter the event. The siege mentality of the 
organizers of the event underscored how little tolerant of criticism and any challenges this 
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regime is, and how it perceives those who would question it as illegitimate and outside the 
parameters of the nation.  
The very fact that those who were perceived as critics were denied entry to the event, 
despite that event being presented as non-partisan and for all Rwandans in the diaspora, points to 
how narrowly the state defines those who belong. Those who protested Rwanda’s military 
incursions into the Congo were not even permitted to participate in the discussion. To pose a 
question during the event, one had to submit the question beforehand, and, if one had not done 
so, there were security personnel standing behind, ready to take the microphone away. The only 
questions that were permitted were ones that reinforced the regime’s narratives of peace, 
reconciliation, and economic growth. From the inside, it appeared as though everyone agreed 
with these interpretations as people seemed happy and enthusiastic; they joyfully applauded the 
Presidential address. However, a part of that joyful energy could be ascribed to the fact of the 
event itself, as the GTA community, which often had occasion to meet, welcomed those who had 
traveled from New York, Boston, Virginia, Washington D.C., Detroit, Edmonton, Calgary, 
Kingston, Ottawa, Laval, Quebec City, and Montreal; the ambiance was of a reunion. Indeed, 
two of my friends ran into a woman with whom they had gone to elementary school and had not 
seen since the genocide.  
The duality of narratives—the carefully orchestrated state narrative inside and the 
challengers kept outside the doors—leads to a bifurcated image of the new nation-state. On one 
hand, the testimonies of investors and entrepreneurs who find in Rwanda unparalleled 
opportunities cannot be ignored. On the other hand, the fact that I overheard the Rwandan 
security forces refer to the protesters outside the venue as “undesirables”, cannot be ignored 
either. Inside the hangar was a joyous, festive atmosphere as various speakers spoke of 
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“sustainable development”, “unity”, “investing in ourselves and our future”, “telling our stories”, 
and, from an investor from Vancouver, “tell people about Rwanda, they don’t know, tell them 
what a great place it is.” The deadly history was mentioned. A Hutu poet described how his 
poetry helped him recover from the genocide, and how, through his poetry, the “stigma of being 
a Hutu was lifted from my shoulders” as, “the difference between the old generation and us—we 
need to tell the truth and consider everyone one nation”. A media entrepreneur from Ottawa who 
had founded a magazine titled African Perspective discussed how the audience needed to look at 
what happened and “try to bring positivity”. He lamented that people only knew Rwanda through 
the genocide, but “please don’t confine us in that arena”.  These narratives of recovery and 
resilience were bolstered by an account from an investor who had found in Kigali a city that was 
“safer than Vancouver”, a country that was, in his experience, totally free of corruption, where 
he could employ 300 workers, pay them a fair wage and offer them health insurance, while still 
making a profit. Another investor of Rwandan origin who had moved from Toronto to Rwanda 
spoke of how rewarding his role as a coffee exporter was as he was able to connect with farmers 
in Rwanda and consumers in Toronto, and how he could live in both worlds, thanks to his 
transnationalism.  
These optimistic narratives of a new and boldly developing country—indeed, as one 
speaker joyfully explained, “Rwanda is only 19 years old!”—were reinforced by glossy 
brochures and magazines handed out at the event touting Rwanda as having “Sustained high 
growth; Robust governance; Investor friendly climate; Access to markets; Untapped investment 
potential” (Investing in Rwanda 2013).  The impressive brochures (one with an image of a 
golden spigot spewing money (Investor Info Pack 2013)) presented Rwanda as a country open to 
investment, ready to facilitate business, offer support, and encourage greater enmeshment with 
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global markets, while focused on renewable resources, ethical practices, green energy and, 
overall, sustainable development. The brochures suggested that for the transnational transplant, 
Kigali would soon offer a modern housing project that could rival those in any major cities with 
its modern spacious designs, its amenities, and location (Vision City n.d.). On paper Rwanda 
looked admirable: a place that anyone would wish to visit, invest in and settle in. According to 
the transnational investors, it was, increasingly, a sound investment opportunity with reliable 
returns.  
 
 
Diaspora as Threat 
Yet, one of the costs of this economic growth has been the quelling of open discourse, 
freedom of press, conscience and dissent. While the opposition parties in Rwanda and their allies 
and members in the diaspora had long been aware of this increasingly authoritarian trend, those 
outside of Rwanda were confronted with the Kagame’s autocratic rule when former RPA Lt Gen 
Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, who had fled Rwanda and gone into hiding in South Africa after a 
very public falling out with Kagame, was shot in front of his home in June 2010. The South 
African authorities launched a probe into the shooting, and “a South African foreign ministry 
official said foreign ‘security operatives’ were involved in the shooting”, meaning Rwandan 
security (“Rwanda Anger at South Africa Nyamwasa shooting Probe” 2010).  In the following 
year, the Rwandan security apparatus once again made headlines, this time in the U.K., as 
Scotland Yard investigated an allegation that “the Rwandan government is masterminding an 
alleged assassination plot in Britain against dissidents critical of the east African country’s 
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increasingly authoritarian regime” (Milmo 2011). The Independent further reported the 
following:  
Rene Mugenzi, 35, a survivor of Rwanda's 1994 genocide who is a British citizen and 
now runs a London-based social exclusion think-tank, said: “I am bewildered that such a 
thing could be happening to me. I am not a political figure in Rwanda, I left when I was 
17. How can it be that in Britain, a foreign government can be allowed to threaten the life 
of a person? Every time I go outside, I am looking over my shoulder, wondering if there 
is an assassin around the corner.” 
The disclosure of the murder plot comes after an investigation by The Independent 
revealed last month that MI5 has warned the Rwandan High Commissioner to London to 
halt an alleged campaign of harassment against critics of Mr Kagame living in the UK. 
But the Rwandan government’s activities against dissidents have increased dramatically 
recently. Last week police served a “Threats to life warning notice” on Mr Mugenzi and a 
second Rwandan, Jonathan Musonera, laying out the danger facing them. 
Mr Musonera, a former member of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army led by Mr 
Kagame which halted the genocide, is one of the founding members of the Rwanda 
National Conference (RNC), a new political party led by exiled military officers which 
poses a threat to the president (Milmo 2011). 
 
The Rwandan High Commission in London insisted that “The government of Rwanda does not 
threaten the lives of its citizens wherever they live” (Morris 2011). The Guardian reported the 
same threat, adding: 
He [Mugenzi] may have been targeted because of comments he made about the Rwandan 
president, Paul Kagame, in March when asked on a BBC programme about the prospect 
of the Arab spring uprisings spreading to his homeland. He replied that criticisms of 
Kagame suggested that he was ‘a despot who doesn’t tolerate any form of opposition; 
that under his leadership, Rwanda has become a dangerous place for those who publicly 
disagree with him or his ruling party’ (Siddique 2011). 
 
Further allegations of the Rwandan government engineering assassinations emerged in early 
2014, when Mr. Nyamwasa’s home in South Africa was ransacked and another dissident, Patrick 
Karegeya, the former head of the Rwandan security agency, was found strangled in a hotel room 
in Johannesburg (“South Africa Links Rwandan Diplomats to Attacks” 2014). Following the 
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death of Karegeya, the Rwandan Prime Minister tweeted the following: “Betraying citizens and 
their country that made you a man shall always bear consequences to you” (Laing 2014).  
 Human Rights Watch published a report in January 2014 detailing the assassinations and 
assassination attempts against former regime members who have fled into exile to Uganda, 
Kenya, South Africa and Europe. HRW has documented seven cases with sufficient evidence to 
reliably point to the Kagame regime as the perpetrator. It further states that “there have been 
other cases of Rwandans who were murdered, attacked, threatened, or who died in unclear 
circumstances in various countries, but are not included because of insufficient information 
surrounding these attacks” (Human Rights Watch 2014). Journalists reporting on these cases 
have been subject to a harassment campaign on Twitter, in an effort to dissuade them from 
pursuing the stories. As an independent journalist, Steve Terrill, revealed in March 2014, a pro-
government twitter account (under a false name) that was hostile to journalists was emanating 
from the President’s office. Apparently, the twitter user had been harassing a journalist who had 
been reporting on the assassination attempts, and, when Terrill demanded that the “misogynistic 
harassment” of the journalist stop (the journalist in question was a woman and the vitriol directed 
at her was highly gendered), Terrill received a reply from the office of the President of Rwanda, 
Kagame. This apparently erroneous use of the wrong twitter account confirmed what many 
journalists had long suspected—that the harassment and intimidation had been originating from 
the presidential office. In retaliation for this revelation, Terrill was rapidly deported from 
Rwanda (Smith 2014).   
In my research I also came across an allegation of an assassination attempt by a Rwandan 
operative in the GTA. Fidèle told me of an attempted assassination of a former RPA (Rwandan 
Patriotic Army) serviceman in the GTA. He said that the Rwandan High Commission in Ottawa 
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was under investigation by the Toronto Police Services for the attempted poisoning of this 
individual. Unfortunately, I was unable to verify this as I did not have enough information to 
submit a detailed enough Access to Information Request. In fact, my Access to Information 
Request, made on May 13, 2014, received the following response: “Re: Threats against a 
Rwandan resident in the City of Toronto […] records regarding the above-noted incident could 
not be located” (Toronto Police Services 2014). Nonetheless, the rumor, even unsubstantiated, 
was significant because the fact that those who publicly opposed the Kagame regime said they 
felt threatened indicated that they were not able to freely voice their views nor publicly challenge 
the current regime. I asked Fidèle how this had affected the perceptions of the regime among the 
diaspora, and he replied thus:  
Fidèle: They send poison everywhere now. 
Interviewer: Do you feel intimidated by that?  
Fidèle: Yes and no. Yes, because I know, I will never go to anybody’s house to drink anything I 
 don’t know. But they can’t shoot me here.  
Interviewer: Yeah, that’s much harder—it was hard enough in South Africa, and South Africa is 
 much less secure than Canada.  
Fidèle: In Canada it’s very hard, you have to be a in a very certain area, like Jane and Finch. But 
 the major thing is poison. And they start already to do everywhere in the world.  
Interviewer: Is your organization talking about this publicly?  
Fidèle: Yeah, we talk about that. 
Interviewer: Right, so you’re trying to raise awareness internationally. 
Fidèle: We don’t do that just to tell people, like be careful, but we ask people who try to get 
 involved with that like be careful with that. There’s young kids, 25, 24, they get told go 
 do this, poison this one, and we try to tell them no, they send you. I just write something 
 two days ago—I explained to them the government before genocide, the government 
 have Interahamwe, youth, to try to intimidate people. Kagame start that too. He doesn’t 
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 have Interahamwe, but he has Intore. Intore
14
. So what I tell them, if you keep doing 
 that, the Interahamwe start the same way. It was a group of people enjoying life, now 
 look what happened to them. If you keep doing that, look what happened to them.  
Interviewer: Let me ask another question—in Canada, with all its faults, and it’s not a perfect 
 place to live—we don’t poison people when we disagree with them politically. We do 
 other things, but we don’t kill. 
Fidèle: Right, we don’t kill. That’s what I try to tell them—we don’t do that in Canada.  
Interviewer: Right, so, how do people with live here, for as long as many have, how do they feel 
  about their own government doing this kind of thing, when they are used to other kinds 
 of politics?  
Fidèle: That’s what I keep telling them! Why you support people who poison, who kill other 
 people? 
Interviewer: Do they not believe that it happens? Do they deny it?  
Fidèle: I know they believe, but they deny it. I know they believe. When you in private, you talk 
 to two people, they say yeah, but… I say ‘don’t say that! You’re gonna be like the 
 Interahamwe in 10 years!’  
Interviewer: Have you ever asked them—how is it that you can support this when you 
 understand different politics?  
Fidèle: I ask them that, but publicly they deny that. They say ‘No, the Rwanda, it’s beautiful, it’s 
 peaceful, Kagame’s a good president, he doesn’t kill anybody’. They keep denying.  
Interviewer: So there’s a wall… 
Fidèle: Yeah, there’s a wall—they don’t want to admit that. But, privately, they do, they do.  
 The Rwandan ruling regime seemed to both desire its diaspora for the capital and skills 
that it possesses and could return to the nation-state, while, simultaneously, fearing it for the 
challenges it could pose to its legitimacy and longevity. Those who have left are both beautiful 
for their shiny francs and dollars and dangerous because of their ability to speak in challenge to 
the regime. This diaspora is thus caught in a web of longing and repulsion which often echoes 
the longing and repulsion that the members themselves feel for the imagined homeland. Of all 
                                                          
14
 There is no such organization as Intore affiliated with the RPF.  
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the participants whom I spoke to, both formally (recorded conversation) and informally, none, 
except for Fidèle, explicitly mentioned the well-publicized cases discussed above. Some alluded 
to the coverage, but framed it as a smear campaign designed to undermine Rwanda’s gains. I 
suspect that most of those whom I spoke to were well aware of the allegations facing the regime, 
but chose not to speak to me about them as they were tired of always being associated with 
political violence and feared that I, as an outside interlocutor, would fixate on the violence and 
neglect to tell their stories of day to day resilience and successful integration into the new 
host/homeland. Others, perhaps, truly still hoped that the man who ended the genocide could not 
be similar to those who instigated it, and they needed to keep this hope alive as upon it resided 
their ability to persevere. After all, if Kagame was as dangerous as the Interahamwe, what hope 
could they hold for their future and their children’s future?  
 Perhaps the extensive public relations campaign that the Rwandan state had paid for had 
been effective in re-framing how Rwanda and its government were perceived internationally and 
online, including by the diaspora. In 2011 the government of Rwanda hired London public 
relations agency Racepoint Group Inc. to “implement a full scale public relations blitz 
communicating the positive story of Rwanda. As the country moves to a new chapter, 
emphasizing continued economic improvement, stability and social justice, it is crucial to 
educate key audiences about the ‘new Rwanda.’” This public relations campaign was deemed 
necessary because “Expats living in Europe who favored the previous government are effectively 
using the web as a means to undercut perceptions of progress in Rwanda; and certain NGOs, 
such as Human Rights Watch, continue to advance a story of an unstable Rwanda as a means of 
continuing to attract donors and wield influence in the region” (Contract between Government of 
Rwanda [Mushikiwabo] and Racepoint 2011, 13-14, available through the United States 
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Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act database). To achieve the above stated 
ends, the PR firm stated that the goal of the campaign was to “Offset the negative and factually 
incorrect information of those parties with vested interests in mis-portraying Rwanda’s 
advancements. This includes expats with ties to the previous government, NGOs who rely on a 
weak Rwanda as a means for attracting donor dollars and certain members of the UN, whose 
interests lie in a different path for Rwandan development” (Contract between Government of 
Rwanda [Mushikiwabo] and Racepoint 2011, 15). Thus, utilizing modern methods of 
information dissemination, the government of Rwanda sought to challenge the rumours (too 
often proven true) from those it termed “ex-pats” who, apparently, sought to present an “unstable 
Rwanda as a means of continuing to attract donors and wield influence in the region”. While 
courting the favour and capital of certain segments of its diaspora, this regime actively smeared 
and attempted to delegitimize the segments which challenged its legitimacy and which brought 
to the fore its extensive human rights violations. 
 The well-publicized murders of dissidents and harassment campaigns instigated and 
carried out by representatives of the ruling regime in Rwanda had led to a re-evaluation of its 
merit by many observers in the international community. At the same time, as Fidèle explained, 
few among the diaspora were willing to speak of their anxieties and growing unease. Many were 
vested in retaining their perception of state representatives as virtuous because they still 
perceived that they may be a benefit to them. For instance, during the period of the present study, 
one participant returned to Rwanda, ran in the parliamentary elections and became an MP in 
Kigali. Yet, the conversation about Rwanda’s future was an ongoing one and perhaps the best 
indicator of this was the speech given by Gerald Caplan at the 20
th
 genocide commemoration in 
April 2014 held at Friendship House in Toronto (which I attended). Merely a year after he had 
253 
 
publicly denounced “genocide deniers” including Noam Chomsky, Caplan appealed to his 
primarily Rwandan audience thus: “if everyone is saying something is wrong with Rwanda, 
maybe we should listen”. His audience rustled at these words, and later there was much chagrin 
and gossip, but they had been spoken, publicly, by the man that the community had long 
embraced as its closest friend and ally in Canada and the GTA, and could not be unspoken.  
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Chapter Seven  
Belonging in our homes: Claiming Space and Citizenship 
 Even as those who identified as Rwandans in the GTA became part of a larger diasporic 
group and came to see themselves as belonging to a deterritorialized nation, they developed a 
rooted sense of belonging in the new homeland of Canada. This seeming contradiction of feeling 
at home in the new homeland while actively seeking out a sense of belonging in the remembered 
homeland encompasses the tension inherent in becoming a diaspora. This tension, explored 
throughout previous chapters, both reinforces and defies the readings of diasporas as either 
exposing the limits of the nation-state (Bhabha 1990; Gilroy 1993), or as marginal, always on the 
border of the nation and belonging (Bannerji 1997; Ahmed 1999; Scheffer 2003; Agnew 2007; 
Ricouer 2010). The ambivalent welcome that the Rwandan community had experienced in the 
new homeland of Canada echoes the critical readings above. Yet, as this chapter explores, the 
majority of those who identified as Rwandan in the GTA robustly expressed their sense of 
belonging and their deserving of citizenship in their new homeland. The articulations of 
belonging varied: all participants emphasized their sense of security; many expressed their 
appreciation of the liberal democratic values that they perceived ordered day to day life; others 
spoke of how they had changed as a consequence of migration and settlement and had now 
become “Western” or “Canadian”; the middle class participants affirmed their virtue as good 
consumers through home ownership, while their working-class counterparts framed their 
belonging in terms of their non-material contributions; others claimed their stake by expressing 
dissent and practicing their democratic rights; and, finally, others framed their sense of belonging 
in their intimate relationships which rooted them to the broader GTA community. Though the 
framing of belonging differed, each participant in the study expressed pride in being Rwandan in 
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Canada, and this crucial expression encapsulated the perception expressed by the participants 
that they, as an ethno-national group, were part of the larger national group of Canadians. The 
absence of violence and insecurity, the relative material success of the community, and federal 
and provincial policies that permit (if not encourage) difference allowed members of this ethno-
national group to feel at home in Canada, and specifically, the GTA.           
 Possibly the most compelling argument for understanding ethnicity, race, and nation as 
ways of seeing, rather than ways of being, is the ability of those who identify as the Rwandan 
diaspora to make their homes in the GTA. For all the challenges, impositions, and competing 
discourses that those who identify as Rwandan in the GTA have faced, the majority of the 
participants in this study expressed that they felt at home in Canada. They have been able to 
build their lives and create for themselves and their families a sense of safety and comfort in the 
GTA. Indeed, many expressed that while they had experienced challenges that they had not 
anticipated, the daily absence of anxiety and fear that so many associated with Rwanda, even the 
new Rwanda, had enabled them to build better and happier lives than they had imagined 
possible. Canada, specifically the GTA, had offered them the day to day safety and security of 
person that is so important to building a home. Even in light of the racialization and 
marginalization that previous chapters have recounted, most participants insisted on their 
belonging in the new homeland, and in their new homes.  
 
 
Claims of Belonging  
Of those who identified as Rwandans in the GTA, very many claimed the GTA, and 
Canada more broadly, as their home, if not always their homeland. The experience of exile and, 
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for many, statelessness, had persuaded them that citizenship and the legal rights it granted was 
tantamount to home, and so they asserted their place in the new homeland. As Creese proposed, 
“unequivocal statements of belonging based on security in place, and the knowledge that the 
rights of Canadian citizenship could not be arbitrarily taken away” marked those who migrated 
as refugees (2011, 209). Very many participants in this study echoed the claim that they felt at 
home because they felt safe and able to do largely as they wished. Revocata argued that “I can go 
anywhere in the world, can do whatever I want as long as I don’t violate the law. I am a free 
person to do what I want to do.” Jean, likewise, stressed that: 
Canada is a, it’s good, yeah, actually I love it, you know I haven’t been to other countries, 
where I am so accepted, you know, it’s, you know you can do anything, as long as you 
are, you know, you are doing your own thing, not doing bad things like, you know, you 
are not breaking the law, you know? But here you can work, you can study, you can do 
business […], you know you can do anything. Yeah, so it’s a free country, it’s a good 
place to live in, yeah. 
 
Indeed, he explicitly contrasted the ease of day to day life, and hence a sense of belonging, with 
the challenges that he encountered when he returned to Rwanda, as “it’s not easy to fit in there, 
because you have so many things here [in Canada], you can do anything […], you go to a bank 
where you line up, you do things, nobody to pass by, you know, they are in order. But sometimes 
there [in Rwanda] you find people, you have to know each other, you know, so here you can 
apply [for] anything and get papers without hindrance, whatever you want, you know?” (Jean). 
Jean was pointing out a fundamentally different social order in Canada than the one he had 
experienced in Rwanda; in Canada he expected a social world based on norms of rule of law and 
equality, while in Rwanda he expected a social order based on social hierarchy and nepotism. He 
had found a sense of individual freedom that enabled him to build a life, start a business, go to 
school, effectively, as he explained, do anything he may have wished to do, while in Rwanda he 
found that even going to a bank was arduous as people did not abide by the social norms that he 
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had become accustomed to in Canada of lining up and respecting the queue. His sense of 
disorder in Rwanda stemmed from being accustomed to a different set of social expectations in 
Canada. Thus, his acclimatization could be said to be complete as his internal narrative of what 
constitutes a normal social world was based on the world that he participated in day in and day 
out in the GTA. The GTA had become his home in more than just name as he could not envision 
life elsewhere anymore. He had adopted the national cosmology of Canada as the site of order 
and security, rule of law, freedom of expression and conscience, freedom of mobility, and 
political equality, where life unfolded predictably and safely.   
This day to day ease of existence, underpinned by democratic values and civil liberties, 
was repeated by many participants, especially in contrast to the presumed challenges that day to 
day life in the new Rwanda brought. But, perhaps more significantly, many participants, 
especially those who had lived in Canada for a decade or more, expressed that they felt that they 
were more “Westernized” and thus now could only belong in Canada, but no longer in Rwanda. 
Angelina expressed this phenomenon thus: “I have more years than in Africa here, so, I find that 
this is more home, psychologically, and socially, yeah. I feel more Westernized.” This framing 
of home as both a psychological and social site demonstrates the understanding that home is 
“both a place/physical location and a set of feelings” (Blunt and Dowling 2006, 22). Thus, in 
Angelina’s account, home has become the Western hemisphere, culturally and materially distinct 
from her remembered homeland of Rwanda, as well as the assumptions about what that 
geographic space means. Namely, she is referring to the fact that when she travels to Rwanda, 
others identify her as visibly paler for lack of sun exposure, as linguistically different with her 
fluency in English and her loss of easy fluency in Kinyarwanda, and as culturally different in her 
expressions, ideas, and ways of seeing the world. She has become a product of her new home, 
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marked, quite literally, by the lack of sunlight, as non-African. Interestingly, her claim to 
belonging in the GTA also serves to alter what must be considered “Western”. Even as she is 
marginalized and made to feel that her place in the new homeland is contingent, the moments 
when she is able to feel at home and to enact agency in the new home mark her as belonging 
within the socio-geographic space. Her very presence in the GTA reconstitutes what must be 
considered “Western”. As all Canadians of colour have emphatically demonstrated, no longer 
can ”Western” easily and comfortably denote exclusive whiteness; it must be stretched to 
account for the visible plurality that Angelina and her family embody.  
Janvier’s affective attachment to his Canadian home differed from that expressed by 
Angelina as he inadvertently exposed his anxiety about belonging in the new home, while 
insisting on his place within it. Janvier explained that “Canada is wonderful to me, I raise my 
kids, my son is in the cadets now, navy cadets. Yeah, I tell him if you want to get into navy, go 
ahead! He is now a petty officer, in the summer he will be training, in Trenton, he will be going 
there to train. So if you want to go to military academy, go! He can die for this country if need 
be, go! That’s the Canada I know.” His desire to show his affinity for the new home is framed in 
the rhetorical willingness for his child to serve in the military and, even, “die for this country if 
need be”. This rhetorical strategy serves to both demonstrate his affinity, as well as to 
demonstrate his worthiness as a citizen who is completely committed to the new homeland, as he 
is even willing to sacrifice his child’s life in the name of the homeland. This desire to show 
devotion denotes his framing of nationalism as based in blood, and claims of belonging as 
necessitating the spilling of blood. This narrative suggests that if one spills blood, one has a 
greater claim to belonging in the new homeland. Unlike the participants who migrated in the late 
1980s and whose affective statements focused primarily on liberal democratic virtues, Janvier 
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was referencing the new, post-9/11 Canadian nationalism of a warrior culture which presupposes 
the need to spill blood in order to affirm national belonging and merit citizenship (McKay and 
Swift 2012). Appropriating this new national cosmology demonstrates his anxiety about his 
place in the new homeland as he feels the need to demonstrate his worthiness of belonging, 
chillingly, even at the cost of his child’s life.  
A more quotidian, though not banal, statement of belonging was the expression of 
participating in the day to day life in the city and doing so confidently. Jean-Paul explained that 
he first realized that he had begun to feel at home when he recounted that:  
I’m here, I’m paying taxes, I’m working, I’m doing everything that everyone else is 
doing, why should I consider myself as second? It’s not, and umm, yeah. So that’s how it 
started, and then some confidence builds in, you go to the subway, you see someone you 
think is a Canadian asking you the directions, and you think, oh, my goodness, I can be of 
some use here. Even small things like that that make you feel part of the environment. 
 
His first experience of someone else presuming that he belonged enough in the space that he 
could give directions pleased him enormously and brought with it the realization that, despite 
day to day racialization, he could still find a home in the new community. Further, he also staked 
his claim of deserving belonging in the new home on participating in citizenship obligations like 
paying taxes.  
Middle class participants also expressed their deserving of citizenship and calling Canada 
home due to being good consumers, and, thus, in a neoliberal state, good citizens. Quite literally, 
in these accounts, the fact of home ownership became the marker of having earned one’s place in 
the new homeland. Home ownership embodies the ideals of “material achievement and stability” 
(Blunt and Dowling 2006, 117), and thus suggests both the family’s financial security as well as 
its place as a stable site of ongoing consumption. Indeed, “the living environments of poor and 
working-class people have often been deemed ‘unhomely’, or morally and aesthetically 
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inappropriate and sometimes inadequate. The suburban home, on the other hand, is constructed 
as the proper place of moral, aesthetic and familial acceptability, even superiority” (Dowling and 
Blunt 2006, 118). Fidèle echoes this construction of political belonging based on consumption 
when he proudly proclaims that merely two years after migrating to Canada he bought his first 
house, while “I see some people 20 years after, they still don’t have a house. And most 
Rwandese are like that, they think it’s so complicated to do it, so they don’t do it.” The implicit 
moral judgement of other Rwandans places them as culturally, even intellectually inferior, 
because “they think it’s so complicated”, while he was able to do so within two years of 
migration. Yet, this account erases the material differences between individuals, as, for instance, 
Fidèle migrated with European work experience and education, enabling him to attain a 
professional position quite rapidly, and thus an income that allowed him to buy into the housing 
market. Conversely, as I discussed in previous chapters, very many of those who migrated 
arrived as refugees and did not have their credentials recognized, thus had to either re-train or 
take low-wage survival work.  
Olivia also framed her sense of belonging in terms of home ownership as she stated that 
this was a marker of her successful integration. Thus, “I’m attached to the country, but umm, as 
much as I’m fully integrated in this country, I have good job, I see myself as a successful 
immigrant in this country, I own a house, (I don’t own it, the bank owns it, but I pay the 
mortgage [both chuckle]) and my kids are growing up, and they make me proud, I feel I have 
Canadian friends” (Olivia). Here, the success of a new migrant is framed primarily as the ability 
to purchase a home, and thus enter the ranks of the middle class in the new homeland. Yet, for 
Olivia, homeownership alone does not express her sense of belonging, as she also points out that 
her children have had the emotional and social space to grow up in a way that makes her proud 
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and that she has “Canadian” friends. Both these points indicate that her home is both the physical 
and economic space of the house, but also the social world that she inhabits and has been able to 
build new relationships within.  
Janvier likewise articulated his claim in terms of home ownership as he stated that “I’m 
like any Canadian, I’m like any Canadian, I have a house. I have had for over 10 years. I struggle 
with bills like any other Canadian, the same things as any other Canadian around here.” In this 
narrative, like in Fidèle’s and Olivia’s, the axis of belonging and being “Canadian” is home 
ownership and the attendant consumption suggested by struggling with bills. During the process 
of my research, a number of families that I got to know were in the midst of renovating their 
homes. Some were doing so in order to increase the market value of their home in the case of a 
future sale, while others were doing so in order to sell their current home at the highest possible 
price in order to move up to a home that suited them better. Not only were these families fully 
enmeshed in the real estate market, but they were also fully invested, both financially and 
emotionally, in the discourse of perpetual consumption and “moving up”. In a neo-liberal state 
where financial security is too often a pipe dream, the house becomes more than a home—it 
becomes the chief investment of middle class families and all their savings are poured into it in 
the hopes that it will continue to pay dividends. Thus it both represents the hope for future 
stability and the anxiety that such a future is not possible. This contrast between the instability of 
living in a capitalist society and the physical security and stability afforded by Canadian political 
norms and institutions echoes the dialectical relationship between belonging and non-belonging 
that is foundational to becoming a diaspora. Yet, despite the insecurity that underpins them, the 
narratives of home ownership are fundamentally narratives of pride as it not an easy feat to 
become a home owner in the GTA given the price of housing. Even in the suburbs, where these 
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homes are, their ownership requires years of saving and scrimping since very few from this 
community had family wealth that they could put towards the purchase and none inherited homes 
as other, non-racialized members of the middle class sometimes do. Thus, for a Rwandan 
migrant to attain that measure of respectability given the significant obstacles that were 
discussed in chapter 5,was a laudable feat, even if the conception of citizenship as consumption 
is an inherently exclusionary one that places markets above human life.   
 The working class Rwandans whom I interviewed also insisted upon their claim to 
belonging in their new homes, but framed it in different terms than their middle-class 
counterparts. Counter-narratives of belonging focused on individual contributions to collective 
goods, such as participation in public health initiatives, in the settlement of new migrants, and in 
public education initiatives. Diane proudly recounted her involvement with a public health 
project aimed at educating parents. She framed her participation in the project as both her 
individual wage-labour, making her worthy of belonging by virtue of participating in the labour 
market, and as her contribution to the general good. In a society that values humans by how 
much they work and earn, she needs to be employed in order to be perceived as deserving of 
citizenship rights. Yet, her income does not allow her to consume on the same scale as her 
middle class counterparts, thus undermining her claim. Nonetheless, by understanding herself as 
contributing to a greater good, she is able to challenge the equating of citizen with consumer, and 
define herself as equally deserving. Grace discussed her position as the public face of HIV/AIDS 
education and her willingness for the organizations that she is involved with to publicize her case 
in order to combat the stigma and misinformation around these diseases. She specifically tied her 
labour to her sense of belonging as she explained that this is her way of returning service in 
exchange for the social support that she lives on. By articulating this as a reciprocal relationship, 
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she assuaged her own sense of survivor’s guilt, as she received the necessary anti-retroviral 
medications that so many she knew were denied and also had a roof over her head. It was also a 
way of thinking that staked her claim as a contributing member of society. Christophe recounted 
his role as an educator about the Rwandan genocide and his individual outreach to new 
communities. Others spoke of developing charitable campaigns that served the needs of their 
local communities. In each of these instances, the individual’s action was framed as her 
contribution to the collective good, and indicated the implicit sense of belonging in the new 
communities that these individuals were fostering and building. Each of these narratives 
expressed the worthiness of these individuals and their stake in their own homes. Yet, even given 
this distinct difference in the degree to which one is able to feel a sense of rootedness, the 
participants emphatically insisted on the GTA being their home.  
 The sense of belonging that I have described above was also evident in individuals’ 
willingness to criticize public policy and offer their own vision for the future of their 
communities. Olivia offered a critique of the newcomer settlement programs offered by the 
province, based on her own experiences with these services:  
when I came here, I had access to social services, I had access to umm, Ontario Works, I 
had a nice apartment, but I was lacking someone who can give me phone call and say 
how are you today? […] And my social worker couldn’t understand how I behaved the 
way I was behaving because you’re giving me money, but I’m not happy. You know? So 
that’s the thing. Our system is just predesigned, which is fine, and that’s why this country 
has been sustainable for many years, but at the same time as our community landscape is 
changing, I think we need to be more flexible and adjust ourselves, because what’s the 
point of welcoming them here, if we don’t give them a chance to be successful and 
contribute to this country later on? There’s no need, you, you, you are just creating a 
circle of poverty, and a circle of, of, depressed people (Olivia). 
 
Olivia’s critique offers a nuanced understanding of the particular challenges that newcomers 
face, as well as a simple remedy—“someone who can give me a phone call and say how are you 
today”. She is willing to offer her assessment of these services as she feels that she has a role in 
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improving public services because she feels a sense of ownership of her community. Admittedly, 
she is able to speak thus because she was able to gain access to these services, while those who 
are undocumented would not be able to voice this form of ownership. This sense of ownership of 
space is also evident in the accounts of many others who likewise offered their critiques of public 
policies or social attitudes. It denotes a deeper sense of place and a feeling of rootedness as those 
who were willing to speak thus to me, an outsider to their community are aware that they have a 
right to these critiques and understand that voicing them is a citizenship right in a democracy 
where dissent must also be heard. It is also significant because, as so many recounted, in the old 
Rwanda there was no space for dissent, and, some admitted, the new Rwanda follows this trend.  
 
 
Intimate Connections to the New Homeland  
 The cliché “home is where the heart is”, for all its saccharine sweetness, captures an 
important dimension of the concept of home and how one is able to feel at home. Where one’s 
friends, lovers, partners, parents, and siblings reside is the place one is most likely to associate 
with a sense of home. Many participants’ extended families lived in Rwanda, thus their sense of 
home was often bifurcated as they claimed a space in the GTA, yet longed for the family in 
Rwanda. Yet, just as often, there were few family members left in Rwanda as the extended 
family had perished in the genocide, leaving the remainder scattered across Europe, North 
America, and Africa. Yet, even those whose closest family lived elsewhere expressed intimate 
ties to the new home. Jean Paul explained his new sense of place thus:  
I have a Rwandan friend who is planning on getting married with a Rwandan girl, and 
they were debating whether they should go back to Rwandan and do the marriage there, 
the ceremony, and they ended up saying, you know what we’ve got more friends here 
than in Rwanda, the people we know are the ones we live with—why don’t we just do 
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that? And I think that’s a big point to be made about people’s connections to the 
community where you live, umm, and you feel more like if I have a problem, I don’t tend 
to call a friend in Rwanda—I call a friend here. So, they broaden, they become broader as 
time goes on (Jean-Paul). 
His circle of friends, even as it was largely made up of others who identified as Rwandan, 
nonetheless existed in the new homeland, tying him to his new community in a very particular 
way. He sounded surprised when he expressed that he was more likely to call a friend “here”, 
than in Rwanda, as he had earlier in the interview expressed that he had to “fight with myself to 
convince me that I belong here—that I am one of you guys” (Jean-Paul). His sense of rootedness 
had snuck up on him, evidently as it had upon his friends who ultimately decided to hold their 
wedding in their new community. Indeed, their conclusion that “the people we know are the ones 
we live with” beautifully echoes the notion that one feels at home where one loves.  
 Another visible marker of belonging in place, or at home, is the incidence of marriages 
outside the community. While the majority of those I spoke with who were married had married 
someone who also identified as Rwandan, a noticeable number of individuals had chosen 
partners from outside the putative community and these partners then participated in the social 
life of the Rwandan community. These couples were visible because the partners from outside 
the community were often white, thus rendering them hyper visible at Rwandan events. Yet, as I 
got to know some of them, I observed the degree to which they were part of the Rwandan 
community in the GTA and, conversely, the degree to which their family was part of the broader 
community in the GTA. These marriages embodied the notion that those who had migrated from 
Rwanda now had built new homes in the GTA as the very intimate space of their marriages 
replicated the pluralism of the community in their new homes.  
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Rwandan Pride in the New Homeland  
 A significant marker of belonging among those who identified as Rwandans in the GTA 
was their ability and willingness to perform their ethnic/national identity in the public spaces of 
their new home. As discussed in chapter four, the evolution of genocide commemoration 
ceremonies from private, individualized ceremonies held in homes to larger, publically 
accessible ceremonies held in public spaces demonstrates the developing sense of connection to 
the new homeland among this community. Part of the 19
th
 commemoration was held in Toronto 
City Hall, and part of the 20
th
 commemoration was held in Queen’s Park, the Ontario provincial 
legislative building. As the organizers stressed at the time, the very fact of holding these events 
in such highly symbolic public spaces speaks to both the external recognition of this community 
as one of many that make up the social fabric of the city and the province, as well as the sense, 
among the community, that it has a valid claim to public symbolic space. This growing 
confidence and desire to be seen as a Rwandan diaspora by the wider society was expressed in 
many interviews.  
 Among the youth of the community, which, understandably, is a group made up of only 
those who wish to be identified as Rwandese, a few participants discussed their perceptions of 
their place in Canada and how they perceived the role of their Rwandan nationality/ethnicity. 
Mathieu, born in Canada, explained that as a boy and adolescent he was always aware of his 
difference because of both how others perceived him, as a young black man, as well because the 
traditions and culture practiced in the home differed from what he perceived as dominant 
practices. He spoke of initially being drawn to a youth hip hop black culture, as discussed in 
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chapter five, partly as a method of contending with his difference. However, by late adolescence, 
he developed a “desire to be more connected to my Rwandan people. As much as I appreciated 
multiculturalism, I had more of a desire to be in touch with the Rwandan community” (Mathieu). 
He began to actively seek out others who also shared a desire to be connected to the community 
and together they formed CARY (also discussed in chapter five). CARY served as both an 
internal space whereby young people who identified with Rwandan identity could meet and 
socialize, as well as a vehicle for collective and public identification as Rwandan in the GTA. In 
as little as two years of existence, CARY had at the time of writing already begun to articulate a 
public face meant for a non-Rwandan audience. Alongside the barbeques hosted in the public 
parks of Toronto Island, it had also organized a garbage collecting event from a public space. I 
was unable to attend the event, but the buzz on the listserv indicated that it was well-attended and 
that many more senior members of the community wrote commendations to the youth for their 
commitment to public service. Indeed, a few emails were explicitly congratulatory that CARY 
was showing Canadians how service-oriented Rwandan youth is. There seemed to be a perceived 
need to demonstrate the virtues of the community, in this case of its youth, to a larger audience 
of non-Rwandans. But the interesting component of this exchange was the fact that there was a 
larger audience and that those who were commenting were engaging in a self-aware process of 
representing themselves as Rwandans.  
 Natalia, a young woman who had spent most of her life in Canada, also expressed a 
desire to be connected to the Rwandan community and a need to represent this community to a 
larger audience: 
I feel that, umm, what Canada really, what I love about, well, not Canada as a whole, 
more Toronto, it’s the way it accepts minorities, it accepts other groups, and not only 
accepts them and tries to mold them into Canadians, it accepts them and tries to 
reasonably have them share their culture, with other Canadians. That’s what I love about 
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it—they won’t basically do that melting pot kind of thing where they want to bring you in 
and transform you to one of their own, they’re going to bring you so you can share your 
culture and share your values and share your views on life with others (Natalia).  
As a fluent English speaker, Natalia did not perceive that she was made to feel different; rather, 
she seemed to revel in her self-identified difference. She perceived that, in her new home, she 
was welcome and, in fact, encouraged to share her culture and identity, and she did so eagerly. 
She spoke of informing her non-Rwandan friends about the genocide and teaching them about 
Rwandan culture. She also said she was very proud that one of her close non-Rwandan friends 
had chosen to work on a development project in Rwanda. This friend’s choice to engage in 
development work in Rwanda seemed to affirm Natalia’s perception that her culture was prized 
and valued in the new homeland. Arguably, the neo-colonial Western development projects 
enacted in the so-called Global South do not affirm the value and worth of the cultures in which 
they intervene. Yet, to Natalia, who, having being raised in the GTA seems to have appropriated 
narratives about the presumed neediness of Rwanda, this engagement serves as recognition of 
her status in the GTA as a representative of her culture.  
 Very many of those whom I interviewed wished to speak and be heard; they desired 
visibility as Rwandans. Indeed, a persistent lament was that people in the GTA were unable or 
unwilling to differentiate them from other black groups, such as the many Caribbean 
communities, and thus they were denied expression of their unique culture. The desire to not be 
seen as of Caribbean origin was discussed in chapter four as an appropriation of regional racist 
narratives, and this dynamic cannot be ignored. Yet, in this lament is also the very clearly 
articulated desire to be seen and recognized as Rwandans in day to day life. One participant 
recounted that he attended an event where both the Foreign Minister of Rwanda and the Foreign 
Minister of Canada where present and that this moment of the meeting of his two emotional 
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worlds was very significant for him. He had the opportunity to speak to both Ministers and 
narrated the following: “to the Minster of Foreign Affairs of Canada and Foreign Affairs of 
Rwanda, I said no one else is here, I feel so loyal to both of you, and that I would want that 
Canada and Rwanda merge the way they have fused in me and have dual loyalties.” His 
statement to the representatives of both the states that he identifies with was less an articulation 
of a real desire for merging the two and more an emotional appeal for both to recognize how 
deeply connected he is to both states. In this moment, he was expressing a deeply felt patriotic 
love of the two states that he has claimed as home and that, evidently, he finds welcoming. 
 The desire to be seen and recognized as belonging to both Rwanda and Canada was also 
expressed by many participants, although, it must be recognized that not all those who 
participated in this study felt at home in either place. Yet, those who did wanted to speak of this 
belonging. Theodore expressed his sense of belonging in his perception that “I can use Rwanda 
to help Canada, and I can use Canada to help Rwanda. So anyway, I can be a bridge. Whenever I 
have, people they need help anyway, they need help, it can be spiritual help in Canada, or it can 
be spiritual material in Rwanda” (Theodore). His representation of himself as a bridge 
beautifully evokes his perception that he is anchored in both homes. The fact that he perceives 
that he can “use” the two states to help the other signifies his sense of agency in both 
cultural/social spaces. He is confident in his place in both homes and thus feels he can reach out 
to others who may need his help. Olivia also expressed a sense of deep rootedness as she stated 
that “it feels good to have two homes you can call home, it gives you a wide range of of, 
universal citizenship. You feel that you go to Africa you belong there, you come here, you 
belong here, it, it gives you that sense of community wide diverse and uhh, inclusion” (Olivia).  
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 Another external signifier of pride and belonging in Canada is the Rwandan attire worn at 
community events. At all the public events, be they commemorative or 
celebratory, mostly middle aged women wore beautiful dresses cut from 
recognizably African cloths and sewn in African styles: bright, joyous 
silk cut in the Rwandan loose formal gowns called umushananas, which 
are a two piece gown that resembles the Indian sari:  
 
 
or slim-fitting floor length mermaid dresses cut 
from brightly patterned cotton, resembling West 
African fashions, kaba and slit two piece dresses:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
or the wrapper, which varies in cut, but usually 
incorporates an elaborately tied turban: 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of 
Umushanana 
Source: Anna 
Ainsworth 
Figure 2: Illustration of 
Kaba and Slit 
Source: Anna Ainsworth  
Figure 3: Illustration of 
Wrapper 
Source: Anna Ainsworth 
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I admired the beauty of these dresses as they stood out among the younger women dressed in 
contemporary Western fashions, marking a site of contested cultural codes. Attire is a political 
site as it “touches the body and faces outward toward others”, hence possessing a “dual quality” 
that Terence Turner has termed the “social skin”, which “invites us to explore both the individual 
and collective identities that the dressed body enables” (Tranberg Hansen 2013, 2). Indeed, 
Marie explained that the dresses I had observed were an articulation of Rwandan identity: a 
statement that “here I am, and I’m part of you” (Marie). This intentional message, worn in public 
spaces in the GTA, is a clear marker of pride in Rwandan identity, as these dresses are made or 
purchased in Rwanda on trips and intentionally brought back to Canada to be worn on special 
occasions, such as weddings, funerals, and other celebrations. They are also worn out of aesthetic 
pleasure as other women recognize and admire the beauty of these dresses and dress for each 
other’s appreciation. Indeed, as Marie explained, one would not wear these gowns elsewhere 
because “if I wear this dress, nobody would appreciate it, you know? Nobody recognizes it 
anyways, nobody knows it. But if I wear it to [Rwandan] church they’re going to say, ‘wow, 
beautiful dress’” as they appreciate both the attendant meanings and the pleasing shape of the 
dress.  
The Rwandan or African dress as code, visible for all, was an example of “fashion as 
political practice” as it was also a contestation of western codes of dress and meaning (Allman 
2004, 1). These women were bodily interjecting traditional African attire in the modern space of 
the GTA, thereby challenging the dichotomy of tradition/modernity, and the attendant 
assumptions that fashion is “about status, mobility, and rapid change in a Western, capitalist 
world” while those outside the West, specifically in Africa, are “‘the people without fashion’” as 
they can only be seen through the lens of ethnographic study of ethnic costumes (Allman 2004, 
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2-3). Interestingly, these dresses themselves serve as signifiers of cultural and aesthetic exchange 
within the larger African continent as the kaba and slit and wrapper dresses originated in West 
Africa and have become popularized in other regions of the continent, while the umushanana is 
now increasingly seen in Kenya and Tanzania, having crossed the border from Rwanda (Rugina 
2013). These dresses, brighter and more elaborate than their western cousins, stand out in 
Rwandan celebrations and intentionally draw the eye, in the midst of firmly modern practices of 
transnational cultural and economic exchanges. They are not remnants of a past discarded by 
modern forces, but the lively articulations of global intercultural exchanges and expressions. In 
Canada they are exotic, but, importantly, unlike the niqab or the hijab, read as largely 
unthreatening, thus an acceptable performance of one’s culture.   
Yet these dresses were also expressions of an internal political narrative as one young 
Rwandan woman, watching the parade of bright silks and cottons, scornfully remarked that they 
were “like a circus”. She was expressing both her individual dislike of attire that she hates to 
wear because it is “awkward” and uncomfortable, as well as her disdain for an older generation 
that is unwilling to submit to Western acculturation. To her, these dresses were not symbols of 
pride, but symbols of an outdated ethic and aesthetic that ought to be replaced with modern (read 
Western) fashion. Yet her comments also expose the degree to which she had appropriated the 
dichotomy of tradition/modernity and the assumption that only the West possesses and expresses 
modernity, while the so called ‘rest’ is hopelessly traditional and bound by its traditions. The 
women who wore these dresses themselves actively challenged this dichotomy because in their 
day to day lives, on the streets of the GTA, they are unlikely to wear these dresses—they are 
more likely to wear Western garb, making them largely indistinguishable from the professional 
class of women in the city. Also, as Marie pointed out, these dresses are not designed for 
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Canadian winters, so practical considerations, not a penchant for pre-modern notions, also 
determine their use. 
Publicly performing Rwandaness in Canada is an expression of the desire to be seen and 
recognized as Rwandans who belong in Canada. The majority of the participants in this study 
expressed that they had made Canada home and that they felt that they belonged in the new 
homeland. These statements were often accompanied with a critical evaluation of racialization 
and marginalization in the new homeland, yet, a homeland it was. However, those who identified 
as Rwandans in the GTA, while still acknowledging the moments of exclusion, were adamant 
about their place in the new homeland and expressed this both in the interviews and in their 
private and public practices. As one participant expressed, having experienced extreme 
discrimination and exclusion in the remembered homeland, Rwanda, those who have settled in 
the GTA are more tolerant of what they perceive to be lesser forms of exclusion. Having been 
denied a home for so long, the chance to feel at home, even contingently, becomes even more 
important for individual and collective well-being. Thus, those who identify as Rwandans have 
staked their claim to belonging and have done so proudly and defiantly; they will not be denied a 
home again, even as they are marginalized and their access to full citizenship is restricted and 
contingent.   
The sense of belonging described in this chapter is, in many ways, the key paradox of this 
study. The racialization and exclusion that marked the day to day existence of those who identify 
as Rwandan in the GTA suggests that belonging is not a possibility; yet, as this study has 
demonstrated, the memory of extreme violence generated a desire for the imagined homeland, 
even as it compelled those who had settled in the GTA to forge homes. Thus those who claimed 
belonging in this group simultaneously sought belonging in the homeland by becoming part of 
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the larger diaspora, and sought belonging by setting down roots in their new homes in the GTA. 
Thus, to be become a diaspora is to be caught at the interstices of a state power that expels on 
one end and absorbs on the other. However, even as such powerful forces as states act on 
individuals, those discussed in this study created their own sense of home and belonging, by 
living both here and there, and by living in both the time of violence and the present.  
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Chapter Eight  
Conclusion  
Rwandans who identified as Rwandan and live outside of Rwanda have been studied 
primarily as a means to better understand domestic politics in Rwanda (Mamdani 2001; 
Reyntjens 2004; Prunier 2009), and not as people worthy of analysis because of the significance 
of own particular lives and experiences. Those who have focused on Rwandans in the Canadian 
diaspora explicitly have done so to collect their memories of violence (Montreal Holocaust 
Memorial Centre 2014; Montreal Life Stories 2015), but no study has looked at these individuals 
as an emergent community, embroiled in internal and external contestations about what it means 
to be part of a diaspora, to be Canadian, and to be Rwandan (or not Rwandan). The present study 
has sought to turn the analytical lens onto Rwandans who live in the GTA in order to understand 
how they became a diaspora, that is, people who understand themselves as belonging to a group 
that has a shared imagined place of origin, resides away from the homeland and sustains close 
ties with the homeland, even as they came to feel at home in Canada. It offers a glimpse into the 
multiple discourses that those who identify as Rwandan face in their day to day lives and how 
they individually and collectively contest narratives of what it means to be Rwandan and 
Canadian. In conducting this study, I sought to listen, carefully and analytically, to a group of 
people who have only been heard as victims or perpetrators of unthinkable violence, in order to 
hear how, carrying the burdens of memory, they have built lives beyond the violence. Those 
lives, experienced in both Canada/Rwanda and in the dual time of violence/present, embody the 
dialectical relationship between belonging and non-belonging that constitutes a diaspora.  
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Summary of Findings 
This study offered an analysis of how ethnicity, nation, race, and diaspora are constructed 
among members of the Rwandan diaspora in the GTA and to challenge the assumption, present 
in much of the literature on diasporas, that a diaspora is created by movement away from a 
putative homeland. Indeed, as Axel has argued (2001), I proposed that a diaspora is an entity that 
is actively called into being and constructed. The modern history of hyper-real violence that is 
remembered and retold among those who identified as Rwandans in the GTA had become 
instrumental in the construction of a collective identity and the impetus for belonging in Canada, 
even as the ways the violence was narrated and remembered became one of the central fractures 
in the community. Following Alexander (2004), I proposed that violence becomes meaningful as 
a contingent event constituted as ethnic or national not in the moment it occurs, as Brubaker 
seems to imply, but when it is recalled and inscribed as meaningful. The practice of 
remembering the violence as ethnic/national, and commemorating it as such, constitutes the 
meaning of the event as ethnic/national. The remembered violence becomes constitutive of the 
new ethno-national entity because, in recalling and retelling the violence, collectively created 
shared understandings of the trauma are generated, which then had the effect of breaking the pre-
existing social order. The imagined community that existed before was dissolved, and in its place 
a new imagined community was constructed. The new Rwandan state then utilized its High 
Commission in Ottawa to call into being a diaspora based on principles laid out in a new 
constitution for the diaspora; through Presidential visits, exchange programs and online 
connections, it sustained this construct among those who lived in the GTA. Yet, even as the 
Rwandan state framed this group as desirable largely for remittances, it framed segments as 
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dangerous, especially when they raised concerns about the state’s legitimacy and its violent 
actions within Rwanda and beyond. Thus, individuals were caught between the desire for the 
state and a repulsion towards it.  As the Rwandan state reached out to the newly forming 
diaspora, the Canadian state offered an ambivalent welcome as Rwandans were racialized and 
othered by the policies and discourses of multiculturalism. Even as the Canadian state professed 
cultural and ethnic inclusion as one its central myths, it explicitly framed new migrants and 
potentially dangerous and in need of management.    
I set out to explore through this case study Rogers Brubaker’s assertion that race, 
ethnicity, and nation are ways of seeing, rather than ways of being. These perspectives on the 
world, rather than things in the world, shape how individuals interpret their world and how they 
are interpreted and slotted into pre-determined classifications (Brubaker 2006, 17). To be seen as 
black, as Rwandans in Canada are, is to be read through the racist lens of the potentially criminal 
black male body and the oversexualized black female body; it is to be subject to scrutiny and 
hyper-visibility, while simultaneously neglected and ignored. Ethnicity, in this study, refers 
largely to the ethnic labels of Hutu and Tutsi which, as nearly all participants insisted, no longer 
existed. Yet, as I also heard, most categorized their social worlds according to these labels. 
Fundamentally, it meant that to be Tutsi, as most in the study were, was to be perceived as a 
perpetual potential victim and thus granted moral and social capital, and to be Hutu was to be 
seen as a perpetual potential perpetrator and to be subject to discipline and silencing, especially 
about the violence that has been enacted against Hutus. To see the world through nation was to 
echo the Rwandan state’s mythico-history of the genocide and to actively participate in the 
nation-building projects carried out in the GTA as part of a national and patriotic duty. It meant 
accepting the new national cosmology and, significantly, publicly enforcing it.  
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In investigating how ideas about one’s place in the world are constructed, I sought to 
highlight the agency of those who are framed and constructed—or understand themselves—as 
Rwandans and to demonstrate how each individual participant in the study negotiated and 
navigated the discourses that she encountered. Thus, I have proposed that the violence of the 
genocide is constitutive of the very notion of Rwandaness and that in thinking themselves as 
Rwandans, or Hutus or Tutsis, the participants of the study invoked memories of the time of 
violence to make sense of their present. It was impossible to understand oneself as Rwandan 
without recalling the genocide. Non-Rwandans also imposed a reading of Rwandaness as the 
product of violence as the genocide is the only thing that other Canadians know about this small 
East African state. Thus, the violence is recalled both within the community and without and 
overdetermines the identity. To understand oneself as Rwandan in the GTA was to 
simultaneously exist in the time of violence and in the present and the toll of this dual 
temporality was expressed in the trauma that lingered among the community.   
Yet, even though the trauma remained and marked individual lives, people of Rwandan 
descent nonetheless connected to one another and shared conceptions of themselves as a 
community. Whenever this group gathered as Rwandans, there was an active expression of and 
engagement with the very category of Rwandan particularly because the inherited national 
cosmology, generated by the new Rwandan state, was re-written and re-narrated through this 
engagement. Individuals challenged, contested, and engaged the narratives that had been passed 
from the top down as they negotiated the “thresholds of meaning” and engaged in the process of 
cultural production (Bhabha 1990, 4). In these moments the “practical categories, situated 
actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, 
institutional forms, political projects and contingent events” (Brubaker 2006, 11) that make up 
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the idea of nation, ethnicity, and race, were in play and generated the appearance of these 
categories as things in the world. Yet, even as these were (re)enacted, those who identified as 
Rwandans engaged in, to borrow from Brubaker, a “‘micropolitics’ of categories, [through] the 
ways in which they categorize[d], appropriate[d], internalize[d], subvert[ed], evade[d], or 
transform[ed] the categories that [were] imposed upon them” (2006, 13).  
The community dates back to the late 1980s when the first migrants of Rwandan origin 
settled in the GTA, though the condition of exile from the homeland for many dates as far back 
as 1959. These well-educated young men, hailing largely from Uganda, formed social bonds 
based on their shared language and experience of exile. However, this nascent community did 
not perceive itself as a diaspora until after 2007. As such, it was nearly fifty years after the first 
migratory wave left modern Rwanda that those study participants who identified as Rwandans 
living outside of Rwanda came to see themselves as belonging to a larger collective, namely, a 
diaspora. Individual communities, specifically those in the GTA, had understood themselves to 
share a cultural and linguistic affinity when they connected with one another, but it was only 
when the new Rwandan regime implemented an organized and centralized process of naming 
them and gathering the disparate communities under one umbrella organization that they came to 
see themselves as being part of a diaspora. This process of coming to see themselves as a 
diaspora was not an organic, natural outcome of migration, but the product primarily of a state 
campaign to generate a diaspora in order to attain more remittances and to draw back the 
expertise among those who had left.  
Even as the Rwandan state-sanctioned RDGN created a perception of unity, individuals 
choose to connect to the organization based on friendships and long-standing interpersonal 
relationships, rather than an ethno-national affinity. The organization hosted events, chief among 
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them the genocide commemorations, which served as moments of nation-building and were 
examples of what Brubaker has termed “contingent events” when groupness, or the appearance 
of cohesion occurred (2006, 11). As the dead of 1994 were invoked by the state and its branches 
among the diaspora to create a national narrative and new cosmology (Anderson 2006), 
absenteeism was one measure of quietly resisting the appropriation of the violence and the 
silencing of alternate narratives. Thus, in resisting the framing of Tutsis as perpetual and eternal 
victims and Hutus as perpetual and eternal perpetrators, individuals engaged in what James C. 
Scott has named “infrapolitics”, or the “the struggle waged daily, by subordinate groups,” yet is 
“beyond the visible end of the spectrum” (1990, 183). These performances of unity also served 
to silence those whose trauma did not fit the cosmology that had emerged out of the new 
Rwandan state. Those who had lost family and friends to the RPF forces, especially after the 
genocide was ended, could not tell their story and their memories and trauma were silenced.  
Groupness was also evident in the formation of CARY, the Rwandan youth organization 
Toronto branch. While the inaugural gala and events hosted by CARY offered a façade of 
unified Rwandaness, young people had not connected as Rwandans until the High Commission 
had organized camps for youth designed to teach them their identity. These camps resulted in the 
formation of youth organizations in a number of Canadian cities. The young people whom I 
interviewed had not connected on their own in any significant way before the state mechanism 
explicitly formed a connection between them and thus generated the new expression of identity 
among Rwandan youth.  
 A more evident contestation of centralized state-generated ethno-national identity was the 
continuing division between those who identified as Tutsi and those who identified as Hutu. The 
current government adamantly argued for a ‘Rwandan’ identity and denied the existence of the 
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ethnic Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa identities, even as Tutsi were socially, economically, and politically 
privileged in the new Rwanda (Mamdani 2001; Reyntjens 2004; Prunier 2009). The state’s 
phrase that “we are all Rwandans” was echoed among those in the community in the GTA. Yet, 
despite this repetition of official rhetoric, participants explained the many ways in which these 
identities continued to infuse day to day life. Indeed, some participants refused to use the phrase 
because they perceived it to conceal the ethnicization of the Rwandan state. Others explained 
that in the GTA community it was easier to tell who was a Hutu and who was a Tutsi than in 
Rwanda because of the small size of the community. Even youth who did not have a lived 
memory of life in Rwanda were taught by their parents to utilize an imagined physiological 
taxonomy to identify Hutus or Tutsis. Thus, new arrivals to the community were rapidly defined 
and framed as one or the other and, if they wished to remain part of the community, had to 
contend with the consequences of this definition. These ostensible differences dictated silences at 
social gatherings as any mention of contemporary politics and the history of the genocide were 
intentionally reserved for moments when one was among one’s own kind. Both putative groups 
expressed anxiety about interacting with the other as, unbidden, memories arose and inherited 
cosmologies redefined social situations. Indeed, some Tutsi community members took it upon 
themselves to police the boundaries and to call out those whom they perceived to be trying to 
hide their Hutu identity. Thus, those who identified as Hutus faced surveillance and policing if 
they chose to interact with the community.  
Another fissure in the narrative of unity was the experience of gendered narratives of 
nation and ethnicity. Migration had exposed men and women to new ideas about gender and a 
new legal and institutional regime which facilitated women’s greater autonomy, resulting in the 
breakdown of many marriages in the community. This echoed what Manuh (1998) and Creese 
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(2011) found among other African diaspora communities. This marital discord, a product of 
contested gendered norms, was often understood as a failure to preform Rwandan 
culture/ethnicity properly. Young, unmarried women were also subject to scrutiny and 
surveillance to ensure that they embodied the national/ethnic behavioural codes emphasizing 
modesty, respectability, reserve, and appropriately moral behaviours. As Burnet found in 
Rwanda, so too in Canada, women who transgressed these social codes faced ostracization and a 
challenge to their identity as Rwandan women (Burnet 2012). To avoid this fundamental 
challenge of their identity and place in the world, Rwandan women in the diaspora had found 
ways of navigating the terrain of what constituted a “good woman”, while also finding ways to 
define themselves and live their lives according to their own strictures and needs.  
As much as members of the community were subject to internal narratives of meaning, so 
too were they subject to Canadian-state driven discourses about who belongs in the imagined 
nation that is Canada. Under the policy/discourse of multiculturalism, Rwandans found the 
language of inclusion, yet, too often, encountered racialization and marginalization in what 
Philomena Essed has termed everyday racism (1991). While Will Kymlicka understands this 
exclusion as failures of multiculturalism, following Sara Ahmed (2007), I proposed that the 
marginalization that people of colour encounter in multicultural Canada is not an anomaly, but a 
constitutive aspect of a discourse that posits them as bearers of a sometimes unbearable 
difference. Their cultures are interpreted as transhistorical and fundamentally anti-modern and 
framed as antithetical to the progressive state that is ostensibly welcoming them.  
Those who participated in this study expressed this very dynamic as central to their day 
to day lived experience. Yet, they also insisted on their place in the nation and on their 
belonging. Many expressed “love” for Canada. In doing so, they were expressing a deeply rooted 
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affective tie, as well as performing their prescribed role as the perpetual outsiders who must 
continually prove their worth. Indeed, this struggle, waged daily, took a toll on individuals’ well-
being. Many expressed that they had suffered from depression and anxiety, and that distance 
from their families further exacerbated their emotional decline. Too many faced the lesser value 
placed by Canadian state discourses and policies on people who attempted to migrate in the 
family class, as Peter S. Li has demonstrated (2003). Further, those who wished to have family 
visit again faced the racist immigration system (Tettey and Puplampu 2005), and were subjected 
to increased scrutiny because they were racialized as African.  
In understanding multiculturalism, the participants expressed a nuanced understanding of 
this discourse, while filling it with their own hopes and expectations for belonging. Their 
experiences exposed the degree to which multiculturalism excluded whiteness as whiteness was 
perceived to be the norm against which people of colour were marked. Those who identified as 
Rwandans in the GTA were routinely subjected to racialization and reminded of their difference 
marked in their habits, beliefs, practices, accents, and place of origin, as Agnew has observed 
with other people of colour (2005; 2007; 2009). To be racialized as black in the GTA was to be 
read as criminal, immoral, vulgar, loud, and visible. Rwandan men were subjected to covert, 
nervous glances, followed in stores by security, stopped excessively by police officers, and 
undermined daily in their workplaces. Young men, perceived as black youth, were subjected to 
police surveillance and attention and generally presumed to be dangerous, especially in groups. 
Women were less likely to be assumed to be criminals, but were subject to sexualisation, 
surveillance, oversight, and disregard. They were routinely neglected in classrooms and 
workplaces, even as their performance of their sexuality was observed and commented upon.  
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 The racialization that nearly all participants described forced them to develop coping 
mechanisms. Thus, when individuals were called by the dehumanizing epithet “nigger”, they 
explained its use as originating in ignorance, rather than attributing it to a systematic, 
institutionally inscribed practice. Others trained their sons especially to be passive and 
exceedingly polite in the face of police harassment in order to pass unseen. Others spoke of not 
“blacking” themselves and thus avoiding the negative repercussions of being seen as black. Yet, 
all these defense mechanisms had the effect of internalizing the racism by individualizing it. 
Thus, when a young man was subjected to harassment and violence, he could only blame himself 
for “blacking” himself, rather than being able to point to a system of institutionalized racism.  
 Racialization contributed to labour market segregation, often forcing people of colour 
into low-wage insecure jobs. Due to the linguistic capital of speaking one or both of the official 
languages, many in the community were able to find employment relatively shortly after arrival, 
but few found employment commensurate with their previous education and credentials, echoing 
the findings of  Li (2003), Laryea and Hayfron (2005), and Creese (2011). Many resorted to 
survival work, and those who chose to return to school faced the additional burden of accruing 
debt and delaying their earning capacity. Yet, even Canadian educational credentials did not 
ensure full-time employment. Many participants recounted how they were disciplined for their 
non-regional accents on the job, or outright denied work based on the assumptions made about 
their accents. As Creese has argued, a “‘refusal to hear’ non-standard accents” is another form of 
daily domination which denies upward mobility and erases linguistic capital (2011). Thus, 
racialization had the material effect of denying this community upward mobility and full 
citizenship rights in their new homes.  
285 
 
 Many in the study chose to turn to transnational engagements with the remembered 
homeland to satisfy their need for belonging and acceptance. Nearly all engaged in the routine 
transnationalism of connecting with family and friends in Rwanda, others also had developed 
non-governmental aid organizations that were active in Rwanda, and many participated in events 
organized and run by the Rwandan state. Perhaps the most salient feature of transnationalism in 
this community was the degree to which it took place in the virtual world of the internet and 
generated a new notion of nationhood whereby the nation-state did not have a monopoly on 
classification and identification.  
 Yet, transnational engagements with family and friends “back home” did not always 
work to strengthen ties and connect people in geographically disparate locations. At times, this 
very transnationalism created expectations that the now Western migrant was affluent and able to 
help those back home, while he carried the additional burden of being reminded of his economic 
marginality in the new homeland. Others expressed that their survivor’s guilt prevented them 
from enjoying the interactions. Likewise, the development of NGOs designed to meet the 
developmental needs of Rwandans in the homeland was also tied up in notions of guilt and the 
survivor’s desire to mitigate her own trauma and pain by becoming an active agent.  
  Meanwhile, the Rwandan state attempted to dominate the transnational engagement of 
Rwandans in the diaspora through centrally organized networks and by hosting regular Rwanda 
Days whereby the President traveled to major urban centres in North America and Europe to 
encourage return and investment in Rwanda. Yet, even as it sought to attract the capital and skills 
of its diaspora, the state actively framed portions of it as undesirable and threatening to its own 
fantasies. Those who are thus framed were violently excluded from participating in the edifice of 
state-organized transnationalism and actively harassed.  Indeed, the Rwandan regime stood 
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accused of orchestrating the murder of so called “dissidents” among the diaspora. Thus, it framed 
the diaspora as both desirable for the remittances and skills it could bring as well as threatening 
to its legitimacy and longevity, and this central dynamic of desire/threat formed the basis of the 
state’s relationship with its diaspora.  
Even as those who identified as Rwandans in the GTA remembered the violence that 
constituted the very category of Rwanda and were subjected to the discourses of nation, 
ethnicity, and race by the Rwandan and Canadian states, they navigated, negotiated, and daily 
interpreted these forces to build their homes and new lives. Indeed, very many in the study were 
emphatic that they had found a new home in the GTA and expressed their sense of belonging in 
their new homeland. They understood themselves as active citizens and consumers, thereby 
staking their claim to their neighbourhoods and communities, and making rich lives for 
themselves and their children. 
 
 
Limitations of the Study 
This study set out to demonstrate how nation, ethnicity, and race are ways of seeing 
among those who identify as Rwandans in the diaspora, by tracing the processes by which these 
ideas are generated, transmitted, and sustained, while observing how these same ideas are 
challenged and questioned. Centrally, it also sought to assert that those who define themselves as 
Rwandans in the GTA are agents in their own identification. However, by focusing on one 
relatively small community and utilizing formal interviews with only 31 members of this 
community, it is a very limited study. While the research was based on participant observation in 
community events as well, its findings are only a partial snapshot of the political, social and 
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psychological dynamics at play. The 31 interviews, while in depth, nonetheless were limited in 
number and future researchers would benefit from speaking to a greater number of individuals in 
order to attain an even more representative sample and fuller picture. Further, as was discussed 
in the introduction to this study, perhaps the greatest limitation is the fact that I was only able to 
interview two individuals who openly identified as Hutus, as the rest of the interviewees either 
chose not to identify themselves or identified as Tutsis. The fact that the GTA is a largely 
English-speaking community means that the majority of those who have settled here have come 
from English-speaking regions like Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. Thus the community is, in 
fact, majority Tutsi. However, there are many who would identify as Hutus, but whom I was not 
able to meet, or, if we met, they were not open to being interviewed, and thus their perspectives 
are not fully incorporated into the study.  
Further, by virtue of relying on participants’ self-identification as Rwandan, this study 
did not consider the perceptions of those who have chosen to no longer identify with this ethno-
national identity. There are a substantial number of individuals in the GTA who choose not to 
interact with the community and who choose not to identify as Rwandans. Their perspectives 
would have been a welcome addition to this study and may have worked as a corrective to 
moments when I may have unintentionally reified these identities. Yet, to locate them would be a 
challenge as they have intentionally disassociated themselves from community events and other 
moments of groupness, which were my routes to finding interview subjects. Despite these 
limitations, the findings of my study are significant, but must be regarded as tentative and will, 
hopefully, spark further research.  
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Contributions and Wider Implications  
This study explicitly contributes to the literature on nationalisms, violence and memory, 
diasporas, and multiculturalism. The original contributions of this study are the following 
theoretical claims: firstly, building on similar claims made by Jennie Burnet in relation to the 
new state in Rwanda (2012), I proposed that the new (Rwandan) nation  and the new diaspora 
has been built upon the mythico-history that all Tutsis are perpetual victims and all Hutus are 
real or potential perpetrators. I argued that this nation-building ideology was very evident among 
the diaspora community in the GTA as the Rwandan state enforced a singular reading of recent 
history which erased the memories and trauma of one segment of the community and granted 
moral and social privilege to the other. Secondly, another key theoretical contribution has been to 
build on Rogers Brubaker’s notion that nation is a contingent event (1994; 2006), by proposing 
that it is not the event itself that contributes to the idea of the nation, but how the event is 
remembered, recalled and retold. Thus I proposed that violence becomes ethnically or nationally 
significant and meaningful by how it is remembered and by what meanings are attributed to it. 
Thus, I argued, the Rwandan diaspora was created upon the foundation of the new mythico-
history which offered a centralized account and memory of the terrible violence of the genocide. 
The process of creating and sustaining a memory of the violence becomes imperative to 
sustaining the concept of the diaspora. Finally, the third original theoretical contribution of this 
study has been to propose that becoming a diaspora and feeling at home in the new homeland 
can occur simultaneously, which counters the assumption of much scholarship on diasporas that 
becoming a diaspora is produced by alienation from the new nation (Clifford 1995; Bannerji 
1997; Ahmed 1999; Scheffer 2003; Agnew 2007; Ricoeur 2010). Thus, to understand oneself as 
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part of a diaspora does not inherently mean that one does not perceive oneself as belonging in the 
new homeland.  
Perhaps the more significant contributions of this study are empirical, due to it being the 
first study of the Rwandan diaspora and of how Rwandans living outside Rwandan came to 
understand themselves as belonging to a Rwandan diaspora community. As I have indicated 
above, Rwandans in the diaspora have been studied in an effort to understand the horror of 
genocide and its consequences, but they have not been studied as a diasporic group. This study is 
the first (the only other study I am aware of is an MA thesis by Wendy Owen in 2010 at the 
University of Michigan) to investigate the questions of nation, ethnicity, race, and diaspora by 
looking at this particular group. Thus, this study makes a significant contribution to filling a 
major gap in the literature about the Rwandan diaspora. Another empirical contribution of this 
study is to add to the growing body of literature about African migrants in Canada (Manuh 1998; 
Elabor-Idemudia, 2001; Abdi, 2005; Tettey and Puplampu 2005, Okeke-Ihejirikak, Spitzer, 
2005; Owen 2010; Creese 2011; Naji 2012; Montreal Holocaust Centre 2014). In particular, this 
study offers a glimpse of this migrant group in the GTA, and the processes of community 
formation therein. This study follows in the footsteps of those cited in focusing on the 
perspectives of African migrants, a relatively new experience within the Canadian nation, and on 
the racialization that they experience, which differs in some respects from other groups that are 
racialized as black in Canada. Canadian multiculturalism, while ostensibly creating a space of 
inclusion, serves to frame and define migrants as dangerous and potentially “radical” others who 
must learn to adapt to the liberal and tolerant values of Canada. Even though, in the 
contemporary moment African migrants are framed as less threatening than migrants from South 
Asia and the Middle East, and Muslims in particular, they are still subject to routine exclusions 
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in their interactions with state institutions. The exclusion and marginalization that Rwandans in 
the GTA experienced strengthened their desire for a connection with the homeland and created 
the conditions whereby a diaspora could be created. Thus, in the case of Rwandans in the GTA, 
the creation of a diaspora needed both a state or state-like institution which generated a mythico-
history and a new nationalism, as well as a host state that denied full citizenship and belonging. 
These states, acting on a disparate group of people who may have shared little in common, 
created, on one hand, a need and desire for belonging, and on the other, a promise of belonging 
in the construct of a diaspora. Thus, out of this dialectical relationship the diaspora emerged.  
Another significant empirical finding is that even as individuals connected to one 
another, they did not come to see themselves as a diaspora until the Rwandan state called the 
diaspora into being in 2007. Prior to this, there was a loosely connected community of 
individuals who identified as Rwandans in the GTA, but their connections to one another were 
based on inter-personal ties, not on a collective identity generated by movement away from the 
homeland. The anxiety and fear of a repetition of violence, fostered and fed by the Rwandan 
state’s narratives, led individuals to perceive the state as necessary for their own protection. 
Thus, the needs of those who identified as Rwandans in the GTA met the Rwandan state’s desire 
for remittances and they were willing to become participants in the creation of the diaspora. 
Nonetheless, they did not mutely accept the state’s definitions and conditions; rather, many 
contested and re-interpreted the categories that were imposed upon them. Hence, this study 
points to the very specific ways in which states constitute a diaspora, and offers a case study that 
counters the assumption that movement away from the homeland in and of itself generates a 
diaspora, following Brian Axel’s critique of the place of origin thesis (2001). However, the 
present study also points to the need to examine specific cases of diaspora formation attentive to 
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the differences as well as the similarities between them, such as the presence or absence of a 
"home" state and the role of such states in diaspora-making in particular contexts. 
This study also contributes to the existing literature on memories of violence, especially 
the memory of the Holocaust. Specifically, this study builds on Idith Zertal’s assertion that the 
horrific violence of the Holocaust and the existence and experiences of the survivors themselves 
were erased from public discourse in the first period of the new Israeli state (1998). I have 
offered another case study of a post-genocide state which has appropriated the violence of 
genocide as its foundational myth, while also denying and silencing survivors. While two case 
studies do not form a rule, it is noteworthy that dynamics so similar to those observed by Zertal 
occurred as part of the nation-building efforts of the Rwandan state. This parallel suggests the 
need to consider an accounting of horror and genuine care for survivors as unlikely, if not 
impossible, within the institutional processes of the state alone. When an event like a genocide is 
reframed as a mythico-history and forms the cosmology of a new nation through the institutional 
discourses, categories, rituals, and norms of the state, it, perhaps, must be misremembered, at 
least within the first generation. Perhaps, truly confronting horror and building a new nation are 
incompatible projects. For to glance into the abyss of genocide is to envision a world where there 
is no connection, and no hope for the future. It is to face the annihilation of human bonds.  
The interdisciplinary approach, blending sociology, anthropology, political science and 
institutional studies as well as borrowing from psychoanalytical concepts is another contribution 
to the field of diaspora and nationalism studies. In utilizing a broad range of concepts from many 
fields, I was able to observe phenomena that would be invisible with a singular lens, such as the 
consequence of individual trauma on interpersonal relationships, as well as the effects that this 
has on the ability of elites to generate consensus around the mythico-history and the attribution 
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of collective guilt. Nonetheless, this sizeable toolkit also enforced intellectual rigour and 
discipline as it forced me to always bear in mind state structures, for instance, even as I observed 
and thought through the actions and words of individuals. Thus this multidisciplinary approach 
serves to enrich the study of diasporas and nations by keeping the state in, but also bringing in 
culture, language, emotions and ideas—all equally constitutive of reality.  
This study also suggests that one of the most fruitful methods of studying nationalism is 
through in-depth interviews and participant observation to enable us to observe the micro 
dynamics of identity construction. Macro studies do offer very useful data sets, but are ill 
devised to observe the deep, multi-layered sediment of identity. For instance, a focus on the 
micro dynamics has allowed me to observe absenteeism at official commemorations which very 
subtly challenges the state’s mythico-history and appropriation of memory. Had I not been 
attuned to the quieter details, I would have been led to conclude that the mythico-history has 
been unquestioningly accepted by the diaspora. Likewise, the focus on the micro allowed me to 
understand that before 2007 there was no such thing as a diaspora in the GTA, even though 
people of Rwandan origin were connected to one another and to the state in Rwanda. Only in 
listening to individual accounts was I able to ferret out that people had been connected through 
various interpersonal ties, but not as an ethno-national group. The focus on smaller, daily 
experiences rather than the larger, louder, enactments of nation allowed me to observe when 
groupness did not occur, and, thus, to conclude, that it is indeed, as Brubaker proposes, 
intermittent, contingent and unstable (2006).  
Thinking through the consequences of the hyper-real violence of the Rwandan genocide 
had to involve digging beneath the statements of state representatives and community leaders (or 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs) about reconciliation, and listening and observing those who live 
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with the burden of that history.  Further, to understand how state discourses and policies affect 
individuals, it is not enough to merely observe the policy.  We must also seek out an 
understanding of how those whom the policy targets interpret, analyse, engage or evade the 
policy directives. For instance, in this study I observed that Rwandans in the GTA were well 
aware of the discourse of multiculturalism, but nonetheless appropriated its language to create 
spaces of belonging and to position themselves as experts whom the rest of us need to hear.  
Finally, this study offers some methodological insight into how to listen to survivors of 
violence and how to offer them spaces where they can begin the long and difficult process of 
healing. The Rwandan diaspora in the GTA is unique in its internal dynamics and mythico-
history of nation, ethnicity, and race. Yet, it is also very similar to other migrant groups that have 
emerged out of violent conflict. Since the Holocaust became the subject of public scrutiny, we 
have been trying to think through what it means to live with and offer welcome to those who 
have been marred by unthinkable and unimaginable violence. Too often it has been easier to turn 
away, to allow the survivors to live out their lives within the private hells that their memories 
evoke. If we are to imagine a truly democratic and pluralistic society, we must find ways to hear 
and see survivors. That meant respecting if someone wished not to speak of the violence, and 
listening to those who did wish to speak, even if it had little to do with the question I had posed. 
That meant observing the non-verbal cues, waiting out silences patiently, and sharing the 
memory as best I could by attending the annual genocide commemorations, as I have now done 
for the last 3 years and intend to continue to do. It meant not contesting the narratives of the 
violence that I heard, even if they echoed exclusionary narratives, and seeking to understand 
what might motivate someone to think in those terms. Among the many things we must learn 
from survivors is the horrific cost of violence. The hardest part of conducting this research has 
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been the necessity of listening carefully to narratives of horrific violence, which is extremely 
difficult. However, if we are unable to listen and hear, we cannot hope to understand or to share 
a community with those who have difficult stories to tell.  
There were also other moments when I could feel my whole being straining against the 
strictures of listening. Yet, I had to listen. Otherwise I would have failed in what I had set out to 
do—to hear what ethnicity, race, and nation mean to this community and how this community 
understands those constructs. There were moments when I failed to listen well and probably 
silenced my interlocutor, and that I regret. But when I forced myself to listen, I began to hear 
stories that I had not expected about simultaneous belonging and non-belonging, challenging my 
analytical framework which rested on the presumption that to be racialized in the GTA is to be 
marginalized and excluded. I learned to hear that when my participants spoke of loving Canada, 
they meant it, even as they were fully aware of being discriminated against in institutional 
settings and in interpersonal interactions.  
The only possible way to conclude is to express my deep gratitude to those who chose to 
speak, in the hopes of being heard, and who chose to share their narratives. Many of these stories 
must have been hard to tell, and the cost of telling them was borne out in broken voices and 
shaking hands. To those who chose not to speak I am also grateful as they welcomed me into 
their community, shared their time with me, fed me (oh so well), and invited me to live with 
them, if only for an evening. The welcome I received is the same welcome I would hope for 
them in the GTA. 
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Appendix A: Abbreviations and Terms 
APROSOMA (Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse): Political party created by 
 Hutu businessman Joseph Gitera in 1957 which claimed to be a class-based party, but 
 attracted only Hutu membership. 
DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) 
FAR (Force Armées Rwandaises): The national army from 1962 till 1994. 
GTA (Greater Toronto Area): encompasses Toronto, Etobicoke, Mississauga, Scarborough and 
 North York  
Interahamwe :‘Hutu Power’ youth wing of the MNRD Habyarimana political party which was  
 responsible for executing the genocide.  
MDR (Mouvement Démocratique Rwandaise): Re-invention of PARMEHUTU in 1991, 
 ethnically based and anti-Tutsi political party. 
MRND (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement) :Political party formed 
 by Habyarimana in 1974.  
MSM (Mouvement Social Muhutu): Hutu political party created by Grégoire Kayibanda in 1957.  
PARMEHUTU (Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu): new version of MSM by 1959.  
PL (Parti Libérale): Centre-right political party formed in 1991.  
PSD (Parti Social Démocrate) :Centre-left party formed in 1991, alternative to ethnic-based 
 political discourse. 
RCA (Rwandese-Canadian Association) 
RCCA (Rwandan Canadian Cultural Association) 
RDGN (Rwandan Diaspora Global Network in Toronto)  
RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army): The post 1994 military of Rwanda made of up the military 
 branch of the RPF. 
RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front): Initially a rebel movement originating in Uganda in 1987 which 
 fought a civil war with Rwandan forces from 1990-1993, signed a peace deal, then 
 invaded again when the genocide began and chased the Interahamwe out of Rwanda. It 
 subsequently formed the new regime in Rwanda by becoming the ruling political party. 
UNAR (Union Nationale Rwandaise): A Tutsi monarchist party created in 1959 that was hostile 
 to the Belgians, but wanted the largely Tutsi monarchy to retain political power. 
311 
 
UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees)   
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Appendix B: Informed Consent From 
Study Name: Performing Rwandan Identity in the Diaspora: Remembering the green hills in 
'cold' Canada 
Researcher: Anna Ainsworth, Doctoral Candidate,  
Graduate Program in Political Science, York University 
Contact: Email address: …………. 
Purpose of the research: The purpose of this research is to understand what it means to be a 
Rwandan in the diaspora. It seeks to understand how those who identify as Rwandans living in 
Toronto understand their own ethnic identity and how that is affected by both the Rwandan state 
and the Canadian state. This information will be gathered through informal interviews with 
community members, and observation of their social/civic life. It will then be presented and 
reported to the community in a meeting organized by the researcher, and at academic 
conferences and finally in a dissertation. 
What you will be asked to do in the research: You will be asked to engage in an informal 
conversation with the researcher during an interview of about 1 hour. If you are willing to do so, 
there may be a follow-up interview of an additional hour at a later date.  
Risks and discomforts: While there are no direct risks associated with the interviews and the 
research, in order to avoid any discomfort, the researcher will allow you to decide what you wish 
to speak of and will not push topics that cause you to express or exhibit discomfort. Full 
confidentiality will be maintained and all names and any identifying features will be removed 
from the final report, unless written consent is granted to use names or identifying features. 
Voluntary participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may 
choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to volunteer will not influence the 
relationship you may have with the researchers or study staff or the nature of your relationship 
with York University either now, or in the future. 
Withdrawal from the study: You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, 
if you so decide. Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, 
will not affect your relationship with the researchers, York University, or any other group 
associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from the study, all associated data 
collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible. 
Confidentiality: Confidentiality will be assured in the following way: all data collected will only 
be accessible to the researcher and the researcher will keep this data in a locked cabinet in her 
home. In the final report she will remove all names and identifying features, unless she written 
consent from you to do otherwise. Handwritten notes and audio tapes will be used. After the 
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conclusion of the study, the information will be kept in the locked location for 15 years at which 
point it will be offered to the University archives. If the archives do not wish to retain it, it will 
be destroyed. Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law. 
Questions about the research? If you have questions about the research project or about your 
role in the study, please contact the researcher, Anna Ainsworth at email address ………, or the 
supervisor Dr. Susan Henders at email ……. You may also direct any questions to the graduate 
program office in Political Science at phone number:  ………….  
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-
Committee, York University’s Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the 
Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines. If you have any questions about this process, 
or about your rights as a participant in the study, your may contact the Senior Manager and 
Policy Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research Tower, York 
University,  
Legal rights and signatures: 
I, _______________________________________________________, consent to participate in 
Performing Rwandan Identity in the Diaspora: Remembering the green hills in 'cold' Canada 
conducted by Anna Ainsworth. I have understood the nature of this project and wish to 
participate. I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below 
indicates my consent. 
_______________________________________________ Date:_______________________ 
Participant         
_______________________________________________ Date:_______________________ 
Principal Investigator  
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Additional Consent 
I agree to have features that could be used to identify me included in the study. Such information 
would include my age, gender, profession, time of migration, etc. It would not include my 
name or the names of any members of my family.  
 
Signature: ___________________________________Date: _____________________________ 
Participant  
 
 
I agree to have photographs taken of me included in the study. These photographs would not 
be labelled with my name or the names of my family. 
 
Signature: __________________________________  Date: _____________________________ 
Participant  
 
Signature:__________________________________  Date:_____________________________ 
Researcher  
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Appendix C: Interview Questions 
 Can you tell me about yourself? (age, occupation, etc.) 
Rwanda  
 How long ago did you leave Rwanda? 
 What led to your migration?  
 Tell me about growing up in Rwanda. 
 What do you remember about your childhood in Rwanda? 
 Do you have friends/family still there? 
 To what extent do you keep in touch with friends/family in Rwanda? How often are you 
in contact? How do you stay in touch? 
 Do you visit? 
 Do you plan to return to visit or stay? Why? 
 How do you feel about Rwanda? Why? 
 What other kinds of connections do you have to Rwanda? (property, investments, 
community ties, etc.) 
 To what extent do you feel that you belong in Rwanda? Why? 
Canada 
 Tell me about life in Canada  
 When did you arrive in Canada?  
 What influenced your choice to settle in Canada? 
 What are your impressions of life in Canada? 
 Do you have family in Canada?  
 How do you feel about Canada? Why?  
 Have you experienced discrimination in the workplace, in personal relationships, in your 
neighbourhood?  
 What are your connections to Canada? (property, investments, community ties, etc.) 
 To what extent do you feel that you belong in Canada?  
Personal/social life 
 Tell me about your social life. 
 Whom do you socialize with? In what circumstances? 
 To what extent do you interact with other people of Rwandan origin? In what 
circumstances?  
 Where do you interact with each other? 
 Do your friends have similar lifestyles to you?  
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 Do your friends of Rwandan origin feel about Rwanda the way you do? Do you discuss 
these feelings with them? 
Self-Identification 
 How do you describe yourself?  
 Do you describe yourself differently in different circumstances? Why? 
 Have you always described yourself in this way? 
 If not, what caused you to describe/define yourself differently?  
 Do you consider yourself to be part of a community of Rwandans in Canada? What 
caused you to think of yourself that way?  
 How do you define this community? 
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Appendix D:  List of Interviewees and Interviews 
 Pseudonym  Date of first 
interview 
Location of 
interview  
Number of 
interviews 
Estimated 
total length 
of 
interview(s) 
Primary 
consent 
Secondary 
consent  
1 Jean-Paul 23/05/2012 Restaurant  1 1.5 hrs.  X X 
2 Janvier 13/06/2012 Cafeteria  1 1 hr.  X  
3 Christophe 30/06/2012 Restaurant  1 1.5 hrs.  X X 
4 Marie 13/08/2012 Coffee shop 2 2 hrs.  X X 
5 Grace 25/08/2012 Church  1 1.5 hrs.  X X 
6 Jean 16/09/2012 Church  1 1 hr.  X X 
7 Seraphine 21/10/2012 Church  1 1 hr.  X X 
8 Theodore 28/10/2012 Church  1 1 hr.  X  
9 André 28/11/2012 Place of 
employment  
1 1 hr.  X  
10 Angelina 20/01/2013 Coffee shop 1 1.5 hrs.  X X 
11 Diane 10/02/2013 Church  2 2 hrs.  X X 
12 Revocata 10/03/2013 Telephone  1 1 hr. X X 
13 Theodosia 17/02/2013 Church  1 1 hr.  X  
14 Bernard 03/09/2013 Coffee shop 1 1 hr.  X  
15 Patrice 03/23/2013 Coffee shop 1 2 hrs.  X X 
16 Olivia 06/05/2013 car 2 2 hrs.  X  
17 Natalia 07/05/2013 Coffee shop 1 1.5 hrs.  X X 
18 Mathieu 19/07/2013 Coffee shop 1 1.5 hrs.  X  
19 Richard 29/06/2013 Participant’
s home 
2 5 hrs.  X X 
20 Simon 31/07/2013 Participant’
s home 
3 6 hrs.  X X 
21 Jeanne 08/07/2013 Coffee shop 1 1.5 hrs.  X X 
22 Delphine 07/09/2013 Coffee shop 2 2 hrs.  X  
23 Felicién 11/10/2013 Participant’
s home 
1 45 min.  X  
24 Fidele 17/10/2013 Restaurant  1 2 hrs.  X X 
25 Georges 07/11/2013 Coffee shop 1 1 hrs.  X X 
26 Pierre 04/08/2014 Participant’
s home 
1 3 hrs. X X 
27 Agnes 07/06/2014 Library  1 1 hrs.  X  
28 Connie 13/02/2014 Library  1 1.5hrs. X  
29 Louise 18/06/2014 Coffee shop  1 1.5 hrs. X  
30 Vincent 22/06/2014 Restaurant  1 45 min.  X  
31 Anita 03/07/2014 Coffee shop  1 1 hrs.  X  
 
 
